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All dwelling in one house are strange brothers three  
as unlike as any three brothers could be,  
yet try as you may to tell brother from brother,  
you’ll find that the trio resemble each other.   
The first isn’t there, though he’ll come beyond doubt.   
The second’s departed, so he’s not about.   
The third and the smallest is right on the spot,  
and manage without him the others could not.   
Yet the third is a factor with which to be reckoned  
because the first brother turns into the second.   
You cannot stand back and observe number three,  
for one of the others is all you will see.   
So tell me, my child, are the three of them one?   
Or are there but two?  Or could there be none?   
Just name them, and you will at once realise  
That each rules a kingdom of infinite size.   
They rule it together and are it as well.   
In that, they’re alike, so where do they dwell?   
 
(Ende, 1984: 138-139).   
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Abstract.   
 
This thesis explores understandings of time in psychotherapy, philosophy, and 
anthropology, with particular reference to time in Sigmund Freud and Selvini-
Palazzoli’s work.  From these findings I propose how a time framework has a 
bearing on psychotherapy.   
 
My ethnographic approach is through textual research, case vignettes from my 
psychotherapy practice, transcript analysis from filmed interviews, and accounts 
of experiences of time in therapy from patients’ self-reports.  I state why I have 
not given significant space to time within the discipline of physics, finding this 
area of thought has a more abstract and mathematical approach not directly 
applicable to human nature or psychotherapy.  However, I summarise some of 
Newton, Einstein, Hawking, and Barbour’s contributions, since their ideas form a 
backdrop to Western thinking about the nature of mankind and our universe, and 
thus inform the philosophical sections.   
 
The main therapeutic approaches are Freud and Palazzoli’s conceptual 
frameworks (psychodynamic and systemic) and their different emphases on time 
in healing.  This provides the reference point for the study.  Then, taking the 
Greeks (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle) and Augustine, followed by a more modern 
emphasis on phenomenology, (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, 
Camus, and Ricoeur, inter alia) the strengths and weaknesses of philosophical 
explorations of time are critically analysed in terms of psychotherapy.   
 
An interview with a Romanian family bridges philosophical and anthropological 
perspectives.  I explore the effects of conceptualising time, using qualitative 
research methods, and propose different kinds of socio-politico-historico-cultural 
time.   
 
Anthropological scholarship more directly helps think about time in 
psychotherapy.  I make detailed reference to two cultures, Balinese and Sora.  I 
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then explore the nature of ritual, which provides fertile ground for conceptualising 
time in psychotherapy.   
 
Finally, I evaluate these philosophical and anthropological contributions on time 
to psychodynamic and systemic psychotherapy, and consider implications for 
fast-changing temporal relationships in contemporary Western societies.   
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Preface.   
Although I registered for my PhD in January 2007 at the age of 61, I have been 
collecting my material on time, consciously and not so consciously, for years and 
decades before.  My psychotherapeutic practice, my publications, my teaching, 
my preoccupation with age and aging, have been deeply and explicitly temporally 
focused.  I have been saving material of all kinds ‘in preparation’ even though 
often I was not aware what I was preparing or saving for.   
 
My earliest ‘researches’ on families and time go back to when I was seven or 
eight years old as I ‘researched’ my family tree with my god-mother and heard 
stories of migration, loss, accident, and so on.  She would no doubt be proud of 
what has emerged from those early days were she still alive.  Even the asymmetry 
of that story in terms of maternal and paternal family sides latterly has become of 
particular interest, with the consequences over time of such imbalance.   
 
A relatively peripatetic childhood and adolescence, multiple schools and boarding 
school experiences, no doubt all play a part in wanting to make sense of time, and 
of time and place.  An adult life where I have lived and worked in Mali, France, 
and Zambia; settings where I have developed training programmes and much else 
on several continents and many more countries; my interest in language learning, 




22nd February 2013 
 
  




While I take full responsibility for all the work in this thesis, it would have been 
much the poorer without the knowledge and wisdom of the many people whom I 
wish to acknowledge and thank for their interest, ideas, and generosity of time.   
 
Perhaps the formal start of this venture was during a walk across The Backs in 
Cambridge, discussing the philosophy of John Stuart Mill with my daughter, 
Bethan, and reflecting how I wished I had realised my dream of doing my PhD.  
The conversation that followed resulted eventually in applying to Goldsmiths 
College.  I am also grateful to Bethan for her insightful comments as a 
philosopher for chapters 3 and 4 and the place of time in philosophical thinking.  
Dr Diane Waller as Head of Department of the erstwhile PACE had the faith to 
offer me a place, and during her time there, showed continuing interest in my 
progress.  Dr Anna Traianou taught the course on Qualitative Research Methods 
with a focus and clarity that fed my enthusiasm.  I produced a first draft of chapter 
5 as an elective assignment at the end of the course.  She generously gave me 
feedback and time to help me think how better to order my ideas.   
 
Two members of Goldsmiths provided me with invaluable challenge, support, and 
guidance, as internal examiners for my Transfer of Registration viva.  They were 
Professor Marjorie Mayo and Dr Victoria Goddard.  They challenged me to focus 
on my task in hand, and the result is a much tighter structure.  I hope I have done 
them justice.   
 
Until she left the department, Maria Dumas, Research Administrator, was a 
supportive and helpful colleague who guided me unerringly in the academic 
administrative process and more, and was instrumental in helping me feel I was 
part of an institution, when as a part-time student, it is easy to feel disconnected.   
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Throughout the whole process, there have been many colleagues and friends who 
have shown real interest in my ideas, and made me feel that the approach I was 
taking had some originality.  Among them are my long-time colleague and 
clinical supervisor Dr Christopher Dare, with whom I have had many 
conversations about Freud, psycho-analysis, psychotherapy, philosophy, and 
research, and whose wisdom deserves to show through in this thesis.   
 
Many colleagues have made it possible for me to ‘try out my ideas’ in workshops, 
seminars, and conferences.  While I cannot acknowledge their contributions to my 
thinking in detail, I wish to honour their names and their part in my story: Arve 
Rolandsen (Fauske) and early ideas about time and couples work; Dr Tamás 
Kurimay (Budapest) especially chapter 5 and our thinking on weak ties that sadly 
I did not have the time to pursue; Dr Noga Nabarro (Tel Aviv), Bernd Roedel 
(Stuttgart), Dr Ileana Radu, Marius Radu, Stefana Racorean and Mara Frentiu 
(Timisoara) all providing particular help with Romanian recent history; Dr 
Gianmarco Manfrida (Prato / Florence), Dr Iva Ursini (Milan), Valeria Pomini 
(Athens), Julia Huxter (London / Singapore), Dr Alison Macdonald (London), Dr 
Gary Robinson (Derby), and Cynthia Rogers (London) who has been a long time 
enthusiast for this project, who read an earlier draft of my thesis, and questioned 
my original placing of Freud and Palazzoli.   
 
Many students have shown more than passing interest in these ideas, and many 
have contributed through conversation their perspectives from their socio-cultural, 
ethnic backgrounds.  In particular I mention former MSc students from the 
Institute of Psychiatry who have contributed their thinking: Frank Aust, Dr 
Yuriko Morino, Luminata Henshaw, Yael Samuel, Eva Evangelopoulou, Iva 
Ruiceva, Suzanne Hutchison and Tope Demosu.  I am grateful for opportunities to 
explore my thinking on this theme in the many seminars at the Institute of 
Psychiatry that I gave over the years.   
 
Those who participated non-clinically as part of my ethnographic work have been 
generous with their time, and to my patients who contributed, often directly and 
	   14	  
knowingly, and I owe a debt of gratitude for their generosity and interest.  In 
particular I must mention ‘Jane’ whose story has become an integral and unique 
part of my thesis.  I acknowledge ‘Caitlin and Peter’, ‘Dan’, ‘Judie’, ‘Charlene’ 
‘Douglas’, ‘Jenny’, ‘Joy’ and ‘Judith’ for the case vignettes.  I trust that were they 
ever to see this thesis, and some have expressed such an interest, they would 
recognise how they became part of my story as I was a part of theirs.  Thank you.   
 
From the different non-clinical interviews I thank the Smith family (London), the 
Mocan family (Timişoara), ‘Yael and Saul’ (Tel Aviv), and Andreea and Remus 
(Timişoara), often for giving more of their time in follow-up.   
 
Zaro Weil’s enthusiasm for this project and our discussions about early chapters 
on hot afternoons at Perdiguier were a source of great encouragement.   
 
Finally, and purposely, I have left to the end, two people who have become 
central to my learning, my struggles at times to become a scholar, and their belief 
in this project.  They are my two supervisors who in their unique and different 
ways have repeatedly gone the extra mile - and then some!  They are Dr Angela 
Hobart and Christopher Hauke.  Thank you both for seeing me through with your 
rigour, wisdom, knowledge, encouragement and challenge in equal measure, 
humour, and genuine interest in these ideas, and for your unfailing patience at the 
seemingly endless repetition of my re-writes.  Wherever I now stumble it will not 
be for want of encouraging me to stay focused and to have confidence in myself.  
Thank you.   
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Word usage.   
In the interests of simplicity and readability, I have made certain decisions about 
word usage.  I use some interchangeably to avoid wooden repetition of the same 
word or phrase.  Throughout, I tend to refer to ‘psychodynamic’ approaches to 
therapy, since this covers a broader spectrum.  When referring specifically to 
Freud’s ideas, I use ‘psycho-analysis’ and psychoanalysis interchangeably.  I am 
aware that this describes theory and a model for practice.   
 
When I refer to Systemic therapy, I have in mind Palazzoli’s thinking and model, 
while I use ‘systemic’ generically for a way of thinking and other similar 
approaches in the field.  I acknowledge there is a specific difference between the 
words ‘the Unconscious’ and ‘unconscious’ in Freud’s work.   
 
I use ‘psychotherapy’ and ‘therapy’ interchangeably.  This has most to do with 
how sentences scan, and nothing to do with the debates I remember from the old 
Rugby Conferences over who could legitimately use terms such as ‘psycho-
analysis’ or ‘psycho-analytic psychotherapy’.  These are territorial disputes that 
hold no interest for me, just as they fail to do within the family and systemic 
therapy ‘debate’.   
 
I have a personal preference for ‘patient’ rather than ‘client’, so that becomes my 
preferred description of someone in therapy.  I frequently refer to ‘Western’ 
models of therapy and ways of describing the world.  This is to remind the reader 
of my orientation, and that this, even rather global attribution, is to differentiate 
other cultural (oriental) world-views.   
 
The ethnographic material comes from clinical vignettes and interviews I have 
conducted over the years in different contexts, so that rarely do I have to refer to 
the therapist in the third person.  Where I do, I have sometimes used the form 
‘s/he’ to reflect gender difference although I equally use ‘she or he’.  While 
sensitive to our different perspectives arising from gender (and ethnicity, culture, 
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religious belief), I have endeavoured to avoid cumbersome formulae that owe 
more to anxious correctness than the flow of the narrative.   
 
Finally, the following words are important in the discussion; ‘instant’, ‘now’, and 
‘moment’.  At times these could be used almost interchangeably.  However, there 
are differences.  Plato (1997) speaks of ‘the instant’ and when I use this word, I 
have in mind a period of time that occupies (almost) no time at all.  ‘Now’ is very 
much instant, and Barbour, among others, speaks of many ‘nows’, but they seem 
to occupy ‘a bit more time’, at least time enough to allow something with some 
kind of duration to occur.  The ‘moment’ is perhaps a longer ‘now’ with more 
duration, or as Husserl (1991) might say, has ‘thickness’.  One may do something 
in a ‘moment’.   
  



















Word Count, including footnotes - from the Foreword on: 98340 
I have written my thesis so that footnotes add to my central ideas, or in some 
instances provide text in the original language.  Footnotes are part of the word 
count and are primarily to add body and interest.  The thesis is not dependent on 
them for its essential argument.   
 
Word Count, excluding footnotes: 86106  
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Foreword: tempus fugit?   
 
‘My memory is like a Mexican mural in which all times are simultaneous.’ 
(Isabel Allende, quoted in: Schacter, 1996: 32)  
 
‘I need my memories.  They are my documents.’   
(Louise Bourgeois, Imagine.  BBC1, 13 November 2007) 
 
 
You are standing on the Greenwich Meridian, an arbitrary line running north-
south, at the Greenwich Observatory.  You have just synchronised your identical 
watch with your friend who is standing at Lands End, and through the marvels of 
the mobile phone network, at exactly 12.00 noon by your watches, you report to 
your friend that the sun is directly overhead.  Your friend informs you the sun is 
high in the sky but by his estimation and according to his synchronised watch it 
will not be exactly overhead until 12.05 p.m.  In a later conversation over a glass 
of wine you realise that at a synchronised clock time, the sun at its zenith in 
Greenwich is earlier than the sun at its zenith at Lands End.  If time is to be 
measured by the trajectory of the sun, it is later at Lands End than its earlier 
identical position in the sky at the same clock time.   
 
This simple scenario implies alternative aspects of time: different kinds of time, in 
the relative position of the sun in different geographical locations at something 
called ‘clock time’; ideas of simultaneity; methods of marking time and the 
‘quicksilver’ nature of time.  Certainties of time and place turn out to be relative.   
 
For as long as I can remember, I have been preoccupied by questions of time.  
Mottoes from two schools capture this: Ex spinas uvas (‘From thorns to grapes’) 
implies the passage of time, from something in the past to the future, in a 
framework of change (in time) in the symbolism of thorns transformed.  And Dum 
tempus habemus, operemur bonum (‘While we have time, let us do good’) is 
prescriptive in its ‘let us’, while ‘do’ implies ‘labour’ and ‘endeavour’, in a 
fleeting present ‘while’ within our short life-span.   
	   19	  
 
Arising from my preoccupations, I am interested personally and as a 
psychotherapist in exploring meaning in the multiple time contexts of human 
existence – in what makes us tick!  To do so, I call on philosophy and 
anthropology as my dual guides.  If early Greek philosophy tends towards 
introspection and abstraction, anthropology invites us to look outwards to grapple 
with uncertainty, change, and how to live with the seemingly messy.  To my 
knowledge, no-one has attempted to bring understandings from these disciplines 
together in the context of ‘time’ in psychodynamic and systemic psychotherapy.   
 
My re-search is ambitious.  I believe that its unique quality is the attempted 
polygamous union of psychotherapy, philosophy, and anthropology, before the 
‘altar of time’.  To help, I co-opt those competitive siblings, breadth and depth, in 
the hope of not sacrificing too much along the way.  I have sought to follow the 
route of traditional scholarship, and scholarship should be about the joy of 
exploration and excitement of learning as sufficient justification, unhindered by 
hoping to achieve any ulterior goal. 1   
 
Whatever the academic patina of this work, I am telling stories, mine and others’, 
for ‘(w)hatever form they take, stories are indeed for an eternity. … (T)hey wind 
their way through our villages and in their telling and retelling, they link the past, 
present, and future’ (Stoller, 2009:173).   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I was saddened to see the title of a seminar in Goldsmiths College, University of London, on 
‘How to market your PhD’.  I am privileged that I do not have to think of this exploration as 
something to exploit, sell, or get a return on my investment – an ROI as business people call it.   
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Introduction.   
 
“When will people see the book?” he asked eagerly when we had finished.   
“In several months, Baba” I answered.   
“You’ve told my story, my son, and I am grateful.”   
“Thank you Baba.”  I was very pleased with his praise.   
“But to tell my story,” he said, “you have to tell your story as well.  It takes two 
hands,” he said, using a well-known Songhay proverb, “to secure a friendship.”   
“Or to tell a story,” I said.   
(Stoller, 2009: 161) 
 
 
The Study.   
In what ways are time and space important in psychotherapy?  Little attention has 
been given to different kinds of time, the subjective experiences of time, and the 
rhythms generated in treatment.  This raises questions for me.  What is 
‘psychotherapeutic time’, if it exists?  In what ways is it comparable to healing 
experiences and perceptions in other socio-cultural contexts?  How far does time 
relate to different concepts of personhood?  How may that help understand time in 
a Western context?  Little emphasis has been given to the intentional use of time 
or how time is ‘played’ with in treatment.   
 
An important quality of my research rests on an ethnographic approach.  I am, in 
this respect, my own ethnographer.  This comes from my clinical psychotherapy 
practice and filmed non-therapeutic interviews.  Whereas in anthropological 
research, interest often focuses on other socio-cultural worlds, where the 
researcher remains an outsider, even if a participant observer (c.f., Barfield, 1997: 
348), my ethnography entails constantly holding in mind my direct involvement 
in the process.  Even so, this is ‘ethnography as itself a process of interpretation’ 
(ibid: 264).  What my descriptions most certainly are not, are ‘behaviourist, 
statistical, and formalist-linguistic approaches to human society’ (ibid: 263).  
Throughout my ethnography, via case vignettes, people’s stories that I tell, I am 
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concerned with others’ stories, just as (for a time at least) I become part of those 
others’ stories.  While there are many descriptions of ethnography (and 
ethnology), which change with time, I take as my working description: 
‘ethnography is the systematic description of a single contemporary culture, often 
through ethnographic fieldwork’ (ibid: 156).  My ‘contemporary culture’ is the 
culture of psychotherapy as it has evolved in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  My ‘fieldwork’, psychodynamic and systemic (Jenkins, 2006), is my 
therapeutic practice in the consulting room, often lasting years with some patients 
and briefly with others, and my teaching and working experience across three 
continents.   
 
My research considers perceptions and experiences of time in therapy.  I suggest 
that in psychodynamic and systemic approaches to psychotherapy, embedded in 
practice but not always acknowledged, time influences what is emphasised and 
thus the patient’s experience of the rhythmic patterns of change and flux, and that 
in these approaches time is somehow different.  I further suggest that in 
psychotherapy and all healing there are kinds of time that are different to the 
mundane, which have a bearing on length of treatment, length of sessions, time 
between sessions, and the qualities of experience of therapy.   
 
I explore this elusive material as a Western psychotherapist.  Its elusiveness 
invites an unorthodox approach and in this research I hope to go beyond the 
orthodoxies that often characterise psychotherapeutic description (Jenkins, 1985).  
I adapt my methodology to make it more relevant to my subject as Corbin 
suggests and, ‘(o)ne must remember that each research project is different, and 
that each person … infuses the method with some aspect of the self and of the 
project’ (Corbin, 2009: 37).  The personal element in my approach is part of its 
uniqueness.  An important aspect is to ground my findings in my 
psychotherapeutic practice and ethnographic interview material.   
 
I draw on forty years’ experience in the family and systemic therapy field for this 
research.  This began with my introduction to R.D. Laing’s ideas about working 
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directly with families (Laing, 1971a) and his explorations of the transactional 
nature of symptoms in intimate relationships.  My data is my current and recent 
clinical / non-clinical work, where I have increasingly been exploring the nature 
of time.   
 
In The Unreality of Time, McTaggart sets out to show that anything existent 
cannot ‘possess characteristics of being in time’ (McTaggart, 1927: 23). 2  
Philosophy demonstrates that what is so often taken for granted is, conceivably, 
quite otherwise.  Through philosophy and anthropology I explore preconceptions 
about time in the work of Freud and Palazzoli.  Philosophy is in many ways the 
precursor to psychology and psychotherapy.  Anthropology, by contrast, provides 
a multi-layered, socio-cultural contextual base, from which to measure the validity 
of philosophical constructs and test their relevance for psychodynamic and 
systemic psychotherapy.   
 
I look to the intellectual disciplines of Western philosophy and anthropology to 
avoid becoming self-referential and to provide alternative reference points to 
Western psychology.  My thesis is epistemological and empirical, derived from 
my philosophical and anthropological approaches, as a basis for examining direct 
experience embodied in the case studies.  Despite the different approaches 
inherent in philosophy (the world of abstraction) and anthropology (the social 
world which is observed and participated in) both are crucial reference points.  
Research into psychology (psychotherapy) in relation to philosophy and 
anthropology has a history, since ‘the divorce of philosophy and psychology is a 
relatively recent affair’ (Honderich, 2005: 265) and from some philosophical 
perspectives, once we have ‘mapped these folk conceptions [of ourselves 
embodied in language and everyday patterns of thought and actions] we turn to 
psychologists, anthropologists, and others for an explanation’ (ibid: 266).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Marinoff (2000) discusses the value of McTaggart’s views on time in therapy.  I return to this in 
chapter 4.   
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An important aspect of time is memory in its various guises.  Memory is a 
recurring theme in my three chosen disciplines, just as in fiction.  Proust’s quasi-
autobiographical account of recall, of something seemingly totally forgotten, in 
Du Coté de Chez Swann, partly captures the essence of what I will be exploring in 
my research:  
‘Suddenly, the memory returned.  This taste, it was of the little piece of 
madeleine biscuit that on Sunday mornings at Combray (because that was 
the day when I did not go out before time to go to mass), when I would go 
to greet her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie would give me after having 
dipped it in her tea or lime infusion.  The sight of the little Madeleine 
biscuit reminded me of nothing before the moment of tasting it’ (Proust, 
1954: 57.  Personal translation). 3   
 
Perhaps conscious awareness, having minds and memory, are necessary qualities 
for us to have a sense of ‘time’.  ‘They are conscious of being conscious’ (Hall, 
1989: 134).  Proust describes how the taste for him, more powerful than the sight 
of the madeleine biscuit, instantly evoked childhood memories.  At that moment 
the past becomes present, the passage of time collapses, and its subjective nature 
is apparent.  Hall suggests that Proust, similar to other writers, uses ‘time as a tool 
to pin down consciousness’ (ibid: 134). 4   
 
A tripartite structure.   
Given the complexity and sources of ideas, a linear structure of introduction, 
hypothesis, literature review, research methodology, research interviews, findings, 
and conclusion, in the more traditional approach to social science research, is not 
appropriate.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘Et tout d’un coup le souvenir m’est apparu.  Ce goût, c’était celui du petit morceau de madeleine 
que le dimanche matin à Combray (parce que ce jour-là je ne sortais pas avant l’heure de la 
messe), quand j’allais lui dire bonjour dans sa chambre, ma tante Léonie m’offrait après l’avoir 
trempé dans son infusion de thé ou de tilleul.  La vue de la petitie madeleine ne m’avait rien 
rappelé avant que je n’y eusse goûté;’ (Proust, 1954: 57).   
4 Paul Ricoeur discusses Proust’s A la Recherche du Temps Perdu from a textual perspective.  This 
passage is, he argues, much more than the event recorded.  The narrator asks how he could 
understand the experience, and suggests that ‘the question holds within it the trap of an overly 
brief reply, which would simply be that of involuntary memory’ (Ricoeur, 1985: 130-52). The 
account is more complex, and my purpose in quoting the passage is to underscore the power of 
seemingly forgotten memory that, when re-evoked, annuls the time between the chronological 
event and the moment of its recovery.   

















Figure I:1 Meeting of the three ways.    
 
I visualise the structure and evolution of the thesis more as a ‘meeting of three 
ways’ (Figure I:1), like the meeting of the three roads from Delphi, Daulis, and 
Thebes (Sophocles, 1984).  Depending on where one stands, it is ‘a place of 
divergence or convergence.  So it’s a matter of which way you happen to be 
travelling, a widening of choice, or a narrowing.  From the gods’ perspective all 
ways are the same and all roads will be travelled in the end.  It’s only a matter of 
time’ (Vickers, 2007: 29-30).   
 
A three-way meeting point can be uncertain territory, where unusual connections 
develop.  It is a place for decision.  Choosing one option precludes, at least 
temporarily, the alternative(s).  Choice means  re-ordering decisions, when the 
simultaneous gives way to the sequential, and time enters.  Such a meeting point 
is all those ways and none, like a place that is almost a non-place (Augé, 1995).   
 
Since we are living in an increasingly cross-cultural globalised society it is 
essential to understand how other cultures construct their worlds.  There are many 
ways in which (the meaning / importance of) time can lead to serious 
misunderstandings (Hall, 1989; Levine, 2006).  Personal consequences of such 
inter-cultural misunderstandings are highlighted in a story of the Hmong, a 
displaced people living as a community in America (Fadiman, 1998), and 
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emphasised by the impact of migration on refugees (Losi, 2006).  Just as this is 
significant at a macro-cultural level, similarly it is at the micro intimate level of 
Western psychotherapy.   
 
Ethical considerations:  
A unique aspect of my work is access to my clinical case material that is informed 
by a range of therapeutic models (Jenkins, 1985, 1986a, 2006, 2008).  Examples 
are taken from my current and recent clinical practice and public demonstration 
interviews.  For this I draw on: contemporaneous written notes or filmed material 
of families / couples / individuals; filmed material of non-treatment families / 
couples made in the public domain; psychotherapeutic material I have made for 
public television.  In all instances, with the exception of the Mocan family 
(chapter 5) who requested that their names be used, and public TV material, 
which meets the criteria of being ‘in the public domain’ (ESRC: 10), all 
identifying information, including names and personal background, has been 
changed or removed to ensure confidentiality.  All clinical material has been 
anonymised, and consents for teaching and research were obtained from patients 
at the appropriate time in line with the Research Ethics Framework (ESRC), and 
the Code of Ethics and Practice (AFT, 2000), having explained ‘the difference 
between research and therapy … to all concerned, [ensuring] that the therapeutic 
process and therapist-client relationship are not adversely affected by any research 
involved’ (AFT, 2000: para. 21).  Throughout, I hold in mind the ethical and 
professional issues arising from the case material to ensure that patient 
confidentiality and my professional practice are not compromised (AFT, 2000).   
 
The thesis.   
In my thesis I reflect the chronological development of ideas discussed by 
relevant scholars when it is appropriate, but I also follow themes of convergence 
or divergence where they arise, so as not to lose the overall thread.  Each of the 
three disciplines has its own tempo, and each must be presented in ways that 
respect their traditions.   In particular, I draw heavily on case vignettes.  These 
importantly are stories that reflect the lives of people in distress and in transition.  
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They are part of my ethnography, just as the author, I am also part of their 
ethnography, what Stoller says about ‘dialogical ethnographies … in which the 
presence of the ethnographer … was reflexively acknowledged’ (Stoller, 2009: 
156).  Just as the therapist often bridges different polarities in healing, so I attempt 
to bridge different disciplines and different ways of thinking, without losing what 
is unique and essential.  And while each chapter explores different aspects of my 
research question, the final discussion is reserved for chapter 9.  Thus, the broad 
remit of each chapter is as follows.   
 
The primary aim in chapter 1 is to identify the topic of my dissertation, - the 
uniqueness of exploring time in psychodynamic and systemic models of 
psychotherapy in relation to philosophy and anthropology, - and to demonstrate 
its relevance.  I quote from journalism and fiction to indicate a much wider field 
of enquiry than I can undertake. I also refer briefly to theoretical physics and time, 
to acknowledge its importance and provide a background to my research, but 
decided that this is too vast a subject to do it any justice within the length 
constraints of my thesis.   
 
Chapter 2 illustrates similarities and differences of psychodynamic and systemic 
psychotherapy using Freud and Palazzoli’s ideas about time.  Different 
phenomena of ‘no time’ as in the Unconscious, time compression in ‘the 
transference’, and the ‘time of the system’ (ts) are discussed.  This lays the 
foundation for my subsequent inquiries.   
 
In chapter 3 I examine ‘time’ from the early Greeks and St. Augustine, and 
different attempts to describe time and its ‘components’.  The significance of the 
‘instant’ or moment, the nature of ‘present’, and time as number, are analysed 
with preliminary thoughts about their relevance to change in psychotherapy.    
 
In chapter 4 I mainly explore more recent developments in philosophy, influenced 
by phenomenological and existential thinking from the twentieth century on.  
Phenomenology appears to bring description closer to events as experienced, 
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while existentialism, broadly speaking, opens up reflections on meaning in human 
existence.  Both aspects touch important elements in Western psychotherapy.  A 
common experience in therapy of being simultaneously in two places or times is 
considered through philosophical lenses.   
 
The body of chapter 5 is an ethnographic study based on an interview with a 
Romanian family.  This chapter acts as a bridge between two scholarly 
disciplines, philosophy and anthropology.  It emphasises the importance of 
history, politics, religious faith, gender, socio-cultural context; of different kinds 
of memory, transgenerational patterns (over time), and enduring belief systems.  It 
identifies varieties of time, how articulating them offers a sense of coherence, and 
differentiates kinds of memory.  It questions the place of philosophical concepts, 
and posits time’s centrality in giving sense in human life.   
 
Chapter 6 follows naturally from the Romanian family interview, to place 
Western time in a broader framework.  The importance of a socio-cultural 
perspective is vividly exemplified in the work of the anthropologists I have 
selected.  Anthropological descriptions are supported by the story of Saul and 
Yael, where I develop a socio-cultural story of time.  The ethnography provides a 
canvas for the role and place of the healer or therapist.  Memory and time are 
focused on more psychotherapeutically.   
 
Taking time in two cultures, the Balinese and the Sora, chapter 7 demonstrates 
how different cultural ‘models’ can expand Western perceptions of time.  Sora 
traditions exemplify time beyond the grave through dialogues with the dead.  This 
contrasts with much Western (Freudian) thinking about loss and time, with a 
focus from present to past.  I suggest that such socio-cultural examples expand 
how we work with time in psychotherapy.   
 
Chapter 8 examines how the structures of ritual and rites of passage fit a 
psychotherapy framework.  It draws together themes that have appeared 
throughout this thesis, such as rhythm, place of the body, time.  In particular, I 
	   28	  
explore the nature of the liminal being betwixt and between, aspects of ritual time, 
and their relevance to therapy.   
 
In chapter 9, Ending at the Beginning, I draw together the material of my research 
and return to my question.  Inevitably it is a mixture of clarity indicating where 
philosophy and anthropology add significantly to understanding time in 
psychodynamic and systemic psychotherapy models, and ambiguity from these 
scholarly contributions.   
 
My findings raise other questions for the future of psychotherapy in an 
increasingly globalised world.  The textual or visual internet is one such 
development in treatment.  Already, my use of Skype for clients and supervisees 
in the UK and overseas, possibly leading to greater demands for immediate 
change or other kinds of time-compressing / time-collapsing phenomena, are 
symptomatic of Western, highly pressured, urbanised living.  Thus, in the future, 
we may experience different kinds of immediacy of the ‘moment’ or ‘instant’, 
reflecting an acceleration of time disconnected from meaningful social contexts, 
leading to other kinds of malaise, potentially a world of increasing ‘non places’ 
(Augé, 1995).   
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Chapter 1.   
 
Setting the scene.   
 
‘The past isn’t dead and buried.  In fact it isn’t even past.’   
(William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, quoted by Barack Obama,  
18th March 2008)  
 
‘As far as we are concerned, events before the big bang can have no 
consequences, so they should not form part of a scientific model of the 
universe.  We should therefore cut them out of the model and say that time 
had a beginning at the big bang’  
(Hawking, 1990: 46).   
 
 
Introduction and aims.   
This chapter introduces the uniqueness of exploring and comparing the place of 
time in two models of psychotherapy by reference to selected philosophical and 
anthropological perspectives.  The question that informs this is:   
Do philosophical and socio-cultural descriptions of time contribute to 
understanding the different experiences of time and its emergent qualities 
in psychotherapy, with particular reference to psychodynamic 
psychotherapy (Sigmund Freud) and Milan Systemic psychotherapy (Mara 
Selvini Palazzoli), and if so, in what ways?   
 
As an overview I touch here on the main areas of my thesis, pinpoint certain 
themes, and establish the style of my ethnography, which is derived primarily 
from clinical case vignettes and non-clinical material.  The chapters that follow 
each have their specific focus in the overall context of this chapter.   
 
Psychology developed from philosophical endeavours to understand the mind and 
explain how we know that we know. Psychotherapy evolved from both 
disciplines.  Psychology has made time a subject of study:  
‘Time is one of the continuing, compelling and universal experiences of 
our lives, … All our perceptual, intellectual and emotional experiences are 
intertwined with time.  We continually feel time passing but where does it 
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come from?  We continually experience it but we cannot taste it, see it, 
smell it, hear it, or touch it. How, then, do we experience time?  What do 
we use to experience it?’ (Ornstein, 1969: 15).   
 
Ornstein conducted a number of experiments to discover how we experience time, 
although ‘(t)here is no point of departure for a scientific analysis of time 
experience’ (ibid: 17).  He wanted to understand the ‘mechanism or class of 
mechanisms which underlie time experience, particularly that of duration’ (ibid: 
19).   
 
Reference to time is often made in the professional literature as an aspect of 
therapy practice, but with little critical examination of its nature.  Little scholarly 
contribution drawing systematically on philosophy and anthropology has been 
made that takes time as the organising principle.  Systemic clinicians Boscolo and 
Bertrando (1993) are an exception. 5  Practitioners from different systemic 
approaches (de Shazer, 1985; Penn, 1985; Seikkula et al., 2003) focus on the 
future, and Tomm (1987a, b, 1988) describes different kinds of temporal circular 
questions.  Mann (1973) and Molnos (1995) address the question differently, 
describing ‘time-limited’ therapy.  Others consider time in analytic psychotherapy 
(Ellis, 2008; Fiorini and Canestri, 2009; Perelberg, 2007a, b).  Green (2002) 
explores time in psychoanalysis.  Bruner (1986) discusses our understanding of 
mind.  Stern (1998) describes the development of the self, a cumulative process 
where past gains remain while new ones are added, and he examines the meaning 
of ‘the present moment’ in clinical work and everyday life (Stern, 2004).  Cooper 
and Erickson (2006) explore the active manipulation of time distortion in 
hypnosis.  Jenkins (2007) reflects on the ‘fragmented time’ of the Alzheimer’s 
patient, or what psychoanalytically Green (2002) might describe as ‘shattered 
time’.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Times of Time (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993) focuses entirely on the place of time in 
systemic psychotherapy.  However, it is primarily a book for clinicians where the majority of 
chapters are case studies.  References to philosophical and anthropological texts are not rigorously 
systematic.   
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Structure.   
I begin with transcripts from a non-therapy family interview to indicate how a 
temporal focus changes the picture.  I link these thoughts to a clinical account, 
which sets a context for considering how two different schools of therapy 
influence and are influenced by different understandings of time.  Initial insights 
from philosophy and anthropology follow.  Finally, I acknowledge the importance 
of physics in describing time and say why this is not given a significant role in my 
research.   
 
In my Introduction I described a dual structure of convergence/divergence to my 
thesis, ‘where three ways meet’.  The following example gives substance to my 
method and introduces my ethnography.  This begins my exploration of the place 
of time in human relationships and, ultimately, in psychotherapy.   
 
Case vignette: Smith family.   
I interviewed the Smith family for a BBC TV programme 6 on families with 
adolescent children.  They are, Chris and Nina, (both aged 42), Polly (14) and 
Rebecca (12).  Chris works in personnel, and Nina is an NCT teacher.  The 
parents have been married for nineteen years.  See Figure 1:1.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Help Yourself series, BBC 1, 23 March 1992.  The length of the whole interview was 19’ 20”.   
	   32	  
 
Figure 1:1.  Smith family genogram.   
 
A time framework alters this family’s experience.  Rather than privileging gender, 
socio-cultural background, or life and work demands, a different perspective is 
achieved once time becomes an important factor.   
 
We may think about time inter- and trans-generationally (Figure 1:1).  The 
genogram structure, based on kinship charts in anthropology, was developed by 
Murray Bowen (Bowen, 1978), and later developed by other clinicians (Jenkins, 
2006; Lieberman 1979a, b, c; McGoldrick and Gerson, 1989; Paul and Paul, 
1982).  It presents historical and contemporary time simultaneously, helping 
connect current and earlier patterns. The genogram can help identify 
discontinuities due to changing transgenerational circumstances, or the impact of 
religio-socio-political-economic events.  We later consider inter- / trans-
generational time for a Romanian family after the 1989 revolution (chapter 5).   
 
The transcripts of the interview demonstrate the impact of time on intra-familial 
relationships, changing parental relationships and child-parent alliances over time, 
and the effects of the time lapse in sharing important information.  They 
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demonstrate the time of the interview, (a facet of the ‘time of the system’, 
Palazzoli et al., 1978, chapter 2), the rhythm of interaction between family 
members, and with the interviewer.  Even in a single encounter, the intersecting 
rhythms of spontaneous interpersonal connecting become apparent.  Rhythm 
introduces pattern, a construct of the mind, with varying durations of sequencing.  
These are part of micro- and macro-socio-cultural contexts of time (Hall, 1989).  I 
explore in later chapters, the varying rhythms of treatment over time.   
 
The first excerpt is the start of the interview.   
























“If one of the girls were going to have some kind of worry, of any kind, who would 
first notice it in the family?”  
 
“Well, possibly me, because I’m with them more.  I think Chris only sees them, to 
get a lot of time with them, at weekends.  So I’d be picking things up on a day-by-
day basis.”   
 
“You’d be more likely to pick up.  Do you have a sense who out of your daughters 
would be more likely to have worries about growing up, about adolescence, about 
school?”   
 
“They’ve got very different personalities.  So, in some ways I suppose, in some 
ways because Polly’s the quieter, and of course also a bit older, she’s the older one.  
Perhaps I’m more aware, I’m more tuned in to the fact that perhaps she’d have 
more worries that she’d want to talk about, …”   
 
“You’d be more tuned in to Polly because she’s the older one and quieter one?”    
 
 “Yes, but I think I’m aware of the danger that because she’s the older one, it 
doesn’t necessarily mean the younger one, who is more chatty, doesn’t have things 
she wants to say, and doesn’t have things she’s worried about.”   
 
“If you, Polly, were going to show, … let your mother know first, that you were 
worried about something, what would be a good way of letting her know you had 
something on your mind?”   
 
Nina describes why she would be more likely to notice any worries, in terms of 
the time she spends with them compared to Chris.  Her relationship is built on a 
continuous narrative day-to-day basis; Chris’ is more episodic.  While gender and 
other aspects play an important part, I am particularly interested here in how 
family members construct their time worlds.   
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Of the two children, Nina tells us that Polly would be more likely to speak; “she’s 
the older one”.  Time plays a part in terms of her age, as well as her quieter 
temperament.  Nina highlights the difference in the two children and their 
different age related concerns.   
 
The second excerpt, from the middle of the interview, introduces different 
elements, as they discuss worries and family relationships.   

























“Who would Rebecca go to?  What kinds of things would worry you? … “Would 
you (Rebecca) have a different way of telling your mother or father you were 
worried?”   
 
“Yes, I’d go to my mum.  I wouldn’t mind if Polly were there because she’s older 
and she understands, because she’s been through it as well. … So she might be 
embarrassed to speak in front of me, but I wouldn’t be embarrassed in front of 
her.”   
 
“Yes, she’s the older one in the family.  She started off as an only child, and 
you’ve always been one of two.”   
 
“Yes.”   
 
“What kinds of things might worry you, ‘cos you’re twelve?   
 
“Yes.  Well, friends and school relationships, …”   
 
“But you know, as a rule, we’re pretty close to our parents, …”   
 
“On the other hand, sometimes you’ve wanted to create a bit more distance, 
haven’t you?  Do you remember, I always used to want to walk you to the school 
bus, and you said: ‘Well, look.  It’s not really the done thing for parents to walk 
their children to the bus any more’?”   
 
Rebecca defines relationships in terms of ages – a way to mark moments in time 
and time passing – and different developmental stages.  This is about her older 
sister (who comes before her, and therefore she, Rebecca, comes ‘after’) having 
been through such difficulties.  I confirm her age (twelve) and therefore her 
‘chronos time’.  Chris introduces an interesting element about emotional distance 
defined through physical and emotional space (not walking together to the school 
bus) linked to age as developmental time of early adolescence.   
 
Excerpt 2, continued.   
Nina  “Yes, but that was interesting, because Polly spoke to me first, because she didn’t 




























want to hurt Chris, (nervous laugh) …  
 
“So she went through you?”   
 
“Yes, she spoke about it, but I’ve forgotten, it was about a year on.  It was just a 
convenient thing because they were going in the same direction, at the same time 
in the morning, and err, Polly came to me and said did I think Chris would mind.”   
 
“What do you think Polly worried about speaking to you first of all in saying 
‘Come on Dad, I’m a big girl now.  I don’t want to walk to the bus with you 
now’?”   
 
“Perhaps just uncertainty about how I would react.”   
 
“Do you have any fantasies or ideas about how she thought you might have 
reacted, that she might not have known how to handle?”   
 
“No, no.  Just a certain natural nervousness.  But then, ..”   
 
“I just wondered whether you felt that his little girl didn’t need him any more?”   
 
“That’s quite important.  You’re in the middle between being a little girl and a 
young woman, and he might feel that his, err …, days were numbered, being a 
father who looks after you in that way.  Do you think he might have felt a bit 
rejected?”   
 
“Yes, that was what I was worried about.  I didn’t want to hurt his feelings by 
saying I was growing out of you in a way.” 
 
Nina discloses for the first time that Polly had spoken to her a year before about 
how to tell Chris.  Fear of upsetting him delayed the conversation by a year.  I 
emphasise another dilemma that, with time’s passing, Chris’ role as caretaking 
parent was changing, as were her needs for him.  Nina confirms this: “I just 
wondered whether you felt that his little girl didn’t need him any more?”  This 
underlines the transformative nature of developmental changes over time.  Polly is 
no longer a little girl as Chris enters middle age.   
 
Philosophers wrestle with the question of time, and for this research it is 
important to examine whether philosophy can aid our better understanding of it in 
psychotherapy.  It may be that the philosophical language of time refers to a 
different kind of time.  As daughters, Polly and Rebecca share their present (or 
now) but Polly’s is an older (later in her life) present/now, and Rebecca’s is a 
younger (earlier in her life) present/now.  Polly’s present fourteen is Rebecca’s 
present twelve.  Polly came before / earlier than Rebecca, who came after / later; 
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Polly’s twelfth birthday occurred two years before Rebecca’s, whose fourteenth 
birthday will happen (two years) after Polly’s.  In the same vein, Chris and Nina 
are much later in their lives than their daughters, preceding them in a time 
sequence.  How we conceptualise the nature of now, or the present, and its 
relation to the past and future, is important in terms of understanding change.   
 
In her dilemma over telling her father of her embarrassment, Polly speaks to Nina 
earlier before eventually speaking to Chris.  During this period there is a time 
(duration) when Nina knows Polly feels unable to speak to her father.  During that 
period, there are different kinds of relationship.  Nina’s and Chris’ experience of 
their daughter is different.  When Chris realises how long Nina knew about 
Polly’s difficulty before he does, this creates a re-evaluation for him of the nature 
of his relationship with Polly, possibly with Nina, and the Nina-Polly relationship.  
At this point I am describing time in linear, sequential terms, but this is not the 
only kind of time.  
 
In the filmed programme discussion with the family it became clear that the 
interview had created a novel experience.  They experienced a moment out of 
ordinary time similar to ‘this queer creature, the instant … being in no time at all’ 
(Plato, 1997: 388) that I examine in chapter 3.  Rebecca said: “… I think we said 
things that we wouldn’t really say if we were just a family.  We wouldn’t go into 
such detail and it was quite good discussing it so we sort of knew each other’s 
feelings”.  The shared belief that each member knew how the others felt was 
challenged in that moment.   
 
The programme discussion embodies layers of time.  The family and I discuss the 
interview with the programme presenter, which is filmed at a different time and 
studio, later to be edited. 7  We are filmed in that discussion watching excerpts of 
the previously filmed family interview, as is the subsequent discussion about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In bringing up film, and filming of film, other time dimensions are introduced.  This highlights 
the complexity of any discussion of time.  I reflect in more detail on this phenomenon in chapters 
5 and 9.   
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interview.  Multiple layers of time, memory, and emotion, are in play.  Each layer 
affects and is recursively affected by the others.  Temporal linearity and 
circularity are like the ripples and cross currents of a pebble thrown into a pond.   
 
A further facet of time was introduced when a month after the interview, and 
before the programme was broadcast, Nina wrote on behalf of the family.  She 
summed up: “I think it is really fascinating to see how it’s stimulated our thoughts 
about each other and clearly it was more powerful than we even realised at the 
time”.  Does part of the ‘power’ lie in the creation of a different kind of time and 
space, where the unspoken and the not-(yet)-conscious become available?  Her 
letter occupies another time, from a different place, in another medium.  It brings 
another layer to the story.   
 
Other themes are embedded in these excerpts.  They include: the family’s ways of 
dealing with conflict, power, and gender when Rebecca describes Chris “having 
power over mummy, it’s bit sexist, because she’s a woman and he’s a man”.  
Parental and couple boundaries, relationship alliances and coalitions, are revealed.  
We would acquire different information by introducing a temporal socio-cultural 
perspective on the physical, psycho-sexual, educational development for the two 
girls, raised in a white middle class family in south London, whose parents are in 
early middle age, married for nineteen years, with three of their parents still alive.   
 
First considerations: time in psychotherapy.   
In the Smith family interview I discussed some changes in rhythm and pattern 
when viewing relationships through the lens of time.  I now give a brief clinical 
example.   
 
Case vignette: Susan.   
Susan’s story is set in the context of childhood psycho-sexual trauma, its impact 
on her marriage, sexuality, and sense of self.  She is recently married, in her mid 
30s.  When seen in couples therapy she had talked about her father sexually 
abusing her.  Following careful preparation, she had a separate session with her 
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father.  During that encounter Susan asked: “When was the last time you sexually 
abused me?”  He replied immediately: “When you were thirteen”.  She had no 
recall and asked him when and where that was.  He described the exact time and 
place.  Having collected her from a French school trip, he had stopped the car in a 
lay-by and assaulted her sexually.  Susan had no recall and seemed confused.  In 
the next session I reminded her that she had once said she could not let her 
husband, or any man, drive with her in the passenger seat.  The ‘memory’ of that 
event was present without ‘knowing it’ or actively recalling what she was 
‘remembering’ until that moment.   
 
Different therapy models indicate how to work with such ‘material’.  In 
psychodynamic practice, the therapist works with the patient in an exclusive 
relationship.  As this developed and strengthened, Susan might begin to feel 
anxious or panicky as the therapist increasingly ‘gets alongside’ her. 8  The 
therapist would look to link that feeling in the consulting room with other times 
and events when she had felt anxious or panicky, eventually making an 
interpretation that this related in some way to an important earlier relationship in 
her life, perhaps with her father (c.f., Malan, 1979).  Ultimately the expectation 
would be that she (re-)discovered the event for herself.   
 
In a systemic approach Susan was offered the opportunity to work directly with 
the person who abused her.  Her encounter took place in therapy, in the present 
with the abusing parent.  The therapist had a role in that meeting and in the 
subsequent session as a bridge between Susan’s two temporal and physical 
worlds.  This was more like a guide than a psychological archaeologist exploring 
the unconscious (Faulks, 2006; Freud, 1915: Vol. XIV).  There must be trust, and 
to that extent transference to the therapist as a safe person or ‘good object’ in 
Object Relations terms is paramount.  But in systemic practice the emphasis is not 
on the patient experiencing the therapist and attributing to him and the 
psychotherapeutic environment the abusive experiences of her childhood that then 
need to be worked on, ultimately to dissolve the transference as an integral part of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The play on words is intentional.   
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healing in the way Freud suggests (Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI: Lecture XXVIII, 453-
454).   
 
The two approaches suggest different beliefs about time and change, the length of 
treatment, and frequency of sessions.  I will suggest that in both models there is a 
re-inserted time of the therapy that is qualitatively different to time in everyday 
life.  It may be the therapeutic transference with the therapist’s conscious use of 
self, or implicitly held by the therapist to enable change.  This leaves the question 
whether philosophical and anthropological perspectives add to our current 
understanding of time in psychotherapy.  Psychodynamic and systemic 
approaches have many differences that it would be wrong to blur.  Despite this, I 
take the position that it is more helpful to view difference as representing 
complementary views and not competing realities.  Systemic therapists 9 intervene 
mainly in what has been internalised by family members as their psychological 
make-up.   
‘The site of action of family therapy interventions is thus the same as that 
of psychoanalytic psychotherapy but whereas psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy is directed towards the point at which the internal world is 
being externalised, family therapy is directed towards the point at which 
the external world is becoming internalised’ (Dare, 1981: 283).   
 
I will now consider briefly the standpoints of Freud and Palazzoli in the context of 
Susan, and then introduce the basis of philosophical and anthropological 
approaches to this material.   
 
Freud and Palazzoli.   
Freud and Palazzoli speak of systems, intrapsychic or interpersonal.  These 
systems have their own rhythms and time patterns.  They are conceptualised 
differently.  In relational terms, we might go so far as to suggest that individuals 
assume relational roles with each other that could be described in intrapsychic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Until the 1990s it was more usual to refer to ‘family therapy’, with the disadvantage that this 
emphasised a treatment population rather than a way of thinking and practising.   
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terms as the super-ego, ego, or id (c.f., Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX, The Ego and the 
Id). 10   
 
An important time debate in psychotherapy concerns treatment duration.  Long-
term and frequent contact is frequently the norm in psychoanalysis.  This fits with 
beliefs about change and the importance of the therapeutic alliance.  An 
alternative view is put forward for the Milan Systemic model that greater intensity 
can be achieved by less frequent sessions at longer intervals in between.  This 
introduces questions about models of therapy, the nature of change, timing of 
sessions, and the spaces in between.  It raises questions about a ‘different kind of 
time’ for change to occur, about boundaries, and the role of the therapist.  Some 
of this was implicitly present in Susan’s story.   
 
Philosophy: first thoughts.   
By introducing philosophy as a major plank of my work, there is a risk of 
becoming lost in the abstract, and that describing time normatively does not touch 
the extreme experiences of many patients in acute distress.  This is part of the 
challenge and unique aspect of my research.   
 
In Parmenides, Plato (1997) proposes a dilemma whether the instant between two 
other things (motion and rest) is in time or out of time, and whether something 
can exist out of time.  Perhaps the ‘instant’ is a different kind of time that enables 
change.  These are quite abstract ideas.   
 
Aristotle (1999) proposes a different perspective about time and number, and the 
place of before and after.  For Susan it was not a question of before and after.  She 
had no active recollection of the last time her father abused her and had no 
‘number’ to hold onto.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Freud changed his ideas about the nature of the Unconscious and its structure during his career.  
I focus mainly on his views about time, which changed little in his career.   
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A well-known phenomenon in therapy is of sequential events (earlier, later) 
experienced simultaneously.  Kant (2003), as do other philosophers, suggests that 
this is not possible.  Sequencing may be a consequence of Western thinking not 
shared by other cultures and especially by patients locked into their personal 
worlds.  There may be no narrative, only the present moment, or a present of past, 
a present of present and a present of future things (Augustine, 1961).   
 
The task of psychotherapy would appear quite different to the philosophical 
project.  Kant describes time as linear and this may partly coincide with Freud’s 
ideas, but not with a therapeutic model of circular causality, nor with many 
cultural perspectives described by anthropologists.  However, Kant says time does 
not exist independently but is of the mind: ‘Time is nothing but the form of inner 
sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state’ (Kant, 2003: 77).  
Our Western culturally determined descriptions of mind as abstractions bounded 
by the brain influence our views about time.  The Smith family members had a 
view about time and the timing of sharing information.  In the interview they 
began to see some of the consequences of how they organised time.   
 
Phenomenology in philosophy (Heidegger, 1962, 1985; Husserl, 1991) offers 
ideas that invite us to engage with the ‘thinglyness’ of the thing and the thickness 
of the present.  Existentialists, close allies of phenomenologists, also challenge 
ideas about different qualities of time.  Paul Ricoeur (1980, 2000) suggests ideas 
about time relating directly to psychotherapy.  Sartre captures a little of the 
patient’s despair and losing sense of time through the mouth of his main 
character, Roquentin, in La Nausée.   
‘Here is what I think happens: suddenly one feels that time is slipping 
away, that each instant leads to another, this one to another, and so on; that 
each instant destroys itself, that it isn’t worth the trouble to try and hold 
onto it, etc.  And then one attributes this property of time to events that 
seem to be in the instants; what belongs to the form, is attributed to what is 
in it.  Briefly, this famous flowing of time, people talk a lot about it, but it 
is hardly there.’  (Sartre, 1938: 84.  Personal translation). 11   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 ‘Voilà, je pense ce qui se passe: brusquement on sent que le temps s’écoule, que chaque instant 
conduit à un autre instant, celui-ci à un autre et ainsi de suite; que chaque instant s’anéantit, que ce 
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If only the instant exists, we are without narrative, and philosophy may not add to 
our understanding of time.  If there is only now, we need to consider 
psychotherapy and time anew, and embrace the episodic world of Strawson 
(2005) or Roquentin’s despair.  Whichever direction is chosen, the proposition 
that time does not exist (Barbour, 2000) has consequences for psychotherapy.   
 
Anthropology: first thoughts.   
It is a common misperception that we see the same as others, or share the same 
realities.  Our models, our cultural lenses, influence our experience of the world.  
My reality is only that, my reality.  This is central to anthropological scholarship.   
 
 
Plate 1:1.  Jackal-headed god, Anubis, weighs a dead person’s heart.  The British 
Museum/Heritage-Images.  http://student.britannica.com/eb/art-100394.   
 
Egyptian painting (Plate 1:1) typically suggests a kind of timelessness.  Feet and 
bodies are represented flat, sideways on, and lack perspective to Western eyes.  
Perspective in painting suggests distance in Western art.  Distance represents 
space and time, but this image without formal perspective has no representational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
n’est pas la peine d’essayer de le retenir, etc.  Et alors on attribue cette propriété aux événements 
qui vous apparaissent dans les instants; ce qui appartient à la forme, on le reporte sur le contenu.  
En somme, ce fameux écoulement du temps, on en parle beaucoup, mais on ne le voit guère’ 
(Sartre, 1938: 84).   
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distance or implied time.  The jackal-headed god of embalming, Anubis 12 weighs 
the hearts of the dead in preparation for the journey through the underworld.  
Embalming is a perfect example of human endeavour to preserve timelessly the 
corruptible body and eternal soul of the deceased.  The absence of perspective 
‘freezes’ time within this frame.   
 
Against the background of this cultural ‘timeless’ image I reflect whether cultural 
perceptions of time can enhance understanding time in psychotherapy.  A 
particular focus of my thesis will be isomorphic aspects of time in ritual, 
psychotherapy as ritual, and ritual in psychotherapy.   
 
Emile Durkheim emphasises the social-collective nature of human experience 
which he terms ‘social time, … and is itself a kind of social institution’ 
(Durkheim, 2001: 12).  He describes kinds of time that may also relate to time 
qualities in therapy.  If different kinds of time exist, we should consider how the 
intimate time of psychotherapy may differ from a more fluid social time.  The rich 
variety of time and its place in traditional healing rituals may cross cultural 
boundaries for Western healing.   
 
Hubert’s interest in time’s representation in religion and magic drew him to 
consider different qualities of time’s effects on participants in terms of ‘the 
theoretical separation of time and space … reconciled with the infinitude and 
immutability of the “sacred”, in which rites and mythical events take place too’ 
(Hubert, 1999: 43).	    If time differs qualitatively in religious or magical contexts, 
we should consider whether, and if so how, this is true for psychotherapy.  ‘The 
examination of any ritual will suffice to show that rites vary by reason of the 
circumstances of time’ (ibid: 45).  If time is an essential aspect of healing, 
invested with rhythms that reflect the life of the culture, a heightened awareness 
may help the Western healer in her/his work.  Nina reflected in her letter that 
something more powerful than they had realised at the time must have happened.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Also called Anpu or Anup.   
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Perhaps in the moment of the interview their experiences of time were altered, and 
even were different for each family member.   
 
An advantage of exploring cultural differences is the opportunity to see the 
familiar with new eyes, such as the account of Sinhalese exorcism and transition 
rites (chapter 8), ‘not only to mark change of identity but actively to transform 
one identity into another’ (Kapferer, 1983: 179).  Psychotherapy is performative 
and transformative.  Just as ‘exorcists are concerned to construct in ritual that 
which they aim to transform’ (ibid: 181), so in psychoanalysis the problematic 
situation is re-created in order to facilitate its ultimate transformation.  The 
shaman or healer necessarily steps outside mundane structures and time.   
 
Physics.   
Physics is a complex subject and covers too wide a scope for my thesis.  It 
essentially departs from my main focus, being more abstract and not involving 
human nature or psychotherapy.  It provides the big picture.  Nonetheless, there 
are aspects that coincide more directly with human experience with relevance to a 
discussion about therapy and time.  I will therefore summarise four particular 
physicists, merely for their important contribution to the main philosophical and 
anthropological material that will follow as the body of my research: Newton, 
Einstein, Hawking, and Barbour.   
 
Isaac Newton (1642-1727) described the fixed nature of time: ‘Absolute, true, and 
mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to 
anything external, flows uniformly’. 13  He describes an idealised view of 
mathematical motion, where motion brings change in position, and change is a 
measure of time.  Newtonian mechanics offers a deterministic view of the world: 
‘if you know the state of a system at some particular moment, you can, in 
principle, predict the state of the system at some arbitrary time in the future’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Cohen, I. B., and Whitman, A., (1999) Isaac Newton – The Principia: A New Translation.  
Berkeley.  University of California Press.  408.  In: Falk, D., (2009) In Search of Time.  London.  
National Maritime Museum.  129.   
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(Falk, 2009: 136), which meant ‘(t)ime was completely separate from and 
independent of space’ (Hawking, 1990: 18).  In a Newtonian universe, time 
existed before anything else; ‘the zero point of time is given no part to play’ 
(Minkowski, 1923: 75).  Experience of time described by people in distress 
appears to challenge Newtonian time.  Time present and past are not the same for 
all of the Smith family members.  In the consulting room, the extent that Susan’s 
past is symbolically present that she is unable to name, was phenomenologically 
replayed in her inability to be a front seat car passenger with a male driver.   
 
A problematic idea is that time flows and that it flows uniformly, unaffected by 
objects in its environment.  What ‘controls’ rate of flow, and what is time in 
relation to?  In the West at the start of the twentieth century, a three-dimensional 
world is reunited with time:  
‘That we have not been accustomed to regard the world in this sense as a 
four-dimensional continuum is due to the fact that in physics, before the 
advent of the theory of relativity, time played a different and more 
independent role, as compared with the space co-ordinates.  It is for this 
reason that we have been in the habit of treating time as an independent 
continuum’ (Einstein, 1961: 62).   
 
Einstein’s theories of special and general relativity challenge Newtonian time 
independent of external influence, although classical mechanics retains ‘a 
considerable measure of “truth”, since it supplies us with the actual motions of the 
heavenly bodies with a delicacy of detail little short of wonderful’ (ibid: 16-17).   
 
Our experience of time is Newtonian.  It intuitively allows us to calculate a 
definite past if we have complete data about the present.  However: ‘Quantum 
physics tells us that no matter how thorough our observation of the present, the 
(unobserved) past, like the future, is indefinite and exists only as a spectrum of 
possibilities’ (Hawking and Mlodinow. 2010: 82).  The old certainties of reason 
and the Enlightenment no longer serve.  ‘We do not “see” time, just as we do not 
see space.  What we perceive are events in time, and objects in space’ (Falk, 2009: 
131), for nobody has ‘ever noticed a place except at a time, or a time except at a 
place’ (Minkowski, 1923: 76).  In a world of relativity each element provides a 
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reference point relative to the other, and the act of observing affects what is 
observed.  ‘(T)he measurement of the time taken, like the measurement of the 
distance covered, depends on the observer doing the measuring’ (Hawking and 
Moldinow, 2010: 97).   
 
Einstein asserted that the speed of light - 300,000 km per second - is unaffected 
by the speed or direction of the moving body from which it is measured: ‘the 
speed of light is … at a specific speed, c’ (Falk, 2009: 159).  Therefore ‘in order 
for the speed of light to be constant, time and space must be relative (ibid: 160). 
Events take place in a four-dimensional framework, three dimensions of space, 
plus time.  Events cannot be separated in time and space.  ‘In space-time, time is 
no longer separate from the three dimensions of space … the direction of time 
(varies) depending on the speed of the observer’ (Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010: 
99-100).  I examine whether the experienced reality of this has relevance for 
psychotherapy.   
 
The notion of simultaneity is of interest.  Einstein gives the example of a train 
travelling at constant velocity in relation to the embankment:  
‘Events are simultaneous with reference to the embankment but not 
simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of 
simultaneity).  Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own 
particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the 
statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of 
an event’ (Einstein, 1961: 30-31).   
 
What may be simultaneous for one person is not necessarily simultaneous for 
another.  Events appear simultaneous from a particular frame of reference; my 
‘now’ is not necessarily your ‘now’, (Barbour, 2000; Falk, 2004, 2009; Feynman, 
1998; Priestley, 1964).  The idea of different simultaneous ‘nows’ has relevance 
for psychotherapy.  Apparently shared experience may be quite different where 
‘time’ is not the same time, or kind of time, for everyone.   
‘(T)he discovery that the speed of light appeared the same to every 
observer, no matter how he was moving, led to the theory of relativity – 
and in that one had to abandon the idea that there was a unique absolute 
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time.  …  Thus time became a more personal concept, relative to the 
observer who measured it’ (Hawking, 1990: 143).   
 
In astronomy we have a fascinating example of seeing now an event that occurred 
‘600 million years after all matter was created in the Big Bang 13.7 billion years 
ago’ (Connor, 2010b: 17), and to observe this galaxy, UDFy-38135539, which 
may already have disappeared or become part of other clusters.  The Planck 
satellite has scanned the whole sky to create ‘a relic map of the universe from the 
beginning of time’ (Connor, 2010a: 7).   
 
The psychological effects of trauma or intense experience may produce an 
‘afterglow’ similar to the ‘microwave background radiation’ (ibid: 7) that remains 
long after the event in astronomical terms, or has even physically disappeared. 14  
If it is possible to map this strange truth, and the universe obeys the same laws, 
there can be little argument against such an isomorphic process at the personal 
level.   
 
If my world and my time are not your world and time, how can we engage in any 
meaningful encounter in psychological treatment?  What appears to take place 
simultaneously in the subjective worlds of patient and psychotherapist may be an 
illusion, and if so, the psychotherapist needs to be aware of and link these 
differently timed universes, and facilitate a rhythm that enables change.   
 
A question that I will return to is how to differentiate past, present, and future.  
The second law of thermodynamics states that ‘in any closed system disorder, or 
entropy, always increases with time’ (Hawking, 1990: 144).  This allows us to 
distinguish between past and future, ‘giving a direction to time’ (ibid: 145).  
Hawking describes three arrows of time; the thermodynamic arrow of time of 
increasing entropy; the psychological arrow of time of a remembered past, but not 
the future; the cosmological arrow of time, ‘the direction in which the universe is 
expanding rather than contracting’ (ibid: 145).  The cosmological arrow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The recent revelation of the continuing pain felt by adults abused when they were young by 
Jimmy Savile, even after his death, is a sad example of this phenomenon.   
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introduces the notion that time has direction.  Part of psychotherapy’s task is for 
people to make sense of their worlds and relationships in time, and whether order 
is possible.  Psychotherapy is negentropic (Bateson, 1970) against the time 
direction of the universe, inasmuch as it pays attention to the lived experience of 
events, for ‘(d)isorder increases with time because we measure time in the 
direction in which disorder increases’ (Hawking, 1990: 147).  Or, the therapeutic 
task may be to recognise the absurd and existential meaninglessness of the world 
(Camus, 1957; Sartre, 1938) and still live in good faith (Yalom, 1989, 2006).   
 
These assertions assume time.  Theoretical physicist Julian Barbour questions 
whether time exists.  He suggests a perspective ‘in which change is the measure of 
time, not time the measure of change’ (Barbour, 2000: 2) 15 with possible 
implications for understanding change and time in psychotherapy.  If change is 
the measure of time and the patient is trapped in trauma of the past devoid of 
change, can we say no time has passed or been measured?   
 
Barbour goes further by asserting time does not exist.  Because time does not 
measure change, time as understood (in the West at least) is no more.  Barbour 
says the Now is not time: ‘The now is what holds time together, … since it makes 
past and future time a continuous whole; and it is a limit of time, in the sense that 
it is the beginning of one time and the end of another’ (Aristotle, 1999: 112).   
 
Barbour takes the example of a number of photographs each recording a different 
Now (Barbour, 2008).  By stating that they represent two events half an hour 
apart, nothing is changed.  We do not have to call it ‘time’.  All we can say is that 
one comes before the other.  But, how can Barbour have a concept of ‘before’ 
without having a concept of what most people would consider to be time?  We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Barbour’s project is to create a theory, quantum gravity, which would bring about the end of 
time.  He seeks to unify the theory of relativity where time is flexible and hard to grasp, and 
quantum mechanics, which, like Newtonian time, is regular and independent of the world.  By 
successfully uniting these two theories to describe the universe, time would disappear from the 
equation.  There will be many self-contained instants, what he calls a Now.  Our psychological and 
physical perceptions of the world are different.  This does not imply that we will no longer feel 
what we experience as the flow of time, but ‘new timeless principles will explain why we do feel 
that time flows’ (Barbour, 2000: 14).   
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may deduce something we later call time, post hoc.  A Now has no duration or 
thickness, and nothing changes, so we cannot say that time has passed.  A Now is 
an instant, experienced as unchanging; ‘(t)he instant is not in time – time is in the 
instant’ (Barbour, 2000: 34).  Because we have different experiences of Nows, our 
sense is that time is different.  By changing the order of the photographs nothing 
is changed apart from order, since each image is self-contained just as ‘yesterday’ 
is unchanged.   
 
Time is an abstraction constructed from the changes of things in Barbour’s world.  
The Nows that we accumulate we call our past, but I suggest, this does not take 
account of human experience of meaning and emotion.  What we call the past has 
different degrees of importance in Western psychotherapy, with varying emphasis 
for instigating change.  I begin this exploration in chapter 2.   
 
Reflections. 
In this opening chapter I have set the scene for thinking how time as a key 
reference point changes our perspectives.  We saw that time can be layered, is 
affected by contexts of place, and that there are different kinds of time.  I used 
material from my work, in this case a non-clinical interview, which establishes 
my personal ethnographic approach to this research.   
 
Physics is important to help understand the world we inhabit and its origins.  
Concepts of relativity, simultaneity, the now, and the origins of the universe, can 
inform how we think, see, and experience ourselves, despite their abstract nature.  
So, I shall hold these in mind.   
 
A brief clinical example suggested that memory is an important aspect of time, 
and that remembering occurs in different ways, even when the person is not aware 
they are remembering (the clinical vignette of how Susan ‘remembered’ her 
sexual abuse).  This allowed a mention of my two main thinkers, Freud and 
Palazzoli, before touching on philosophical and anthropological insights on time.  
In philosophy I indicated that time in the ‘instant’ or the ‘now’ may not be in time 
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as understood in everyday experience.  We have yet to discover whether Plato’s 
instant and the instant when therapeutic change occurs are similar, and whether 
the context bound cultural realities of anthropology, and the logical and rational 
descriptions of time from philosophy, can mesh in therapy.   
 
Along the way we brushed up against a number of ideas and themes that are 
important for my research.  In mentioning Stern’s (1998) cumulative 
developmental model of the self where nothing is lost, only more is added, we 
have a constant ‘thick present’ (Husserl, 1991) in relation to a past and future.  
Husserl will speak of this in terms of ‘retention’ and ‘protention’ (chapter 4).   
 
When speaking of narrative, diachronic, and episodic time, we have concepts that 
may aid in describing time and even traumatic time in therapy, as well as 
confusions of earlier/later, before/after, discussed in relation to the Smiths.  All 
are as much part of philosophical discourse in their way (McTaggart, Merleau-
Ponty, Ricoeur inter alia) as psychotherapy.   
 
Multiple layers of time and memory that concerned Freud are the subject matter 
of philosophy (Heidegger, Ricoeur), as much as anthropological research (Geertz, 
Turner, Vitebsky).  A potential tension exists between philosophical linear time 
(Hume, Kant, McTaggart), and anthropological explanations of time as circular 
such as the Balinese (Geertz, Howe) or the Sora (Vitebsky).  In socio-cultural 
research we find reference to different kinds of time, especially in healing and 
ritual.  This potentially has strong significance for this project.   
 
Finally, I referred in this chapter to ‘spaces in between’, an important concept in 
anthropology (Gennep, Leach, Stoller, Turner), and an often-neglected time in 
therapy.  Just as the spaces between notes are important in music (Levitin, 2008) 
so are the spaces (intervals) between therapy sessions, as well as frequency or 
rhythm of sessions.   
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I regard psychotherapy and its founding theories as fundamental to my thesis, and 
I believe there is much to be learned from philosophy and anthropology.  Hence, 
as a foundation, I propose to introduce two frameworks that have influenced me 
the most, Freud and Palazzoli, and explore these for their relevance to the themes 
of time in psychotherapy.  I invite philosophy and anthropology to challenge my 
professional roots and expand my thinking.   
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Chapter 2.   
 
 
Finding Time: Sigmund Freud and Mara Selvini Palazzoli.   
 
‘While Freud was certainly not right about everything, he thought provocatively 
about everything’  
(Neu, 1991: 7).   
 
‘Nothing takes place in a psycho-analytic treatment  
but an interchange of words between the patient and the analyst. …  
Words were originally magic’  
(Freud, 1915-1917: XV: 17).   
 
Choice.   
Freud and Palazzoli make frequent reference to time, possibly more so than many 
other psychotherapists, so that they are a natural choice for me.  Freud has 
profoundly influenced psychotherapy and psychoanalytic therapy approaches in 
the West, and Palazzoli as had a great impact on the systemic therapy field.  Both 
of these thinkers are important to my professional development in different ways 
(Jenkins, 1980, 2012).  Freud was interested in philosophy and Palazzoli, who 
originally trained psychoanalytically, was influenced by the work of 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson, from whose ideas she established her systemic 
thinking.  With respect to Freud, if André Green is right, ‘there is a predominant 
tendency in contemporary psychoanalysis to resolve Freud’s complex temporal 
model into the genetic viewpoint alone’ (Green, 2002: 7).  This research may go 
some way to redressing that balance.   
 
I have chosen to focus on Freud and not include Jung or other contemporaries of 
Freud (such as Ferenczi, Adler, Klein, Lacan, or Anna Freud), although time is 
important in all their work (Ellis, 2008).  The reasons are twofold.  I took the 
opportunity to explore Freud’s ideas in depth for my personal interest, and 
because his ideas and language have so permeated the consciousness of the 
Western world and beyond.  And I chose not to research Jung’s important ideas 
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about the unconscious, symbol, simultaneity, 16 nor any of the other important 
early thinkers in psychoanalysis to avoid diluting my material.   
 
I chose Palazzoli because of her impact on the field of Systemic psychotherapy, 
which is an important part of my professional orientation.  Her practice changed 
radically during her career.  Her early work was as a psychoanalyst.  She was later 
influenced by anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s epistemology.  Just as I have 
restricted my research to Freud, so I have avoided including much material from 
those who were not part of the original Milan team.  Both scholars have had, and 
continue to exert, an important influence on my thinking and practice (Jenkins, 
2012).   
 
Aims.   
This is the foundation chapter for my thesis representing my discipline of 
psychotherapy.  It is the backdrop to what follows from philosophy and 
anthropology. Apart from two short examples from my practice, Freud and 
Palazzoli speak for themselves.   
 
Some of Freud’s references to time are explicit, such as: the timelessness of the id 
and the Unconscious (Freud, 1915: XIV); dreams as the ‘the royal road to a 
knowledge of the unconscious’ (Freud, 1910: XI: 33); the place of memory 
(Freud, 1901, VI) and therefore time; or distortions of time in the therapeutic 
transference (Freud, 1917, XVI).  Palazzoli and her colleagues describe ‘the time 
of the system’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978); the place of time in clinical practice 
(Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993); experiments with the duration of intervals 
between sessions and duration of therapy (Palazzoli et al., 1978, Boscolo and 
Bertrando, 1996).   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jung was less preoccupied with the aetiology of past experience.  Symptoms are not necessarily 
due to past events but may represent the clash of conflicting wishes in the present that are resolved 
in the symptom.   
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Clinical vignette.   
The following incident from my practice draws attention to time considerations in 
psychotherapy and the ubiquity of time in healing even when not explicitly part of 
the therapist’s focus.   
 
I was surprised when Alex, a psychodynamic psychotherapist, phoned to ask if I 
would see him individually.  Many years previously I had seen him and his wife 
for couples therapy.  He was phoning with an unconventional request, to “make 
sense of my thirteen years of psycho-analysis”.   
 
During the first session I asked Alex to tell me about his decision to end analysis.  
He said his wife had come to feel that psychoanalysis was no longer helping him 
and was affecting their relationship.  He agreed to end his analysis.  In that 
September he told his analyst that he wished to terminate in December.  He was 
told: “You can’t do that.  You need at least another five years because we haven’t 
dealt with your anger yet”.  Although Alex was surprised at this, he continued 
with his plan and ended when he wanted to.   
 
This example emphasises the therapist’s position with regard to time and change.  
‘(T)he therapist is required to coordinate his own time with that of the client, 
allowing space for new perspectives and avoiding getting stuck in one vision of 
the client’s story’ (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996: 69).  Alex felt the model of 
therapy was determining the process more than his needs.   
 
In this partial account, a number of elements relating to time are evident.  They 
include beliefs about the time (duration) necessary for effective treatment, and the 
speed of change in therapy, in this instance thirteen years plus another putative 
five years. 17  Change is incremental and slow, while the frequency of sessions (up 
to five times a week) is intense.  It means there are only short intervals between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Length of psychoanalytic treatment has increased over the years: ‘Since the beginnings … the 
length of treatment has grown increasingly longer; so much so that, far from taking advantage of 
our growing experience to reduce its length, the time required … for an analysis with no 
foreseeable end has become a dissuasive reason for not undertaking it’ (Green, 2002: 45).   
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sessions.  In addition, the quality of relationship with the therapist is individual, 
long-term, exclusive, and private.  Therapy often impacts on the patient’s social 
domain but it is not necessarily focused on.  And finally the therapist takes an 
expert position about what are the patient’s needs.   
 
These thoughts provide a basis from which to consider Freud and Palazzoli’s 
descriptions of time.   
 
Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939).   
An overview.   
Freud addresses time in different ways and acknowledges that there is much that 
he does not fully understand.  Most of his theories are time-embedded, and 
highlighting this aspect may achieve a different appreciation of his thinking 
(Green, 2002).   
 
‘The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is 
the fundamental premiss of psycho-analysis’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 13).  In 
these few words Freud divides what is in time or timed from what is timeless and 
unchanging.  He is interested in the location of the psychical in the Unconscious, 
while I focus on the place and nature of time in his thinking.  However, while 
Freud ‘refers to notions of temporality which operate as pivotal to his 
psychoanalysis, … he rarely theorises his concept of time (Ellis, 2008: 1).   
 
Freud began his medical career as a neurologist.  Some of his intuitions about 
brain function have been vindicated by twentieth century neuro-science.  As 
Gerhardt (2004) maps out, effective brain functioning in the adult is significantly 
influenced by the social context of the child’s development and we know now that 
the brain continues to develop throughout life and not only in-utero.  Early 
experience plays an important part in brain development during a period of 
enormous growth.  For example, the brain more than doubles its weight in the first 
year of life in healthy infants.  There is a developmental argument in favour of the 
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unconscious.  Early experiences are encoded non-verbally by the child, primarily 
in the right hemisphere, and remembered pre-linguistically. 18   
 
When a therapist attempts to help the patient recall, in language, in ‘an 
interchange of words’ (Freud, 1916: XV: 17) this requires access to preverbal 
memory, which is not laid down through language.  ‘We cannot consciously recall 
any of it, yet it is not forgotten because it is built into our organism and informs 
our expectations and behaviour’ (Gerhardt, 2004: 15).  Freud speaks of repression 
and resistance to remembering when the difficulty may more accurately reflect 
age-determined brain development and early human encoding of experience.  
What the patient cannot know consciously requires the therapist to ‘behave as 
‘timelessly’ as the [patient’s] unconscious’ (Freud, 1918: Vol. XVII: 10).  There 
can be no haste in psycho-analysis as Alex experienced, for ‘the slowness with 
which deep-going changes in the mind are accomplished – in the last resort, no 
doubt, the timelessness of our unconscious processes’ (Freud, 1913: Vol. XII: 
130), determines the nature of treatment, its pace (time duration), and the nature 
of change.  It is, however, sometimes forgotten that Freud undertook brief 
therapy: ‘His analyses frequently finished in less than a year, and some of them 
lasted considerably less.  (His training analysis of Sándor Ferenczi … lasted only 
six weeks)’ (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996). 19   
 
Much of Freud’s psychology concerns sexuality, the Unconscious, neuroses, and 
instinctual drives.  His goal was to develop a scientific theory of mind and an 
important innovation was identifying the longitudinal, temporal structure to our 
lives.  Freud maintained that early events structure how we live and he was 
interested how children are different from adults.  He has had a profound effect on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In brain and social development of the self, as new stages occur, the former ones remain: ‘All 
domains of relatedness remain active during development.  The infant does not grow out of any of 
them; none of them atrophy, none become developmentally obsolete or get left behind. … In fact, 
each successive organising subjective perspective requires the preceding one as a precursor’ 
(Stern, 1998: 31-32).  In this sense time is held developmentally almost like an archaeological dig, 
where all layers exist simultaneously.   
19 This is also born out by the correspondence of James and Alix Stacey, while Alix was in Berlin 
in 1924-5, giving a fascinating background to the socio-cultural context of Freud’s ideas and the 
role of the Stracheys, in The Letters of James and Alix Strachey, 1924-1925 (Meisel and Kendrick 
(Eds.) 1986).   
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Western thought, our language, and our view of time, not least the idea that the 
seven-year old is still there in the adult such that the character of the ego is ‘a 
precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes … that … contains the history of those 
object-choices’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 29).  Unsatisfactory resolution of early 
relationships or experiences renders the person more likely to repeat similar 
relationships later in life as attempts to gain mastery over early painful 
experiences, for ‘the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood 
will be general and lasting’ (ibid: 31).   
 
A temporal focus is clear in Freud’s understanding of symptom formation and is 
found in Introductory Lectures to Psycho-analysis (Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI) 
lecture XXIII.  He describes an accidental experience (traumatic) that occurs 
which arouses feelings from an earlier time (he terms this Disposition due to 
Fixation of the Libido) where the concurrence of the two is causative of neurosis.  
He gives this in diagrammatic form, Figure 2.1 as a ‘genealogical tree’.  In his 
temporal historical description he includes the possibility of phylogenetic 
explanation.   
 
If we accept that early childhood events continue to be re-worked in the present, 
our understanding of time will change.  It was from this developmental 
perspective that Freud devised a view about primary and secondary process 
thinking (The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud, 1900: Vol. IV), which underpins 




to Fixation of 
Libido +!







Figure 2.1.  The Paths to Symptom-Formation.  Lecture XXIII, 362.   
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‘… we perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem 
that space and time are necessary forms of mental acts.  There is nothing 
in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the 
passage of time, and … no alteration in its mental processes is produced 
by the passage of time’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 74).   
 
When time and timing are important in duration of treatment and for the patient-
therapist relationship Freud’s statement that a significant part of the psychical 
structure is unchanged by time raises challenging questions.  Time is ‘introduced 
into the ego by the perceptual system; it can scarcely be doubted that the mode of 
operation of that system is what provides the origin of the idea of time’ (ibid: 76) 
suggesting that the ability to perceive and reflect, rather than react, is part of 
acquiring a sense of time, ‘between a need and an action … a postponement in the 
form of the activity of thought’ (ibid: 76).  Postponement, itself a measure of time, 
enables us to experience ‘time’.  How we understand notions of ‘interval’, 
‘postponement’, and whether they differ to time either side of the interval may be 
relevant.   
 
There are descriptions in philosophy (chapter 3) and evidence from 
anthropological studies (chapter 8) that there is a point whether moments out of 
time exist in activities isomorphic to therapy.  We will see whether these insights 
deepen our understanding of ‘no recognition of the passage of time’.  There is also 
the phenomenon of unconscious memory (chapter 4) or unattributed ‘permanent 
traces’ (Freud: 1901: Vol. V: 538).   
 
Given the volume of Freud’s output, I restrict myself to five areas.  Source 
material consulted or quoted is given in the appropriate footnote.  These are the 
Unconscious which is central to understanding Freud. 20  Compulsion to repeat 
structures other aspects of Freud’s thinking 21 with its sense of returning to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Reference texts from among which I quote are: The Interpretation of Dreams [1900: IV]; On 
Beginning the Treatment [1913: XII]; The Unconscious [1915: XIV]; From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis [1918: XVII]; Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920: XVIII]; The Ego and the Id 
[1923: XIX] and; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis [1933: XXII]).   
21 We see how Freud begins from a biological base (Freud, 1933: XXII: 106) to then suggest 
psychological explanations and temporal repetition in relationships (Freud, 1920, XVIII, 18ff; 
1923: XIX: 117-118; 1933: XXII: 143).  This theme is explored in more detail later.   
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same logical point at different temporal points. 22   Dreams which are central to 
Freud suggest another understanding of time, 23 while Memory includes ways of 
holding, controlling, managing, or changing the past. 24  Finally Transference 
constitutes a mainstay of psychoanalytic therapies in complex manifestations of 
time. 25   
 
Time in psychoanalysis.   
The Unconscious (Ucs.). 26   
Freud was influenced by developments in archaeology and the physical 
explorations of archaic time in Europe of his day.  He used these explorations 
metaphorically.  ‘In the mind of each of us, it is civilization itself … that destroys 
the traces of past experience, burying the personal life of instinct under the weight 
of its censorious denials and demands’ (Schorske, 1991: 9).  We will re-consider 
‘mind’ as immanent when discussing Bateson (1971).  The psycho-analyst 
resembles the archaeologist recovering the buried (Unconscious) to see the light 
of day (Conscious).  Perhaps the most relevant aspect of ‘mind’ in Freud’s work 
for our attempt to understand the nature of time is the Unconscious.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Reference texts from among which I quote are: Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through 
[1914: XII]; The sense of symptoms, lecture 17, and Fixation to Traumas – the Unconscious, 
lecture 18, [1917: XVI]; Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920: XVIII]; Remarks on the Theory and 
Practice of Dream-Interpretation [1922: XIX]; An Autobiographical Study [1925: XX], and 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety [1926: XX]; Anxiety and Instinctual Life lecture 32, [1933: 
XXII]); and Moses, His People and Monotheist Religion in Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays 
[1939: XXIII]).   
23 Reference texts from among which I quote are: The Interpretation of Dreams, (Part 1) [1900: 
IV]; and The Interpretation of Dreams, (Part 2) [1900: V]; Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis 
[1910: XI]; A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams [1917: XIV]; Revision of 
the Theory of Dreams, lecture 29 [1933:XXII].   
24 Reference texts from among which I quote are: The Interpretation of Dreams [1901: V]; The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life [1901: VI]; 14, The Unconscious [1915: XIV] and Mourning 
and Melancholia [1917: XIV]; Parapraxes, lectures 2-4, [1917: XVI]; The Archaic Features and 
Infantilism of Dreams, lecture 13, and The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, lecture 23, [1917: 
XVI]).  Freud considers temporal factors (The Interpretation of Dreams (Part II) [1901:V]; 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria [1905: VII]; and A metapsychological supplement 
to the theory of dreams [1917: XIV].   
25 Reference texts from among which I quote are: Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 
[1905: VII]; Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis [1910: XI]; Transference, lecture 27, [1917: XVI]; 
and An Outline of Psycho-Analysis [1938: XXIII].   
26 ‘… “Unconscious” (spelled with a capital “U”) is used to denote a system that is part of the 
mental apparatus in the topographical frame of reference, and which is thought of as functioning  
according to certain specific laws.  Its contents, as long as they remain in this system, always have 
the quality of unconsciousness (or lack the quality of consciousness)’ (Sandler et al., 1997: 65).   
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Mind is not located in a physical area of the brain with ‘special relations to 
particular parts of the body and to particular mental activities … but to regions in 
the mental apparatus’ (Freud, 1915: Vol. XIV: 174-175).  Simply put, ‘(p)sycho-
analysis is seeking to bring to conscious recognition the things in mental life 
which are repressed’ (Freud, 1910: Vol.  XI: 33).  The concept of the Unconscious 
is fundamental to the theory of psycho-analysis.   
‘In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental 
processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of 
them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by 
means of sense-organs. …(P)sycho-analysis warns us not to equate 
perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental 
processes which are their object.  Like the physical, the psychical is not 
necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be’ (Freud, 1915: Vol. XIV: 
171).   
 
I am not concerned here with whether, or how, material becomes conscious, nor 
the relationship between the system preconscious (Pcs.) and the conscious (Cs.), 
nor mechanisms of repression and resistance.  In tune with future chapters I take a 
more phenomenological approach as proposed by Husserl (1991) and Heidegger 
(1985, 1993) (chapter 4), to elucidate time and the unconscious through a 
Freudian lens.  ‘To have heard something and to have experienced something are 
in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of 
both is the same’ (Freud, 1915: Vol. XIV: 176).  However, it is important to be 
aware of how the word ‘unconscious’ is used; ‘The distinction between what is, 
from the point of view of description, unconscious, and the use of the term to refer 
to a specific system should always be kept in mind’ (Sandler et al., 1997: 65).  As 
an adjective, unconscious includes what is in the Unconscious and Preconscious 
systems.  Figure 2.1 helps distinguish the three systems.   
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      Descriptively unconscious mental  
      content.   
 
Figure 2.1.  From Sandler et al., 1997: 66.  The movement from left to right is 
from depth to surface and varying degree of accessibility.   
 
The Ucs. functions at the level of primary psychical process without the ordering 
function of language: ‘In the Ucs. there are only contents, cathected with greater 
or lesser strength’ (Freud, 1915: Vol XIV: 186). 27  Freud is unequivocal about 
time in the Unconscious: ‘The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e., they 
are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no 
reference to time at all.  Reference to time is bound up, … with the work of the 
system Cs’ (ibid: 187).  In an unconscious mind there is no acceptance of reality 
or time, for ‘unconscious mental processes are in themselves ‘timeless’. … they 
are not ordered temporally, … time does not change them in any way and … the 
idea of time cannot be applied to them’ (Freud, 1920: XVIII: 28).   
 
In dreams, which are ‘pure present’ (Green, 2002: 1), the unconscious mind 
accepts the hallucinated reality of a lump of cheese, rather than question its 
physical reality.  Dream can be a hallucinated wish-fulfilment (in primary 
process) as a satisfaction of desire.  A characteristic of the unconscious (primary 
process) is that time is not represented.  We can dream of a self who is aged three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cathexis and cathected (from the German Besetzung) is never fully defined.  It includes the idea 
of investissement (French) and energy, associated with instincts or psychical agencies; it is used 
metaphorically and as an analogy.  (See: Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 62-65.)   
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in the present, and can bring together who one likes without reference to time.  
The timeless quality of the unconscious is reflected in that ‘… nothing that ever 
existed in the unconscious completely loses its influence on the personality’ 
(Klein, 1959: 262).  There is a part that remains ever-present, even if not 
recognisably so, as Susan realised with regard to her father’s abuse (chapter 1). 
Thus, an adult can still be working (unconsciously) on early events, since past and 
present co-exist simultaneously: ‘Freud wishes us to struggle with this 
multifaceted vision of the simultaneity of the noncontemporaneous’ (Schorske, 
1991: 9).  This assumes a mind that processes segmentally, where each part 
functions autonomously.  For example, an important part of our mind does not 
accept our mortality.  In primary process thinking we cannot die, while in 
secondary process, despite our unconscious wish that it cannot be true, we know 
we are mortal (cf., Yalom, 2006).  We have to find a way to live with both 
realities: ‘the fear of death is something that occurs between the ego and the 
super-ego’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 58). 28   
 
The preconscious (Pcs.) and conscious (Cs.).   
Freud suggests changes in mind result from an internalization of the person’s 
world.  Topographically, the boundary between the preconscious and the 
conscious is relatively diffuse, while the boundary caused by repression around 
the dynamic unconscious is clear.  Mental processes in the preconscious and the 
conscious accord with the ‘reality principle’, and are qualitatively different to the 
unconscious and the ‘pleasure principle’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX).   
 
Space and time are manifested in a particular way.  The (conscious) ego is 
structured on reality and subject to rules of the world and physical reality; ‘The 
ego develops from perceiving the instincts to controlling them’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. 
XXII: 76).  It is ‘that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and 
influence of the external world’ (ibid: 75).  The super-ego responds to the 
demands of people who are important and on whom we depend.  Conscious life is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 I am indebted to Dr Christopher Dare with whom I have had many conversations about Freud 
and his legacy, although the ordering of these ideas and any errors are entirely my own.   
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forever fleeting, so that we live in the moment; ‘an idea that is conscious now is 
no longer so a moment later’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 14) even if it can be 
recalled another moment later.  In that in-between ‘liminal moment’ (chapter 8), 
we do not know what that idea was, except ‘that it was latent, … that it was 
unconscious’ (ibid: 14).   
 
If time, negation, and doubt, do not exist in the Unconscious, how does this affect 
our understanding of Freud’s thinking about time?  He outlines his ideas on time 
in Dissection of the Personality, beginning with the super-ego which arises from 
early influences as ‘the advocate of a striving towards perfection’ (Freud, 1933: 
Vol. XXII: 67).  When raising children, parents ‘have forgotten the difficulties of 
their childhood and they are glad to be able now to identify themselves fully with 
their own parents who in the past laid such severe restrictions upon them’ (ibid: 
67).  He suggests a temporal story of unconscious trans-generational transmission, 
with super-ego contents perpetuated, like ‘the infection of habit, from generation 
to generation’ (Drabble, 2000: 208). The present is never solely the present for 
Freud.  What has been lived, learned, or transmitted, is more than superficial 
phenomenology; ‘Mankind never lives entirely in the present.  The past, the 
tradition of the race and of the people, lives in the ideologies of the super-ego, and 
yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to new changes’ (Freud, 
1933: Vol. XXII: 67).   
 
We are not speaking of consciously known ‘time’ but of beliefs and behaviours 
transmitted from generation to generation, as real as our DNA carrying 
information across centuries and as resistant to change.  It is unconscious when it 
‘is being activated at the moment, though at the moment we know nothing about 
it’ (ibid: 70).  The unconscious system of the mind, (the system Ucs.) is more ‘a 
mental province … than a quality of what is mental’ (ibid: 71).   
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Internal systems and archaic structures.   
It is often confusing to know where Freud is in his thinking about the 
Unconscious.  This is partly because he developed and changed his ideas.  He 
describes a mental territory of the Systems Ucs., Pcs., and Cs., and then three 
powerful forces that seem to struggle with each other; the ego, id, and super-ego. 
29  He emphasises conflicts between these opposing forces, between the real-
external and the psychical-internal.  A partial description of the ego, super-ego, 
and id, may be helpful.   
 
Ego, super-ego, and id.   
The ego ‘is a specially differentiated part of the id’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 38) 
that represents external reality, while the super-ego represents the internal world 
of the id.  What has been created over time in the id and remains there, the ego 
takes over and is re-experienced in terms of itself as an individual: ‘Owing to the 
way in which the ego ideal 30 is formed, it has the most abundant links with the 
phylogenetic acquisition of each individual – his archaic heritage’ (Freud, 1923: 
Vol. XIX: 36).  Freud describes this temporally, from the basic instinctual to 
‘what is highest in the human mind by our scale of values’ (ibid: 36).  The ego’s 
ability to internalise and retain fixes time.  For example, ‘when the ego is 
supported by the internalised good object, it is more able to master anxiety and 
preserve life’ (Klein, 1958: 239) by holding something good and constant. 31   
 
The ego forms its super-ego from the id in a seemingly timeless sequence ‘of 
former egos … bringing them to resurrection’ (ibid: 38).  The task of psycho-
analysis is ‘to enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id’ (ibid: 
56), ‘the dark, inaccessible part of our personality’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 73).  
A partial ego function is conscience; ‘no vicissitudes can be experienced or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Freud’s views about the ego, id, and super-ego, also changed over his career.   
30 Also: ‘super-ego’.   
31 The super-ego, from which comes the ego and the foundation of which is ‘the early introjection 
of the good or bad breast’ (Klein, 1958: 239) can become over severe, and attack, humiliate, or 
threaten, the ego.  The id exists trans-generationally.  It can be inherited, bequeathed from 
generation to generation as in it are ‘residues of the existences of countless egos’ (Freud, 1923: 
Vol. XIX: 38).   
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undergone by the id, except by way of the ego’ (Freud, 1923: Vol. XIX: 38), as 
representative of the external world of the id.   
 
The id proves the exception to philosophical thought that space and time are 
integral to all mental activity. 32  ‘There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the 
idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and … no alteration in 
its mental processes is produced by the passage of time’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 
74).  The task of psycho-analysis is to confront ‘the unalterability by time of the 
repressed’ (ibid: 74) and to neutralise the id’s psychic energy that allows the 
patient to experience archaic material as though it were still recent.   
‘(A)fter the passage of decades they [memory etc.,] behave as though they 
had just occurred.  They can only be recognised as belonging to the past, 
can only lose their importance and be deprived of their cathexis of energy, 
when they have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and it is on 
this that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small 
extent’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 74).   
 
The id is driven by the pleasure principle, neither more nor less.  This dark 
inaccessible part of our personalities neither recognises nor is affected by the 
passage of time ‘except by way of the ego’.  While parts of the ego and super-ego 
are unconscious, they do not possess the id’s ‘same primitive and irrational 
characteristics’ (ibid: 75).   
 
Compulsion to repeat.   
A problematic aspect of psychotherapy is patients who repeat the same problem, 
often without conscious awareness.  It is as if, phenomenologically, time has 
become fixed in an endless loop returning to ‘the same logical point’ (Howe, 
1981) at different, often regular moments in a temporal sequence.  ‘(I)f a 
compulsion to repeat does operate in the mind, we should be glad to know 
something about it, to learn what function it corresponds to, under what 
conditions it can emerge’ (Freud, 1920: Vol. XVIII: 23).  Freud returns to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This is despite other arguments to the contrary in philosophy, for example, (cf. McTaggart, 
1927, chapter 4), or theoretical physics, (Barbour, 2000, 2008), discussed in chapter 1.   
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repetition and the compulsion to repeat in many of his works, describing it in 
different ways.   
 
Freud suggests that instincts represent ‘an impulsion’ toward re-establishing a 
situation that has been upset by external influence and that ‘this essentially 
conservative character of instincts is exemplified by the phenomena of the 
compulsion to repeat’ (Freud, 1925: Vol. XX: 57).  This results from the 
simultaneous and mutually conflictual action of Eros and the death instinct. 33  
Freud paints a picture of the ego protecting itself from dangerous instinctual 
impulses by means of repression so that the repressed is banished from the realm 
of the ego and becomes subject to laws of the Unconscious.  When the danger has 
passed and the ego no longer needs to protect itself, the impulse becomes free to 
‘run its course under an automatic influence – or as I should prefer to say, under 
the influence of the compulsion to repeat’ (Freud, 1926: Vol.  XX: 153).  I will 
consider ‘compulsion to repeat’ from a time perspective rather than hypothesised 
opposing internal forces.   
 
There is a relational dynamic in Freud’s understanding of repetition over 
generations where ‘the attempted solution’ (Watzlawick et al, 1974) becomes part 
of the problem:  
‘Thus a man who has spent his childhood in an excessive and to-day 
forgotten attachment to his mother, may spend his whole life looking for a 
wife on whom he can make himself dependent and by whom he can 
arrange to be nourished and supported.  A girl who was made the object of 
a sexual seduction in her early childhood may direct her later sexual life so 
as constantly to provoke similar attacks’ (Freud, 1939.  Vol. XXIII: 75-
76).   
 
Freud suggests this is a way to understand neurosis and character formation, how 
pattern and repetition in adulthood develop from and perpetuate early experiences.  
It is a temporal perspective to human relationships.  This becomes the search for a 
resolution to an existential dilemma that in an endless repetitive ‘more of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Thanatos, although Freud does not use this word in his writing (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 
447).   
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same’ is doomed to fail.  Melanie Klein emphasises ‘the influence of early 
attitudes throughout life (and) the fact that the relation to early figures keeps 
reappearing and problems that remain unresolved in infancy or early childhood 
are revived though in modified form’ (Klein, 1959: 258).  This phenomenon of 
unresolved problems reappearing ‘in modified form’ makes it more difficult to 
identify the original problem, where the problem or symptom is a compromise 
(Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI).   
 
The patient’s inability to escape is ‘in the end … his way of remembering’ (Freud, 
1914: Vol. XII: 150).  In the therapeutic transference such patterns often replicate 
the patient’s previous experience (Malan, 1979).  There is an elegance in this way 
of ‘remembering’ without consciously ‘knowing’ what is being remembered.  
‘The patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him, and what he 
cannot remember may be precisely the essential part of it’ (Freud, 1920: Vol. 
XVIII: 18).  We should consider why it is important to remember through 
repetition and the function of therapeutic transference.   
 
When the patient is unable to acknowledge the accuracy of the therapist’s 
interpretation he ‘is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary 
experience instead of, … remembering it as something belonging to the past’ 
(ibid: 18).  This is an important time distinction.  The patient remembers a past 
event as contemporary, unable to differentiate timeframes.  The analyst 
endeavours to bring as much as possible into conscious memory so as to minimise 
repetition.  ‘Resistance’ is a struggle between the conscious – the coherent ego – 
and the Unconscious – the repressed part of the ego.  These repetitions are 
doomed to fail in the form they present when ‘(l)oss of love and failure leave 
behind them a permanent injury to self-regard in the form of a narcissistic scar’ 
(ibid: 20), to be re-enacted endlessly in the ‘now’. 34   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Freud distinguishes between active repetition of the same experience, and the passive ‘perpetual 
recurrence of the same thing’ (ibid: 22).   
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In order to understand compulsion to repeat we link ‘the symptom to the system’ 
(Papp, 1983).  Freud suggests that ‘(t)he task is then simply to discover, in respect 
to a senseless idea and a pointless action, the past situation in which the idea was 
justified and the action served a purpose’ (Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI: 270).  Hence 
the importance of the past to understand current behaviour.  Obsessional patients 
‘have a tendency to repeat, to make their performances rhythmical and to keep 
them isolated from other actions’ (ibid: 270).  Obsessional behaviour incorporates 
its particular rhythms and timing in washing, checking, counting, or repeating.  
For some, ‘the same reactions are perpetually being repeated uncorrected, to their 
own detriment’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 106) while others can be deeply 
destructive.  ‘What earlier state of things does an instinct want to restore?’ (ibid: 
107).  Compulsion to repeat may also represent attempted restoration rather than 
overcoming.   
 
Compulsion to repeat is significant in treating ‘trauma’.  ‘These patients regularly 
repeat the traumatic situation in their dreams; … It is as though these patients had 
not finished with the traumatic situation, as though they were still faced by it as an 
immediate task which has not been dealt with’ (Freud, 1917: Vol.  XVI: 274-275).  
The individual is (trans)fixed in a present-past without release.  In Freud’s 
formulation of such mental processes he describes an ‘economic’ view having 
‘purpose’. 35  ‘Indeed the term ‘traumatic’ has no other sense than an economic 
one.  We apply it to an experience which within a short period of time presents the 
mind with an increase of stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in 
the normal way’ (ibid: 275).  This is a Western utilitarian approach.  An Eastern 
way would explain  this by spirits entering or a curse being laid.   
 
Dreams and memory.   
Although The Interpretation of Dreams dates from 1900 I have left Freud’s ideas 
about dreams until now because it is often highly speculative.  I have found this 
less useful when considering time, despite its importance for Freud and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Freud also describes instincts as ‘economic’, that is, having a ‘purpose’ such as to obtain 
pleasure (c.f., Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI: 356).   
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Unconscious, and how humans encode information at different stages of 
neurological maturation.   
 
In The Interpretation of Dreams we see the importance of the Unconscious and of 
not accepting what appears at face value, ‘the fundamental distinction between the 
manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. 
XXII: 8).  Freud describes overcoming resistances associated with forgetting, 
‘when … concealed purposive ideas assume control of the current ideas, and … 
superficial associations are only substitutes by displacement for suppressed deeper 
ones’ (Freud, 1900: Vol. V: 531).  Dreams are psychical acts having a future 
wish-seeking fulfilment motive, unrecognisable due to psychical censorship: 
‘(T)he scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life’ 
(ibid: 536).   
 
The different elements or ‘systems’ of dreams ‘stand in a regular spatial relation 
to one another’ (ibid: 537) similar to the sequence of lenses in a telescope, where 
‘in a given psychical process the excitation passes through the systems in a 
particular temporal sequence’ (ibid: 537). 36  Psychical processes move from 
perceptual to motor phenomena and ‘memory traces’ are left in the psychical 
apparatus.  Dreams are ways to remember past events or situations (sometimes 
without ‘remembering’ the memory) and as part of the royal road to the 
Unconscious they can signal anxieties about the future.  Yet, for all their 
immediacy and seeming reality, dreams occupy a different kind of time.   
 
Freud describes a structure of the perceptual (Pcpt.) system and different mnemic 
(Mnem.) systems.  There is a system that has no memory trace while other Mnem. 
systems hold different permanent traces where ‘(t)he first of these Mnem. systems 
will naturally contain the record of association in respect to simultaneity in time’ 
(Freud, 1900: Vol. V: 539).  The Pcpt. system is without memory but ‘provides 
our consciousness with the whole multiplicity of sensory qualities’ (ibid: 539).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Freud terms these ‘ψ-systems’.   
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Memory implies time, sequence, order, and the Unconscious (Ucs.) offers 
memory and time without conscious (Cs.) knowledge or recall.   
 
Dreams can have a powerful visceral quality and often recall early infantile 
experience that is highly visual, affective, sensory, and necessarily pre-language. 
37  Freud describes ‘regressions – that is thoughts transformed into images’ 
(Freud, 1900: Vol. V: 544), or ‘the process of transforming the thoughts into 
pictures’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 20).  Dreams are important, for ‘the influence 
of memories, mostly from childhood, which have been suppressed or have 
remained unconscious’ (Freud, 1900: Vol. V: 545).  Like hallucinations, they only 
lose their inchoate characteristic ‘in the process of being reported’ (ibid: 546).  
Most early childhood memories are visual, so it is strange that Freud emphasises 
the importance of repression, regression, and censorship, when there may be a 
simpler explanation:  
‘If we now bear in mind how great a part is played in the dream-thoughts 
by infantile experiences or by phantasies based upon them, … we cannot 
dismiss the probability that in dreams too the transformation of thoughts 
into visual images may be in part the result of the attraction which 
memories couched in visual form … bring to bear upon thoughts cut off 
from consciousness’ (ibid: 546).   
 
This helps explain Freud’s difficulties in translating pre-verbal material into adult, 
cognitive, verbal expression, typical in an educated Western context. Verbal 
communication is highly valued: ‘Nothing takes place in a psycho-analytic 
treatment but an interchange of words between the patient and the analyst’ (Freud, 
1916: Vol. XV: 17).  Freud realised this ‘language problem’: ‘what characterises 
the waking state is the fact that the thought-activity takes place in concepts and 
not in images.  Now dreams think essentially in images’ (Freud, 1900: Vol. IV: 
49), suggesting different kinds of psychological space and time. 38  From a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Anthropologist Gregory Bateson makes reference to dreams, and acknowledges that in dreaming 
there is no negative, as Freud suggests that in the id is no negation.  Bateson writes: ‘within dream 
or fantasy the dreamer does not operate with the concept ‘untrue’.  He operates with allsorts of 
statements but with a curious inability to achieve metastatements’ (Bateson, 1955: 158).   
38 Christopher Hauke argues that in film it is often the language of images that remains most 
powerfully in the memory.  It is a non- or pre-verbal representation that does not rely on spoken 
language for its effect (Hauke, 2013).  Similarly, the pre-verbal child may recall vividly an event 
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temporal perspective Freud observes: ‘… a dream might be described as a 
substitute for an infantile scene modified by being transferred on to a recent 
experience’ (Freud, 1900: Vol. V: 546).  Dreaming allows temporal and spatial 
transpositions of early experience to be disguised and attributed to other, later 
experience.   
 
Freud also claimed a much greater temporal memory and vista through dreams: 
‘(W)e are promised a picture of a phylogenetic childhood – a picture of the 
development of the human race’ (ibid: 548).  He believed dream analysis might 
provide access to evolutionary origins of our human archaic heritage on ‘the royal 
road to … the unconscious’ (Freud, 1910: Vol. XI: 33).   
 
Transference.   
Transference links with our thinking about compulsion to repeat: ‘(T)ransference 
is only a piece of repetition, and … repetition is a transference of the forgotten 
past not only on to the doctor but also on to the other aspects of the current 
situation’ (Freud, 1914: Vol. XII: 151).  This is a clear statement of a relationship 
between a past that is not remembered and the effect on relationships in the 
present.  Transference is central to the theory and practice of psychoanalytic 
therapies with implications for understanding experiences of time.  Its ‘range of 
use and span of meaning continues to represent a central aspect of the … 
therapeutic process in particular, and of the psychoanalytic psychology of 
interpersonal relationships in general’ (Sandler et al., 1997: 101).   
 
Freud first speaks of transference in The Psychotherapy of Hysteria when the 
patient transfers onto the therapist (physician) ideas that arise from treatment.  
The following is one of his earliest descriptions:  
‘What happened before was this.  The content of the wish had appeared 
first of all in the patient’s consciousness without any memories of the 
surrounding circumstances which would have assigned it to a past time.  
The wish which was present then, … linked to my person, with which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or period, but the channel of memory is more likely to be image or picture, or linked to other 
senses as in Proust’s madeleine biscuit.   
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patient was legitimately concerned; and as a result of this mésalliance – 
which I describe as a ‘false connection’ - the same affect was provoked 
which had forced the patient long before to repudiate this forbidden wish’ 
(Freud, 1895: Vol. II: 303).   
 
The pertinent elements are a wish appearing in the patient’s consciousness, 
without memory of its origins, attributing thoughts and affect from a previous 
period onto the physician in the present, making thereby a ‘false connection’ in a 
professional relationship.  David Malan describes this phenomenon in terms of the 
‘triangle of the person’ (Malan, 1979: 80) 39 such that the transference from the 
patient to the therapist in the present relates to or echoes current or recent past 
difficulties, that ultimately refer to an early and important relationship, usually 
parental.  He also terms this ‘a triangle of time’ (ibid: 80).  My focus is not on 
how to work with and through the transference in analytic practice, but to describe 
what occurs in treatment and the nature of this kind of time.   
 
Transference is a natural phenomenon and is important in facilitating healing; ‘It 
is everywhere the true vehicle of therapeutic influence; and the less its presence is 
suspected, the more powerfully it operates’ (Freud, 1910: Vol.  XI: 51). 
Transference in clinical practice raises interesting questions about time and 
potential temporal confusion.  Transferences ‘are new editions or facsimiles of the 
impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the 
progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, … that they replace some 
earlier person by the person of the physician’ (Freud, 1905: Vol. VII: 116).   
 
Resolving the transference is integral to psycho-analysis.  Unlike other 
approaches that preserve the transference relationship, ‘in analysis it is itself 
subjected to treatment and is dissected in all the shapes in which it appears.  At 
the end of an analytic treatment the transference must itself be cleared away’ 
(Freud, 1917: Vol. XVI: 453), putting an end to ‘new editions of the old conflicts’ 
(ibid: 454).  The consequence of working with the transference, of ‘constantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Malan attributes these ideas to Karl Menninger (1958) The Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique.  
New York.  Basic Books.   
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resolving the transference’ (ibid: 453) and its continuing dissection, ultimately to 
clear it away, is that the therapist often works simultaneously in different temporal 
frames.  The past is as if it were contemporaneous, and simultaneously the 
contemporary is often re-enactment of an unresolved past.   
 
Time in the transference is relational and interpersonal.  It takes what is happening 
to the patient in therapy, in relation to the patient’s current or recent experiences 
in the context of early life experiences, against a ‘canvas’ of the therapist’s 
history.  Western therapy takes place in a private, exclusive, professional 
relationship, and assumes many of the qualities peculiar to both people.  By 
peculiar qualities I mean their histories, culture, gender, ethnicity, and even 
physical characteristics. 40   
 
From this perspective, we see how time permeates Freud’s work.  Additionally, 
there is the time or length of psycho-analytic treatment.  Freud speaks of this in 
various places, but the basis for effective treatment is the relationship between the 
analyst and patient which requires time for trust to be created and for the therapist 
to understand what lies behind the presented problem(s).  There are two 
conditions for the patient to be helped: ‘First, the patient must, through 
preparation, himself have reached the neighbourhood of what he has repressed, 
and secondly, he must have formed a sufficient attachment (transference) to the 
physician for his emotional relationship to him to make a fresh flight impossible’ 
(Freud, 1910: Vol.  XI: 226).   
 
I will summarise.  If we take Freud’s views on time, what does he contribute?  He 
offers a model of the person returning to an archaic state, the world of the 
Unconscious, and pre-civilised conscience.  He proposes a model for compressing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 While much emphasis in the analytic world is on the individual and the importance of early life 
experiences, the relational is important: ‘the phenomena in which the psychiatrist is 
preponderantly interested, namely the changes whereby an individual comes to expect his world to 
be structured in one way rather than another.  These are the phenomena which underlie 
‘transference’ – the expectation on the patient’s part that the relationship with the therapist will 
contain the same sorts of contexts of learning that the patient has previously met with in dealing 
with his parents’ (Bateson, 1960: 220).   
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time, past, present and future, which co-exist within the same ‘picture’ or image.  
He suggests that in dreaming we return to a world free of responsibility, free of 
constraint, a timeless world of the Unconscious, a hallucinated world.  If we leave 
aside his complicated and complex structures of the mind of opposing forces, 
resistance, repression, and censorship, of the Unconscious, Preconscious and 
Conscious, and the relational structure of the id, ego and super-ego, he maps a 
Western mind of great complexity multi-layered in different time-frames.   
 
Mara Selvini Palazzoli (1911-1999).   
Invitation to circularity.   
Mara Selvini Palazzoli, psychiatrist and psychotherapist, was an innovator and 
leader in the field of family therapy in the latter part of the twentieth century until 
her death in 1999.  Her work and that of her colleagues had an impact on how we 
think about mental health, how we formulate recalcitrant problems, ways to treat 
psychotic behaviours and many other problems encountered in psychotherapy. 41  
The main texts consulted of which she was an author include: Palazzoli, (1974) 
Self-Starvation: From the Intrapsychic to the Transpersonal Approach to 
Anorexia Nervosa; Palazzoli et al., (1978) Paradox and Counterparadox: A New 
Model in the Therapy of the Family in Schizophrenic Transaction; Palazzoli, et 
al., (1986) The Hidden Games of Organizations; Palazzoli, et al., (1989) Family 
Games: General Models of Psychotic Processes in the Family.  Important articles 
of which Palazzoli was an author include: Palazzoli, et al., (1977) Family rituals: 
a powerful tool in Family Therapy; Palazzoli, et al., (1980) Hypothesising-
circularity-neutrality: three guidelines for the conductor of the session.   
 
Palazzoli’s early work was individually focused, psychoanalytic, specialising in 
treating anorexia nervosa.  She later moved to a family systems based approach.  
In her subsequent work (Milan Systemic therapy) she suggests that time plays an 
important part in understanding change.  This includes time between sessions.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The work I describe here originated in Milan (hence the epithet the Milan Group) at the Institute 
for Family Study, Milan, a non profit organization.  The four clinician-researchers were: Drs. 
Mara Selvini Palazzoli, Gianfranco Cecchin, Giuliana Prata, and Luigi Boscolo.  All were 
psychiatrists who had undergone psycho-analytic training.   
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She introduces her ideas about ‘the time of the system’ (the ‘ts’), part of which 
entails the ability to observe sequences of interaction that repeat or return to the 
‘same logical point’ (Howe, 1981), discussed in chapter 7.   
 
Many researcher-clinicians have built on her ideas, including from among her 
original collaborators: Boscolo, and Bertrando, (1993) The Times of Time; 
Boscolo and Bertrando (1996) Systemic Therapy with Individuals; Boscolo, et al., 
(1987) Milan systemic Family Therapy, and a seminal paper by Cecchin (1987), 
Hypothesising,	   circularity,	   and	   neutrality	   revisited:	   an	   invitation	   to	   curiosity.  
Others from different cultures espoused, worked with, and developed, these ideas, 
notably: Tom Andersen (1987, 1990) in Norway, David Campbell, (Campbell et 
al., 1994, Campbell and Draper, 1985, Campbell, Draper, and Huffington (1989), 
Campbell and Groenbaek, 2006) in the UK, and Karl Tomm (1987a, b, 1988) in 
Canada.   
 
In Self-Starvation (Palazzoli, 1974) Palazzoli describes her professional journey 
from the original Italian publication (1963) when working psychodynamically, to 
the revised 1974 English version and her growing interest in family therapy and 
the family of the anorexic patient.  She sums up the change in focus: ‘(I)f we take 
a transpersonal view of the family, all forms of mental illness must be considered 
logical adaptations to a deviant and illogical transpersonal system’ (Palazzoli, 
1974: 193).  A disturbed person only behaves ‘differently from a so-called normal 
person because he is reacting to a different situation’ (ibid: 193).  Psychotic 
behaviour makes sense once the psychotic situation is included in the description.  
These ideas owe much to Gregory Bateson’s work on communication and theories 
about schizophrenia and mental illness (Bateson, 1960, 1969, 1971; Bateson et al., 
1956). 42   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The film Family Life (Ken Loach, 1972) reflects this view, influenced by R. D. Laing (1965), 
who like Palazzoli was influenced by Bateson’s work.   
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Time of the system: the ‘ts’.   
Time is an important theme in Palazzoli’s work.  ‘(An) aspect of interpersonal 
communication that has not received enough attention is time (T).  As with X 
(content), Y (relationship), and N (field), it is possible to qualify every 
communication differently according to the value of time (T) within which the 
other variables occur’ (Palazzoli, 1986).  Time and timing of symptoms are 
important, linking onset to events in the family and to age (time) appropriate 
socio-culturally disrupted expectations.  ‘(W)e must map the time sequences and 
focus on them as closely as possible. … All time sequences relative to the 
symptom, … are of paramount interest to us’ (Palazzoli et al., 1989: 212).   
 
Sebastian Kraemer 43 proposes three questions when considering clinical 
problems, to which I have added a fourth.  All have temporal implications.  They 
are: “Why now?”  Why at this time even if the problems are longstanding is this 
now a problem?  “Why worry?”  Why should people be worried depending 
whether this is a normal life difficulty being treated as a serious problem or a 
serious problem that could lead to more serious consequences?  “What for?”  
What function or role does the problem play in stabilising the situation and what 
might be the concerns about potential change or improvement?  My fourth 
question is “What next?”  What are future implications and what needs to be 
different in the future?  These questions originate from thinking in the Milan 
model.   
 
Palazzoli’s clinical application of the ‘time of the system’ originates in Bateson’s 
work, most clearly described in The Cybernetics of Self.  Bateson points out a 
system characteristic that the behaviour of any part of / person in a system is 
partially prescribed by its previous behaviour which underlies temporal 
characteristics of all human systems.   
‘Message material … must pass around the total circuit, and the time 
required for the message material to return to the place from which it 
started is a basic characteristic of the whole system.  The behaviour of the 
governor (or any other part of the circuit) is thus in some degree 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Personal communication 1984.   
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determined, not only by its immediate past, but by what it did at a time 
which precedes the present by the interval necessary for the message to 
complete the circuit.  There is thus a sort of determinative memory in even 
the simplest cybernetic circuit’ (Bateson, 1971: 287).   
 
Bateson maintained that human beings in any system will be controlled to some 
extent by information in that system and will have to ‘adapt his own actions to its 
time characteristics and to the effects of his own past action’ (ibid: 287).  From 
this he argues that the mental characteristics of the system are immanent in the 
whole, not located in any single part.  This reflects his non-Western thinking 
about mind, pattern, communication, and relationships (Bateson, 1936), discussed 
in chapters 6 and 8.   
 
Palazzoli was aware of different experiences of time and place by her anorexic 
patients.  ‘(T)his space-time experience is one of the fundamental aspects of 
individual existence, of our particular life-style’ (Palazzoli, 1974: 140).  Her 
insight was how patients’ experience of time changes as they begin to recover as 
‘the patient (attempts) a reconstruction of her past experience of space and time’ 
(ibid: 140-141) she discovers a new relationship with her present and a different 
expected future.  One patient reports: “Now I live in time, and make the best of it.  
I used to be crushed by it, by my efforts to be ready for anything.  Now I am 
ready, precisely because I don’t have to be” (ibid: 142).  This reflects the 
changing time of the patient (her ‘time of the system’) as she recovered.   
 
Palazzoli describes the ‘time of the system’, or ‘ts’:  
‘Every system, … is not only characterised by a ps, or nodal point, which 
is peculiar to the system, but also by its own “time”.  By its very nature a 
system consists of an interaction, and this means that a sequential process 
of action and reaction has to take place before we are able to describe any 
state of the system or any change of state’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 14).   
 
There are important implications for therapy and understanding the time of 
change.  For ‘a sequential process of action and reaction’ to occur a certain period 
of time elapses, and in effective therapy an understanding of the ‘ts’ is integral to 
the process.  Whereas Freud would have spoken of resistance, Palazzoli suggests 
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where there are rigid homeostatic systems ‘the ts necessary for change is far 
greater than in flexible morphogenetic systems’ (ibid: 14-15).  When it comes to 
new ideas or challenging the family’s interactional rhythms a longer period of 
time is often necessary for the system (patient) to (re-)organise and incorporate 
changes in relating.  The team discovered that without leaving sufficient time 
between sessions there was not enough time for initial improvements to take root 
or for family members to react to (the perceived threat of) change.  Only with 
sufficient time can the therapist experience the ‘system’s’ habitual (by its ‘rules’) 
ways of dealing with the threat of change, which then enables the therapist to 
devise further interventions to provoke change.  This ‘leads to the hypothesis that, 
contrary to common practice, the intensity of therapy is not in direct relation to 
the frequency and total number of sessions’ (ibid: 180).   
 
Ts, families, and couples.   
The ‘ts’ is not solely the patient’s.  Each individual, couple, or family, has its ‘ts’.  
Equally there is the therapist’s ‘ts’, the system of therapy ‘ts’, and the socio-
cultural context in which the therapist works.  All have their own synchrony.  A 
simple example from my clinical practice will demonstrate this.   
 
Case vignette: time of the couple.   
Towards what I perceived to be the ending of treatment, I gave a couple a 
particular ritual of forgiveness (ritual, chapter 8) that they should jointly 
undertake outside the city away from their everyday context.  At each of the next 
three sessions I inquired if they had found an opportunity to do this.  Each time I 
inquired they agreed the ritual was important and explained why they had not had 
time.  At the fourth subsequent session they reported successful completion of the 
ritual.  They described in great detail how they had performed it, spending the 
whole afternoon in the process, the emotional ordeal it entailed, and the effects it 
had provoked.  They said that now they felt ready to end therapy.   
 
On reflection, I realised that my ‘ts’ as therapist thinking that now was right to end 
and their ‘couple ts’ were different.  No harm was done, and what they had written 
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down as part of the ritual to be carried out together had continued to exert its 
influence over the weeks, waiting to be performed when their ‘ts’ was right for 
ending.   
 
How we understand causality, whether linear or circular, and how we construe the 
world has significant implications for relationships.  This is discussed in Paradox 
and Counterparadox.  When human behaviour is understood as circular and 
systemic ‘any punctuation in the sense of before and after, cause and effect, can 
only be arbitrary’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 40).  Rather than attribute internal 
motivations or intrapsychic phenomena, behaviour is described in terms of 
‘moves’ and ‘games’ in the service of maintaining the dysfunctional stability of 
the system.  This is where it is helpful to hold in mind the four ‘why/what’ 
questions.  A common difficulty for family members is ‘the mistaken 
epistemology of the linear model’ (ibid: 41) of direct cause and effect that any one 
person can dominate or determine how others shall be.  Palazzoli argued that the 
old causal-mechanistic model of Western science should be replaced by a 
systemic orientation.  I quote at length:  
‘With this new orientation, the therapist should be able to see the members 
of the family as elements in a circuit of interaction.  None of the members 
of the circuit have unidirectional power over the whole, although the 
behaviour of any one of the members of the family inevitably influences 
the behaviour of others.  At the same time it is epistemologically incorrect 
to consider the behaviour of one individual as the cause of the behaviour 
of the others.  This is because every member influences the others, but is 
in turn influenced by them.  The individual acts upon the system, but is at 
the same time influenced by the communications he receives from it’ 
(ibid: 5).   
 
It is ‘epistemologically incorrect’ in a systemic framework to think of one person 
unilaterally causing another to act in a certain way. 44  This approach changes our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This understanding led to misunderstanding, since it suggests that the individual does not have 
responsibility.  A statement that ‘The power is only in the rules of the game which cannot be 
changed by the people involved in it’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 6) is almost a direct quotation from 
the work of Bateson.  It avoids the question of abuse of power in human relationships such as 
domestic violence or child abuse.   
It seems to me that part of the difficulty is confusing a conceptual level of description in order to 
understand the process and pattern, with what are appropriate actions in human relationships.  This 
is to some extent a ‘political’ question.  It is also about differentiating professional roles in mental 
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thinking about time and questions a dualistic world-view.  If causality is circular 
but time’s arrow has a linear direction, Palazzoli’s model requires a different 
understanding of time.   
 
In Milan Systemic therapy the therapist focuses on relationships as a countermove 
to patients’ attempts to control relationships where they perceive they have lost 
control and where attempts to control represent the epistemological error.  
Symptoms are seen in the context of particular relationships (the ps) at a particular 
time (ts).  Distress results in a positive feedback loop that increases the behaviour 
preceding the distress.  ‘Such positive feedback would provide a verification that 
it was really that particular behaviour which brought about the discomfort, and 
might increase the discomfort to some threshold level at which change would 
become possible’ (Bateson, 1971: 298).  In this model the patient’s activities 
become attempted solutions to problems that ‘resist’ resolution, and become ‘the 
problem’ (Watzlawick et al., 1974).  In Bateson’s words,  
‘the possible existence of such a positive feedback loop, which will cause 
a runaway in the direction of increasing discomfort … is not included in 
conventional theories of learning.  But a tendency to verify the unpleasant 
by seeking repeated experience of it is a common human trait.  It is 
perhaps what Freud called the ‘death instinct’’ (Bateson, 1971: 299). 45   
 
This reflects a different understanding of behaviours (symptoms) not reliant on 
repression or internal forces but on stuck, repeated relational problem-solving 
moves within a social relational context.   
 
The Palazzoli model introduces a time framework, the time of repetition, - that 
partially reflects Freud’s compulsion to repeat, - of pattern and rhythm, and from 
careful observation over time, of predictability of action and response.  In 
Palazzoli’s model this is the ‘time of the system’.  Freud identified this, yet his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
health work.  Haley makes the point: ‘What therapists have in common is independent of a 
particular profession. … A therapist must find a way to follow the rules of his clinical profession 
and also be a therapist, and at times the two are incompatible’ (Haley, 1980: 273).  Goldner 
(Goldner et al., 1990) and her colleagues address the problem of drawing on apparently 
incompatible models in their work with domestic violence.   
45 And also ‘the compulsion to repeat’.   
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medical model and socio-cultural context did not ‘allow’ him to consider such a 
relational intervention.   
‘No one who has any experience of the rifts which so often divide a family 
will, if he is an analyst, be surprised to find that the patient’s closest 
relatives sometimes betray less interest in his recovering than in remaining 
as he is.  When, as so often, the neurosis is related to conflicts between 
members of a family, the healthy party will not hesitate long in choosing 
between his own interest and the sick party’s recovery’ (Freud, 1917: Vol. 
XVI, 459). 46   
 
One of the difficulties is how to describe communication and relational being.  
Freud emphasises language and words in psycho-analysis.  Palazzoli suggests that 
‘we are imprisoned by the absolute incompatibility between the two primary 
systems in which the human being lives: the living system, dynamic and circular, 
and the symbolic system (language), descriptive, static, and linear’ (Palazzoli et 
al., 1978: 52).  We are constrained to use one means (language) to describe 
another (behavioural) ‘to use a dichotomization to describe a transaction, to use a 
dichotomization to introduce a series of dichotomizations’ (ibid: 52), in terms of 
‘before’ and ‘after’, of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’.  This easily results in dualistic 
thinking.  In a circular model it is possible to escape this dichotomization and see 
these as complementary aspects.   
 
Paradoxical communication.   
The Milan group identified a pattern in the lives of families with a schizophrenic 
member that they describe as paradoxical, like poker players constrained to win 
come what may but who only observe the actions of the other members ‘while 
remaining restrained by the shared and unspoken prohibition against placing the 
cards on the table once and for all’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 35).  It is a game where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 We have here an example of how theory informs behaviour.  In the same passage, Freud writes: 
‘Psycho-analytic treatment may be compared with a surgical operation and may similarly claim to 
be carried out under arrangements that will be most favourable for its success. … Ask yourselves 
how many of these operations would turn out successfully if they had to take place in the presence 
of all the members of the patient’s family, who would stick their noses into the field of the 
operation and exclaim aloud at every incision’ (ibid: 459).  It is precisely the reactions of family 
members, their beliefs about the patient’s behaviours, the patient’s responses to family members’ 
views and relationships, which becomes the field of observation and location of systemic 
treatment.   
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each participant has to believe he is winning but must keep this secret from the 
others. 47  ‘It is an absurd game, whose players are determined to prevail while 
remaining within a game whose principal rule precisely forbids either prevailing 
or, reciprocally, succumbing’ (Ibid: 35).  This game without end is timeless.  
Transactions are circular and symmetrical.  Each move is met by a countermove.  
Threats of withdrawing exacerbate the circular process, so the only way to leave is 
to become ‘different, alienated, estranged,’(ibid: 36) although physically present.  
This is  
‘the genius of the schizophrenic – who has become a master of the 
acrobatic leap from one logical level to another, who changes the logical 
level while signalling that he is not really changing it, who, like a Christ, 
has made the ultimate, supreme leap from the class of doing to the class of 
all classes, that of being’ (ibid: 36).   
 
When the nature of being remains indeterminate, when relationships are not and 
cannot be defined, the game becomes paradoxical.  The therapist who engages 
with this class of communication must understand phenomenologically the kinds 
of redundancy that the family employs as a first step to introducing therapeutic 
paradoxes (counter-paradoxes) that will ultimately break the timeless circular 
game.   
 
The team realised they had to take account of the ‘ts’ of the family, and that to 
interrupt the family’s rhythm longer intervals between sessions were needed.  
This allowed the therapists to observe more accurately feedback from the previous 
session ‘proceeding by layers, almost in a circular manner, from the outermost 
points toward the central nodal point, action upon which can trigger the greatest 
transformation’ (ibid: 49).  The more stuck the family, the longer the interval 
between sessions (Boscolo et al., 1987). 48  The focus is to understand and defeat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ‘Game’ has nothing to do with fun, relaxation, enjoyment.  Relationships as games can be 
abusive and dangerous.  They may be lethal.  War is a ‘game’ which has rules that are often 
broken.  Eric Berne (1968) uses the idea of ‘game’ in Transactional Analysis.  Every ‘game’ has 
its duration, rhythm, and pattern and rules for extending duration by injury or extra time.   
48 This is counter-intuitive.  In a rational world, the more stuck, the more serious the situation, the 
more frequent should be the therapeutic sessions.  To do this would be to join the patient’s game, 
where the patient ‘has’ to defeat the therapy.  There is a paradoxical feel to the ‘message’ given by 
the therapist that so serious is the problem, a longer interval between sessions is called for.   
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the game, not the individual or the family, and time is always part of any ‘game’.  
As Boscolo comments, ’I like to use time interventions because I think that one of 
the sources of “pathology” in families is the rigid ideas about time people impose 
on their relationships’ (Boscolo et al., 1987: 250).   
 
Circular questions.   
An important therapeutic interviewing technique based on their systemic 
epistemology was ‘circular questioning’.  Hypothesising, circularity, neutrality: 
three guidelines for the conductor of the session, (Palazzoli et al., 1980) describes 
the therapist’s stance outlined in Paradox and Counterparadox (Palazzoli et al., 
1978).  Many clinicians have taken these ideas further (Andersen, 1987, 1990; 
Anderson and Goolishian, 1992; Campbell and different colleagues, 1985, 1989, 
2006; Hoffman, 1985, 1990; Penn, 1985; Tomm, 1978a, b, 1988) among others.   
 
Circular questioning intends as much to introduce information into the human 
system as to elicit information (Tomm, 1987a, b, 1988).  Questions are relational, 
involving the perceptions of one or more persons with respect to at least one 
other.  Explicitly or implicitly they explore the nature of relationships between 
those present or absent, within different timeframes (past, present, future) actual 
or hypothetical.  Circular questioning addresses behaviours, beliefs, experience, 
feelings, or emotions.  In every instance time contexts are central.  For example, 
depending on the context of the patient, circular questions might include:  
o “Who would be most likely to notice if Anne were beginning to feel 
depressed again?”   
o “How long would Anne have to be depressed before someone noticed?”   
o “Who would care for your mother if she again began to feel it was her 
fault that Anne was struggling?”   
o “When Johnny gets angry, how would you like your mother to support 
your father in being the kind of father he would like to be?”   
o “If Jane got better too quickly, who do you think would be most likely to 
be upset?”   
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o “How does your mother show your father that she needs his support?”  
“How do you think your father feels when your mother tries to support 
him?”   
o “Who will first notice that there is some kind of improvement in the 
family?”   
o “If you had not moved from the city, how do you think that family 
relationships might have been different?”, then naming each family 
member in turn.   
 
These questions inquire about timed events, often containing or challenging 
assumptions about family relationships.  Members are invited to comment on 
others’ views or feelings, thus putting them into other people’s shoes, forcing 
them to take a view from that person’s or that relational perspective.  This 
‘introduces information’ for everyone about beliefs, fears, hopes, the unspoken, in 
the family.  Such questioning is equally effective when seeing couples or patients 
individually (Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins and Asen, 1992).   
 
In The Times of Time, Boscolo and Bertrando, (1993) take time as a thread in 
systemic psychotherapy.  They suggest three relevant ‘time domains’: 
Phenomenological time when an individual observes himself, called this ‘because 
phenomenologists have been most interested in defining time in this way’ 
(Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993: 43).  Sociological time is ‘the time of interactive 
systems’ (ibid: 43).  Anthropological time, the time ‘based on the general assent 
of the individuals and human groups that make up a culture’ (ibid: 43).  
Sociological and anthropological time as described seems a weak distinction, but I 
later develop the concept of multi-layered time in the Durkheim tradition (chapter 
5).   
 
Bosoclo and Bertrando develop the early ideas of the ‘ts’.  They quote Zerubavel’s 
four time perspectives:  
‘One fundamental parameter of situations and events is their sequential 
structure, which tells us in what order they take place. A second major 
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parameter, their duration, tells us how long they last.  A third parameter, 
their temporal location, tells us when they take place, whereas a fourth 
parameter, their rate of occurrence, tells us how often they do’ (Zerubavel, 
1981: 1). 49   
 
Over half their chapters are devoted to clinical examples.  They usefully highlight 
the danger of diagnosis as ‘a label which is by definition timeless’ (ibid: 15).  
Diagnosis freezes the present, begins to fix the future, and narrows options for 
change. 50  In systemic thinking, the future can greatly influence the outcome of 
the present and it has been a focus for clinical innovation (de Shazer, 1991; Penn, 
1985; Seikkula and Olson, (2003).   
 
Let us consider these four time elements in Alex’s case vignette in this chapter.  
We had sequential structure of future time to deal with anger; duration was 
reflected in the thirteen years of analysis and the proposed five more years; this 
should take place now as temporal location before ending; and the rate of 
occurrence should be as previously.  The analyst’s response to the decision to end 
therapy illustrates how ‘the therapist’s idea of the time needed for successfully 
ending therapy may have a very important pragmatic effect in promoting, 
accelerating, or slowing down change’ (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996: 59).   
 
Comparing the ‘time’ of Freud and Palazzoli.   
Freud and Palazzoli’s views about time differ markedly.  In the broadest terms 
Freud centres on the individual and the intrapsychic world.  The Unconscious is 
timeless.  Events from the past are replayed, often unrecognisably.  Early 
experiences are re-enacted (endlessly) in adult relationships and may be 
transposed onto the relationship with the analyst in a phenomenon termed 
transference.  The therapist needs to be sensitive to how peculiarities in the patient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Zerubavel, E., (1981) Hidden Rhythms.  Schedules and Calendars in Social Life.  Chicago.  
University of Chicago Press.  Cited in Boscolo and Bertando, (1993: 54).   
50 ‘He is depressed’ defines the person as he is, as an embodiment of depression, rather than 
showing more or less depressed behaviour in different circumstances.  See also Palazzoli et al., 
1978.   
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may reactivate her/his own early experiences that we term counter-transference. 51  
A common characteristic portrays an internal and internalised world, a mental 
structure characterised by the ego, id, and super-ego as opposing forces in a 
mental layering of the Unconscious, Preconscious, and Conscious.   
 
A dominant theme involves chronology of an infant-past held timelessly in the 
mental structure of the (chronological) adult.  Stern (1998: 19) refers to 
‘developmental theorists working backwards in time’ where normal 
developmental stages are later used ‘to explain ontogeny of pathogenic forms’ 
(ibid: 20).  Such emphasis on long-term aetiology is mirrored in psychoanalysis 
by (increasingly, [Green, 2002]) long-term therapy with brief intervals between 
sessions delving ‘archaeologically’ into not-known-as-remembered (unconscious) 
history in order to achieve developmental change.  The analyst becomes a 
uniquely important figure for the patient and simultaneously endeavours to reveal 
as little personal detail as possible, to avoid contaminating the site of activity. 52   
 
The Milan Systemic model differs in significant aspects, although the team 
carried some of their ‘psycho-analytic history’ in their stance of neutrality 
(Palazzoli et al., 1980) by not revealing personal details to the patient and being 
agnostic about how the patient should respond.  They often had recourse to 
conceptualising psychoanalytically behind the one-way screen, but drew on their 
systemic Batesonian approach for designing and delivering interventions. 53   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In counter-transference, ‘counter’ may be understood as ‘in opposition’ or ‘in parallel’ (Sandler 
et al., 1992).   
52 This stance can have a paradoxical Alice in Wonderland feel to it.  Not to reveal, to withhold as 
much as possible, to minimize personal or other information about the therapist in the consulting 
room (unlike Freud’s room) reveals as much about the therapist as it hides.   
53 At an international family therapy conference in Budapest, c1990, we arranged a lunch-time 
dialogue session with two of the original Milan team, Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco Cecchin, at 
the outpatient department of the ‘Lipot’ psychiatric hospital where I was running a three year 
training programme.  Our guests claimed that establishing a close personal rapport with the patient 
was not central to their work, unlike the approach of Salvador Minuchin, (1974).  However, 
listening to how they discussed their work and observing their practice, it is clear that their 
effectiveness was due to their powerful presence with their patients.  What we say we do or do not 
do is not necessarily an accurate reflection of practice.   
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Systemic time is primarily located externally in the social sphere while 
acknowledging the internal intrapsychic space.  The sense of internalised time is 
more inter- and intra-generational time of family beliefs that may affect change in 
the contemporary family system.  Palazzoli’s emphasis on time echoes Freud’s 
‘time of the system’ but of different systems.  The system for Palazzoli is the 
immediate family or larger social group (Palazzoli et al., 1986) over 
intergenerational time.  The times that Palazzoli emphasises are duration of 
treatment (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993; Palazzoli et al., 1978) and a view of 
brief therapy (ten or so sessions) over an extended period (one to two years). 54   
 
The belief that each family has its own time or rhythm (Boscolo et al., 1987; 
Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993) is a theme throughout their work, even to putting 
the family in charge of knowing when will be the right time to change, and 
supporting them if now was not the right time.  Of course, timing in 
psychodynamic psychotherapy is important, and Casement (1985) reminds us that 
a ‘correct’ interpretation delivered at the wrong moment (not the patient’s ‘ts’ for 
change) will not be effective.  The Milan team realization that longer intervals 
between sessions are often more effective seems counter-intuitive.  It locates 
tension and responsibility for change in the family system rather than the 
therapist.   
 
Unlike much psycho-analytic practice, an active time dimension introduced by the 
Milan school is made specific by asking questions about the future, derived from 
the patient or the therapist as expected or feared, (Penn, 1985; Tomm, 1987a, b, 
1988).  One advantage about a future orientation, however difficult, is that as it 
has not happened no one can be blamed.   
 
These ideas reflect different notions of time, neither being right or wrong.  When 
they are not set up in opposition (as has historically not been the case) they 
generate a unique bin-ocular vision.  They provide the foundation from which to 
examine a number of philosophical and anthropological descriptions of time.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Long term, brief therapy.   





Epistemologies of time: philosophical perspectives. 
The Ancients. 
 
‘If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are’  
(Augustine, 1961: 267).   
 
Aims.   
I begin this chapter on philosophical perspectives on time with a caveat.  ‘To most 
people who have been educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical 
which is not also conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and 
refutable simply by logic’ (Freud, 1923: Vol: XIX: 13).  Because an idea or 
feeling is not consciously known does not preclude its reality, but such a view 
suggests possible difficulties for us in the philosophical world.   
 
I examine time from chosen philosophical views, a very different world to 
anthropology and psychotherapy.  It is a world often of abstraction and reason, 
which has its critics among philosophers (Midgley, 2005).  I explore whether 
philosophical approaches can enhance our understanding of time and change in 
psychotherapy.  If it seems I am plundering ideas from outside my field, in a sense 
this is true, but I have no hesitation to inquire how scholarship from other 
disciplines can enhance my professional world.   
 
I have chosen certain Western philosophers who have attended to time to help me 
explore psychotherapeutic time.  Being such a large field I have to be selective.  I 
have chosen three philosophers from ancient Greece: Parmenides, Plato, and 
Aristotle, and then St Augustine, in this chapter.  In chapter 4, I mainly take 
philosophers from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, being at least partially 
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contemporary with Freud and Palazzoli.  These include Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, J.M.E. McTaggart, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricoeur.   
 
In this chapter I consider Parmenides’ understanding of our ability to self-reflect, 
and whether it is meaningful to think of past or future.  I examine the ‘instant’, or 
‘moment’ in Plato’s Parmenides and Timaeus, and Aristotle’s ideas about the now 
and the relationship between time as number and change.  These are relevant, but 
it is not yet clear whether they add to notions of time in psychotherapy.  I address 
Augustine’s question about what time is, when it is ‘known’ but cannot be 
articulated, and whether this usefully adds to my quest.  All this may be 
problematic, since in therapy we often start from abnormal states of mind to 
understand the ‘normal’ 55 while philosophy begins with and usually remains with 
the ‘normal’.   
 
Language is important.  I have used certain words in the preceding paragraph that 
can be interchangeable but also have specific connotations.  They are: instant, 
moment, now, present.  Some writers favour one above the others.  ‘Moment’ is 
perhaps the most ambiguous.  It means ‘instant’ as a specific point in time, 
seemingly without duration.  Or ‘moment’ has duration, albeit short, involving 
more of a sense of beginning and end.  We might be ‘in the moment’, even in the 
‘now’, but to describe now or instant is to accept that that moment is already past 
and no longer ‘now’.  This links with the phenomenon of change, and even how 
models of psychotherapy locate the site and nature of change differently.  For 
some thinkers ‘now’ has more shape and thickness:  
‘The central idea about different moments of change is this: During these 
moments a “real experience” emerges, somewhat unexpectedly.  This 
experience happens between two (or more) people.  It is about their 
relationship.  It occurs in a very short period of time that is experienced as 
now.  That now is a present moment with duration in which a micro-
drama, an emotional story, about their relationship unfolds. … The 
moment enters a special form of consciousness and is encoded in memory.  
And importantly, it rewrites the past’ (Stern, 2004: 22).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This is not always the case: see Carter et al. (1989a), Lewis et al. (1976), Walsh (1982).   
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Stern suggests that change occurs in a step-wise, non-linear form, which is just 
outside or beyond the ordinary and everyday.   
 
The two case vignettes of Caitlin and Peter, and Dan, provide a psychotherapeutic 
thread to ground the material clinically and contextualise some of these 
philosophical thoughts.  Discussion of their relevance to time in psychotherapy 
comes at the end of the chapter.   
 
Case vignette: Caitlin and Peter.   
Caitlin and Peter were seen in therapy for eight months.  They had been in an 
emotionally fraught relationship for eighteen months.   
 
In one session, they described an incident that seemed characteristic of their 
relationship.  The previous week they were outside a theatre and Caitlin ‘lost’ 
Peter.  She had left him five minutes earlier to collect their tickets.  He was not 
there on her return, and he had turned off his phone.  When she eventually found 
him she could not contain her rage at him for abandoning her.   
 
It became apparent in therapy that Caitlin’s feelings of abandonment were 
unbearably ‘real’ in a horrible past-intruding-on-the-present experience.  Her 
sense of what had been then and what was now had become confused.  She 
described how, in that moment, she began to relive her history of an emotionally 
absent mother and physically abandoning father as she searched for Peter.  It was 
a sense of primitive, emotional loss, compounded by the memory of her mother’s 
gruesome death while drunk in a fire six years earlier.   
 
At that moment outside the theatre, her sense of self-being collapsed as her past 
flooded her present.  Her impotent rage, fear of losing Peter, and fragile sense of 
self-worth, were like a terrified child’s, as he now embodied everyone who had 
ever let her down.  She described how her presentness had reverted to an earlier 
present.  In that instant of panic she had felt again like an abandoned child.  
Caught in her ‘time warp’, she could not step outside this fugue moment and 
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‘mentalise’ her then-as-now-self. 56  Such moments of intense experience often 
result in a serious reduction in ‘the ability to check and evaluate one’s own mental 
states’ (Asen and Fonagy, 2012: 353) with increased likelihood of attributing 
negative feelings to others.  In this process all sense of time (chronos) can 
disappear.   
 
Although focusing here on Caitlin, it emerged how Peter’s old scripts 
complemented hers.  They included never feeling good enough, feeling criticised 
or always in the wrong, and fearful of the intimacy he craved.  His obsessional 
preoccupation with his artistic life and need for affirmation reinforced Caitlin’s 
repeated sense of exclusion, loss, and invisibility.   
 
There is a delicate balance in such a situation.  The therapist has to navigate these 
confusing and conflicting processes, ever aware of past-present confusions and 
present-future anxieties.  If his focus stays only on the present-moment he will not 
engage them (Jenkins, 2005), and if he focuses only on the couple’s re-activated 
pasts, he risks becoming a prisoner of their fears like them (Jenkins, 2006).   
 
There were other time considerations for therapy.  These included the boundaried 
time of the sessions that never seemed long enough; the time of their short 
relationship which had stalled, never progressing beyond an initial ‘falling in 
love’ addictive romantic stage of sexual abandonment in the other (Fishbane, 
2007) that returned endlessly to ‘the same logical point’ (Howe, 1981); 57 and the 
child-like age (time) at which they experienced themselves when distressed.  
Inside and outside shifting realities of time and place in their relationship became 
part of their endless struggle to relate safely enough to each other (Jenkins, 2006).  
Often, ‘relationships are a cure, and that’s the problem’ 58 in attempting to resolve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 ‘Mentalising’ refers to an ability to self reflect, to see others as other, the self as then and now, 
with a sense narrative.  Seeing oneself from the outside and the other from the inside is part of this.  
(Eia Asen and Peter Fonagy: Mentalising Families and Couples, workshop, Institute of Family 
Therapy, London, 1st December 2011.)   
57 It is perhaps no coincidence that the French phrase for the moment of sexual ecstasy is ‘la petite 
mort’.  Death may be seen when time (as we know it) ends or is eternal.   
58 Christopher Dare, personal communication, 2009.   
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earlier problems or heal past hurts.  Caitlin’s subjective experience of not-being is 
acute.  Nothing is real and all is too real.  Neither state feels survivable in that 
instant of abandonment.  In their therapy it was difficult to create a safe enough 
relationship that would survive their anxieties about change, just as they 
repeatedly shied away in their relationship from an intimacy that would have 
enabled this by always seeking sexual intimacy that ‘anaesthetised’ past and 
current hurts and blocked self-reflection.   
 
After serious difficulties or temporary estrangement their pattern of re-connecting 
was passionate, ‘perfect’ sexual intercourse, with the intention then of talking 
about their relationship, their needs, and their future.  In their desperate search for 
intimacy they sought the momentary solace of a ‘petite mort’ of orgasmic losing 
self in the other.  While complaining in individual sessions that they never 
resolved anything, Peter was unable to ensure that they spoke before love-making 
so that their sexual union could then become a celebration of what they could 
share, rather than avoidance of self-reflecting emotional intimacy and 
vulnerability.   
 
Conversation requires and takes time.  It has a ‘thickness’.  Orgasmic climax 
transported them out of time lost in a moment of the paradoxical ‘petite mort’ of 
fleeting eternity.  Their out-of-time ecstasy interrupted the possibility of in-time 
intimacy.  To reverse the phenomenological order of what came before and what 
came after held the key to facing their dilemmas about intimacy.  If we think 
strictly in temporal terms for Caitlin, we see the crystallization of her past into her 
present, which blocks her.  In order to live in the present and with hope it is her 
future potential that needed to crystallise into her present.   
 
Holding these ideas, I turn to concepts of time from the early period of Western 
philosophy.   
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Parmenides.   
Parmenides’ influence in twenty-first century Western thought is far-reaching.  He 
challenges his contemporaries’ understanding about how we think, and his ideas 
permeate to the present time.   
‘Parmenides’s ideas have had so powerful a grip on the evolution of 
scientific ideas … Indeed, admiring or appreciating the ideas of both 
‘classical’ and ‘modern’ physics is … almost the same thing as 
appreciating the influence of Parmenidean ideas’ (Popper, 1965: 147).   
 
Parmenides of Elea, (515-440 BC) was known as Ouliades Physikos or healer 
philosopher (Geldard, 2007) thus reflecting the historical relationship of 
philosophy and healing.  Both disciplines share an interest in the human mind, 
knowing, and the ability to reflect (Asen and Fonagy, 2012).  Parmenides’ poem 
On Nature 59 is divided into two, The Way of Truth and The Way of Opinion 
sometimes translated as The Way of Illusion.  It provides an early example of, ‘the 
consciousness of the ‘knowing animal’ ’ (Tallis, 2007: 2), and awareness of truths 
that originate beyond immediate experience.  This is similar to psychotherapy.   
‘Presocratic philosophy in the fifth and sixth centuries BCE marked a 
crucial step in the long transformation of human beings from stimulus-
driven sentient beasts to enquiry-driven persons. … The ‘Parmenidean 
moment’ was key to this step’ (ibid: 11).   
 
Parmenides attempted to understand the nature of change and invariance, how we 
know, and how we know that we know.  Without knowing that we know, lacking 
awareness of self as self and other as other, there is only the immediate moment.  
Not knowing that we know does not preclude memory but it precludes the ability 
to articulate that memory and give it explicit meaning.  A sense of self in different 
places implies a sense of time, or some way to identify difference, even if only as 
a sequence of Nows (Barbour, 2000).   
 
There appears to be no past or future in The Way of Truth.  Things either are or 
they are not, and if they are not it is impossible to conceive of them: ‘Never must 
you come to think that Nothingness can be’ (Geldard, 2007: 25).  Parmenides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Only some hundred lines or fragments remain.   
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questions the existence of being and time.  He asserts that now exists without past 
or future.  And if there is only One and no ‘coming-to-be’, there is only infinite 
eternity without beginning or end.  Appealing to reason Parmenides describes an 
endless now without past or future, the absurd in contemporary existentialism 
(Camus, 1957; Sartre, 1938, 1945; Stevens, 1997) with no clearer conclusion to 
the nature of our universe than contemporary science (Barbour, 2000; Falk, 2004, 
2009; Hawking, 1990, Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010).  The Way of Truth 
therefore reflects the uncompromising world as it is:  
‘Nor can Being be divided, since it is all One.   
Nor can it be dissolved, to become a lesser thing,  
But all things are full of Being and continuous.   
For Being holds Being close in powerful bonds,  
Without beginning or ending, because Becoming  
And Extinction have been driven far away.   
True conviction has sent them far away’ (Geldard, 2007: 26).   
 
Only ‘what is, is’, and ‘nothingness cannot exist’.  According to reason all is 
immutable, and change is impossible, unlike the world of seeming, change, and 
flux of The Way of Opinion.  This world leads to the delusion that ‘the world 
order (diakosmos) of change’ (Popper, 1965: 149) exists.  It is not to be trusted, 
but results in false understanding of ‘the unfounded conventional claims of 
knowledge: the claim that we know from our senses that this world of change 
does exist’ (ibid: 149).   
 
In the history of thought, an important element for some scholars is the 
relationship of reason/logic and sense/subjective, but Parmenides dismisses the 
subjective as untrustworthy.  Being is continuous, indivisible, without beginning 
or ending.   
‘Only one account of the Way remains: Being Is!   
Along this path are many signs: Being is uncreated,  
Eternal, Whole, of only one substance, unmoved  
And without end …  
 
Nor can we say it Was or it Will Be,  
Because It Is Now, Whole, One, Continuous.   
 
For Nothingness has no words or cohering thought.   
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Nor can It come to be in some future time.   
Thus, coming-to-be and dying are unheard of’ (Geldard, 2007: 25).   
 
Time implies beginning and ending in human experience, but such human 
subjectivity is untrustworthy.  If Parmenides is correct, we are left with 
uncertainty about how to deal with subjective experience, even if of a now devoid 
of past or future.   
 
Part of Parmenides’ contribution is to question how we know the world.  He 
proposes reason as the basis for knowledge:  ‘His proofs are by reductio ad 
absurdum’ (Popper, 1965: 160).  There is ‘a theoretical world of reality behind the 
phenomenal world of experience’ (Ibid: 160).  Behind this world of experience 
and appearance possibly lies the unchanging world of what is, which means we 
should mistrust The Way of Opinion and accept only unchanging timeless time.  
Appealing to ‘let highest Reason judge’ (Geldard, 2007: 24) Parmenides 
dismisses the illusory world of subjective experience.   
 
Caitlin struggled with feeling she did not have a stable sense of self-being.  She 
desperately wanted her life and relationships to be different, yet change terrified 
her.  How could she change and still remain who she was if she had no sense of 
self?  She lived her life mainly in a changing world of feeling and subjectivity, the 
not-to-be-trusted Way of Opinion/Illusion, fleeing her personal Way of Truth, the 
pain of ‘what is, is’ and believing that nothingness can exist and is too awful to 
contemplate.  Parmenides seems to offer either-or; the world is one way and not 
the other.  Time exists or does not exist when a perspective that embraced both-
and in different measure would reflect the greater complexity of Caitlin’s world.   
 
Parmenides raises an important issue therapeutically.  He explores the problem of 
change and how a thing can change and still be itself.  If change is possible, it 
must occur presumably in a context of time and space; ‘How can a thing change 
without losing its identity?  If it remains the same, then it does not change; yet if it 
does not remain the same, then it is no longer that thing that has changed’ 
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(Popper, 1973: 113).  The popular French aphorism, ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose’ conceals a Parmenidean truth.  Change and time are central to 
psychotherapy as is ‘the intuition that beneath the surface of ever-changing 
appearance there is an immutable, unalterable, undifferentiated reality, an 
intuition which was undeniably Parmenidean, [that] has been hugely influential’ 
(Tallis, 2007: 16).  Or, possibly, change occurs out of time, requiring a different 
order of description.  If so, we must ask how that can be.   
 
Plato.    
Parmenides influenced Plato who confronted these same questions about time in 
Parmenides and Timaeus.  Both were written in his later period. 60  Before 
outlining the main arguments in these texts as they relate to time, I describe an 
incident in therapy with Dan.  One difference to Caitlin’s experience is that this 
occurs in the session.  In both instances events relate to their history and memory, 
but my recounting of them is different.  Caitlin’s recounts an earlier event, while 
Dan’s is my contemporaneous account.  Apart from the events, these are simple 
examples of kinds of memory, autonoetic and semantic (Tulving, 2005) that I 
discuss in chapter 5.   
 
Case vignette: Dan’s rage.   
I saw Dan and his wife in couple therapy.  He also saw a male therapist in 
individual therapy.  In the previous session Dan described how well a weekend 
camping in the New Forest with his adult son from his first marriage had gone.  
Now, he seemed despondent about himself as son, husband, and father, and his 
rage took over.  Instead of articulating it symbolically in words, he began to roar, 
punching the small table beside him until it half collapsed under his assault.  Still 
shouting, he picked up a pot-plant, banged it on the half-destroyed table, shook it 
at me, and got up to leave.  I quietly said: “Please sit down, Dan”.  After a pause 
he sat down, angry, but now crying.  Then came the story of all the men who had 
let him down; absent father, sexually abusing male teacher, his male therapist, me, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 There is some question as to whether the Timaeus belongs to the middle period.  The general 
consensus seems to favour his later period with Timaeus following Parmenides.   
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- among others, all those he wanted to annihilate.  At that moment, the invisible 
boundary between the symbolic therapeutic relationship where he could talk out 
his despair and the urge to act out his rage at all men who disappoint hung in the 
balance.   
 
He railed against me like a helpless child flailing at adults who are 
uncomprehending of his elemental needs for comfort and affirmation, and 
simultaneously as someone who is aware of himself as an adult in the present.  
Unlike the experience of patients who lose all sense of where they are spatially or 
temporally as Caitlin reported, he remained conscious of his adult physical 
presence and overwhelmed by his primitive ‘narcissistic’ hurt.  This moment is 
not simply Plato’s instant out of time that we will consider.  It is more complex 
embodying thickness and depth (Husserl, 1991, discussed in chapter 4).   
 
Parmenides.   
The main protagonists are Parmenides, a young Socrates and an Aristotle.  How 
much represents Plato’s own views in this and the other dialogues is open to 
question but we may assume that it is mainly through Parmenides that Plato 
speaks.  Early in the debate the proposition concerns the nature of ‘forms’:  
‘ “And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other 
have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that 
belong to us. … These things that belong to us, although they have the 
same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to 
themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this 
way are of themselves but not of the forms.” ’  (Plato, 1997: 367-368.)   
 
Discussion of the nature of forms, patterns of forms, the property of different 
levels of understanding, and relationships between parts and wholes, runs 
throughout the discourse: ‘ “…(F)orms are what they are of themselves and in 
relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what 
they are in relation to themselves” ’ (ibid: 368).  Our relationships are not with 
abstract concepts, mastery or slavery for instance, but with the person who is 
master or slave.  Parmenides questions the nature of philosophy.  The 
philosopher’s place is to hypothesise the consequence if the thing is, and the 
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consequence if the same thing is not, for to achieve a full view of the truth, a 
philosopher must ‘hypothesise as being or as not being’ (ibid: 370).   
 
The example of time arises from this debate about like and unlike.  Its nature, 
existence, and measurement, are not in question here.  Time, being older than, or 
younger than, or the same age as, are the subject matter in regard to likeness, 
unlikeness and ‘equality of time’ (ibid: 375).  The first attempt in this dialogue to 
define an understanding of time follows a debate about the nature of older and 
younger.   
‘ “Now, don’t you think that ‘was’ and ‘has come to be’ and ‘was coming 
to be’ signify partaking of time past?”  -  “By all means.”  -  “And again 
that ‘will be’ and ‘will come to be’ and ‘will be coming to be’ signify 
partaking of time hereafter?  -  “Yes.” - “And that ‘is’ and ‘comes to be’ 
signify partaking of time now present?”  -  “Of course.”  -  “Therefore, if 
the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time 
come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to 
be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be.”  -  
“Very true.”  -  “Could something partake of being except in one of those 
ways?”  -  “It couldn’t.” ’  (ibid. p. 375.)   
 
Plato does not explore the relationships between these three aspects of time.  
While it could be possible to partake ‘of no time at all’, there are only three ways 
of being in time - past, future, or present.  ‘To be’ in any sense means to be in one 
of these time perspectives, for partaking of no time at all is not to exist.   
 
In the example Dan, even in his rage, participates in time, remains conscious of 
where he is.  However desperate he feels, he is able to remain at least partly 
present.  However, it seems likely that qualitatively, Caitlin ceases to know 
herself existing consciously at moments of acute distress, as when she 
experienced abandonment by Peter.    
 
Parmenides observes that logically there must be a state where time ceases, 
(Caitlin/Peter), or at least there is a different kind of time, (Dan).   
‘ “The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from 
it to each of two states.  For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest 
continues, or from motion while motion continues.  Rather, this queer 
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creature, the instant, lurks between motion and rest – being in no time at 
all – and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the 
resting thing changes to moving.  …  But in changing, it changes at an 
instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just then it 
would be neither in motion nor at rest” ’ (ibid: 388).   
 
This is an attempt to understand ‘the now’, or ‘instant’ in and out of time that, 
constantly in flux, is forever in the moment, time without length: ‘(w)hen it is 
present it has no duration’ (Augustine, 1961: 266).  Parmenides questions the 
nature of time and whether one can partake of it.  He concludes that by being, we 
necessarily partake of time.  ‘ “But is to be simply partaking of being with time 
present, just as was is communion with being together with time past, and, in turn 
will be is communion with being with time future?” … “So the one partakes of 
time, if it in fact partakes of being” ’ (Plato, 1997: 384).  This does not resolve the 
nature of ‘being’, and hence time, a preoccupation of twentieth century 
existentialist philosophers (Sartre, 1943, 1944, 1945).   
 
Plato’s Parmenides implies the indissolubility of being and time, leaving the 
nature of ‘the instant’ unresolved.  I suggest that the ‘instant’ offers an overlooked 
way of conceptualising those fleeting moments where change occurs in 
psychotherapy, at the moment of being ‘in no time at all’ while simultaneously 
‘the one partakes of time’.   
 
These two contentions seem mutually exclusive.  They may be so in Parmenides’ 
The Way of Truth, but maybe they can co-exist in the untrustworthy subjective 
state of The Way of Opinion.   If so, we face different levels of experience and 
different kinds of time.  This instant (now) may be the sine qua non for change as 
a disjunctive moment ‘in no time at all’ which is necessary to uncouple the what-
is-known-before from an unknown-hereafter in a particular kind of instant (time).  
I suggest this invisible instant has been neglected in understanding what happens 
to time and change in psychotherapy.   
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If we return to Dan’s outburst, it occurs as if in that moment there is no past or 
future (Parmenides, Geldard, 2007).  He is incandescent, breaking the table.  Yet 
simultaneously he remains adult, present, and angry at his powerlessness.  It is 
hard to distinguish in that instant how much Dan is in and out of time.  It becomes 
clear that this eruption out of ‘normal time’ in the session, provided a different 
kind of instant to reflect on and confront later on at the collision of his two painful 
times: then and now.  He oscillates between these times and is in both.  Caitlin 
and Peter, by contrast, actively seek escape from a time of duration into the 
timeless ecstasy of sexual climax.   
 
The ‘now’ in the context of becoming older is relevant to understanding time.  
The now is everywhere and nowhere, intangible and present, vital and ignored.  In 
the following lengthy quotation, Parmenides grapples with this:  
‘ “But it is older, isn’t it, whenever, in coming to be, it is at the now time, 
between was and will be?  For as it proceeds from the past to the future, it 
certainly won’t jump over the now.”  -  “No, it won’t.”  -  “Doesn’t it stop 
coming to be older when it encounters the now?  It doesn’t come to be, but 
is then already older when it encounters the now? … For if it were going 
forward, it could never be grasped by the now.  A thing going forward is 
able to lay hold of both the now and the later – releasing the now and 
reaching for the later, while coming to be between the two, the later and 
the now.”  -  “True.”  -  “But if nothing that comes to be can sidestep the 
now, whenever a thing is at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and 
then is whatever it may have come to be.”  -  “Apparently.”  -  “So, too, 
the one: whenever in coming to be older, it encounters the now, it stops its 
coming-to-be and is then older.”  … “Yet the now is always present to the 
one throughout its being; for the one is always now, whenever it is.” ’ 
(Plato: 384-385).   
 
The nature of was, is, and will be is not questioned, although Dan’s was-and-now 
are temporarily simultaneous despite a clear sequencing of events in the room.  
From Plato’s preoccupation with complementary opposites emerges the idea that 
there is only now.  This has consequences for psychotherapy.  Freud emphasises 
the importance of history and its influence in the present, while much systemic 
thinking emphasises the present (the now) with less emphasis on the past.  Plato 
suggests that there is only the present now, as much as the now ‘always present to 
the one throughout its being’ is a now that once was in the future, or will be in the 
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past.  This accords with Barbour (2000), for the reality only of Now, nearly two 
and a half millennia after Plato.   
 
Plato’s Parmenides introduces number.  This links ‘earlier’, ‘later’, and 
chronology:  
‘ “Now, shall we say in connection with number that things that are more 
or things that are less come to be and have come to be earlier? … So of all 
the things that have number the one has come to be first.  …  But that 
which has come to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others 
later; and things that have come to be later are younger than what has 
come to be earlier. …” ’ (ibid: 385).   
 
This is not ‘number’ such as planetary revolutions by which to measure interval 
and time.  We saw aspects of this when noting respective ages, and therefore 
relationships, in the Smith family (chapter 1).  The relevance for psychotherapy 
rests where the patient becomes confused in a narrative sense of before and after, 
flow and direction.  The question of narrative or episodic time, (Strawson, 2005) 
or existential disconnection from the world (Sartre, 1938, 1945) will demand 
further consideration.  Only then may we attempt any conclusions about 
philosophy and time in psychotherapy.   
 
Timaeus.   
In Timaeus, Plato reiterates ideas about time discussed in Parmenides.  Timaeus is 
a discourse rather than a dialogue and Timaeus, who is probably ‘a dramatic 
invention of Plato’s’ (Cooper, 1997: 1224), speaks alone.  He presents what may 
be Plato’s creation story.  ‘According to that story, a divine craftsman or demiurge 
imposed order and beauty upon a pre-existing chaos to fashion our world in the 
likeness of an eternal model’ (Zeyl, 2000: xiii).   
 
Plato introduces number and time through Timaeus.  For my purposes it is less 
important whether Plato believed this literally than his idea that the universe had a 
beginning.  ‘The widespread acceptance of Big Bang cosmology has given new 
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life to the question of what, if anything, caused the Big Bang to occur – thus 
giving room to the idea that the universe might have been created’ (ibid xiii). 
Plato says of the god creator; ‘And so he began to think of making a moving 
image of eternity: … would make an eternal image, moving according to number, 
of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call 
“time” ’ (Plato, 1997: 1241).  Time is the number of revolutions of the sun and 
moon and other heavenly bodies around the earth.  They represent duration, 
rhythm, pattern, interval, order, sequence, and simultaneity, inter alia.   
 
Time’s slippery quality is not so easily pinned down.  Days and nights, months 
and years, are parts of time, while ‘was and will be are forms of time that have 
come to be’ (ibid: 1241).  When we say was and is and will be, ‘according to the 
true account only is is appropriately said of (time)’ (ibid: 1241) since was and will 
be refer to the becoming that passes in time because they are motions.  Plato 
describes approximations of eternity since the Living Thing’s nature that created 
the universe is eternal, but anything created by that which is eternal is by 
definition not fully eternal, and so is limited by what we call time, while what is 
changeless cannot become older or younger.  We perceive time that seems eternal 
and is like number and ‘what has come to be is what has come to be, that what is 
coming to be is what is coming to be, and also that what will come to be is what 
will come to be, and that what is not is what is not’ (ibid: 1241).  Plato concedes 
that this does not accurately describe these phenomena.   
 
This vision of time is bound up with a Western static cosmological understanding 
of the universe.  The sun, moon, and five other stars 61 were created for the 
‘coming to be of time’, which ‘came to be in order to set limits and to stand guard 
over the numbers of time’ (ibid: 1242) followed by a description of the path of the 
stars.   The important element is that these celestial bodies ‘were to cooperate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The two stars mentioned are the Dawnbearer, the Morning Star or Venus, and Hermes or 
Mercury.   
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producing time’ (ibid: 1242) each star completing its allotted journey to produce 
days, months, and years.  Time is the movement of all these bodies.  It is possible,  
‘to discern that the perfect number of time brings to completion the perfect 
year at that moment when the relative speeds of all eight periods have 
been completed together and measured by the circle of the Same that 
moves uniformly, have achieved their consummation’ (ibid: 1243).   
 
This suggests purpose and intent in movement of the stars.  Plato proposes that 
before the coming to be of time, ‘the universe had already been made to resemble 
in various respects the model in whose likeness the god was making it’ (ibid: 
1243).  He describes the existence of the universe ‘within the real Living Thing’ 
(ibid: 1243) and this agrees with some current thought in theoretical physics about 
the origins of the universe (Barbour, 2000; Falk, 2009; Hawking, 1990).  Plato 
implies pre-existence in a mind before existence in the universe.  Hawking (1990) 
suggests something similar that we treat the Big Bang as the de facto beginning of 
time for all practical purposes, since we cannot know anything that precedes it.   
 
The ability to distinguish periods of time and the cycles of the sun ‘has led to the 
invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened the path to 
inquiry into the nature of the universe’ (Ibid: 1249-1250).  What follows this work 
of Intellect (nous) is an explanation of how things have come about by Necessity 
in the universe.  The question of time is not explicitly addressed again.   
 
Number is important for understanding time in Parmenides and Timaeus.  In 
Timaeus Plato suggests ways to understand time and proposes ideas about 
emerging and coming to be.  These are relevant to psychotherapy.  Process is 
important in the sense of coming to be from what either was not, or was coming to 
be something other, or is coming to be something other in the future.   
 
With this in mind, I turn to Aristotle’s discussion of number, time, and the now in 
relation to future and past.   
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Aristotle.   
In Physics, Aristotle states that the question is ‘first, whether or not (time) is a real 
entity and, second, what its nature is’ (Aristotle, 1999: 102).  Roark (2011: 176) 
suggests that ‘Aristotle’s view on the nature of time can be expressed … as 
distance is to space, so time is to motion’, making time a measure if motion 
represents change, although this will not in itself help with how to measure time 
in relation to change.  We may say that change is slow or fast, but time is not 
changed by the pace of change.  The dilemma is:  
 ‘Some of it has happened and does not exist, and some of it is in the 
future and does not yet exist; these constitute both the infinite stretch of all 
time and the time that is with us at any moment; but it would appear to be 
impossible for anything which consists of things that do not exist to exist 
itself’ (Aristotle, 1999: 102-103).   
 
Because it is either no more or yet to come, Aristotle concludes that we are left 
only with now, but ‘(t)he now is not a part of time, because a part measures the 
whole and the whole must consist of its parts; time, however, does not seem to 
consist of nows’ (ibid: 103).  Although time seems not to consist of nows, and 
thus does not exist in time, the ‘now’ appears to divide past from future.  This 
would be similar to Plato’s instant.  The now makes past and future continuous.  It 
‘is what holds time together, … and it is a limit of time, in the sense that it is the 
beginning of one time and the end of another’ (ibid: 112) which, being future and 
past, describe different kinds of time.  The now represents a defined point in time 
when something did or did not, will or will not happen.   
 
Aristotle explores the nature of now in terms of sequencing and simultaneity.  
Different nows cannot be simultaneous, except where ‘one might contain another 
as a longer stretch of time contains a shorter stretch’ (ibid: 103).  For a later now 
to exist, an earlier one must have ceased to exist.  Aristotle concludes: ‘… the 
now is a limit, and a finite time can be grasped’ (ibid: 103) although he proposes 
that a state may exist where ‘nows’ can temporarily be simultaneous, and not 
earlier or later.  ‘(T)o be one and the same now’ (ibid: 103) then ‘nothing would 
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be either earlier or later than anything else’ (ibid: 103).  All times would exist 
simultaneously in the present.   
 
We see the problem of how to define time when using ‘time’ to describe ‘time’: 
‘Time, however, is not defined in terms of time: it is not defined as being such-
and-such an amount of time, or as being such-and-such a kind of time.  So it is 
easy to see that time is not change’ (ibid: 104).  Aristotle introduces here the idea 
of ‘such-and-such a kind of time’.  We should hold in mind the possibility that 
there is a ‘such-and-such a kind of time’, or different kinds of time with possible 
relevance to time in psychotherapy.   
 
While time is not change, Aristotle suggests that time is an aspect of change, and 
that change follows the nature of ‘magnitude’.  Since magnitude is continuous, so 
is change, ‘and because change is continuous, time is too’ (ibid: 105).  In order to 
measure change or magnitude, we need a concept of before and after, of earlier 
and later, so that ‘what is before and after is a change’ (ibid: 105) and from this 
we know time in terms of the limits of before (earlier) and after (later).  
Descriptions of before and after is what we call time ‘when we have received an 
impression of the before and after in a process of change’ (ibid: 105).  What 
comes between the before and after, between the earlier now and the later now, 
we call time.  Time becomes the awareness of alteration between the different 
nows we describe when we say time has passed.  This describes change but ‘time 
is not change, … it does not exist without change.  So … we had better start with 
this fact and try to see better what aspect of change time is’ (ibid: 105).  Aristotle 
seems to imply something of the tensions of time and change, a focus that was 
important in the work of Palazzoli and her team (chapter 2).   
 
If we have only a single now, neither time nor change can be measured, since 
there is no limit between one part and another.  In this formulation ‘this is what 
time is: a number of change in respect of before and after’, so that ‘now 
determines time, in respect of before and after’ (ibid: 106).  Continuing further on, 
time ‘is measured by change and change is measured by time (and this is because 
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the quantity of the change of the time is measured by a change determined in 
time)’ (ibid: 116) which becomes circular in argumentation.  It suggests a self-
reinforcing loop of time  change  time, but does not help understand how 
change is measured in relation to time.  The relevance is psychotherapy’s concern 
with intra- and inter-personal change and how psychodynamic and systemic 
therapy understand time and change differently.  Giving such importance to time 
may mean we alter how we conceptualise therapy.   
 
Despite this, time remains intangible.  We may measure it in terms of speed, 
magnitude, distance, number, many kinds of metaphor, yet its essence remains 
elusive.  Is the now of Aristotle the same Now of Julian Barbour? 62  Aristotle 
foresees Barbour’s argument that time does not exist by two and a half thousand 
years.  He compares the now to an object that moves through different places but 
remains unchanged.   
‘And a now follows a moving object, just as time follows change; for it is 
the moving object that enables us to know before and after in change, but 
the now exists in so far as the before and after are numerable.  So in the 
case of before and after too, whatever it is that the now is is the same, 
(since it is what is before and after in change), but what it is to be the now 
is different (since the now exists in so far as the before and after are 
numerable). … So in a sense the now is always the same, and in a sense it 
is not, because the same goes for a moving object’ (Aristotle, 1999: 107).   
 
Without now there would be no time and without time, no now, and although 
continuous, time is distinguished by the now.  Yet, Aristotle suggests, the now is 
not a part of time, just as the division of a movement is not part of the movement.  
It ‘is an end and a beginning of time, but not of the same time’ (ibid: 113).  It 
marks the boundary between past and future and is qualitatively different from 
before and after.   
 
Aristotle introduces the idea of recurrence, which is manifest in rhythm and 
pattern.  Recurrence describes another kind of time, a time that returns to the same 
point, such as harvest to harvest, but at different temporal points.  Recurrence is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Barbour does not reference Aristotle in The End of Time, yet the overlap of ideas is remarkable.   
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important in psychotherapy as it suggests degrees of stability / no-change and the 
predictability of pattern.  Where such recurrence is identified as part of problem 
maintaining behaviour (Watzlawick et al., 1974) the therapist (or shaman) devises 
interventions intended to provoke change.  Such phenomena of recurrence may be 
thought of in Freud’s terms of compulsion to repeat or Palazzoli’s concept of the 
time of the system.   
 
One of Aristotle’s struggles was how to conceive two nows occurring 
simultaneously.  The Planck satellite (chapter 1) provides images of ‘the 
afterglow of creation’ of energy emitted some 13.69 billions years ago (Connor, 
2010; Morison, 2010).  Aristotle may have been more prescient than he could 
have imagined.  It is possible for events from such different times to be seen 
simultaneously.  It is not an uncommon phenomenon for patients in 
psychotherapy to experience events from different chronological times 
simultaneously, as did Caitlin and Dan in different ways.  What seems to happen 
is patients ‘amalgamate the later now into a unit with the earlier now and 
eliminate all the time in between’ (Aristotle, 1999: 104-105).  In treatment the 
most extreme example of this would be trauma.  Aristotle’s description captures 
the sense of time being compressed.  The Planck satellite example describes two 
different times simultaneously observed externally and not dependent on the 
observer’s state of mind, while clinical experience suggests the simultaneous 
presence of two different times, or kinds of time, experienced internally arising 
from the patient’s state of mind.   
 
Aristotle argues that past and future do not exist.  Augustine argues similarly.  
Past and future do not exist, but do not exist in different ways.  Something from 
the past existed and ceased existing, while something in the future has not yet 
existed.  The past had potential, and has crystallised in one outcome; the future 
still has potential and has yet to crystallise.  If Caitlin, Peter, or Dan, said they 
wanted to undo the past, (which partially characterised Caitlin’s struggle to free 
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herself from her history) it would be absurd, 63 and to the extent they attempted 
this, they would become caught in an endless loop of repetition (Freud, 1925: Vol. 
XX).  Attempting to change the past is a category mistake.  The best may be a 
new relationship with the facts of the past.  Ultimately, therapeutic change needs 
to focus from present to future.   
 
Analysing future time clinically as a measure of potential is helpful.  The past is 
over and has crystallised and the future is yet to crystallise.  The now in the 
present is the moment when crystallization happens, and a choice is made.  Caitlin 
repeatedly re-crystallised her past, while eventually Dan was able to crystallise a 
different potential future.   
 
Augustine.   
Seven hundred years after Plato and Aristotle, Augustine explores the nature of 
time in book XI of Confessions (Augustine, 1961).  Unlike his Greek 
predecessors, he writes from a position of faith.  He seeks to understand God and 
his will, and the nature of creation as a follower of Christ.  Like Plato in Timaeus 
this is a creation story.  He grapples with the nature of eternity, time, and what 
preceded time, to account for the existence of time, matter, and God.  Before 
anything existed,  
‘there must have been some material thing created before heaven and 
earth, something which, by its motion in time, could lend itself as a 
mouthpiece through which those words could be spoken in time.  But there 
was no material thing before heaven and earth; or, if there was, you must 
certainly have created it by an utterance outside time’ (Augustine, 1961: 
258).   
 
This is a fundamental existential question. 64  How could matter be created unless 
there were some force or being ‘outside time’ that could bring it into being?  It is 
not the theological argument that is important here, except for eternity that is ever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Not the ‘absurd’ of the existentialists, in full consciousness of one’s situation and knowing one’s 
destiny.  ‘Toute la joie silencieuse de Sisyphe est là.  Son destin lui appartient’ (Camus, 
1942:165).   
64 Existential philosophers (Camus, 1942, 1957; Sartre, 1938, 1943, 1945, 1948) take this a stage 
further, discussed in chapter 4 where I explore what is required to live in the present and confront 
the ‘absurd’ of future death without despair.   
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still, and time that is never still.  My focus is future, present, and past; duration; 
the changing nature of the present; measuring time; and time’s existence outside 
the instant, concepts most relevant to psychotherapy.   
 
Augustine asks: ‘What, then, is time?  I know well enough what it is, provided 
that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled’ 
(Augustine, 1961: 264).  However: ‘All the same I can confidently say that I 
know that if nothing passed, there would be no past time; if nothing were going to 
happen, there would be no future time; and if nothing were, there would be no 
present time’ (ibid: 264).   
 
Augustine considers Aristotle’s dilemma of the past that has gone and is no longer 
and the future that is not yet.  Neither exists, but similar to Aristotle, they are two 
kinds of potential not existing.  If the future has potential to crystallise, it 
possesses the potential not to crystallise, or not to crystallise one way rather than 
another. 65  This leaves the present.  If that did not move to become the past and 
were always present, it would ‘not be in time but eternity’ (ibid: 264) and if future 
and past exist ‘I want to know where they are’ (ibid: 267).  If the present is by 
virtue of moving to become the past, we cannot really say that the present is 
‘when the reason why it is is that it is not to be’ (ibid: 264).  We are confronted 
with the temporary nature of time in the present, the same present that represents 
the initial and every encounter in psychotherapy.  Augustine suggests that past, 
present, and future do not exist as three distinct times:  
‘It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past 
things, a present of present things, and a present of future things.  Some 
such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see.  
The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is 
direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation’ (ibid: 
269).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In our understanding of time and the future we can believe that the future has the potential not to 
be.  In Western thought we believe that the universe is not pre-determined and that we can 
influence how we crystallise the future.  This is a fundamental tenet of psychotherapy.  Many 
Muslims believe otherwise; that our every moment is predestined by Allah.   
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The human mind articulates these three times but time does not exist anywhere 
else.   
 
If Augustine is right, time is a peculiarly human phenomenon and a consequence 
of our minds and evolved brains.  Augustine describes alternative ways to 
understand past, present, and future.  He suggests that we conjure up memories of 
the past in the present, and we consider anticipated events in the present.  The 
future does not have an existence until it becomes present, when it is no longer 
future.  Similarly, the past does not exist except when remembered consciously, or 
unconsciously, through behaviour, attitude, or distressing symptoms.  Memory 
and remembering, phenomena of the past in the present, were discussed in 
Freud’s ideas.  They are important themes in the following chapters.  The present 
is in part memory and consequence of past actions and anticipation of future ones.   
 
How do we measure time?  ‘It must be measured while it is in process of passing.  
It cannot be measured after it has passed, because nothing then exists to be 
measured’ (Augustine, 1961: 269).  Time arises from what does not exist, for the 
future is passing through the present which ‘has no duration, and moving into 
what no longer exists’ (ibid: 269).  We measure the movement of bodies, such as 
the sun, by which we determine time as the difference between day and night.  It 
is the circuit of the sun re-appearing in the east by which a day is measured.  Were 
the sun to complete its circuit, its recurrence, in half the time, it would still be a 
day, but of shorter duration.  ‘It is clear, then, that the movement of a body is not 
the same as the means by which we measure the duration of its movement’ (ibid: 
273).  This suggests that time ‘is an extension of the mind itself’ (ibid: 274) since 
through the agency of mind we remember ‘the past’, and envisage ‘the future’, in 
a present that ‘has no extent’ (ibid: 275).   
 
Augustine’s formulation of the mind is similar to our contemporary understanding 
of the brain because ‘everything which happens leaves an impression on it, and 
this impression remains after the thing itself has ceased to be.  It is the impression 
that I measure, since it is still present, not the thing itself, … as it passes and then 
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moves into the past’ (ibid: 276).  We measure the impression not time via the 
medium of the mind (brain, neural pathways), which expects (future), perceives 
(present), and remembers (past).  A long future becomes a long expectation of the 
future; a long past becomes a long remembrance of the past; these activities occur 
in the present.   
 
Reflections.   
Psychotherapists work in the interstices of the seemingly rational-cognitive, and 
the emotional, subjective worlds of experience where time, memory, and recall 
are fluid, transient, or beyond language.  The Parmenidean search for invariance 
and certainty that ‘highest Reason judge’ (Geldard, 2007: 24) echoes a Western 
twenty-first century search for rational reassurance.  Parmenides is perhaps the 
originator of this project.   
 
Do we find an echo in Freud’s ideas about the timelessness of the unconscious, 
and Western man’s search for certainty?  How congruent are the ideas of these 
philosophers with Freud’s belief in the importance of history in his 
archaeological, evolutionary model of the past influencing the present?  Freud 
believed that early experiences once laid down and left alone do not change.  He 
partially echoes Parmenides’ assertion that change cannot be ‘Because It Is Now, 
Whole, One, Continuous’ (Geldard, 2007: 25) or at least not without analysis.  
Parmenides remains part of the intellectual heritage of Western philosophy and 
civilization, and his mistrust of ‘the way of illusion’ challenges the basis for 
understanding the patient’s world of subjectivity and experience.   
 
Returning to Caitlin and Peter, we see that underlying their feelings that nothing 
promised could be trusted and the other would disappoint, was a sense that 
nothing could change.  Everything past was now and seemingly timeless for 
Caitlin.  While struggling in a world of the present she responded to others as if 
they were, or were like, those who had failed her in her childhood.  Like a child in 
an adult’s body it was as if her time had stalled.  The incident outside the theatre 
was isomorphic of her repeated experience.  Her history of broken personal 
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relationships, a failed marriage, and unfulfilled promise in her professional life, 
meant she craved and distrusted intimacy in equal measure.  She functioned 
significantly below her professional potential, where she was perceived to be 
unpredictable and difficult.  She seemed to re-create situations where others 
would abandon her.  It was as if by precipitating the worst she might in some 
measure retain control.  Tragically, she lost what she craved.   
 
Where was Caitlin in that instant, if we consider the specific moment of 
abandonment outside the theatre?  She was physically present on the pavement, 
but she seemed to be in ‘no time at all’, emotionally and cognitively unreachable 
by Peter or herself.  Rather than being reassured by Peter’s return, she became 
more enraged.  Once lost in that instant, Caitlin had no personal resources, and 
Peter’s reassurance inflamed her more.  She cannot survive her crystallised past, 
cannot be in the present (outside the theatre), and cannot envisage a differently 
crystallised future.  This example resembles that instant which is neither motion 
nor rest in Plato’s Parmenides.  I return to this theme later.   
 
Aristotle echoes Plato with respect to now not being part of time.  This is similar 
to Caitlin’s experience of abandonment that precipitates her into an un-boundaried 
now.  That there is no past is not her experience, except that what is past and what 
is present are fused.  The past overwhelms her present.  We shall see effects of 
such ‘retention’ in a ‘thick present’ (Husserl, 1991) in chapter 4.  Events long past 
become contemporaneous, re-enacted in present events like a compulsion to 
repeat.  Nothing is earlier or later; neither before nor after.  This may seem 
inexplicable in a philosophical logical, rational, deductive world that does not 
account for Caitlin’s experience.  Was she simultaneously in two different nows, 
or had she left the now outside the theatre to be in a different, dissociated, and 
frightening earlier emotional, psychological now?  Can physical and psycho-
emotional realities disconnect, so that different nows co-exist?   
 
Variation and change have been identified as important aspects of time.  We 
should hold in mind Caitlin’s experience of neither variation nor change, where 
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she incorporates the contradiction between the present and her emotional reality.  
Childhood events are distressingly re-experienced in her adult present without 
variation or change.  Her re-activated past-in-the-present feels worse than events 
at the time.  In a future case vignette, Jane will describe a similar experience of a 
re-lived trauma that is more terrifying than the abuse at the time.  Caitlin’s 
experience of the present collapsing into her past is to ‘amalgamate the later now 
into a unit with the earlier now and eliminate all the time in between’ (Aristotle, 
1999: 104-105).  Any distinction between different nows is lost ‘when the mind 
seems to remain in a single, undifferentiated condition’ (ibid: 105).   
 
It is evident that the philosopher’s and the patient’s time differ.  In the therapeutic 
moment, the patient finds that emotional distance from the past event is far closer 
than any chronological distance.  It is as unchanging as The Way of Truth and ever 
vulnerable to reactivation in the immediate now.  This abusive and chaotic past is, 
as Freud asserts, always present unconsciously and liable to be reactivated as 
powerfully as the memories evoked by Proust’s madeleine biscuit.  It is an 
unbearable present when re-connected by an experience isomorphic with her early 
history.  For Caitlin, potential is in the past-present.  It feels like a potential that is 
forever crystallising unlike in healthy functioning of a present-future potential yet 
to crystallise.   
 
Phenomenological processes of ‘transference’ in Western psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, and reactivated elements of lived pasts in the present, are used 
explicitly in treatment, following Freud’s discovery of its power.  
Psychotherapeutic approaches vary in the importance they give to these present-
past-time phenomena.  Greater credence is beginning to be given to this 
phenomenon in the systemic field.   
 
Augustine’s three kinds of present are useful.  Plato and Aristotle argue that future 
and past do not exist, yet we live and organise our Western lives by these 
timeframes.  Augustine’s formulation of the present-of-past-things, the present-of-
present-things, and the present-of-future-things eases some of those difficulties.  It 
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helps to understand Caitlin’s experience.  Her past only exists in her present-of-
past-things, and what she fears about possible future relationships only exists in 
her present-of-future-things.  These become her present-of-present-things.  It 
seems that she is left with a now-of-all-things.   
 
Caitlin’s story raises many issues including; inside and outside ‘realities’; 
intrapersonal (intrapsychic) and interpersonal (relational) time; the nature of 
memory; the subjective reordering of time and narrative; the place of meaning of 
self and other.  Arising from these are encoding and accessing belief systems and 
their relationship to behaviour(s) and events; the quasi-trance-like state where the 
individual loses her/himself and is neither ‘in’ nor ‘out’ of time (Hall, 1989).  
More attention needs to be given to Palazzoli’s ‘time of the system’, the 
interweaving of timeframes, and their relation to change.  This will raise questions 
about socio-cultural contexts for healing, and the private context of Western 
psychotherapy.   
 
I now turn to selected Western philosophers mainly from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to explore how they might add to understanding time in 
therapy.   
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Chapter 4.   
 
Epistemologies of time: some nineteenth and twentieth  
century philosophical perspectives:  
 
 
‘Whatever has the air of a paradox, and is contrary to the first and most 
unprejudic’d notions of mankind is often greedily embrac’d by philosophers, as 
shewing the superiority of their science, which cou’d discover opinions  
so remote from vulgar conception’  
(Hume, 1978: 26).   
 
‘Il n’y a qu’un problème philosophique vraiment sérieux: c’est le suicide.  Juger 
que la vie vaut ou ne vaut pas la peine d’être vécue, c’est répondre à la question 
fondamentale de la philosophie’  
Camus, 1942: 15. 66   
 
‘Le passé est un ancien avenir et un présent récent, le présent un passé prochain et 
un avenir  récent, l’avenir enfin un présent et même un passé à venir’  
(Merleau-Ponty, (1945: 484). 67   
 
 
Chapter structure.   
Marinoff argues an active role for philosophy: ‘Philosophy was originally a way 
of life, not an academic discipline – a subject to be not only studied but applied’ 
(Marinoff, 2000: 8). 68  This statement supports the inclusion of a philosophical 
element in my thesis.  However, the coherence evident in the previous chapter is 
not easily achievable here.   
 
After considerable reflection, I realised that Descartes (2000), Hume (1978), and 
Kant (2003), particularly the latter two, have little to say about time within a 
psychological framework.  As the Enlightenment where ‘there is no truth or 
reality accessible independently of a conceptual scheme’ (Honderich, 2005: 254) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 ‘There is only one philosophical problem of real importance: suicide.  To be of the opinion that 
life is worth or is not worth living, is to answer philosophy’s basic question’   
67 ‘The past is a former future and a recent present, the present an immediate past and recent 
future; the future ultimately a present and even a past yet to come’.   
68 Yalom’s fictional account (2006) of the last year of a group therapy group mixes the philosophy 
of Schopenhauer with the dynamics of change, and the ending of life.   
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pre-dates depth-psychology, it contributes only marginally to temporal 
perspectives in psychotherapy.  Hence, I make only cursory reference to the ideas 
of this period.  Psychotherapy and post-modernism may partly represent a 
reaction to the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and rationality, (Hendel, 1955; 
Tambiah, 1990).   
 
I have thus made a leap, glancing only cursorily toward the Enlightenment, from 
Augustine to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  A more contemporary 
emphasis on phenomenological existential approaches to a philosophy of time 
begins with Husserl and Heidegger and ends with contemporary philosophers 
Ricoeur and Galen Strawson.  This seems more in tune with clinical practice.   
 
Aims.   
My aim is to consider certain philosophers who were broadly contemporaneous 
with Freud and Palazzoli and have made a study of time, and to ground these 
ideas in therapeutic practice with clinical examples.  Jane’s experiences are 
described in most detail, drawing on contemporaneous clinical notes, her account 
of being in therapy and her experiences of time.  Her story of time in ritual is 
taken up again in chapter 8.  I describe other case vignettes briefly in relation to 
phenomenological ideas rather than to specific therapeutic models.  Only in 
chapter 9 do I draw the many strands together and return to my original question.   
 
Case vignette: Jane.   
The following account is characterised by dissociation and time fragmentation.  I 
present material taken from interviews with Jane 69 about her experiences during 
and in-between sessions to illustrate, often disturbing, experiences of time.  Later, 
I take an example from therapy to underscore how fragmented elements of her 
story were drawn into the beginnings of a narrative, to focus on her potential to 
crystallise her future and be less defined by her crystallised past.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The name Jane is an agreed pseudonym.   
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I saw Jane in therapy for over eight years.  Semi-structured research interviews 
with her took place two and a half years after therapy ended.  She describes some 
of her experiences of time in and between her sessions. 70   
 
Jane is a woman of extraordinary courage and integrity.  Both parents had 
regularly abused her sexually and physically from infancy.  Assaults continued 
during therapy into her early fifties.  Her parents, aged sixty-eight, received thirty-
year prison sentences for their crimes.  Her mother later died in prison.   
 
Jane’s first memory of abuse is aged between three and four, when after sexually 
abusing her, her father slit their cat’s throat to warn her of the consequences of 
telling.  That traumatic experience, along with innumerable others, became her 
past-ever-present.  In adolescence, her father made her pregnant three times.  Her 
mother performed two abortions and she miscarried the third child following 
severe beatings.  She suffered broken bones, stabbings, imprisonments, and 
repeated paternal vaginal and anal rape.  The police discovered her parents kept 
detailed written and photographic records of her abuse spanning almost fifty 
years.  During therapy she sometimes arrived with fresh injuries inflicted by either 
parent or after occasions when her father had tried to rape her.  Abuse was 
historical and contemporaneous; trauma was past and current. 
 
As part of therapy with her ever-present fear of the threatened consequences of 
telling, Jane would either be led to re-visit and articulate the appalling abuse to 
which she had been subjected over decades.  Sometimes a sound, movement, or 
word, would re-connect her without warning with those events.  In these instances 
she would find herself thrust back in time, re-experiencing her trauma now.  She 
would dissociate, not to a safe emotional or psychological space, but to her terror.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Contemporaneous notes were made at meetings with Jane on 23rd July 2010, 18th February and 
15th April, 2011.  They took place in a different room (place) and time of day from where we met 
for therapy.  This was to disconnect as much as possible from the overwhelming feelings she 
frequently experienced during therapy.   
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Her ability to split off, a strategy that in daily life allowed her to function 
adequately, would break down.  I agree with Kalsched’s definition of dissociation.  
‘Dissociation is a trick the psyche plays on itself.  It allows life to go on by 
dividing up the unbearable experience and distributing it to different 
compartments of the mind and body, especially the “unconscious” aspects 
of the mind and body.   This means that the normally unified elements of 
consciousness (i.e., cognitive awareness, affect, sensation, imagery) are 
not allowed to integrate’ (Kalsched, 1996: 13).   
 
This citation reflects a Western view of ‘mind’ and differs from descriptions we 
will encounter in other socio-cultural contexts.  It describes a breaking apart and 
compartmentalising of the intrapsychic structure to protect the integrity of the 
individual, often at considerable cost.  It is not a static state of affairs:  
‘Experience itself becomes discontinuous.  Mental imagery may be split 
from affect, or both affect and image may be dissociated from conscious 
knowledge.  Flashbacks of sensation seemingly disconnected from a 
behavioural context occur.  The memory of one’s life has holes in it – a 
full narrative history cannot be told by the person whose life has been 
interrupted by trauma’ (ibid: 13).   
 
The discontinuous effect on memory when events are experienced episodically, 
and the sensation of fragmentation or disintegration fractures time, or seems to 
freeze the moment.  This often leaves the individual with a profound sense of 
hopelessness and powerlessness.  Time changes utterly at that moment.  Jane’s 
description of being in the therapy room, - her recurrent nightmares, intrusive 
recollections, and many other symptoms, along with her dissociative states, - meet 
the criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (DSM-IV, [309.81] 2000: 463-468).  
My concern in understanding her trauma is about the impact of time distortions, 
‘the memory of one’s life (that) has holes in it’, where ‘a full narrative history 
cannot be told’.   
My opening question was: 71  
HJ.  “What were some of your experiences of being in the therapy room, 
especially with regard to your experiences of time?  You remember that I 
sometimes said that bringing you back into the present, when you seemed 
to disappear, was a bit like pulling you back in at the end of a rope.”   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 23rd July 2010.   
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Jane.  “There were times when I wasn’t in the room.  It was a bit like 
watching T.V. and it goes from one camera to another, it was seamless, it 
would slide.  I was never aware of the transition, this was before we did 
BMW, 72 and I would suddenly become aware of what was going on, and 
suddenly I was in a different place; the sights and smells from a different 
place and time.  There was never any thought, ‘how can this be possible’.  
I couldn’t think this isn’t possible because I was with Hugh, or that I was 
now a lot larger than then. … It was like being in a dream but still awake, 
it was terrifying because of the scary things that were happening.  It was a 
re-enactment of what used to happen.  Somehow it seemed to be worse 
than it had been in the first place; it seemed more frightening than it had 
been at the time.  I would end up where I had been before, a moment that 
was leading up to a bad bit that I knew was going to happen, when before, 
in the real time, I didn’t know beforehand exactly what was going to 
happen.”   
 
“It was like reading a book that you have read before and only part 
remember.  At that moment, I could see the future and that made it seem 
worse than it had been.  I was not aware of you 73 in the scenario while 
experiencing the terror.  I was completely oblivious of that.”   
 
We discussed whether Jane ever confused me the therapist with her abusing 
parents.   There had been a period of helping her gather evidence that eventually 
provided grounds for police action.  The ‘problem’ had been that as therapist I 
acted like her parents.  They had ‘gathered evidence’ to justify their extreme 
physical and sexual abuse.  Therapeutically, I gathered evidence to ensure her 
ultimate physical and emotional safety, but the process was similar.  This 
sometimes made it difficult to distinguish between now in therapy, of being told 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 BMW is a simple three-part ritual I created for her to help deal with moments of panic and 
dissociation that involves Breathing (B), a personal mantra (M), and writing down (W).  I discuss 
this in chapter 8.   
73 Myself, the therapist.   
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then why she deserved to be punished (abused), the now of the continuing abuse 
by both parents, and whether now what was happening in therapy became like 
another earlier event of being abused.  She said that in the sessions:  
“I would eventually be aware that the therapist was talking to me.  
Sometimes it would feel like it was hours and hours, because I could be 
aware of being in a different place, and yet complete scenarios would be 
replayed.  The whole thing would unfold and the whole thing would be re-
enacted, and it would seem at the same time it was real time.”   
 
We see three important elements; her subjective experiences of time distorting; re-
enactment of previous trauma; memory of past historical events.  We discussed an 
incident during one of the early sessions of therapy when, unable to put her story 
into words, and not yet comprehending the extent of her abuse, I asked her to 
represent her family using felt tip pens on paper:  
“I got the pen in my hand.  I couldn’t hold it properly (she was holding the 
pen like an infant, grasped in her fist).  I’d obviously got the task.  It was 
like my brain was refusing to work out what to do.  Then I thought, I know 
what I can do, but I couldn’t get my hand to do anything.  It was like my 
brain was saying, ‘I won’t think about that, we’ll think about something 
totally different’.  It seemed like it was years, absolutely ages.  I’d got the 
pen in my hand; it wasn’t going to play the game.  I was running through 
all the scenarios of what happened in the past, and trying not to let myself 
go there.  I was trying to keep hold of where I was.  What you asked me to 
do was pulling my brain back to where I didn’t want to go.”   
 
It took five or six minutes to make a single mark.  I began to understand and 
experience how the past-in-the-present imprisoned her.  Or more accurately, how 
she was paralysed in her disorientation between re-experiencing her past and 
being present in the room.   
 
As we consider further philosophical time perspectives, it may be helpful to note 
some of the issues that Jane raises.  She describes her experience when she 
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“wasn’t in the room” or present-now time.  Time and place would ‘slide’.  Her 
sensory landscape changed in terms of sights and smells that belonged to another 
place and time.  All this seemed normal.  She did not question how it was possible 
to be physically in the room now, yet exist simultaneously outside it in an earlier 
time.  Her experience of sequential time changed.  This was further affected by 
knowing what would happen next in this future-of-her-now-present-past in the 
temporary disintegration of the chronological present of therapy.  She knew in her 
chronological past that what would happen would be terrifying, but its exact 
nature was unknown.  In therapy, when present-in-the-past, she already knew the 
precise ‘future’ that awaited her.  She also experienced sessions as often lasting 
‘hours and hours’. At those moments she was ‘in a different place’ that became 
her ‘real time’.   
 
With these ideas in mind I give a brief historical context before examining 
nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers.   
 
René Descartes.   
René Descartes (1596-1650) is often referred to as the ‘father’ of modern 
philosophy.  He endeavoured to examine everything as clearly as possible ‘in the 
natural light of reason’ (Descartes, 2000: 41).  This is different to Jane’s 
phenomenological experience.  We cannot trust our senses, for ‘I understand only 
by the faculty of judging, which is in my mind’ (ibid: 29).  It is the senses, or 
overwhelming feelings that Jane ‘understands’, when she cannot think or locate 
herself temporally or spatially.  ‘I am, I exist; that is certain. … As long as I think’ 
(ibid: 25).  Descartes can be certain of his existence because he is certain of one 
thing: he is thinking.  His project does not fit easily with psychotherapy as a 
metaphysicist who attempts to understand the world from an a priori position, 
relying on ‘no predictive power or connection with the facts of experience’ 
(Hampshire, 1956: 67).   
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David Hume.   
In A Treatise of Human Nature 74 Hume’s (1711-1776) references to time appear 
mainly in Part II of Book I.  All ideas ‘are deriv’d from simple impressions’ 
(Hume, 1978: 4) which affect experience of time.  Impressions are different to 
memory, the main purpose of which ‘is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their 
order and position’ (ibid: 9) which we may also call time.  It might seem Hume is 
more relevant to us than Descartes as he is an empiricist looking to experience 
unlike Descartes’ concentration on a priori and reason.   
 
Jane often experienced jumbled ‘order and position’ in her memory that she found 
distressing, so that her sense of time became dis-ordered.  To have a sense of 
time, it is important to apprehend events that can be compared with parts of 
separable time. 75  There is idiosyncratic ordering and sequencing in Jane’s 
account, but timeframes are no longer differentiable.  Her experience of time 
contradicts Hume’s statement that ‘each of its parts succeeds another, and that 
none of them, … can ever be co-existent.  For … every moment must be distinct 
from, and posterior or anterior to another. … (T)ime, as it exists, must be 
compos’d of indivisible moments’ (Hume, 1978: 31).  In Jane’s world different 
times co-exist with, interfere, and interrupt, each other.  Hume is sensitive to this 
in certain situations: ‘A man … strongly occupy’d with one thought, is insensible 
of time; … (where) the same duration appears longer or shorter to his 
imagination’ (ibid: 35).  This partially accounts for changing experiences of 
duration but not for simultaneous experience of different periods.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 A Treatise of Human Nature, published in 1739, is David Hume’s major work, completed in 
France when he was twenty-eight.  His task, as the full title indicates, was ‘an Attempt to 
introduce the experimental Method of Reafoning into MORAL SUBJECTS’, or as he says of his 
philosophy ‘which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or 
impressions and ideas’ (Hume: 1978:64).   
75 Clearly this statement is heavily culturally determined, and a strongly Western point of view.  I 
will discuss the importance of socio-cultural contexts in experiencing time in chapters 6-8.  Hall, 
(1989) introduces the idea of time as Monochronic (M-time) and Polychronic (P-time), the latter 
describing an ability to live simultaneously in different timeframes and the former being 
segmented and sequential.  ‘Monochronic time seals off one or two people from the group and 
intensifies relationships with one other person or, at most, two or three people’ (Hall, 1989: 48).   
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The elusiveness of time and its quality is captured in his analogy with music.  If 
time ‘must be compos’d of indivisible moments’, it also has different parts that 
are distinguishable and different, while not existing in parts: ‘Five notes play’d on 
a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho’ time be not a sixth 
impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses’ (ibid: 
36).  The five-note sequence is a whole experience.  Time is not a separate ‘sixth 
impression’ but is a quality of the five notes.   
 
Hume was an empiricist looking at human nature as a whole system of ethics, art, 
and religion.  Anomalous experiences in detail would distract him from his main 
enterprise for an overarching theory of society.  He was not concerned with 
human nature on a granular scale.  So, while the Age of Reason may introduce 
new concepts of time we do not find in Hume, even with the importance he 
accords to impressions, a way to understand time experienced by someone under 
great emotional pressure, a time beyond ‘everyday’ experience.  Jane’s emotional 
arousal destroys her ability to stay in the present.  Her terror is partly her inability 
to distinguish now ‘parts of time’ from past ‘parts of time’. 76   
 
Immanuel Kant.   
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) believed reason would lead to analytic a priori truths 
that all rational people would agree on of the world as it exists and appears.77  
Thus, when all else is removed, we are left with two aspects serving ‘as principles 
of a priori knowledge, namely space and time’ (Kant, 2003: 67).  We can no more 
intuit time externally than we can intuit space internally, i.e., time is inner and 
space is outer.  He questions their existence and whether they would exist without 
being intuited ‘(o)r are space and time such that they belong only to the form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 I am indebted to Bethan Livesey for her insights into the place of Descartes and Hume.   
Personal communication 2013.   
77 Two concepts that Kant uses are important: a priori and a posteriori.  By the former he means 
that which is known in and of itself through pure reason independent of the senses.  This is unlike 
empirical knowledge that has its sources a posteriori, comes from experience (Kant, 2003: see 42-
43), and prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger.  ‘A priori literally means “prior 
to experience”.  Such knowledge is said by Kant to be “necessary”, while Husserl calls it 
“essential” ’ (Dostal, 1993: 144).   
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intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, apart from 
which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever?’ (ibid: 68).   
 
Kant uses the analogy of a line that is necessarily one-dimensional, ‘and we 
reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with this one 
exception, that while the parts of the line are simultaneous the parts of time are 
always successive’ (ibid: 77).  If we take this and imagine crumpling a section of 
the line of linear points into a ‘ball’, the sequence is now squeezed and 
concentrated into a single spatial point that represents a temporal point.  The 
intensity of time points crushed together provides an image of pressure and loss of 
temporal differentiation, where everything folds into an overwhelming moment.  
This representation resembles Jane’s description of emotional overloading, 
manifested in her physical distress.  Amplifying this analogy, her therapy is akin 
to un-crumpling the ball and re-extending the line to help gain control over her 
frightening re-experiences of trauma. 78   
 
Kant attempts to bridge the worlds of reason and experience.  He introduces the 
idea that ‘(t)ime is not something which exists of itself, or which inheres in things 
as an objective determination’ (ibid: 76).  It ‘is nothing but the form of inner 
sense, … of our inner state’ (ibid: 77) where the mind plays an important part and 
subjective experience is relevant.  This echoes Aristotle who ‘wondered whether 
or not there would be time if there were not mind’ (Aristotle, 1999: 115).  Kant’s 
proposition that time only exists in ‘intuition’ without objective reality is belied 
by Jane.  She re-experienced the sensations of her abuse as more real than the 
original event.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 I am grateful to Christopher Hauke who, as a result of my analogy, introduced me to David 
Bohm, a quantum physicist, who considers ideas of enfolding and unfolding of the universe and 
the ‘unbroken wholeness of the totality of existence’ in what he terms the implicate order.  ‘(I)n 
the implicate order the totality of existence is enfolded within each region of space (and time).  So, 
whatever part, element, or aspect we may abstract in thought, this still enfolds the whole …’ 
(Bohm, 1983: 172).  On a completely different scale, this seems comparable with what I am 
attempting to convey.   
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Against this brief background, I focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
beginning with the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger.  I give a brief 
description of phenomenology followed by a case vignette to anchor the 
discussion.  This marks a step from a priori to a posteriori. We begin with what is 
experienced directly.  In the psychoanalytic world of the mind we are perhaps 
inheritors of the Enlightenment, while in systemic approaches we engage more 
directly with phenomenological legacies.   
 
Phenomenology.   
Phenomenology is ‘primarily a theory of knowledge … (which) distinguishes 
sharply between perceptual properties on the one hand, and abstract properties on 
the other’ (Honderich, 2005: 695). 79  The distinction between what is experienced 
and conceptualised, - Jane’s different phenomenological experience to an 
observer’s experience - suggests an avenue for understanding kinds of time in 
therapy.   
 
Phenomenological approaches seek to describe what is experienced.  ‘Because 
phenomenology “brackets”, or suspends belief in, all metaphysical constructs in 
order to focus solely on what shows up as it presents itself in our experience, its 
findings are supposed to be apodictic, beyond all possible doubt’ (Dostal, 1993: 
141).  An existential view suggests ‘phenomenologists reinstate the world in its 
diversity and deny the transcendent power of reason. … To think is to relearn how 
to see’ (Camus, 1942: 43). 80  In the phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty 
states that ‘psychology and physiology are not parallel activities, but two ways of 
understanding behaviour.  The first is concrete, the second abstract’ (Merleau-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Levinas suggests a stage beyond phenomenology: ‘En posant le présent comme la maîtrise de 
l’existant sur l’exister et en cherchant le passage de l’exister à l’existant, nous nous trouvons dans 
un plan de recherches que l’on ne peut plus qualifier d’expérience.  Et si la phénoménologie n’est 
qu’une méthode d’expérience radicale, nous nous trouverons au delà de la phénoménologie’ 
(Levinas, 1983: 34).  (‘By placing the present as superior to the ‘existant’ over the existing, and in 
seeking the way from existing to the ‘existant’, we find ourselves on a seeking level that one can 
no longer call experience.  And if phenomenology is nothing other than a radical method of 
experience, we will discover ourselves beyond phenomenology’.)   
80 ‘les phénoménologues restituent le monde dans sa diversité et nient le pouvoir transcendant de 
la raison. … Penser, c’est réapprendre à voir, …’ 
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Ponty, 1945:32). 81  He continues that phenomenologically ‘what is tangible is 
what one grasps with the senses’. 82   
 
Every therapeutic encounter must include the phenomenological meeting of 
patient and therapist before and as part of theory.  Just as phenomenologists are 
concerned ‘with what is experientially real rather than abstractly true’ (Stevens, 
1997: 151) so psychotherapy addresses the patient’s ‘experientially real’; ‘feeling 
is this vital communication with the world which makes it present to us like a 
familiar space of our lives’ 83 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 79).  In his words, ‘le champ 
phénoménal is an area for psychological and philosophical reflection’ (ibid: 80).  I 
introduce Judie’s experience through this ‘lens’.   
 
Case vignette: Judie.   
Judie’s story lends itself to phenomenological description.  This centres 
specifically on a psychotic episode where attempts to protect her from loosening 
her grasp on mundane realities were ineffective.   
 
Despite a professional qualification, a wide range of friends, and loving but 
emotionally troubled husband, the constant ‘voice in her head’ left Judie feeling 
unwanted and unsatisfactory. 84  Anti-depressant medication could not assuage 
this.  At age 32 she suffered a psychotic breakdown.  She had strongly 
internalised as core to her being her mother’s statement that she should never have 
been born.  In effect she did not have the right to exist.  Her older sister who had 
died at a few months was the child who should have survived.  Judie could never 
replace her sister, or equal her younger brother.  She ‘never got things right’.  In 
some intangible way she was not right in her entire being, as if she were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 ‘La psychologie et la physiologie ne sont donc plus deux sciences parallèles, mais deux 
déterminations du comportement, la première concrète, la seconde abstraite’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945: 32).   
82 ‘Le sensible est ce qu’on saisit avec les sens’ (ibid: 33).   
83 ‘Le sentir est cette communcation vitale avec le monde qui nous le rend présent comme lieu 
familier de notre vie’ (ibid: 79).  ‘Sentir’ has both the meaning ‘to feel’ and to ‘smell’, and has the 
same root as ‘le sens’ – sense (in French, touch, judgement, opinion, feeling).   
84 This is ‘voice’ in the sense of story she told herself from her mother, not an auditory 
hallucination.   
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existentially illegitimate.  Her psychotic episode was a de facto state of not 
existing, experienced by her as being outside place and time.   
 
Judie could no longer live as an adult while believing she was somehow wrong 
and unlovable.  She wanted to start a family, the act of an adult, but felt unformed, 
waiting permission to enter the world.  The stress of living in two temporal worlds 
was intolerable.  Not welcomed into the world by her mother, she existed in a 
liminal state 85 unstably on the threshold of the legitimate world.  Even her 
Christian faith, believing in a loving heavenly father could not fill her existential 
void. Her earthly father had worked away from home during the week for much of 
her childhood, leaving her feeling bereft of his love and support.  She could not 
bear to reflect on her situation or confront these ‘demons’ for fear of alienating 
her mother and jeopardising any possibility of the maternal love and acceptance 
she craved.   
 
An existential-phenomenological perspective captures part of Judie’s struggle to 
become: ‘Existentialism conceives of persons as being always in the process of 
‘becoming’.  Its focus is on awareness of the human condition and what arises 
from the human capacity to reflect on their own experience of being a person’ 
(Stevens, 1997: 152).  In an existential sense, understanding existence precedes 
essence.  ‘(W)hat [Christian and atheistic existentialism] have in common is quite 
simply the fact that they are of the view that existence comes before essence, or if 
you like, that we must start from the subjective’ (Sartre, 1945: 26). 86  Each 
individual must take responsibility for their life.  This requires a sense of self 
which Judie lacked.   
 
Judie experienced a deep abandonment that had turned to despair.  Her psychosis 
became a step towards personal responsibility, independent of maternal approval. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 ‘Liminal’ has the sense of being betwixt and between, neither in a previous state and not yet in a 
future one.  We will consider this in relation to time and ritual in chapter 8.   
86 ‘Ce qu’ils ont en commun, c’est simplement le fait qu’ils estiment que l’existence précède 
l’essence, ou, si vous voulez, qu’il faut partir de la subjectivité’ (Sartre, 1996: 26).   
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87  ‘Each person must ask himself: am I the person who has the right to act such 
that humanity takes account of my actions?’ (ibid: 36). 88  The person who is 
unable to become self-reflective risks remaining fixed in an earlier emotional 
temporal period while chronological time and the demands of adulthood accrue.  
Therapeutically, it is important that time the past and its meanings, are not 
crystallised forever, and that the future can encompass potential for change.  
‘(P)henomenologically, it may be a misconception to regard the past as immutable 
and indeterminate.  For although it cannot be regained, it can be reconceptualised 
in the present and seen as something other than it appeared to be at the time’ 
(Stevens, 1997: 185).  It is important the patient no longer defines herself by (the 
sum of) their past experiences.  We explore these ideas in more depth.   
 
Edmund Husserl.   
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) presents certain challenges, partly because his work 
on time (first published in 1928) is a collection of lectures reflecting his evolving 
ideas between 1893 and 1917.  He questions the nature of time and intentionality 
phenomenologically. 89  Both concepts are important in this context. 90  I focus on 
lived-inner phenomenological time.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 I realise that my position is close to, and influenced by, the work of R.D. Laing (1965, 1971a, b) 
whose thinking challenged the medical establishment, especially in his existential analysis of 
madness that illness may be the product of seeing things too clearly.   
88 ‘Et chaque homme doit se dire: suis-je bien celui qui a le droit d’agir de telle sorte que 
l’humanité se règle sur mes actes?  Et s’il ne se dit pas cela, c’est qu’il se masque l’angoisse’ (ibid: 
36).  
The abandonment (‘délaissement’) that Sartre speaks of is not one of despair.  Reality resides in 
action, and there lies individual responsibility.  ‘La doctrine que je vous présente est justement à 
l’opposé du quiétisme, puisqu’elle déclare: il n’y de realité que dans l’action; elle va plus loin 
d’ailleurs, puisqu’elle ajoute: l’homme n’est rien d’autre que son projet, il n’existe que dans la 
mesure où il se réalise, il n’est donc rien d’autre que l’ensemble de ses actes, rien d’autre que sa 
vie’ (ibid: 51).  If we accept that the only reality is action, that each person is only his own 
‘project’ and the sum of those actions, this pushes the responsibility onto the shoulders of the 
individual, a strongly Western view of ‘man in the world’.   
89 Echoing Augustine’s statement about time, Husserl writes: ‘Naturally, we all know what time is; 
it is the most familiar thing of all.  But as soon as we attempt to give an account of time-
consciousness, to put objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the proper relationship 
and to reach an understanding of how temporal objectivity – and therefore any individual 
objectivity whatever – can become constituted in the subjective consciousness of time, we get 
entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions’  (Husserl, 1991: 3).   
Husserl was influenced by his fellow compatriot, the philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917), 
‘whose work was inspired by the philosophy of Aristotle, whom he regarded as a ‘man for all 
times’ ’ (Honderich, 2005: 106).   
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Husserl set out to begin without presuppositions.  ‘(A)s a prelude to constructing 
this “phenomenological philosophy”, he undertook a very careful series of 
investigations into cognitive processes of all kinds … including a notable account 
of the “psychology of internal time-consciousness” ’ (Gell, 1992: 221).  Husserl 
understands subjective time and ‘time-consciousness’ to permeate every aspect of 
our lives (memory, duration, expectation of the future).  ‘Intentionality’ gives a 
model for conscious life since ‘(c)onsciousness is always consciousness of 
something; if one chooses to speak of consciousness in terms of “acts”, then every 
act of consciousness must be said to “intend” an object’ (Brough, 1991: xviii).   
 
Phenomenology and phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness propose a 
way to understand kinds of time in psychotherapy.  It describes  
‘the given naïve and scientific consciousness of time according to its sense 
(time is taken by us to be what? temporal relationships present themselves 
as what? and what sorts of relationships are meaningfully intended in the 
sense of belonging to the representation of time, to the intuition of time?): 
therefore the phenomenological task is to analyse the meaning, the 
“material”, the “content” of the representation of time – specifically, as far 
as its essential types are concerned and naturally not with respect to each 
individual case that might be cited’ (Husserl, 1991: 194). 91   
 
Husserl suggests an experiential, intentional, engagement with what time is, at the 
level of typology and not its specifics.  Judie’s time-consciousness in its sensing, 
her temporal relationship with her mother and what was phenomenologically 
‘intended’, were different to her professional qualifications and other 
achievements.  Phenomenological apprehension of time is unconcerned with 
objective time that along with objective space and the world of things Husserl 
terms ‘transcendencies’.  Phenomenological analysis does not tell us about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 I have chosen not to give attention to his, and subsequently Heidegger’s, more abstract concepts 
in relation to time.  For example, I will not address Husserl’s idea that the ego, as he terms it, is the 
source of time, whether time as a primordial source, or of the ‘standing and perduring primal now’ 
(quoted in Dostal, 1993: 148 ff) being not in time, but that which temporalizes.   
91 I take ‘essential types’ in this context to mean the main kinds or classes of time.   
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objective time, just as objective time teaches us nothing about Judie’s 
phenomenological sensing. 92   
 
The relationship between what is ‘sensed’ and what is apprehended 
phenomenologically, with ‘something temporal that is perceived’, points to 
different co-existing time.  What Jane sensed in therapy differs from ‘objective 
time’.  Her ‘phenomenological datum’ affects her ‘relation to objective time’ in 
the room.  ‘Sensed time’ is more real and visceral as ‘objective time’ recedes.   
 
Husserl’s present differs from Plato’s non-dimensional instant ‘being in no time at 
all’, and Aristotle and Augustine’s past and future that do not exist (chapter 3).  
We discussed then a present that has a crystallised past and crystallising potential 
future.  Husserl’s present encompasses something similar.  The Husserlian present 
is “thick” with substance.  ‘(W)e might say that the present is “thick” to the extent 
that, within the present, we find both the past and the future; that is we find all 
three dimensions of time. … Every present moment carries these two aspects as 
essential to its being what it is as present’ (Dostal, 1993: 146-7).93  Husserl 
invented a terminology for the present.  Every moment contains ‘retentive’ (past) 
and ‘protentive’ (future) elements (Figure 4.1).   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Husserl describes a subtle relationship: ‘If we give the name “sensed” to a phenomenological 
datum that by means of apprehension makes us conscious of something objective as given “in 
person”, which is then said to be objectively perceived, we must likewise distinguish between 
something temporal that is “sensed” and something temporal that is perceived.  The latter refers to 
objective time’ (ibid: 7).   
93 Clifford Geertz was interested in the existentialists and Husserl. He speaks of ‘thick description’ 
in particular (Geertz, 1973: 3-30) in his attempt at an interpretive theory of culture.   








Figure 4.1.  Retentive and protentive aspects are constitutive elements of the 
present.  They create a ‘thick’ present.   
 
Retention, present moment, and protention, constitute every instant.  ‘Retention’ 
differs from active memory which requires conscious recall, and unlike 
expectation, the not-yet-present of ‘protention’ is not held consciously.  This 
tripartite present incorporates ‘no longer’, and ‘not yet’. 94   
 
In Jane and Judie’s accounts, we see that the present-of-the-present-moment 
recedes and retention, the present-of-the-past-moment, overwhelms their struggle 
to stay ‘present’.  The present-of-the-future, ‘protention’, the as yet un-trodden 
future where potential hope might crystallise, is swamped by the present-of-the-
past.  This flooded moment has duration, beginning and end, even if 
phenomenologically it feels never-ending.   
 
Husserl suggests a simple experiment: Look at a piece of chalk, close one’s eyes, 
and re-open them.  While the actions are divided in time, with a 
phenomenological time separation, ‘there is no division as far as the object is 
concerned: it is the same.  In the object there is duration; in the phenomenon 
alteration’ (Husserl, 1991: 8).  Jane experiences phenomenological change 
(alteration) of where, when, and how she is.  Judie’s mother remains a timeless 
fixed object, and although there is duration each time she ‘looks at her mother’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 This is reminiscent of Augustine’s thinking that there is only the present, that there are three 













Husserl: time flows ineluctably towards the future.   
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she feels timelessly illegitimate and hopeless, in an absence of phenomenological 
change (alteration).   
 
Husserl’s ‘thick’ present supports experience of the past remaining painfully 
present.  He takes the example of a note lingering that is ‘continuously held in 
consciousness’ which ‘remains present’. 95  Being present in the past, ‘(t)he 
moment shades off and changes continuously, and according to the degree of 
change, [it] is more or less present’ (ibid: 18).  Present and past moments are a 
simultaneous ‘present moment of experience’.  The ‘past’ has a ‘present’ that is 
held in the present and is forever receding.  Husserl calls this ‘shading off’ into a 
further and further past.  By contrast, Jane and Judie experience a past-remaining-
present without ‘shading off’.  Their present-of-the-past remains immediate and 
constant, a time that does not heal (Hall, 1989).  This partially supports 
simultaneity of time, since a past event that endures ‘is present now and present 
constantly, and present together with the new moment “past” - past and present at 
once’ (Husserl, 1991: 19).  If we reconsider this visually the present and 












Figure 4.2.  The “thick” present, where ‘retention’ dominates.   
 
Husserl suggests that the remembered event is not the event as experienced in the 
earlier time-point.  ‘Retention’ becomes a now that exists, although ‘(e)very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Once again there is an echo in Augustine’s present of past things; present of present things; and 
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actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of 
modification.  It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously’ 
(ibid: 31).  Each receding now modifies previous nows in retention so that,  
‘(w)hen a temporal object has elapsed, when the actual duration is 
finished, the consciousness of the now-past objects by no means expires 
with the object, although it now no longer functions as perceptual 
consciousness, or said better perhaps, as impressional consciousness’ 
(ibid: 31-32).   
 
Jane’s experience of ‘modification’ was frightening intensification, the opposite 
of ‘shading off’.  ‘Shading off’ means past events have not become fixed and 
toxic.  ‘A present [event] can indeed “remind” one of a past [event], exemplify it, 
pictorialise it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past’ 
(ibid: 33).  To the extent that Jane experienced her relived trauma as worse than 
the original event, present recall became not only ‘another representation of the 
past’ but an exacerbation of it.   
 
The author’s memory of waking up in the same room and the re-evocation of 
visiting aunt Léonie in Du Côté de Chez Swann, or Caitlin’s infantile rage of 
abandonment (chapter 3) reflect different kinds of unbidden memory.  The 
experience of the moment is identifiable but qualitatively different from the 
primary ‘retention’.  Freud suggests that deeply painful events remain even when 
apparently forgotten, as we saw for Susan who did not ‘remember’ the last 
occasion her father abused her (chapter 1).  This is ‘retention’ manifested in 
different ways.   
 
I turn now to Heidegger, one of Husserl’s pupils.   
 
Martin Heidegger.   
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) sets out to chart time in Being and Time, although 
the final part on time was never completed.  A significant difficulty understanding 
Heidegger is his dense language, his particular use of German, and his frequent 
invention of words.  Words matter to Heidegger as much as meaning: ‘The stale 
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language of traditional philosophy – ‘consciousness’, ‘ego’, ‘thing’, and so on – is 
ill-suited to this new territory’ (Inwood, 1999: 2).  I am therefore necessarily 
selective in my choice of material. 96   
 
Heidegger’s endeavour to elucidate the nature of Dasein or being 97 provides a 
contextual marker for psychotherapy:  
‘time has a distinctive function to play in distinguishing the kinds of being, 
and … traditional realms of being are distinguished according to temporal, 
supratemporal, and extratemporal being. … (T)he history of the concept of 
time, that is, the history of the discovery of time, is the history of the 
question of the being of entities’ (Heidegger, 1992: 140-141).   
 
He emphasises a ‘phased structure’ that is ‘temporalised’, to understand the 
primary character of Dasein as ‘to-be’ (ibid: 163) and as ‘life’ (ibid: 165).  
Temporalization characterises phases of knowing.   
 
Heidegger was interested in what it means ‘to be’, not as a being, but Being itself.  
His ideas influenced the work of German psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger and 
Swiss psychoanalyst Medard Boss, both of whom developed an existential 
understanding of mental illness (Scott, 1992). 98  He describes understanding 
Being as: ‘… the darkest of all’ (Heidegger, 1962: 23) for each one is a finite 
Being, knowing our finiteness faced with a horizon that we cannot transcend at 
the moment of death.  The existential position of the absurd is to live well when 
confronted by the inevitability of a time when our being is no more (Camus, 1942; 
Sartre, 1944, 1948).  However, the abstruse nature of Heidegger’s work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Although a Western philosopher, Heidegger was influenced by ideas from the East, especially 
Japan.  In looking at his sources (May, 1996) it is clear that Heidegger was influenced by oriental 
thought, and the significance of language.  In an interview with Tezuka Tomio, Heidegger 
explains that ‘what is most essential about human existence is concentrated in language, and that 
he therefore tries to understand human existence and its workings on the basis of instances where 
language comes forth purely and with forceful energy’ (Tezuka, 1996: 60).  Heidegger saw that to 
truly understand, ‘East and West must engage in dialogue at this deep level.  It is useless to do 
interviews that merely deal with one superficial phenomenon after another’ (ibid: 62).  Graham 
Parkes describes ‘the Daoist themes to be found in Sein und Zeit’ (Parkes, 1996: 79) and 
Heidegger was familiar with Lao Tse and Zen texts.   
97 Inwood (1999) describes how Dasein, Da-sein, and Dassein (42-44), and ‘being’ (26-33), are 
multi-layered in Heidegger’s thinking.   
98 We find the early roots of an existential approach to mental illness later in the work of Ronald 
Laing (1965, 1971a, b) in the UK, and Thomas Szasz (1972) in the US.   
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compounds the difficulty of grasping his ideas about time.  A preliminary 
comment on the fundamentally grounded nature of his approach gives substance 
to his thinking.   
 
Heidegger wishes to ‘describe some equipment without any philosophical theory’ 
(Heidegger, 1993: 159).  An example is found in The Origin of the Work of Art 99 
of Van Gogh’s Leather Clogs (Plate 4.1).  The shoes’ purpose determines the 
materials in their manufacture and their form, which describes ‘what we already 
know’ (ibid: 159).  They only become what they are meant to be, the less aware 
the owner is of them as they are worn.  ‘The peasant woman wears her shoes in 
the field. … It is in the process of the use of equipment that we must actually 
encounter the character of equipment’ (ibid, 159).   
 
 
Plate 4.1. Leather Clogs, Vincent Van Gogh,  
1888.  Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam.   
 
Heidegger explores the being of the clogs in depth. 
‘From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread 
of the worker stares forth.  In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes 
there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge … This equipment 
belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman.  
From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its 
resting-within-itself’ (ibid: 159-160).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The ideas in this essay were first described in a public lecture, Freiburg, 13th November 1935.   
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Heidegger reflects on the nature of the art representing these shoes in its own 
sense of embodiment.  He attempts to reach the essence of the thingly-ness of the 
very being of equipment, art, and in Dasein the being of being human, a 
fundamental ‘suchness’, which in essence is a Buddhist concept.  ‘The artwork 
opens up in its own way the Being of beings.  This opening up, i.e., this revealing, 
i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work.  In the artwork, the truth of beings 
has set itself to work. … What is truth itself that it sometimes propitiates as art?  
What is this setting-itself-to work?’ (Heidegger, 1993: 165).   
 
All entities have a kinetic structure and at ‘various points in his career Heidegger 
called this kinetic structure of disclosure the ‘time-character’ of being or the 
‘truth’ of being or the ‘clearing’ of being’ (Sheehan, 1992: 30) for ‘(m)atter and 
form and their distinction have a deeper origin. … (T)he thing’s thingly character’ 
(Heidegger, 1993: 161) that seeks always ‘things’ general essence’ (ibid: 162).  It 
is necessary ‘to grasp the essence of the thing’ (ibid: 163), ultimately to reach the 
point ‘when we think the Being of beings’ (ibid: 165).  His interest in the essential 
nature of being, the ‘thingly character of the thing, the equipmental nature of the 
equipment, the workly character of the work’ (ibid: 157) reflects attempts to grasp 
phenomena. 100   
 
In a series of lectures in 1925 101 Heidegger describes intentionality as ‘a structure 
of lived experiences as such’ (Heidegger, 1992: 29).  Every lived experience is 
directed towards something so that perception whether or not correct or existing 
‘is in itself intentional’ (ibid: 31).  It is important to understand that perception is 
intentional and that when remembering it is the matter itself that is remembered.  
If a boat trip is remembered, ‘I do not remember the representation but the boat 
trip itself’ (ibid: 35).  Jane remembers the abuse but emotion overwhelms the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 His statement that: ‘The greatness of the discovery of phenomenology … is the discovery of the 
very possibility of doing research in philosophy’ (Heidegger, 1992: 135-136) summarises an 
important part of his wish to establish a scientific and verifiable basis for philosophy, as Freud 
wished for psycho-analysis.   
101 Published in English (1992) as History of the Concept of Time.   
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distinction between representation and event.  She experiences this as worse than 
the abuse at the time.   
 
Taking temporality as his basis in Being and Time, Heidegger set out to describe 
the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein.   
‘Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some 
primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalises.  How is this 
mode of the temporalising of temporality to be interpreted?  Is there a way 
which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being?  Does time 
manifest itself in the horizon of being?’ (Heidegger, 1962: 488). 102   
 
Much of his description appears static, without a sense of change.  He suggests a 
metaphor of time as horizon, like approaching the cliff edge that we never really 
comprehend.   
‘The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon 
(woraufhim) factically existing entities are essentially disclosed. … (A) 
potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future, 
one’s ‘Being-already’ is disclosed in the horizon of having been, and that 
with which one concerns oneself is discovered in the horizon of the 
Present’ (Heidegger, 1962: 416).   
 
His preoccupation with Being means time per se is lost and unlike Van Gogh’s 
leather clogs, we never grasp what time is, although we are concerned with ‘the 
presence of something which is present’ (Kockelmans, 1992: 160).  According to 
Heidegger, all entities are disclosed on the spectrum of a temporal horizon.  The 
horizon of the present is conceptually useful.  In therapy, patients often live on the 
horizon of the present pulled back to the horizon of their past and, if not strictly in 
Heidegger’s terms, they struggle to retain a sense of temporal unity.  In moments 
of stress their feelings may resemble being at the edge of an existential-
ontological abyss of past horizons (like an unchanging retention-of-retention) or 
horizons of future being.   
 
Heidegger challenges us to experience phenomenologically the thingly-ness of 
matter and the Being of being.  In the peasant’s clogs the viewer is confronted not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 ‘The future, running ahead to death, is the primary ‘ecstasis’.  (The root meaning of ‘ecstasis’, 
like that of ‘existence’, is ‘stepping forth’.)’ (Honderich, 2005: 373).   
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only by the thingly-ness of the clogs and the purpose for which they were made, 
but their history in their condition, their presentness in their owner’s world, and 
their potentiality (their protentive-ness) for future use, known by their state of 
repair and the anticipated work they still have to accomplish for their owner.   
 
Phenomenological presentness entails memory and future horizon.  Heidegger’s 
‘Horizonal’ concept is potentially useful for boundaries of time and being.  The 
therapist who engages directly with her patient enters into a similar 
phenomenological temporal relationship in which implications of time and being 
are embedded.  Past, present, and future, temporalise time differently to everyday 
awareness in the now, and we understand that patients in distress often 
‘temporalise’ their worlds out of synchrony with the temporal experience of the 
quotidian world.   
 
Merleau-Ponty.   
I include Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1907-61) in the phenomenological tradition, 
because he builds on Husserl and Heidegger, and for his key role in existentialist 
thought. 103   
 
Time is born from one’s relationship with things.  I begin with Merleau-Ponty’s 
now, since therapy deals with many kinds of now.  He suggests it is a mistake to 
define time as a succession of nows (‘une succession de maintenant’).  Like 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty explores the concept of the thick instant and as moment 
succeeds moment ‘layers of time … thicken’, (‘la couche du temps … s’épaissit’) 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2011: 478) in retention of retention.  In consciousness of the 
past, and rather than time accumulating a number of retentions (event A becoming 
Ai, Aii, etcetera), it is a particular temporal context, (such as before the war, after 
the volcano erupted) that locates time: ‘ce n’est pas le passé lui-même que 
j’atteins’.  ‘When I recover the tangible origin of memory [souvenir] … I reunite 
lost time [temps perdu] which, from that particular moment to my present, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Merleau-Ponty was a ‘co-founder with Sartre of existential philosophy … [developing] a 
description of the world as the field of experience in which I find myself’ (Honderich, 2005: 588).   
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chain of retentions and the dovetailing of successive horizons, creates a 
continuous thread’ (ibid: 480). 104  Merleau-Ponty does not propose three discrete 
time elements as an accumulation of retentions (or protentions).  ‘(T)he new 
present is the passage from a future to the present and from the former present to 
the past’ (ibid: 481) 105 in a single movement.  Time moments do not exist 
successively.  They are differentiated from each other (‘ils se différencient l’un de 
l’autre’) in mutual relationship, resulting in a single phenomenological flow ‘since 
in time, to be and to pass are synonymous, and in becoming past, the event does 
not cease to be’ (ibid: 482). 106  Each person is in time and not a spectator.   
 
This brings us ultimately to a realization that different time dimensions are 
inseparable.  Being in the present is to be from forever and to be forever, so that 
‘the “synthesis” of time is a synthesis of transition, it is the movement of a life 
that unfurls, and there is no other way of accomplishing it than to live this life; 
there is no specific time place, it is time that proceeds and itself begins again’ 
(ibid: 485). 107  The important thing is to understand what is in us and in the 
world.  This depends on a particular point of view at the time and on the subject 
who observes, ‘it is through my appearance in the world that matter has meaning’ 
(ibid: 493). 108   
 
In psychotherapy we often observe that the patient no longer experiences a safe 
relationship with those around (‘avec d’autrui’) nor authentically with themselves.  
Merleau-Ponty emphasises the place of experience unencumbered by outside 
understandings.  This is often hard in therapy.  Patients’ pasts, - Husserl’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 ‘Quand … je retrouve l’origine concrète du souvenir, … c’est que je rejoins le temps perdu, 
c’est que, depuis le moment considéré jusqu’à mon présent, la chaîne des retentions et 
l’emboîtement des horizons successifs assure un passage continu’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 480).   
105 ‘… le présent nouveau est le passage d’un futur au présent, et de l’ancien présent au passé …’ 
(ibid: 481).   
106 ‘… puisque dans le temps être et passer sont synonymes, en devenant passé, l’événement ne 
cesse pas d’être’ (ibid: 482).   
107 ‘… la <<synthèse>> du temps est une synthèse de transition, c’est le mouvement d’une vie qui 
se déploie, et il n’y a pas de lieu du temps, c’est le temps qui se porte et se relance lui-même’ 
(ibid: 485).   
108 ‘… c’est par mon surgissement dans le monde que l’étoffe a un sens’ (ibid: 493).   
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retentions / retentions of retentions, - become like a piling up 109 that bears down 
without differentiation, or that feels incoherent without a sense of flow, 
continuity, or safe thickening of the past, and the difficulty of facing a future that 
seemingly never changes.  Merleau-Ponty’s ideas challenge how one may live 
grounded in the present, unencumbered by the past, envisaging a different kind of 
future, and thereby remaining present in the flow of life.   
 
Paul Ricoeur.   
Because Ricoeur strongly emphasises narrative, I begin with Jane’s story from a 
narrative perspective.   
 
Case vignette: Jane’s ‘Roll of Honour’.   
Despite holding down a job, much of Jane’s world was fragmented, episodic, and 
liable to fall apart at any moment.  We came to a point when I felt she might begin 
to integrate some of these ‘bits and pieces’ in a tangible way that could become a 
touchstone in the future.  She began to identify her achievements under what she 
called her Roll of Honour, subsequently changing the title to Role of Honour, 
Figure 4.3. 110   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Merleau-Ponty uses ‘entassement’ which also means ‘congestion’.   
110 Jane playfully named it her ‘role’ in the sense that she had a ‘role of honour’ as well as it being 
a ‘roll of honour’.  She typed her hand written ‘role of honour’ and brought it to the next session.   
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My Role of Honour 
 
Now there’s a future I have a life 
I am an Individual                I am as good as anyone else  
I can trust people                  I have Feelings can love  
It wasn’t my fault                 Found how far I can go  
Not a secret anymore            I am a normal woman  
Courageous  
 
Figure 4.3.  Dated 11th May 2000.  ‘Bits and pieces’ united in one.   
 
These statements created the beginnings of a different narrative.  They include a 
new sense of identity and responsibility, sense of self in relation to others, 
overcoming terror about speaking of her abuse, freedom to experience positive 
feelings, and feeling normal.   
 
The most important statement declares her changed relationship to time: ‘Now 
there’s a future I have a life’.  The possibility of a future offers hope freed from 
guilt, and a changing relationship to her past, no longer defined by it.  This 
statement and the Roll of Honour were often recalled during subsequent difficult 
moments in therapy.  It became part of her new narrative, a new plot where her 
‘bits and pieces’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 74) could be joined together.  I consider Ricoeur 
in the light of Jane’s story.   
 
Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) belongs to the phenomenological existential tradition. 
111  My sources are Narrative Time (1980), Time and Narrative (1984, 1985, 
1988), and La Mémoire, l’Histoire, l’Oubli, (2000).112  Such a large body of 
material forces hard choices.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 He refers extensively to the Ancients whom we have considered (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle 
and Augustine), the Enlightenment (Hume and Kant), and the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Heidegger. 
112 Published in English as Memory, History, Forgetting (2006).   
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Ricoeur (1984) analyses Augustine’s (1961) exploration of time, and Aristotle’s 
concept of plot (1996).  Like the poet or playwright, therapists mentalise (Asen 
and Fonagy, 2012) to make sense of the patient’s story from the inside: ‘By 
envisaging things very vividly in this way, as if one were actually present at the 
events themselves, one can find out what is appropriate, and inconsistencies are 
least likely to be overlooked’ (Aristotle, 1996: 27).  The main emphasises for 
Ricoeur are plot, time, narrativity, and temporality, paying attention to 
connections.  ‘By plot I mean the intelligible whole that governs a succession of 
events in any story’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 171) or ‘the imitation of the action (by ‘plot’ 
here I mean the organisation of events)’ (Aristotle, 1996: 11).   
 
Ricoeur refers to the intersection between events where the plot turns into the 
story as ‘the crossing point of temporality and narrativity’.  He explores links 
between time and narrative as essentially a human experience, transcending 
culture at their convergence.  ‘(T)ime becomes human to the extent that it is 
articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when 
it becomes a condition of temporal existence’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 52).  Where we 
consider psychotherapy as narrative time will be at the centre of therapy in the 
patient’s untold story:  
‘The patient who talks to a psychoanalyst presents bits and pieces of lived 
stories, … of “primitive scenes” … We may rightfully say of such analytic 
sessions that their goal … is for the analysand to draw from these bits and 
pieces a narrative that will be … more intelligible. … (This) assures the 
continuity between the … inchoate story and the actual story we assume 
responsibility for’ (ibid: 74).   
 
There are a number of layers.  Stories can be inchoate and not consciously known, 
suggesting a different kind of time and experience.  “(P)rimitive scenes” are 
historical, reflecting the importance of the past in much Western psychotherapy.  
The therapist like a writer or composer draws together ‘bits and pieces’ from the 
past in their episodic nature to create a ‘plot’ with narrative coherence.  Ricoeur 
describes linear time ‘from untold and repressed stories in the direction of actual 
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stories’ (ibid: 74) from a past towards a present.  Jane’s roll of honour from the 
past, in the present, towards a different future is one example.   
 
Ricoeur suggests a reciprocal relationship between narrativity and temporality: 
‘Indeed I take temporality to be that structure of existence that reaches language 
in narrativity and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as 
its ultimate referent’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 169).  Relevant to narrative, Sartre reflects 
on temporality:  
‘Temporality is obviously an organised structure and its three “supposed” 
time elements, past, present, future, should not be seen as a collection of 
“data”, out of which we make a total – for example like a series of “nows” 
of which some are not yet, others are no longer – but as moments 
structured from an original synthesis’ (Sartre, 1943: 145). 113   
 
In this ‘original synthesis’ time is ‘thick’ (Husserl, 1991).  Each part incorporates 
or presupposes the other(s) unlike the present of past, present, and future 
(Augustine, 1961) which Sartre terms paradoxical, (the past that is no more; the 
future that is not yet; the present that does not exist, like a dot that has no size). 114  
Sartre suggests, like Husserl (1991) and Merleau-Ponty (1945), that temporality is 
not an accumulation of separate instants.  The only way to study temporality ‘is to 
approach it as an entirety which defines its component structures and gives 
meaning’ (Sartre, 1943: 145) 115.  Ricoeur on narrativity has a strong affinity with 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre.   
 
Narrative time emphasises connectedness, which is implicit in Western 
psychotherapies.  ‘(T)ime becomes human to the extent that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 52) but like therapy different narrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 ‘La temporalité est évidemment une structure organisée et ces trois prétendus “éléments” du 
temps: passé, présent, avenir, ne doivent pas être envisagés comme une collection de “data” dont il 
faut faire la somme – par exemple une série infinie de “maintenant” dont les uns ne sont pas 
encore, dont les autres ne sont plus – mais comme des moments structurés d’une synthèse 
originelle’ (Sartre, 1943: 145). 
Sartre considers this phenomenological description ‘comme un travail provisoire’.   
114 ‘Sinon nous rencontrerons d’abord ce paradoxe: le passé n’est plus, l’avenir n’est pas encore, 
quant au présent instantané, chacun sait bien qu’il n’est pas du tout, il est la limite d’une division 
infinie, comme le point sans dimension’ (Sartre, 1943: 145).   
115 ‘… c’est de l’aborder comme une totalité qui domine ses structures secondaires et qui leur 
confère leur signification’ (Sartre, 1943: 145).   
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styles articulate beginnings and endings differently.  Ricoeur argues the 
importance in philosophy of understanding the ‘structural reciprocity of 
temporality and narrativity’.  Time is too often seen as ‘a linear succession of 
instants’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 170), with philosophers looking ‘to cosmology and 
physics to supply the meaning of time or … try(ing) to specify the inner 
experience of time without any reference to narrative activity’ (ibid: 169-170).   
 
Narrative can occur ‘within an uncriticised temporal framework’ just as therapy 
may be practised without reference ‘to narrative activity’ or time.  However, an 
explicit temporal framework changes our focus.  Ricoeur’s time has depth, like 
the ‘Heideggerian concept of within-time-ness’ (ibid: 175), or the ‘thick’ present 
of Husserl’s (1991) time-consciousness.  Time is grounded phenomenologically 
in experience just as Jane’s Roll of Honour was rooted phenomenologically in 
experience, ultimately allowing her to countenance a future no longer defined by 
her past.  Her temporal experience was increasingly liberated from a timeless 
‘inner experience of time without any reference to narrative activity’ as she 
struggled to stay in the ‘now’, without an unchanging Husserlian ‘retention of 
retentions’ that never shades off, a ‘now’ that is ‘structural from an original 
synthesis’ (Sartre, 1943: 145).   
 
Ricoeur describes two kinds of ‘now’; the ‘absolute instant’ and ‘(t)he existential 
now … which is a “making-present”, inseparable from awaiting and retaining’ 
(Ricoeur, 1980: 173).  Jane and Judie struggled to make-present and stay-present, 
and when unable to, they collapse into a thick past ‘now’, leaving Jane terrified 
and Judie ultimately psychotic.  In saying ‘now’ we make the present a 
phenomenological activity not an abstract now without connection.  
Phenomenologically, ‘now’ clock-time remains linked to diurnal rhythms.  
‘(W)hen the machines used to measure time are cut off from this primary 
reference to natural measures, saying “now” is turned into a form of the abstract 
representation of time’ (ibid: 174) just as individuals bereft of a Heideggerian 
sense of Being, without a sense of making-present, become distanced from feeling 
existentially authentic.   
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Narrative, stories, and time, involve memory.  Ricoeur was concerned with 
memory as ‘passive’ experience of events returning unbidden into consciousness, 
or as an act of conscious recall.  I set the scene for some of his ideas with a brief 
clinical account of ‘mémoire’, ‘souvenir’, and ‘rappel’, to support his thinking.   
 
Case vignette: Charlene.   
The experience described here provides another un-remembered memory, or 
memory (mémoire) without memory (souvenir) or recall (rappel).   
 
Charlene experienced a debilitating fear of harming others.  This had significant 
social consequences with obsessional protectiveness of her young daughter and 
family.  It became evident that efforts to control her environment and avoid 
harming anyone were traceable to an incident in a swimming pool when she was 
six or seven.  She had slid down a waterslide and hit a boy swimming across 
under water making his nose bleed, and eliciting angry responses from adults.  
Linking this with her fear of damaging others, allowed her to experiment taking 
normal risks in everyday activities without the crippling anxiety of harming 
others.  Until that recall in therapy, she had no conscious memory of the event.  
Her ‘memory’ had been endless enactments of strategies to avoid harming others. 
116   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Jane had a similar experience of memory without ‘remembering’.  On one occasion, her parents 
had smashed her car windscreen.  She had it replaced, and as the young man began to clear the 
glass from the car, Jane recounted she had become distressed and shouted at the young man to get 
out.   
We explored the meaning of her car as a personal safe space and the effect on her of the young 
man entering it to clear it up.  She began to see it as a personal invasion, and how this had re-
evoked her experiences of rape and violation.  As she made the connection she began to see she 
had memory (mémoire) of her abuse without conscious memory (souvenir), or recall (rappel) of 
how this (isomorphic) experience reactivated her ‘forgotten’ terrors.  She began to relax.  This 
incident did not mean that she was “going mad”.   
 
Jane had developed ways to deal with the past when it became unbearably present, by suppressing 
recall of her abuse to protect herself from her fear of “going mad”.  Memory in the guise of 
dissociated reliving of events would come unbidden into therapy so that rather than actively 
recalling past events, she would re-enact them, regressed to the age when she first endured them.   
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In this account, we see a replaying in adult life of a single childhood ‘trauma’.  
‘Mémoire’, without ‘souvenir’ or ‘rappel’, plays a powerful role repeating without 
remembering (Freud, 1917, XVI: 270-271).  Her repetition was timeless, repeated 
without change or recall.  Memory, forgetting, or unconscious forgetting that 
protects the individual from painful recall, are different elements of time.  Ricoeur 
(1980: 180) suggests that a ‘plot establishes human action not only within time, 
… but within memory.  Memory, accordingly, repeats the course of events 
according to an order that is the counterpart of time as “stretching-along” between 
a beginning and an end’.  An anonymous reviewer of La Mémoire, l’Histoire, 
l’Oubli (Ricoeur, 2000) writes:  
‘… a distinction between memory, mneme, which is at the level of feeling, 
or pathos, since memory appears passively without the subject willing it – 
is, to put it simply, memory of the kind “Proust’s madeleine biscuit”  - and 
anamnesis, memory, which is in the sense of active work, is seeking recall 
and recollection.  To put it simply again, it is the kind of memory of 
psycho-analytic work.’ (BBF, 2001: 1). 117   
 
The distinction between mneme and anamnesis, ‘the simple presence of memory 
and the effort of recall’ (Vigier, 2001: 2) 118 is important for understanding time.  
Ricoeur’s review of the philosophy of memory, history, and forgetting, from Plato 
to Heidegger, begins with the phenomenology of memory:  
‘By submitting to the primacy of the question “what?”, phenomenology of 
memory finds itself confronted from the start by a formidable aporia, 119 
which everyday language guarantees: the presence in which the 
representation of the past seems to consist looks very much like an image’ 
(Ricoeur, 2000: 5). 120   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117‘… une distinction entre la mémoire, mneme, qui est de l’ordre de l’affect, du pathos, puisque le 
souvenir y apparaît de manière passive sans que le sujet le veuille – c’est pour aller vite, la 
mémoire type “madeleine de Proust” - , et la mémoire anamnesis, qui est de l’ordre du travail, de 
la quête, du rappel et de la recollection.  C’est pour aller vite encore, la mémoire type du travail en 
analyse’ (BBF, 2001: 1).  We see here where language changes the nuances, since in French there 
are two words for memory: souvenir and mémoire.   
118 ‘la simple présence du souvenir et l’effort de rappel’ emphasises active memory and active 
recalling.   
119 ‘Aporia, … is the cognitive perplexity posed by a group of individually plausible but 
collectively inconsistent propositions. … To overcome aporetic inconsistency, we must give up at 
least one of the theses involved in the inconsistency.  There will always be different alternatives 
here and logic as such can enforce no resolution’ (Honderich, 2005: 43).   
120 ‘En se soumettant au primat de la question “quoi?”, la phénoménologie de la mémoire se voit 
confrontée d’entrée de jeu à une redoubtable aporie que le langage ordinaire cautionne : la  
présence en laquelle semble consister la représentation du passé paraît bien être celle d’une image’ 
(Ricoeur, 2000: 5).   
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Although memory refers to past events, blurred time boundaries is a familiar 
phenomenon in clinical practice.  In philosophical description, ‘temporal distance, 
of the depth of the past’ (ibid: 6) (‘distance temporelle, de profondeur du temps 
passé’) differs from a past so lacking depth that it becomes an intrusive present, 
facing us with the Platonic presence of the absent in memory. 121  In Aristotelian 
terms, Ricoeur differentiates memory as recall, - ‘recall consists of active seeking’ 
(ibid: 22), - and memory as simply present that ‘confronts the simple evocation of 
a memory coming to mind’ (ibid: 24). 122  We are often clinically concerned with 
memory that is not easily accesible (mneme) and is beyond conscious awareness 
requiring active recall (anamnesis).  It is as if the absent creates a time gap for 
‘with memory, the absent carries the temporal indicator of what went before’ 
(ibid: 24) 123.  However we represent the past, - by oral tradition, written word, 
monuments, - we make sense of the present through evoking memory (mémoire, 
souvenir, or rappel): ‘(W)e do not have any other resource as regards the past than 
memory (mémoire) itself.  To memory (mémoire) is attached ambition, a 
pretention, … to be faithful to the past. … to indicate the character of the past 
from which we declare memory (souvenir)’ (ibid: 26).  124   
 
If memory is our primary access to the past, we need to understand linguistically 
and culturally different kinds of memory.  ‘In this sense, we should distinguish 
linguistically between memory [mémoire] as focused and memory [souvenir] as 
the thing envisaged.  We speak of memory and memories.  Speaking radically of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ricoeur refers to Aristotle’s Theaetetus in respect of ‘la présence de l’absent’, (Ricoeur, 2000: 
23) and as ‘une ligne entre la simple présence du souvenir et l’acte de rappel’, (‘a boundary 
between simple presence of memory and the specific act of recall’).   
122 ‘le rappel consiste en une recherche active.’  /  ‘fait face à la simple évocation d’un souvenir 
venant à l’esprit.’   
123 ‘(a)vec le souvenir, l’absent porte la marque temporelle de l’antérieur.’   
124 ‘Nous n’avons pas d’autre ressource, concernant la réference au passé, que la mémoire elle-
même.  À la mémoire est attachée une ambition, une prétention, celle d’être fidèle au passé.  … 
elle est notre seule et unique ressource pour signifier le caractère passé de ce dont nous déclarons 
nous souvenir’ (ibid: 26).  We see in the French, the distinction between ‘mémoire’ and 
‘souvenir’.   
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what is dealt with here, it is a phenomenon of memory [souvenir]’ (ibid: 27).  125  
By ‘a phenomenology of memory’ Ricoeur implies memory of past things, of the 
‘what’, or ‘whom’, or ‘how’, a past distinct from and not influenced by the 
present.  In chapter 5 we consider the lived phenomenology of different kinds of 
memory.   
 
Ricoeur’s interest in psychotherapy and narrative reflects therapy that seeks 
connections between seemingly disparate elements to become a new healing 
narrative.  Jane’s Roll of Honour is an example of the importance of a new future-
oriented narrative plot to help confront her ‘memory’.  Charlene developed a new 
narrative about her fear of harming others, and Judie began to change the critical 
narrative that she carried in her head.   
 
Ricoeur’s analysis of Aristotelian plot (Aristotle, 1996) supports this 
understanding.  His attention to Augustine and the shift from a cosmological to a 
personal understanding of time fits with the private world of psychotherapy.  His 
analysis of multi-layered memory (mémoire, souvenir, rappel) suggests a 
language for the presence of the absent in the not-remembered memory.   
 
Time’s unreality: narrative’s challenge.   
Since considering Julian Barbour’s argument against the existence of time in 
chapter 1, (Barbour, 2000, 2008), the philosophical premise has predicated its 
existence.  We have considered the instant or time out of time, and the instant 
having thickness.  As a counterpoint to this, I turn to two other philosophers.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 ‘En ce sens, il faudrait distinguer dans le langage entre la mémoire comme visée et le souvenir 
comme chose visée.  On dit la mémoire et les souvenirs.  À parler radicalement de ce dont il est 
traité ici, c’est une phénoménologie du souvenir.’   
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J.M.E. McTaggart.   
McTaggart (1927) proposes two kinds of time.  They are:  
o The A series that describes an event or experience as Past, Present, or 
Future.  None is permanent, and a moment cannot be in more than one 
simultaneously.   
o The B series is relational, with two states: Earlier and Later.  These 
relationships are fixed.   
Events are either simultaneous or sequential and we can see them in terms of both 
series.  Only the present can be perceived directly while other events are known 
either through memory (the past), or inference / expectation (the future) (A series).  
The past, present, or future, are constructs of our minds and exist in human 
consciousness but this does not make them real: ‘no fact about anything can 
change, unless it is a fact about its place in the A series.  Whatever other qualities 
it has, it has always.  But what is future will not always be future, and what was 
past was not always past’ (McTaggart, 1927: 28).  Thus, the only reality of time is 
earlier / later, (B series).   
 
Unlike time defined by change or number, nothing changes in the B series because 
‘the B series depends on permanent relations, no moment could ever cease to be, 
nor could it become another moment’ (ibid: 26).  The only possible change is 
from farthest future, through to the present, to farthest past, while the event 
remains unchanged. 126   
‘Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one.  
If I say that any event is past, that implies that it is neither present nor 
future, and is so with the others.  And this exclusiveness is essential to 
change, and therefore to time.  For the only change we can get is from 
future to present, and from present to past’ (ibid: 32).   
 
As we lack a verb that encompasses all three times, we can only describe each one 
separately.  ‘The central idea of the A series is that there is a unique and ever-
changing absolute present, relative to which every other element of the series is 
either absolutely past or absolutely future’ (Roark, 2011: 14).  We have seen in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 McTaggart gives the example of Queen Anne’s death that never changes.   
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clinical vignettes how patients experience simultaneity of present-past and 
present-future, while lacking a now-present.  The B series fixes the position of 
earlier or later events in relation to each other, but ‘without an A series there is no 
time’ (McTaggart, 1927: 27).  However, McTaggart argues that attributions of 
past, present, or future, the A series, are ‘only a constant illusion of our minds, 
and the real nature of time contains only the distinctions of the B series’ (ibid: 25) 
and yet without this ‘illusion’ there cannot be time.   
 
If we think of Judie and her psychotic breakdown (this chapter) who could not 
shake off her mother’s belief that she did not have the right to exist, she 
experienced no past, present, or possible future - except one of dread.  Earlier and 
later melded into an intolerable un-survivable present.  In McTaggart’s terms it is 
hardly too much to suggest that Judie had no sense of A series, and in her 
existential feeling of illegitimacy, little deep experience of before / after, or earlier 
/ later in her sense of being.   
 
Anthropologist Alfred Gell suggests that the A series is concerned with ‘tense’, 
‘since past, present and future are the three basic tenses’ (Gell, 1992: 166) and 
that the B series is more concerned with time in an unequivocal manner.  B series 
relationships remain static.  The present in the A series is in constant flux to 
remain the same (present) where ‘the subject has every reason to feel that time is 
passing, because of the workload involved in continually updating beliefs’ (ibid: 
173).  Remaining ‘present’ requires continuous cognitive activity.  Time may be 
an ‘illusion of our minds’ philosophically, but subjective realities as lived realities 
are the locus of healing ‘in continually updating beliefs’ in ever-changing 
relationships to present, past, and future.   
 
If the past cannot be changed in McTaggart’s B series, Husserl’s model allows the 
past to be constantly changing in our consciousness as a by-product of human 
intentionality.  Husserl gives depth to McTaggart’s model, but this does not 
account for retention of retention (of retention) not ‘shading off’ of sight but 
remaining painfully present.  There may be an increasingly distant past in the A 
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series and the fixed relationship of the B series, but for Jane the cruel present of 
on-going parental abuse constantly compounded the ever-present reality of a past 
that never ‘shaded off’.   
 
I now make reference to Galen Strawson’s argument against narrativity, 
beginning with a brief case vignette.   
 
Case vignette: Douglas.   
Douglas is in his mid forties and successful in business.  He describes growing up 
in a family with little spontaneous affection or active interest in his activities.  
When he was twenty-three his father was shot at point blank range in an 
underground car park.  It was an ‘execution’ with a high profile court case but no 
conviction.  Douglas works long hours, is separated from his wife and children 
while maintaining regular contact, has a ‘girl-friend’ with whom he does not live, 
has a one bedroom flat furnished with few material possessions where he feels 
most secure.  He has intermittent contact with friends.  These relationships do not 
overlap.   
 
Douglas wrote of himself: “Life is very episodic, looking forward to the next 
event but not being able to plan very far ahead. … I don’t like my remoteness, 
have struggled to explain it and understand it and the lack of emotions I have been 
left with”.  Of his social and family life he writes of “some personal 
contentedness” but “not being happy about many of these characteristics”.  He 
only feels at ease or real in the immediate now of activity.  He strongly identified 
with Meursault, Camus’ central character in L’Étranger (1957) who lives in a 
seemingly timeless world devoid of emotional significance or connection, with no 
before or after.   
 
Galen Strawson.   
Strawson considers some of these points.  He questions the received truth that 
human beings ‘typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story 
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of some sort’ (Strawson, 2005: 63). 127  He proposes that humans ‘experience their 
being in time’ in different ways, and that ‘non-Narrative’ people lead fulfilled 
lives. 128  Strawson terms ‘Diachronic’ for long-term continuity of Narrativity, and 
‘Episodic’ for a person lacking a sense of distant past or long-term future, 129 
similar to Douglas writing “Life is very episodic, … not being able to plan very 
far ahead”.   
 
Strawson’s argument whether our experience of time is episodic or diachronic 
questions time as a reality.  While he is correct that retelling stories lays down and 
reinforces particular neural pathways his argument might be different if he took 
account of the work of narrative therapists such as Michael White and David 
Epston (1990) who emphasise ‘re-storying’ to facilitate psychological change that 
would create new neural pathways.   
 
Jane’s experience from her earliest years was to be told she was ‘shit’ like the 
dog.  She was repeatedly threatened that revealing her abuse would result in her 
throat being cut like her cat’s.  Her parents’ ultimate thirty-year prison sentence 
could not simply erase this lifelong narrative.  She had painstakingly to connect 
multiple discontinuous elements of her life, her ‘flashbacks of sensation (that 
were) seemingly disconnected from a behavioural context’ (Kalsched, 1996: 13) 
of her life with its many ‘holes in it’.   
 
Douglas’ experience was less tangible.  Growing up in a family with little 
emotional connection, and compounded by his father’s murder, seemed to provide 
him with little sense of narrative continuity.  Work relocations and years of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Strawson argues elsewhere from, I believe, a phenomenological standpoint, that ‘anything that 
exists in space-time – is entirely physical’ (Strawson, 2013: 28).   
128 There is an unexplained sub-text in Strawson’s essay challenging the basis of psychotherapy.  
He singles out psychotherapy as potentially destructive if it imposes either narrative model, but 
does not make explicit what prompts this, especially as this paper is not about psychotherapy.   
129 The ground-breaking book, Families of the Slums, (Minuchin et al., 1967), charts the 
experiences of children lacking a sense of continuity in their lives, who do not connect events over 
time and cannot recall them, nor see the consequences of behaviours on others.  This study 
describes the consequences of the limited extent to which these children can engage in social 
activity to prepare them for adult life.   
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international work travel probably helped mask the episodic and disjointed nature 
of his private world.   
 
Strawson merits consideration.  He argues that psychotherapy does not have to be 
a narrative project nor that disparate events need be linked in a narrative manner: 
‘The key explanatory linkings in psychotherapy are often piecemeal in nature, as 
are many key impacts of experience.  Ideally, one acquires an assorted basketful 
of understandings, not a narrative – an almost inevitably falsifying narrative’ 
(Strawson, 2005: 83).  Although his argument is weakened by the lack of 
alternative and more specifically by a notion of time, his ideas of descriptive and 
normative narrative, and episodic or diachronic time, suggest useful perspectives 
for psychotherapy.   
 
Reflections.   
This philosophical enquiry generates a range of insights.  One of the difficulties is 
that with the exception of Ricoeur and to some extent Heidegger, the 
philosophical time perspectives I have researched relate predominantly to the 
everyday normal, or do not easily account for chaotic lived experience.  In its 
attempt to understand the world philosophy does not set out to describe the effects 
of trauma or stress on experiences of time, and generally does not examine the 
phenomenon of a co-existing past and present.   
 
Descartes (2000) implied that knowledge of our existence is predicated on the fact 
that thought exists and that the confines of our thought suggest that time would 
not exist without human consciousness.  Without consciousness there is no 
number, no ‘self’ to record rhythm or meaning.  If, as Kant suggests, philosophy 
can help describe everyday experience a priori of time, the contrast of stressful 
experience highlights the need for other tools to describe those kinds of time.  
Kant accepts that while a priori there is an argument for time’s existence, 
subjective experience affects awareness of duration.  His idea that in the inner 
space of the mind time varies, changes, and is subjective, tentatively takes us 
closer to time experienced in therapy.   
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The introduction of phenomenology and intentionality by Husserl beginning with 
the world as it is without prior theory, made it possible to start with the person in 
their Being and realities.  Husserl describes an instant that is more than Plato’s 
instant ‘being in no time at all’ or Barbour’s equal-value-now.  Husserl’s ‘thick 
instant’ gives body and substance to time, and Heidegger’s exploration of Dasein 
and being in time introduced the ‘horizonal’ of an existential-ontological 
understanding.   
 
Ricoeur draws on many traditions to remind us that the phenomenological ‘now’ 
must remain existentially connected.  In psychotherapy it must be rooted in 
experience drawn from ‘how it is’ and not from ‘how it should be’.  Ricoeur 
(2000) introduces subtleties for memory (mémoire, souvenir, rappel) that suggest 
how we may formulate the not (consciously) remembered memory, memory that 
is present, and active recall.   
 
The roots of modern Western philosophy from the eighteenth century lie in a 
reductionist understanding of mind that is rationalist and not linked to a deity.  
The phenomenology of starting from the observed in its thingly-ness parallels a 
move from external explanation stretching back to Plato, to man as he is in the 
present.   
 
Strawson challenged belief in the primacy of narrative continuity, yet Jane’s 
fragmented, traumatised, episodic world gave her no peace.  It would have been 
unethical not to help her develop a different narrative.  When unable to think, 
echoing Descartes, she felt she did not exist as if she were outside time and place.  
Certainly her sense of being out-of-time gives credence to McTaggart’s argument 
for time’s unreality.  For her nonetheless this was a state of terror.   
 
I turn next to the world of experience in different socio-cultural contexts and 
ultimately examine ritual for what we can learn about temporality in 
psychotherapy.  I begin with an in-depth case study, partly to bridge philosophical 
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and social anthropological scholarship, and partly for a contemporary 
ethnographic voice to my research.   
  
	   156	  
Chapter 5.  
 
A family’s multiple constructs of time.   
 
‘The word of the Lord came to me again: “What do you mean by repeating this 
proverb concerning the land of Israel, ‘The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the 
children’s teeth are set on edge’?  As I live, says the Lord God, this proverb shall 
no more be used by you in Israel.” ’  
(Ezekiel. 18: 1-2.)   
 
‘(F)or practitioners concerned with individuals, not aggregates, research can never 
be generalizable … Research can only function as a heuristic; it can suggest 
possibilities but never dictate action.’  
(Donmoyer, 2000: 51) 
 
Aims.   
The main aims of this chapter are to describe a piece of qualitative research on 
time with a Romanian family and emphasise socio-cultural perspectives in 
understanding human relationships.  I contrast this with philosophical scholarship 
on time and provide a ‘bridge’ to examine time anthropologically.  The focus is to 
show how a heightened awareness of multiple interweaving timeframes enhances 
an appreciation of people’s lived experience.   
 
Introduction.   
General background.   
In presenting the following interview material, I analyse different kinds of time 
and how changing temporal perspectives influence people’s lives.  In the previous 
two chapters we considered certain philosophical ways to structure time, some of 
which do not reflect patients’ temporal experiences, nor Freud and Palazzoli’s 
thinking.  Even supported with brief clinical vignettes, philosophical discussion 
sometimes tended towards the abstract and rational.  This chapter, where I analyse 
the lived stories of a Romanian family, acts as a bridge between philosophy and 
the more direct cultural history and worlds of chapters 6, 7, and 8, and their 
respective contributions to conceptualising time in psychotherapy.   
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The data comes from a semi-structured interview on time with the Mocan family 
in an international conference plenary session. 130  It is a public research interview 
to gather information, and in a sense to introduce information (Tomm, 1987a, b, 
1988).  It is mainly ethnographically oriented to provide a systematic description 
of a family’s particular culture (Barfield, 1997).  As the interviewer, I am part of 
the process since we do not ‘separate who we are as persons from the research 
analysis that we do’ (Corbin, 2009: 40).  A brief socio-political note provides 
some background.   
 
A socio-political note.   
The Romanian revolution that overthrew the Ceausescu regime began on 15th 
December 1989 in Timișoara and coalesced around Laszlo Tökes, a pastor of 
Hungarian origin.  The conference in November 2006 at Western University of 
Timişoara took place seventeen years later.  A number of the conference 
participants had been junior doctors treating the wounded in 1989 and there is 
now a generation with no personal memory of that era.  The bridge over the Bega 
where students were gunned down, the Romanian Orthodox cathedral where 
retreating civilians were shot against its closed doors, and the Calea Martirilor 
(Martyr’s Street) where many were killed, are within a mile of the university.   
 
The interview is based on family members’ experiences of change and stability 
before and after 1989.  Tanasoiu argues that while there seem to be changes in 
Romania, underlying myths mean that stabilising processes inhibit any ‘change of 
change’ (Hoffman, 1985).  Tanasoiu (2005: 116) identifies the following key 
myths underpinning Romanian society; ‘Unity’, the Saviour, the Conspiracy 
Theory and, the Golden Age’.  These myths define Romanian society over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Second International Conference in Family Therapy and Systemic Practice: Continuities and 
Discontinuities in a Time of Change, 23-25 November 2006, Timisoara, Romania.  Dr Ileana Radu 
and I were conference Co-Chairs.   
 
When planning this conference and choice of themes for the family interview, I had in mind the 
nature of time to identify ways of experiencing and how to describe time.  My focus on 
continuities and discontinuities, time and change, fitted with family members’ expectations for the 
interview.	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centuries.  Tanasoiu draws on three well-known folk legends 131 that reinforce 
those ‘political myths (which) are perpetuated from one period to another 
although new faces and details are used to fill in the script’ (ibid: 112).   
 
The Tismaneanu Report (2006):  
This report, commissioned by President Traian Bãsescu, gives background to life 
in Romania under communism (1945-89).  It highlights the ‘ideology at the core 
of the régime, emphasising that it exercised control by manipulating and 
indoctrinating the Romanian people’ (Tanasoiu, 2007: 63).  Tanasiou quotes 
Gheorghio-Dej, the party’s first general secretary: ‘ “The Ministry of Education is 
more important than the Ministry of Security, since it concerns the cultural 
destruction of the enemy, prepares future comrades, and educates the working 
classes” ’ (ibid: 65).  It confirms the Mocan family’s account:  
‘Since the sins of the parents were passed on to the children, students with 
an “unhealthy” background were given only limited access to higher 
education, “unhealthy” authors were removed from the curriculum, and 
“dangerous elements” among the teachers were removed.  The status of 
teachers, professors, and academics was reduced to that of ordinary 
workers.  The Party’s monopoly over cultural life was achieved through 
“disinfection of the printed word”, censorship and, under Ceausescu’s 
leadership, a “mini-cultural revolution” that confined cultural output to 
serving the leader’s cult of personality’ (Tanasiou, 2007: 65).   
 
Time, continuity, the importance of legacies, and the danger of old beliefs, are 
evident.  Communist party leaders’ timeframe spanned future generations to 
achieve the marginalization and eradication of those from an ‘unhealthy 
background’ (Iliesiu, 2005). 132  The continuing influence of Party members in 
Romania is evident. 133   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The three mythical stories, with their symbolic power, are: “Traian and Dochia”, “Mesterul 
Manole” (The Craftsman Manole) and “Miorita” (The Lamb).  These are the Romanian myths of 
the origins of the nation; the building of the Curtea de Arges, the Romanian Orthodox monastery 
that later became the official church of the princes of Vallachia; and a story that vindicates 
inaction and communion with nature in the face of threats to survival.  (See, Tanasoiu, 2005: 117-
124).   
132 The Report’s publication and presentation in the Romanian parliament demonstrated how many 
people retained a vested interest in its denigration and, if possible, the suppression of history.  It 
provides an example of the importance of time, the manipulation of memory, and attempts to re-
edit the past, which was denied, disputed or ‘re-defined’.  During its presentation there were 
outright abuse and insults.  One member described his activities of the 1960s as ‘simply youthful	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The passage of time allows other ‘stories’ to emerge and the myth that this was a 
people’s revolution is now questioned.  Some involved in the revolution now ask 
whether this was not a coup d’état.  ‘Within a year, it was beyond doubt that one 
faction had simply removed another faction, probably in direct contact with 
Moscow, where Gorbachev had realised the Ceausescu’s system would implode.  
The institutions that had run the country remained intact, albeit with another 
name’ (Vulliamy, 2009: 30). 134   
 
The family interview in a research context.   
Time is the generic category for analysing my data.  The three subcategories are: 
past, present, and future.  Either side of the present are variations of past and 
future: earlier than/later than; nearer to/further from; before and after (McTaggart, 
1927).  I discuss this data and the time categories that I develop from this.   
 
The interview was open-ended so I could develop ideas generated by family 
members.  It was a unique opportunity to explore important themes in situ in 
Romania at a particular period in its post-communist history.  The interview data 
could be interrogated in a number of ways including, gender, authority, decision-
making; internal migration, or communication patterns.  Time was my choice.  
My aim was to highlight the potential importance of ‘time’ in any consideration of 
socio-historical-cultural life, the ‘patterns that connect’ (Bateson, 1973) in a 
familial-social grouping with a shared history, and to explore experiences of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mistakes’ (Tanasoiu, 2007: 67).  During the communist regime, up to 3,000,000 people were 
executed.  There was mass removal of families from their homes, deportation, and confiscation of 
property with migration to the towns into blocks of flats, thereby breaking communities.  Party 
control was extended to the Romanian Orthodox church, while churches with adherence outside 
the country - Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches, - were banned or the hierarchy 
removed.  A system of infiltration into every part of working and domestic life meant that no one 
could be sure whether they were being informed on (Tanasoiu, 2007).  This established a culture 
of fear and distrust.  The legacy and extent of the continuing influence of the Securitate remains to 
the present day, as I see in my work in Timișoara (Anonymous personal communication).  Anna 
Funder captures this in her interviews with former members of the Stasi in the GDR and their 
victims, highlighting the long-term effects on both aspects of totalitarian regimes (Funder, 2004).   
133 Taking coffee in the lunch break in Timişoara (2012) a colleague indicated a smartly dressed 
middle aged man walking past, saying: “He was my interrogator”.  ‘Time has passed’, yet in many 
ways ‘time stands still’. 
134 This is a repeating theme of communist struggle in Romania (Deletant, 1998).   
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continuities and discontinuities of time over time in pre- and post-1989 Romania. 
135   
 
All methods of inquiry have their limitations and research will often bias towards 
discovering what it ‘measures’.  Sometimes the most important information to be 
discovered may not come from formal, generalisable findings.   
‘Even statistically significant findings from studies with huge, randomly 
selected samples cannot be applied directly to particular individuals in 
particular situations; skilled clinicians will always be required to 
determine whether a research generalization applies to a particular 
individual, whether the generalization needs to be adjusted to 
accommodate individual idiosyncrasy, or whether it needs to be 
abandoned entirely with certain individuals in certain settings’ 
(Donmoyer, 2000: 51).   
 
Interview context.   
The family interview addressed the conference theme, Continuities and 
Discontinuities in a Time of Change (Jenkins, 2007, 2008).  The family describe 
changes for their families of origin, themselves individually, as a family together, 
and in the context of historical and political events.  Their Baptist Christian belief 
is historically and socially relevant because of the different, sometimes 
compromised, role of the Romanian Orthodox Church between 1945 and 1989 
(Tanasoiu, 2005).   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Secondarily, it was also to demonstrate interviewing skills and enable family members to 
articulate their lived experiences in ways not necessarily considered previously.  This was similar 
to the Smith family in chapter 1.   
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Case study: the Mocan family.   























Figure 5.1.  Mocan family genogram.  Genograms describe current structure, 
structures over time, highlighting continuities and discontinuities in those 
patterns.   
 
The family 136 is composed of: Liviu, sculptor, Rodica a professor at the 
University of Cluj, and their three children.  An example of Liviu’s work appears 
below (Plate 5.1).  This picks up a recurring theme of the seed, the paradox of life 
out of death, redemption, irresistible force and irreversible change, cycles of the 
seasons, and time / timelessness.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136All family members requested that their real names be used for publication in Terapia Sistemica 
(Jenkins, 2008) and this research.   
Paul	  	  high	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Plate 4.1.  Liviu Mocan: The Seed. 137   
 
In the interview I explore different kinds of time.  I address remembered, or 
autonoetic episodic time (Tulving, 2005), its importance in the present, and the 
place of family members’ beliefs for understanding their future ‘now’.   
‘Narrative, as autobiography, describes the way in which people articulate 
how the past is related to the present… .  Time is placed into a personal 
history, where the past is given meaning in the present. … This 
chronicling of a life, or part of a life, often starts from a point of “how it 
all happened” or “how I came to be where I am today” ’ (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996: 68).   
 
Coffey and Atkinson are at variance with the argument favouring the episodic, 
proposed by Strawson (2005) in chapter 4.  Family members recall lived or 
reported stories.  They ‘articulate how the past is relevant to the present’; family 
culture over time (duration); the continuing effects of the 1989 Revolution (past in 
the present); family continuity and discontinuity over three generations (past to 
present) and; intimations for the children’s generation (present to future, in the 
context of the past).  Family shared faith values are reiterated in their changing 
world (past, present and future).  Finally, a new value of open-mindedness (past 
and present) is recognised.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Liviu Mocan’s website address: www.liviumocan.com. The image of dying as a necessary 
stage before new life, as in the seed that dies in the ground before regeneration, is at the core of the 
Christian message.  It is similar in this respect to Buddhist and Hindu beliefs.   
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Research and the place of the investigator.   
Timing of the study.   
The time interval between gathering material and its analysis becomes a factor.  
This study becomes an observation in the ‘now’ of the family interview in a ‘now’ 
that has become ‘then’.  I observe the DVD of the interview in a different 
contextual ‘present’ or ‘now’ in London than the time of the interview a year 
earlier in Timișoara.  ‘Now’ becomes ‘now-then’ and re-contextualises the 
original event.   
 
Vigouroux discusses temporality for ‘language is experienced differently in the 
here-and-now of an interaction than in the there-and-then of the transcription 
activity’ (Vigouroux, 2007: 85).  Differences of interpretation may ‘be interpreted 
as conflicts of temporalities’ (ibid: 86) and contribute to alternative 
understandings of data.  The ‘there-and-then’ in the film is no longer the ‘here-
and-now’ of the moment as I observe myself now seeing myself interviewing on 
film then. 138  Time is differently expressed according to the culture and meanings 
of the words used.  Scheflen (1978) makes a similar point about understanding an 
event as a video sequence is re-contextualised by increasing the number of before 
and after excerpts.  Such multiple before and after moments are in effect 
accumulations of episodic time (Strawson, 2005) different to the future-present-
past flow the A series and B series, recalling McTaggart’s (1927) argument.   
 
Although it is impossible to approach data empty minded, it is possible and useful 
to suspend (dis)belief.  I adopted a ‘not knowing’ relationship to my material 
(Anderson, and Goolishian, 1992; Hoffman, 1990, 1992) and am agnostic about 
any specific theory of time, although experience of time affects all human 
relationships and societal structures (Hall, 1989; Levine, 2006; Priestley, 1964).  
My years of working in the Sahel in Mali, the Savoie in France, and Lusaka in 
Zambia, in such different socio-political contexts, teach me that ‘absolute beliefs’ 
are contextual and ‘(w)e routinely recognise that in most things we can never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 This text will be read in yet another ‘now’, further re-contextualising all that I say.   
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know anything for sure.  But this does not mean that we know nothing’ 
(Hammersley, 1995: 62).   
 
Methodology.   
I transcribed the one-hour interview using the left hand page. I read through the 
material on completion recording the main categories of description used by 
family members and then coded the material for time-related and other significant 
categories on the right hand pages (Appendix 1).  This helped organise the data 
and identify discrepancies of understanding and experience.  I repeatedly 
interrogated the text and refined my categories step-by-step.  I typed out 
sequences that encapsulated family members’ main themes, using this to review 
the material until I came to what I felt to be saturation point. 139   
 
Interviewing influences, or ‘contaminates’, subjects’ views.  The cycle of 
influence is recursive as the interviewer simultaneously influences and is 
influenced (Hammersley, 2002) vide the Stimulus, Response, Reinforcement 
(SRR) communication model (Watzlawick et al, 1967).  Since it is impossible not 
to communicate, my interest in ‘time’ communicates its importance because a 
question, however ‘open’, reveals intentionality (Husserl, 1991).   
 
My different cultural background and history ‘sends messages’.  It does not 
invalidate the material, but increases the likelihood of a richer and ‘thicker’ 
description (Geertz, 1973).  An interviewing style that elicits or challenges 
implicitly held views may help develop new explanations as the interviewer 
disturbs the family’s culture.  Culture is not some esoteric quality possessed by 
some and not by others.  ‘(C)ulture is simply a convenient term to describe the 
sum of learned knowledge and skills – including religion and language – that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The main categories were:  
o Past – Memory  
o Present  
o Future – for selves / others  
o Gendered stories – over time  
o Change / Choice   
o Legacies – past / future  
o Faith  
o Open-mindedness  
o Freedom / danger 
o Uncertainty  
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distinguishes one community from another and which, … passes on in a 
recognizable form from generation to generation’ (Lewis, 1996: 16-17).  It is fluid 
and dynamic: ‘I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore 
not an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning’ (Geertz, 1973: 5).  In qualitative research, meaning is privileged, ‘those 
webs’ or the ‘glue’ that Kets de Vries (1995) describes.  This family’s culture is 
explored through a qualitative lens of time and change, so as to achieve ‘an in-
depth understanding of people’s experiences, perspectives and histories in the 
context of their personal circumstances or settings’ (Spencer et al., 2003: 5).   
 
I chose a qualitative approach, (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Morse et al, 2009; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to draw out different levels of meaning for family 
members.  In contradistinction to the argument against narrativity (Strawson, 
2005) I look for connection and follow the narrative chronology while analysing 
the content of family members’ comments.  Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 55) quote 
Denzin in support of this approach: ‘A narrative relates events in a temporal, 
causal sequence.  Every narrative describes a sequence of events that have 
happened.  Hence narratives are temporal productions’ (Denzin, 1989: 37). 140  
This fits with my interest in time and how to connect the ‘bits and pieces’ 
(Ricoeur, 1984: 74), the plot that becomes ‘the intelligible whole that governs a 
succession of events in any story’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 171) discussed in chapter 4.   
 
It felt natural to move between statements and behaviours and identify categories 
first as a way to create a framework for accessing beliefs.  I have been guided in 
this by MacDonald (1999) from her experience that following Strauss and Corbin 
too closely ‘may not be the most appropriate for the dataset’ (MacDonald, 1999: 
32) so as to find a more appropriate ‘less restrictive approach to organising the 
categories’ (ibid, 32).  I analyse ‘beliefs’ 141 and meanings in this way, and inquire 
about possible transgenerational transmission.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Denzin, N. K., (1989) Interpretive Interactionism.  Newbury Park, CA.  Sage.   
141 I am aware of the many facets of ‘belief’, and in different cultures.  Needham (1972) discusses 
this in Belief, Language, and Experience (cf., 35-37) and interestingly ‘a man’s assertion that he 
believes is ultimately a reference to an inner state’ (ibid: 74).  See also Hobart (2003: 73).   
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I emphasise in the interview that I am an outsider, bringing an outsider’s 
particular perspective 142.  It underlines the importance of self-reflexive awareness 
(Lynch, 2000) whether as psychotherapist (Jenkins, 2004, 2005, 2006; Rober, 
1999; Roberts, 2005; Yalom, 1989, 2001) or researcher (Corbin, 2009).  It 
supports the observation that our task is ‘an interpretive one in search of meaning’ 
(Geertz, 1973: 5) in relation to cultures.   
 
The interview: narrative text and process.   
This part is divided into three time categories: past, present, and future.   
Past. 143   
Rodica introduces a past timeframe within five minutes of the interview 
beginning:  
 
Excerpt 1.   
Rodica  “May I say something, what David should have said to introduce his dad?  When 
David was two, my husband had an exhibition at the art museum.”   
David  (Inaudible – Liviu laughs) 
Rodica  “… and while he was in the exhibition I had a walk with him in the park.  And we 
have that huge, umm, monument of Matthew Corvin, the king.  …  And he put his 
arms around the boot, and he said: “This is what my daddy made”.  And for me that 
was the first time I realised he knows what his father’s job is, to make this kind of 
sculptures.  So this is probably the way he should have introduced his father.”   
 
Until this point, family members have introduced each other in the present.  
Rodica introduces a specific past moment relating to the personal in terms of 
parenting and the professional regarding Liviu’s work.  This is contextualised by 
historical time, represented by the bronze statue of King Matthew Corvin.144   
 
A few minutes later, following my questions about the Revolution,  
Excerpt 2.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 I am and will always be an outsider, while occupying a place on the boundary in relation to 
central Europe.  I have worked regularly in Czechoslovakia (before the political split), Hungary, 
Yugoslavia (Croatia now), Poland, and Romania since 1987.  In addition, I have worked and 
taught regularly for many years in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and South East Asia.   
143 In the interests of clarity, I have edited the excerpts where possible in the body of the text.  Full 
transcripts of each excerpt used with right hand margin notes are in Appendix 1.   
144 ‘Matthew’ refers to Romania’s Christian heritage.   
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HJ “… And one thing maybe for Paul and Emma and David, what do you think the 
coming down of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989, what do you think it 
means for your mum and dad?” 
 
I invite Paul and Emma to share their view about its meaning for their parents.   
 
















“I was pretty small.  I was two years old when that happened, but I still 
remember the revolution, there were gunshots outside. … That from that 
moment on we gain the freedom to speak, and to write and to express 
ourselves and of religion, and I think that was the best part of it, the freedoms 
we’ve gained.”   
 
“What do you think it meant for your mum and your dad, because it may 
mean a different thing?  What do you think that changed for them in the last 
seventeen years?   
 
“I think they had to decide whether to change their way of thinking and 
basically start a new life, because their whole life style changed at that 
moment, and so I’m glad that my parents were open-minded. … So I think 
that’s the best thing about them, that they became open-minded, and after that 
we travelled a lot and we had a good time.”   
 
 
This sequence introduces a number of past-related concepts, beginning with a 
particular event.  The sequence describing the gunshots is a personal memory. A 
particular kind of freedom is a new category at a particular time that brings its 
uncertainties.  I ask Paul again to become an observer to think about this from his 
parents’ viewpoint and introduce another past time concept, duration.  He 
describes it in terms of choices. The issue was whether they would be ‘open-
minded’ with consequences for changing ways of thinking.  He describes time as 
duration, marked by travelling a lot.   
 
Excerpt 4.   
Emma  “I think this ‘open-mindedness’, (makes quotation marks in the air with her 
hands) you can read a lot of this after the communism, … because I have no 
idea how my parents were before.  I was four as well.  … So, I know a lot of 
parents that are our parents’ age still have problems with adapting themselves 
and raising their children, …  It was great for us that our parents were going 
away all the time, and especially the travelling Paul was talking about.  I 
think it had a lot to save my parents’ relationship, ...”   
 
 
Emma re-introduces the important quality of ‘open-mindedness’.  Her answer 
refers to political time before her birth.  She compares her parents to other adults 
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who had more difficulty in adapting to the post-communist regime that she 
anchors to her personal past: “I was four”.  Change in the political past created 
difficulty in adapting personally to the new present.  Freedom to travel newly 
possible post-revolution, was a consequence.  Political change impacted on 
personal time by saving her parents’ relationship.   
 
Paul and Emma are asked to reflect on events in terms of political events.  Each in 
their different ways relates the question to personal events and consequences.  
Does this reflect the fact as the first post-Ceausescu generation that they were too 
young to experience the Ceausescu régime and uprising at first hand, and so have 
no ‘episodic’ memory of events?  Liviu takes up the conversation almost 
immediately, and introduces complexity of past time.   
 











“My parents were farmers, but very intelligent and people that believed in 
God.  They were very open-minded.  So, they worked a lot as farmers, and 
bought a piece of land, and another piece of land for us three children. … So, 
when my parents had some land, after many years of hard work, the 
communists came, and took everything, everything.  So in that moment they 
were absolutely poor again, as they started. … Then God gave them a very 
good thought, they said, very remarkable, they said, ‘From now on we cannot 
offer our children land,’ - that was the biggest value in the countryside, when 
you have land, you have a life.  Because they said, ‘We cannot offer any 
more land to our children, we’ll move to the city and we will give them 
education’.”   
 
 
And he continues:  












“… It was not simple for the communists.  In order to take the land from 
my parents.  My father was a fighter, so he kept fighting for that. … But my 
father was one of the last ones in the village that accepted.  Only when they 
twisted his arm so badly (makes gesture) then he said: “OK.  No way”.  But 
they could do that because they had not only an open mind, but they had 
God that they believed in, they, they trust in.  So, they could fight with 
people because they had a, ..”  
 
“Truly, a belief system, …”    
 
“Yeah, and that became dangerous for any centralising political policy.  
Right, yeah.”   
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Liviu starts from his personal viewpoint.  He identifies three qualities; 
intelligence, faith in God, and open-mindedness, referring in effect to different 
time perspectives.  The event that changes daily life is the arrival of the 
communists but the higher authority context of a personal faith ‘trumps’ the 
political time of communist party power.  There are two significant belief system 
contexts, belief in God and the communist party.   
 
Belief in God is the ultimate defining context.  It refers to time (duration) while 
“having a very good thought” refers to time (a moment).  This introduces a time 
context that communism cannot control the freedom to abandon the land for 
education, which no-one can confiscate.  It is the freedom to confront and accept 
the existential absurd (Camus, 1943; Sartre, 1943, 1948, 1945).  It describes the 
power of a personal Christian faith in spiritual time, as Jesus (Matthew 10. v. 28) 
enjoins his followers: ‘And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the 
soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell’.  This 
undermined communist political time.   
 
The communist party confiscated all property.  Land ownership symbolises a 
relationship to time, history, and culture.  Confiscation aims to uproot people from 
cultural-historical time.  While this action is in political time past, it is a 
subcategory of a longer historical time.  The decision (from God) to move to the 
town represents a ‘second order change’ (Hoffman, 1985) and places Liviu’s 
family ultimately beyond political control.  Within this historical-political 
timeframe an event is reframed within eternal (timeless) spiritual time and 
theologians term ‘sacred time’ (Duncan, 1999).   
 
Rodica sets the scene with a different story of her past.  Liviu’s is a story of 
discontinuities, while hers reflects continuity of expectations for education and 
learning as more enduring than political power.   
 
Excerpt 7.   
HJ  “It’s different for you? … Was yours different?”     



















“Yes, very different.  I grew up in the city, although my parents also came 
from poor backgrounds, but my mother is a medical doctor.  Errm, I got the 
same idea, but a bit different than his parents. … Errm, it was always clear 
that after you finish high school, you go to university. …  At that time when 
we grew up, we lived in a Christian family, and we had not much choice in 
terms of education.  There was not much to choose, because a lot of the jobs 
were closed, either for what it was called ‘unhealthy social origin’, or just 
because you had Christian beliefs you could not go in a certain direction. … 
And I knew I could never be able to study history, law, umm, what else was 
forbidden?  And of course police, and because we were in a Christian family 
…” 
 
“Become a professor, ..”  
 
“… and we were practising Christians, we were not recommended to go to 
any profession that would make us school teachers, because they were 
getting rid of the school teachers that they had.  …  So I ended up like many 
of the people of my generation, to go to polytechnic school.  To my surprise I 
liked it, and I discovered I had some technical abilities. … And after that, the 
revolution came.  And following my husband in the States for one year that 
he did there as a student, I had the chance of studying something else, and 
getting into a completely new field.  And, er, that job took me to a university 
position now, and I discovered that I enjoy learning, - that I have to study all 
the time, as a job, and that I start to like it.  And it’s probably part of the 
legacy that I had.  And I look at my mother sometimes, and I think that she 
could have gone much farther if she had lived in the times I lived, because 
she was much more serious and much more thorough. … And probably I was 
able to take the legacy a bit further.”   
 
She starts with the personal past and the maternal importance of maintaining 
fidelity to the gendered family script.  However, she describes the consequences 
of Christian faith (spiritual time) intersecting with the communist party (political 
time).  Choices of education for Christians were not barred per se but the removal 
of opportunities for certain jobs effectively closed the doors (Tanasiou, 2007).  
Her option was a polytechnic education to study engineering, but on graduation 
the Revolution had happened.   
 
The resulting changes (political time) meant new travel choices (personal time).  
To enjoy studying is “probably part of the legacy” of temporal continuities from 
her mother.  Political changes - discontinuities - afforded her opportunities that 
were unavailable to the previous generation.  Despite external changes Rodica 
attributes an important level of continuity to her mother’s “values and scripts”.  
While events may change, fundamental beliefs and patterns survive from the past 
to the present.  The continuities theme continues in personal choice:  
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Excerpt 8.   
Rodica  “I was a student at that time and my husband was not a student.  He was a 
stone carpenter, a ‘cioplitor in piatra’, umm.  But my mother, she’s a medical 
doctor and my father never went to college.  They are an unusual couple, 
very unusual, especially for their generation.  And actually, he confessed that 
this was the only reason he looked at me, when he found out that my mother 
has a degree and my father doesn’t.  Because, otherwise, in the culture we 
grew up in, it was almost unacceptable.”   
 
 
This is an example of breaking time honoured social patterns while remaining true 
to personal legacies.   
 
Present.   
The present holds the past as a context and provides a bridge to a future that can 
crystallise differently to the past.  It is a gateway to the possibility of change.  The 
political past defined each person’s position while the post-communist present 
implies potential for choice.  At the same time it creates unexpected dilemmas.   
 

















“What I am saying is that it’s much more difficult now to keep a firm belief, 
umm, to present your value system than it was during the communist times.  
At that time it was dangerous, at that time, if you said it in the wrong setting 
it could have been dangerous, you could lose your job, … But now, …”  
 
“At least it was clear.”   
 
“It was clear.  White was white, black was black. … Right now, I find it 
more difficult to talk about my faith than at that time.  At least at that time I 
could say: ‘Well, I’m brave if I do it!’  Now I’m ridiculous if I do it. …  Just 
one phrase before I pass the microphone, (pause).  I’m at the point of seeing 
these two, (Emma and Paul) somewhat satisfied with the past, at least some 
of our values, the main ones.  I’m more worried if they will be able to pass 
them on!”   
 
“I think that mum is pretty much right, because in the communist regime 
everybody had something they wanted to say, but they never had the courage 
because what it would mean to get arrested. … But nowadays you can say 
whatever you want because today nobody cares. … And that time was like, 
‘I’m saying that, I’m being a brave person, I’m being arrested.  Everybody 
knows I risk a lot by saying that’.  Today you don’t risk anything.  They just 
get to mock you.”   
 
 
The changing (political) past-present contextualises the (personal) present 
situation.  The problem of holding a firm belief is juxtaposed with a repressive 
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past political system that provided certainty so that, paradoxically, current 
freedoms make “it more difficult to talk about my faith than at that time”.  Under 
repression it was easier to define what and why you believed.  Freedom has 
brought challenges and uncertainty about boundaries and personal values.  With 
neither past repressive certainties nor a certain future this may be thought of as a 
‘betwixt and between’ period with a ‘liminal’ sense of timelessness (Turner, 1967, 
1982) discussed in chapter 8.   
 
This is one way to understand the confusing nature of the family’s descriptions of 
their unsettling political and personal worlds.  Eight minutes later Rodica 
describes certain consequences of change: “… I think change is differently for 
everyone, and change from communism to this system has been very difficult for 
everyone”.  She now describes this from her gendered viewpoint.   
 



















“… But as a woman, I think I am part of a generation that is going to 
disappear. … Umm, look at us carefully because we are an endangered 
species!  We inherited (Liviu chuckles) a mentality of being housewives, 
errm, submissive wives, do all the chores in the house, washing, cleaning, 
shopping, - am I right? … umm, …”  
………  
“Ummm, definitely doing preserves in the fall; canning for winter.  
Everybody understands me, and then, after the revolution, all of a sudden 
there was this opening for a lot of careers.  And there were a lot of things we 
could do, that we could not do before, and very graciously, our husbands 
allowed, and I stress the word ALLOWED us to develop a career. … And I 
think that we are a generation that is going to disappear, because we juggle, 
and we still try to do all of this. … but it’s been a few years since I don’t do 
preserves any more. … And sometimes the environment makes me feel 
guilty for not doing any of this. … But, there are other things, and I don’t do 
and feel guilty about them.”   
 
(Laughs)  “I don’t know if I’ll ever be a lot of a career woman. …”   
 
 
Rodica reflects on the past from her present perspective and women’s changing 
roles, as members of “an endangered species”.  This focuses attention on 
changing gendered narratives.  She refers to her gendered inheritance, a legacy 
institutionalised by political and cultural male supremacy.  The catalyst for change 
was post-1989 but the message is ambivalent for, “our husbands … ALLOWED 
us …”.  She introduces a future perspective and whether the political moment, 
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15th December 1989, represents a first order change without underlying systemic 
change of relationship patterns, or whether it was ‘second order’ (Hoffman, 
1985).  If the latter, this would mean there could be no return ‘in time’ to previous 
structures.  W. B. Yeats captures the meaning of such change: ‘Now and in time 
to be, / Wherever green is worn, / Are changed, changed utterly: / A terrible 
beauty is born.’  (Yeats, 1994:154).  Yeats describes the irreversibility of change 
that cannot return to the status quo ante.  The Tismaneanu Report 2006 (Tanasiou, 
2007) marks a step for change in political time, and the moment between ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ represents a potentially discontinuous transformative instant.  
 
Future: transition or transformation.   
Rodica describes a personal present in transition to an uncertain personal future.  
As her life and opportunities change the wider socio-political context changes at a 
different tempo.  When Emma looks to the future she wonders whether the future 
she aspires to will be similar in values to her mother’s and grand-mothers’ 
generations.   
 
The following excerpts primarily address the future where political time seems 
less important than personal time.  Emma and Paul are more active in the 
interview, in a period that involves them.  Historical time is what happened to 
other people while present and future are the preoccupation of today’s generation.   
 
Excerpt 11.   
Emma  “I think that you cannot change the world.  I personally don’t think I can 
change the world, but at least what you can do is change the people that are 
very close to me, and maybe one day, when I’ll have my own family I’ll get 
to share with them some of the values that my parents shared with me.  So, 
I’m not hoping for a new world, I’m just hoping for having a family like 
mine, if I can say that.”   
 
 
The past and the world cannot be changed, although one’s relationship to it can.  
Emma wants to carry forward legacies from her family that celebrate future 
continuity.  In like manner, Paul relates the importance of carrying certain family 
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values to the next generation.  However, as to the likely shape of the political 
future, Emma is uncertain.   
 












“I have no idea what the future brings us, at least politically speaking, 
because maybe as my parents lived years ago, what they will tell their 
children, I mean twenty years ago, maybe my parents thought it will still be 
communism.”   
 
“But you’ll be talking, one way or another, about how your parents lived 
through the end of communism and the beginning of a different kind of 
society in Romania.  …  If you had a child now, you could tell your child 
something of that story.  I wonder what that story would be for you?”   
 
“I don’t know.  Probably a thing that I would try to pass on, …  I think that’s 
the first thing I’ve learnt from my parents is to talk, to communicate. … And 
being able to share things with your family, with my parents means a lot 
because I know a lot of my friends don’t have this at home.”   
  
 
Expectations in the past were clear. The consequences of political disobedience 
included internal deportation or death, so that in the past the future was known.  It 
would be as the present was and the past had been, but present and future are now 
less certain.  While there is certainty about personal values to hand on political 
future time seems less certain and discontinuity more likely.   
 






















(To Emma) “… I don’t know how it felt for your mother when she was telling 
us this, but behind what I was hearing, although she talked about endangered 
species, I was also hearing a kind of story about survival over, errm, not just 
the communist period, but before that. … It was almost as though passing the 
microphone (makes as if to pass the microphone) she’s passing the baton to 
you. … Because it’s going to be different from how it was for her, how it was 
for her mother, how it was for her grandmother.  That is what was coming 
into my mind when I was hearing the story.”   
 
“I don’t think it’s going to be that hard for me, because as I look at my 
grandmothers and their way of keeping the house, I think that as my 
generation comes in, ...  I think, ..”   
………………  
(To Emma) “Maybe, as you see for you or your mother, … you can inherit a 
different kind of freedom and choice without feeling guilty.  Maybe that’s a 
kind of chain you won’t have to carry around any more.  And, of course, it’s 
men traditionally who often make women feel guilty.  So that is also going to 
change in relationships between men and women, husbands and wives.   
………………………… 
“And I thought that every woman is supposed to be a loving, caring wife and 
mother, and it’s maybe why we marry and have children, to find our 
  







identities.  So, like I was telling you, I don’t think I’m going to be a very high 
career woman because I think that somewhere we each find ourselves in our 
gender about families.  And so, about the guilt you were saying, it comes 
along the way I see things.  It’s the same society, there’s nothing wrong.”   
 
“Yes, I think … But actually, you have a choice, and maybe that is the really 
important thing.  And maybe, your mother said, I’m sure there were not the 
same choices for your mother, and certainly not for her mother, and most 
certainly not for her mother before her.”   
 
This exchange touches on a social and political in-between stage.  The old 
structures have not yet ended and new ones are yet to be established.  The 
interview draws attention to transitions where future survival may require 
different skills, and change will involve discontinuity with the gendered pasts of 
mother, grandmother, and great-grandmother.  Emma is confident that the future 
will not be difficult.   
 
Analytical categories.   
My overall category was ‘time’, mindfully observed from the outside, following 
the conference theme of continuities and discontinuities in a time of change.  My 
framework was predictable and unpredictable life events, described by Carter and 
McGoldrick (1989), and the uncertainties of each transitional or transformational 
moment.   
 
As I re-worked the text I further conceptualised my defined times and the concept 
of a ‘personal lived time’, past, present, or future, and ‘political time’ emerged.  
This highlighted the importance of ‘before and after’ temporal moments, in this 
instance the 1989 revolution. 145  Such formulations echo the fluid and dynamic 
A-series and the static B-series of time (McTaggart, 1927) in chapter 4.  Family 
members introduced the theme of ‘legacies’ relating to ‘personal time’ and the 
legacies of communist rule in ‘political time’.  Since all meaning occurs in 
context, I chose historical time as a higher level of terrestrial time abstraction. 146  
Different kinds of ‘personal time’ were articulated by the four adults as 147   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 The communist era had a duration 1945-1989, so that communist rule was a legacy of 
decisions made by the allies after WWII, and the division of geographical spoils.   
146 I am indebted to Dr Tamás Kurimay, Budapest, for this helpful observation.   
147 David’s different position and role are outlined in Appendix 2.   
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o family member individual time.   
o time of the dyadic, triadic, and 
four-person relationships: 
experienced  variously as 
spouse, parent, sibling or 
individual. 148   
o present time of the nuclear 
family and, 
o transgenerational times past of 
the families of origin.   
 
 
These times are an embodied expression of time as reality; time lived, 
remembered, feared, celebrated, or enjoyed.  From my transcript analysis an 
interweaving of different kinds of time began to emerge:  
 
o Spiritual time.  This may be 
thought of as cosmic, describing 
moments in family members’ 
lives where experiences God 
intervening, either in an instant 
that changed the course of 
events or of duration supporting 
each family through persecutory 
times.  This is a perception, of 
eternity.  In some cultures this 
may be linked to fate or destiny  
o The wider historical time.  It is 
outside Romania which scarcely 
influenced the population 
during the Ceausescu years but  
had increasing impact in 
subsequent change  
o Political time.  The time of the 
State, infiltrating and affecting 
work, faith, culture, and home 
lives  
o Gendered time.  Intimating 
changing gendered perceptions 
by others, linking personal time 
with changes over political time  
o Personal time.  Personal and 
therefore gendered, experienced 
subjectively in each person’s 
life, family, faith, and 
community.   
 
The material emphasised the inter-linked nature of personal and political times, 
and the dynamic tension of different pasts and presents.  A parallel linguistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 For four people (two parents and the two older children) there are 32 different relational 
possibilities.  Taken from the perspectives of each of the four family members, there are: 4 
individuals; 12 dyads; 12 triads; 4 ‘quatrads’.  For five members, this produces 70 possible 
configurations.  Such is the complexity of systems.   
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model, Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM), provided a framework for 
this structure, like nested concepts similar to Russian dolls (Plate 5.2).  In the 
CMM model  
‘(1) social actors organise meaning both temporally and hierarchically; 
and (2) all social structures entail ways of managing consciousness of 
various elements of those structures.  The content and organisation of 
structure are by no means “necessary”; they emerge from conjoint action 
and are always in the process of emergence’ (Cronen and Pearce, 1985: 
71).   
 
Meanings are embedded.  Each level becomes the context of and context for other 
levels.  Cronen and Pearce identify five levels of communication: speech act, 
episode, relationship, life scripting, and family myth, moving from the smallest 
specific to the broadest category.   
 
 
Plate 5.2.  Nesting Russian dolls.   
 
I have organised the interview time material to make sense of different temporal 
realities in Figure 5.2.  The limitation of this static figure is it fixes relationships, 
whereas realities are fluid and dynamic.   
  



























Figure 5. 2.  ‘Russian dolls’: CMM asymmetrical nesting of times.   
 
Figure 5.2 is a hierarchical construct, presented as different levels of abstraction.  
The location of ‘spiritual time’ this way reflects a Western viewpoint. 149  
Although time is my framework alternative categories are equally possible.  For 
instance, Kleinman (1981: 28) discusses levels of reality in terms of patients, 
healers, and culture.  This still brings us back to time since realities are located in 
time.  A person’s realities affect their experience of time just as culture and time 
are intertwined.   
 
The different thickness of the arrowed lines in Figure 5.2 represents the quality of 
influence.  The top-down arrow represents greater immediate direct influence over 
events while the down-up arrow represents influence in a subtler and less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 An Eastern view of the spiritual as transcendental, as ‘transcending or being beyond the grasp 
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definable way.  ‘Spiritual time’ is intentionally set apart from either arrow’s 
influence, to reflect its numinous quality.   
 
Discussion.   
Frameworks.   
The dominant element in the family interview presented is time in its continuities 
and discontinuities.  Place is important for understanding human behaviour and 
the forced displacement of populations was a powerful way to control society.  In 
this case ‘before and after’ or ‘earlier than’ / ‘later than’ were significant in 
structuring experience.  The brutal reality of state power in Romanian 
communism as described by the family, was challenged by the intangible power 
of ‘spiritual time’ eternally outside ‘terrestrial’ time.  This constituted a real threat 
to ‘political’ time (Deletant, 1998; Tanasiou, 2007).   
 
The ‘levels’ in Figure 5.2 represent different ‘durations’.  The duration of 
individual life in personal time is transitory compared to political and historical 
time.  The over-arching context of eternity makes all else temporary, and for 
persecution even to be survivable.   
 
Emotional states.   
The effects of the changes described by the Mocan family are complex with 
interweaving different emotional states in this time narrative.  In Figure 5.3, 
taking a certainty / uncertainty dichotomy as an example, I give an example to 
underline ways that family members perceive events.  Following the collapse of 
old structures, many familiar reference points, even oppressive, disappeared, and 
left members uncertain.   
  

















Figure 5.3.  Certainty / uncertainty viewed from the Mocan family perspectives.  
Solid lines represent the known past; dotted lines represent an uncertain present 
and future.   
 
Family members tend to use time to anchor their accounts and give meaning to 
(family) historical reality.  This is not the only possible framework.  ‘Open-
mindedness’ is identified as an important quality and changing gender roles 
increased social and economic freedom for women, but created more uncertainty 
for men.  For all these changes, 1989 becomes a particularly important reference 
point.   
 
Emotional states and their phenomenological manifestation, present an interesting 
perspective on time.  Examples are the ‘pause’ instant, 150 and laughter 151.  
Throughout the interview, as in most conversations, there were pauses or 
‘instants’ of absence.  In these silent moments, speaker and listeners may be in 
different psychological or emotional places.  What happens then?  Are these 
seeking times, reflecting times, or difficult recollecting times?  It seems likely that 
those pauses (instants) represent different experiences of time depending on 
context.  Instants as neither what comes before nor what follows can create 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Christopher Hauke suggested I consider the importance of the pause in conversation.   
151 Dr. Angela Hobart drew my attention to the effects of laughter.   
Before	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1989	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  After	  
Certainty,	  	  (e.g.	  faith,	  gender)	  	  	  	  	  	  fear,	  dispossession,	  torture,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘the	  party	  decides’,	  clarity	  of	  situation,	  “being	  brave”	  
Uncertainty,	  	  	  (e.g.	  faith,	  gender)	  	  	  freedom	  to	  be,	  being	  mocked,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘the	  individual	  chooses’,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  “looking	  stupid”,	  less	  sense	  of	  belonging.	  	  	  
Open-­‐mindedness	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uncertainty about how to understand or respond.  The importance of ‘the instant’ 
in psychotherapy may be, as I have suggested, as a fleeting out-of-time space 
where change can occur.  We considered the instant between rest and motion 
‘being in no time at all’ (Plato, 1997: 388).  That ‘instant’ of the pause, laughter, 
sudden tears, unexpected facial expression, interrupts the ‘motion’ of before and 
after the ‘instant’.  The pause (instant) clearly has duration, yet experientially it 
stands qualitatively outside its ‘before and after’.  Laughter impacts differently on 
the experience of time.  It can stop the flow of time in a conversation, or change 
the affective moment and facilitate unpredictable shifts in relationships.  People 
can be brought together in laughter or through the expression of any strong 
emotion, experiencing an instantaneous change of affect, or be distanced by its 
inappropriateness.  The sudden connectedness that laughter creates in therapy is 
often the touchstone that, in the instant, creates enough of a sense of safety to then 
confront painful or taboo-like issues.  In these instances and instants, the ‘flow of 
time’ is interrupted.   
 
An alternative understanding of time.   
I suggested a hierarchical time framework in Figure 5.2.  In Figure 5.4 I suggest 
an alternative view of the relationship between these time constructs, again 
placing ‘spiritual / cosmic time’ on the outside from my Western perspective.   
  

























Figure 5.4.  Interweaving of different time experiences.   
 
Each solid circle represents a time perspective with degrees of overlap.  The 
particular time perspectives - gendered, personal, or political - influence the 
meaning and experience of events.  Spiritual time appears somewhat paradoxical, 
since it can be perceived as ‘eternal’ (timeless) but exacting immediacy in 
people’s lives that makes it ‘close’.  Juxtaposing different qualities of time 
(personal, terrestrial or spiritual) frames understanding how time can be 
experienced where change is sought in spiritual experience, ritual, or 
psychotherapy.  The circles are ‘dynamic’.  The greater the overlap, or the larger 
one circle is in relation to the others, greater will be the cross-identification 
imposed or voluntary, or greater the engulfment of other aspects by one 
perspective.   
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Time and memory.   
The interview encompasses different kinds of memory of events experienced 
directly or reported by others.  This brings the discussion to recall and time, 
bearing in mind our philosophical discussion in chapter 4 of memory (Ricoeur, 
2000) and the Unconscious (chapter 2).   
 
Memory, imagination, and free association, (chapter 2, Freud) are ways to access 
time past, as the family discusses.  However, memory may help anticipate the 
future.  Tali Sharot (2011, 2012a, b) argues this point from an evolutionary neuro-
scientific perspective.  Memory may not be solely a way to recall and fix time; 
‘the core function of the memory system could … be to imagine the future – to 
enable us to prepare for what is yet to come. … It is designed to flexibly construct 
future scenarios in our minds’ (Sharot, 2011: 42).  This suggests a dynamic 
relationship between past and present, with memory as more than simple archival 
record.  Sharot’s research takes her further.  She suggests that memory, and how 
we remember, is strongly affected by emotion, (Sharot and Phelps, 2004).  
Although she does not make the claim this may help explain the power of re-
membering highly charged traumatic emotional material, discussed about 
Caitlin’s reaction to Peter’s temporary absence (chapter 3) and Jane’s deeply 
traumatised dissociative states (chapter 4).  Sharot suggests ‘emotion may 
enhance recollective experience without necessarily enhancing memory for 
contextual information’ (Sharot and Yonelinas, 2008: 540).  Effective recall 
memory can happen only when not overwhelmed by emotion and the person can 
reflect cognitively about what is re-membered.  The less one can reflect on their 
past or anticipate their future the more a person is likely to be confined to their 
present, and defined helplessly by their past(s).   
 
By defining experiences as ‘before’ and ‘after’ 1989 the Revolution is a context-
marker for the present.  Memory differs depending on one’s place in pre-
revolution politics.  And memory is fallible.  ‘Memories may have nothing to do 
with the accuracy of the recollection itself but [be] due to other factors entirely.  It 
could be that the act of recall itself brings with it a feeling of certainty’ (Hauke, 
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2005: 143).  Tulving summarises his understanding of memory.  ‘As far as we 
know, members of no other species possess quite the same ability to experience 
again now, in a different situation and perhaps in a different form, happenings 
from the past, and know that the experience refers to an event that occurred in 
another time and in another place’ (Tulving, 1983: 1. 152  In: Tulving, 2005: 6).  
Memory is subjective and ‘memory’ of events that did not occur, or denial of 
events that did, are possible.   
 
 
Plate 5.3.  Louise Bourgeois.  b. 1991.   Flashback.   
 
For family members up to 1989, there are different kinds of memory; memory as 
lived and as reported history.  Tulving distinguishes autonoetic episodic (lived) 
memory from semantic (reported) memory.  ‘Autonoesis refers to the kind of 
conscious awareness that characterises conscious recollection of personal 
happenings’ (Tulving, 2005: 15) unlike semantic memory, knowing about things 
past.  Episodic memory is oriented to physical time, since ‘only episodic memory 
allows people to consciously re-experience past events’ (ibid: 16), unlike semantic 
memory when ‘the time in which remembered events occur is different.  We can 
call it subjective time.  It is related to but not identical with physical time’ (ibid: 
16). 153   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Tulving,	  E.,	  (1983)	  Elements	  of	  Episodic	  Memory.	  	  Oxford.	  	  Clarendon	  Press.	  	  	  
153 Tulving argues that the uniquely human possession of episodic memory and consciousness, 
autonoesis, allow us to remember events in which we participated in measurable time and place, to 
envisage future time, and engage in ‘mental time travel’.   
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As family members describe their memories, they employ two kinds of memory: 
the memory of ‘semantic time’ which is not time-anchored, and ‘episodic 
memory’ which is time-experienced.  Eight-year old David knows the Revolution 
was in 1989, but his is semantic memory.   
‘Semantic memory allows the individual to know at Time 2, something 
about what happened at an earlier time, Time 1, but it does not allow the 
individual to remember what happened.  Semantic memory also allows an 
individual to construct possible future worlds, but since it is lacking in 
autonoetic capability, it would not allow the individual to mentally travel 
into his own personal future’ (Tulving, 2005: 18).   
 
Memory is often fixed in a public context.  By noting a place, duration, or event, 
plaques, tablets, and gravestones, ‘fix time’ as public memory, as do books, 
sculpture, and paintings. 154  Written text solidifies and objectifies time as instant 
or duration in relation to a particular past.  The plaque on pastor Laszlo Tökes’ 
church in Timişoara is a memory time marker (Plate 5.4).   
 
 
Plate 5.4.  Plaque commemorating the time and place of the peaceful start of the 
revolution, 15 December 1989, Timisoara.  Photo: Dr. Tamás Kurimay.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Stained glass windows in churches publically ‘fix’ events, originally for an illiterate population, 
to make real the religious stories, and reinforce the place and position of the church.   
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The manipulation of memory in the form of history is evidenced in a personal 
conversation in Prague in 1987.  An eighteen-year old student explained to me 
how school history books portrayed the events of 1968 and the arrival of the 
Russians.  There was no invasion since it was a “people’s liberation”.  Her parents 
had a different (autonoetic episodic) memory to her official semantic memory via 
the (textual) record where ‘text’ froze time in her history book.  The different 
ways humans remember and tell stories about their pasts (lived, or recounted 
authoritatively by others) and about their presents or futures, is important in 
psychotherapy.   
 
If we return to Jane’s experiences (chapter 4) and extend these ideas, the personal 
time of her (autonoetic) memory concerns lived time but has become boundary-
less in re-experiencing her abuse.  Her time exists in an interaction with the lived 
physical time of her past, now beyond her control.  It is as if there is a confusion 
of ‘autonoetic episodic’ re-lived re-membering with simultaneous ‘semantic’ 
memory knowing, as if she were there in the moment again, and not there but 
knowing about what was done to her.  She cannot escape her subjective time, re-
locate it in her physical episodic lived past, and remain grounded in her physical 
present.   
 
Reflections.   
Knowing different kinds of memory can be confusing.  Memory can only be 
recalled or known in a present that itself is forever elusive.  Although the present 
exists in its ‘presentness’ (Heidegger, 1962), it must become part of the 
immediate past before it can be noticed, reported, and remembered (Jenkins, 
2005; Stern, 2004).  There appears to be a collapse of temporal boundaries in 
trauma that forestalls the ability to stay in the physical present, when emotion 
(Sharot and Yonelinas, 2008) is like a branding iron that sears event(s) more 
deeply.  This may partly be why it is often important therapeutically to find ways 
to name abusive events and locate them to specific times, places, and sensations, 
so that the patient moves from a subjective, almost pre-linguistic knowing 
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relationship to her story, to a relationship with its lived or episodic memory, 
thereby losing its power.   
 
One notable area for the Mocans is their sense of inter- and trans-generational 
time.  Liviu and Rodica give a glimpse into their family histories and socio-
economic origins, the similarity of shared Christian faith, parental marital choices, 
and gender expectations in negotiating the realities of greater gender freedom 
post-1989.  Members offer different insights into personal history as autonoetic 
episodic, and semantic memory.  Changes of ‘script’ are proposed.  Unlike her 
mother, a professional career is not Emma’s priority.  If time is important in this 
non-therapy context and can so clearly be elicited, it is reasonable to suppose 
there may be value therapeutically in such a perspective.  Just as the Mocans have 
to manage their pasts, so do patients in therapy.   
 
Experience of time can only be understood in contexts of culture and place.  If 
experience of the nature of time is altered by place, how time is mediated in 
Western psychotherapy may differ to other kinds of time.  Patients’ time(s) in 
treatment may not be the same as others’ in their personal lives, and the therapist 
needs to adjust his/her ‘time’ to the patient’s.   
 
Reported in therapy, a husband had ended a two-year affair and the couple now 
struggled to recover their marriage.  The husband’s belief that they must now 
‘move on’ because enough time has passed for them to rebuild their relationship 
without continuing reference to the past, disregarded his wife’s need for time to 
process, re-visit, be re-assured, and ask again and again how this could have 
happened. While it may be true that “You cannot change your past, but you can 
change your relationship to it” their different pasts had to be acknowledged for an 
agreed new starting point to be found.  Their pasts were different.  The affair was 
known to him and secret from her, and the impact on both was further 
complicated by their respective family histories.  The time each needed to heal 
was different as were the kinds of healing time.  We hear an echo of these 
different times in the Smith family (chapter 1).   
	   188	  
 
In our considerations of time philosophically, we faced questions about the non-
ethical nature of narrative in therapy (Strawson, 2005).  Liviu Mocan’s sculpture 
of the seed suggests continuity, but only from the discontinuity of the seed dying 
for the plant to live.  Ricoeur (1980, 1984, 1985, 1988) argues for narrative as 
temporal production, each element being part of the other.  The Mocans described 
the difficulty of negotiating when old ways had changed but new patterns had yet 
to be established, in a phase of uncertainty and potential chaos in the ‘liminal’ 
(Turner, 1967, 1969) that I discuss in chapter 8.   
 
In microcosm, therapy can be a place and time when what seemed evident and 
certain are no longer and what will be is still unclear, as a moment betwixt and 
between that is neither fully past nor yet future.  The Mocans described something 
of their confusing emotional continuities and discontinuities and the impact on 
their functioning.  This contrasts with certain philosophical descriptions that 
seemed to take little or no account of emotional arousal and the subjective.  
Sharot’s work (Sharot, 2011, 2012a, b; Sharot and Yonelinas, 2008) in the 
neurosciences redresses the balance in the role of emotion in memory.   
 
A significant part of the interview analysis was concerned with memory.  Tulving 
(2005) suggests different kinds of memory that complement Ricoeur (2000), 
‘mémoire’, ‘souvenir’ and ‘rappel’.  The difference between memory of a lived 
experience and memory known through others provides a possible framework for 
understanding time, and even for time confusions such as Jane’s.   
 
I suggest there is value in thinking about kinds of time.  For the Mocans in their 
political, social, and spiritual contexts, to have an awareness of which kind of 
time it is, helps understand specific dilemmas.  This was in the context of before 
and after, earlier and later, as well as past, present, and future (McTaggart, 1927).  
An additional kind of ‘time’ was introduced in this chapter.  This was the time of 
‘text’ on plaques or gravestones which publically fix time.  There seems to be a 
difference when what is known orally is written down.  I will suggest that text in 
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word or symbol offers a powerful tool in therapy to fix events or situations, as 
well as providing a medium for healing and change, with some parallels to 
religious symbolism and shamanism in other cultures.   
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Chapter 6.  
 
 
Epistemologies of time, culture, and memory: anthropological perspectives.   
 
‘When we focus too narrowly upon the parts, we fail to see the necessary 
characteristics of the whole, and are then tempted to ascribe the phenomena which 
result from the wholeness to some supernatural entity.’   
(Bateson, 1987a: 52) 
 
‘An anthropologist sets himself to understand a culture which is not his own.  He 
has succeeded when he understands everything the natives say, do and believe.  
But does he always know that he has understood?’   
(Hollis, 1970: 221) 
 
 
Aims.   
Through an anthropological socio-cultural perspective I consider whether insights 
about temporal realities from different cultures can enrich our understanding of 
time more generally in therapy, before considering time in two cultures (chapter 
7) and ritual and time (chapter 8), referencing and contrasting philosophical 
insights from chapters 3 and 4.   
 
To maintain my clinical focus, I describe a moment in therapy where patient and 
therapist are revealed to inhabit different temporal historico-cultural realities.  
From my ethnography, I draw on a filmed interview with a Jewish couple in Tel 
Aviv who share different cultural and gendered experiences of time, rhythm, and 
memory.  I make reference to the Mocan family (chapter 5).   
 
Introduction.   
Unlike philosophy, the discipline of anthropology invites us to grapple with 
human uncertainty, change, societal difference, and accept the messy subjective as 
part of the research territory.  In this I avoid listing or comparing facts.  ‘Anyone 
can produce a new fact; the thing is to produce a new idea’ (Evans-Pritchard, 
1976: 243).  I only touch on some of the mainstream thinkers in (social) 
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anthropology in chronological order, drawing in part on writers who synthesise 
movements in the field, such as Bateson (1958, 1973, 1980), Durkheim (2001), 
Lévi-Strauss (1969), Lewis (1996), Mauss (1990), Peacock (1975), Rappaport, 
(1999), Tambiah (1990), and Turner (1967) in order to underscore the importance 
of culture and context in the development of my ideas.   
 
Context and ‘culture’ as foundational perspectives for understanding human 
activity shape meanings given to time and place.  Hammershoi’s painting (Plate 
6.1) exemplifies this.  There are no furniture, ornaments, or obvious reference 
points, giving few clues about culture, country, or time.  This could conceivably 
be rooms with doors in one of many contexts of time and place.   
 
 
Plate 6.1.  Vilhelm Hammershoi (1864-1916), White Doors.   
 
Philosophy required specific kinds of logic and propositional thinking.  In 
contrast, the psychotherapist must connect disconnected ‘chunks’ of temporal, 
cultural information, find lost linkages or ones not previously made (chapter 4, 
Ricoeur, 1980, 2000; Strawson, 2005).  It is often in the a-temporal reverie of 
seemingly disconnected information that healing associations occur.  It is the 
psychotherapist’s ability to connect disparate perspectives through the timeless 
processes of the system UCs ((Freud, 1915: Vol XIV) that can become a way to 
meaning.   
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Music provides a metaphor.  In music rhythm, like the literary plot (Aristotle, 
1996) holds the work together.  Similarly, social time has rhythms.  What is 
rhythmic and harmonious for one society may be discordant for another (Hall, 
1989; Levine, 2006).  The pauses or spaces in music, ‘instants’ out of musical 
note time are part of rhythm (Levitin, 2006).  Similarly, duration, intervals, and 
instants, are part of the patterns of psychotherapy. 155  Time marked by the 
metronome (Plate 6.2) measures the tempo (time) or beat.  Unlike the lineal, 
constant, pre-set beat of the metronome, musical rhythm is cyclical.  Whether we 
measure ‘the beat’ or ‘the intervals between’ each note, depends on how one 
punctuates the description.  The metronome measures time externally while the 
‘beat’ by which cultures live is more an internal rhythm beyond conscious time.   
 
Plate 6.2.  The metronome.   
 
Written communication is usually linear.  One word follows the next and page 
follows page, vide this thesis.  Music is diachronic made of single (synchronic) 
notes that sequentially create melody.  Synchronic notes that repeat their pattern 
over time, become ‘cyclical’ as they enfold on themselves.  In Western musical 
notation instruments are scored separately and may play the same or different 
notes to other instruments.  Two or more simultaneous melodies, even with 
different rhythms brought together create harmony or disharmony, so that the 
overall result is ‘more than the sum of its parts’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Henri Hubert, writing in 1905 (Hubert, 1999), discusses the place of rhythm in time.   
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Musical themes interweave creating patterns, and patterns within patterns over 
time, returning to the same or complementary phrasing.  What is diachronic for 
each instrument horizontally left to right (an A-series), is synchronic vertically (a 
B-series) (McTaggart, 1927) on the music score.  Music reflects historico-socio-
cultural rhythms.  The rhythms of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 and 
contemporary Afro-Caribbean rap reflect different histories and legacies. 156  
Awareness of the impact of discordant times on the patient, or between patient 
and healer, is important.  In the following clinical vignette, we see a discordant 
vertical historical timeframe (B series) arising from the legacy of a 
complementary slave/slave-owner historical ‘fit’ (cf. Dell, 1982).   
 
Case vignette: Joy.   
Joy’s autonoetic and semantic memory (Tulving, 2005) discussed in chapter 5 
brings her past  starkly into the present.  It illustrates how the sometimes 
presentness of history influences the present-moment without immediate 
awareness.   
 
Joy was a black female Jamaican patient in her late forties.  After about eight 
sessions I was finding it increasingly hard to remain meaningfully connected.  We 
seemed to have reached an always present but unacknowledged unspoken 
impasse.  After an uncomfortable silence I decided to comment on how I was 
feeling.  I asked whether there was something that I had not spoken about, my 
whiteness and her blackness, and a ‘shared history of slavery’, of white slave-
traders / owners growing wealthy from the suffering of black slaves?  She simply 
replied “Yes” without hesitation.  From this emerged freedom to speak of 
women’s stories handed down; her great grandmother’s memories of her mother’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Yoruba (Nigerian) percussionist Solá Akingbolá describes in his programme notes for Routes 
to Roots how the rhythms of the Yoruba language speak through the different drums: ‘The iyaalu 
in the lead drum … is made to ‘talk’ in such a way that the sound of Yoruba, which is a tonal 
language, is skilfully imitated’ (ARC Music Productions, 2007: 2).  The music is devotional.  
Spirituality and ancestor worship are at the root of Yoruba life and culture and its parts cannot be 
understood separately from the whole.   
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slavery.  It was that close in time. 157  We talked of another long-term legacy, of 
the marginalization of black male slaves unable to protect their womenfolk or 
families, and her relationship with her partner and his emotional, psychological 
difficulties caring for her.  We traced the legacies that continue to be worked out 
today in our black and white communities. 158   
 
Our histories had always been ‘present’ in the sessions.  The unvoiced past had 
always been in the room.  And as long as it remained so, the past would 
contaminate the present.  Kareem speaks of ‘psychological occupation [being] 
much more damaging and long-lasting than physical occupation.  It destroyed the 
inner self’ (Kareem, 2000: 33), for ‘(n)either patient nor therapist is ‘innocent’ of 
history and of memory’ (ibid: 23).   
 
With this brief example I share my belief that without intercultural micro and 
macro lenses it is impossible to practise psychotherapy beyond one’s own 
boundaried cultural experience, and even then inadequately (Ahmed, 1986; Carter 
and McGoldrick, 1989; Ho, 1987; Kareem and Littlewood, 2000; Krause, 1998; 
Lau, 1984, 1988; Messent, 1992; Minuchin et al, 1967; Wieselberg, 1992).  Joy’s 
legacy of slavery hints at some of these complexities.  The Mocans’ story 
exemplifies how with our different histories such an encounter could not have 
lead to the same level of relational engagement and understanding without 
addressing different and similar social, cultural, religious, political and economic 
contexts.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Barack Obama in his victory speech on 5th November 2008 referred to his wife Michelle having 
the blood of African slaves and white slave owners in her veins.  In those few words he brought a 
whole history of race, culture, oppression, and identity, to that evening in Chicago.   
158 Andrea Levy (2010) writes a historical fiction of slavery, transition from slavery to freedom, 
and the brutality that accompanied so much of this.  Charles Ward (1983) published his 
autobiography, a tribute to the triumph of a man whose grandfather knew slavery, who left school 
at twelve and in 1980 at the age of 71, received his Doctor of Education from the University of 
Beverley Hills, California.   
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Anthropology.   
There may be no more important task for our survival, however hard, than to 
understand the beliefs and stories of other cultures. 159  At best, we may know 
what people say they believe and what they do: ‘(P)eople do not necessarily 
believe what their culture trains them to say; and the ascription of belief is also 
unjustified if the psychological reference is elided, …’ (Needham, 1972: 5).  This 
does not detract from what people say they believe since such statements are part 
of the socio-cultural glue that contributes to identity and survival.  Understanding 
beliefs, how they arise, and their role in maintaining social stability is complex.  It 
involves the not-consciously-known outside immediate awareness, often 
reinforced by myth (chapter 7).   
 
Social-cultural studies attempt to understand the worlds of the other remaining as 
much as possible the outside observer, so as not to change the observed.  Some 
anthropologists tend to focus on the present.  Augé proposes that ‘it is our need to 
understand the whole of the present that makes it difficult for us to give meaning 
to the recent past’ (Augé, 1995: 30). 160  He identifies an increasing anomie in the 
West manifested by the cult of the individual, a me-first culture, disconnecting 
members from social responsibility.   
 
Carrithers suggests that the anthropologist’s focus is ‘human unity in diversity’ 
(Carrithers, 1992: 146), adding that anthropology is ‘very much a product of a 
particular setting in a particular time, the late colonial and neo-colonial societies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 The emphasis in the US, UK, and Europe on the plight of the Israeli population suffering 
repeated attacks, (influenced at least in part by guilt at the Shoah), often masks the injustices of 
Palestinian dispossession since 1948 of Palestinians whose families had lived in the area for 
centuries, (Abulhawa, 2011; Burg, 2008; Lerner, 2012; MacIntyre, 2008).  Is there an unremarked 
parallel of Europeans seeking freedom from persecution, who settled in America as refugees but 
who almost annihilated the indigenous North American Indian population, with the dispossession 
of Palestinians since 1948.  In both instances the theme, a land without people for a people without 
a land, displays a disrespect for the indigenous inhabitants.  In both cases, history and time have 
been manipulated to suit the dominant discourse (Tolan, 2008).   
160 ‘The question of the other is not just a theme that anthropology encounters from time to time; it 
is its sole intellectual object, … It deals with the other in the present; that is sufficient to 
distinguish it from history’ (Augé, 1995: 18).   
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of the North Atlantic rim’ (ibid: 147). 161  Lewis proposes that a key term in 
anthropology is ‘culture’, 162 ‘a convenient term to describe the sum of learned 
knowledge and skills – including religion and language – that distinguishes it 
from another which … passes on in a recognizable form from generation to 
generation’ (Lewis, 1996: 17).  This introduces an inter- and trans-generational 
focus.   
 
Howard speaks of the ‘focus on large cultural differences and … cross-cultural 
patterns’ (Howard, 1991: 192) in anthropology.  These ‘large cultural differences’ 
may help our understanding of time by learning something of others’ social 
structures against which to compare our own cultural contexts.  Returning to 
Geertz, culture is ‘those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning’ (Geertz, 1973: 5).   
 
We now consider how anthropological insights add to understanding time.  I first 
describe a couple with this in mind.  What simultaneously unifies and 
distinguishes Yael and Saul is complex and contributes to their confusion.  Their 
temporal realities are different, reflecting their other rhythms, families, cultures, 
and histories.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The description of the history of anthropology (Barfield, 1997: 17-23 and 157-160) is 
interesting in itself.  Attention is given to the development of western thinking, but none to the 
historical impact of exploration, colonialism and trade by European maritime powers from the 
seventeenth century onwards.   
162 Lewis suggests that ‘culture’ is a neutral term, and all communities have their culture.  ‘Culture 
is thus the protective shell of a community and cultural distinctions become, to some extent, an 
index of social identity’ (Lewis, 1996: 16).  Culture is a complicated, multi-dimensional subject, 
and beyond the scope of this chapter to consider it in great detail.   
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Case vignette: Yael and Saul. 163   
Yael and Saul are a Jewish couple in their early forties, possessing different socio-
cultural histories. 164  Their stories provide an opportunity to examine how time, 
culture, and history, flow and interweave.  Different cultures (American and mid-
European/Israeli) linked by a shared non-observant and racial identity (Judaism), 
informed by different immediate histories (times), lead to contrasting approaches 
to continuity, discontinuity, change, loss, and connection.  There are some 
similarities to the Mocan family, not least that both are stories of physical survival 
and persecution.  Yael and Saul’s stories are deeply rooted in millennial times of 
the race.   
 
The excerpts.   
These excerpts come from an essentially ethnographic interview.  Excerpt 1 
comes at the start with Saul’s story of his family and the Holocaust - the past.  
Excerpt 2, halfway through the interview includes Yael describing loops of time, 
her mother’s death and their continuing dialogue - her present-past.  Excerpt 3 
from the end of the interview considers parental hopes for their children - the 
future.  The whole interview illustrates different aspects of time and how old 
loops replay differently in a continuing present.  Yael says these loops are of past 
and present in relation to where they are going, the future.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Yael and Saul were interviewed as part of an international training programme at Shinui 
Institute, Tel Aviv, March 1998.  The focus of the interview was to explore their stories as a 
couple and the influence of family histories and time on their relationship.  The interview took 
place in a large training room with the thirty-five course participants present in the same room.  It 
lasted an hour and ten minutes.  The interview was filmed as part of a two and a half hour session, 
all of which the couple participated in.  Excerpts are verbatim transcripts.   
164 Neither is religiously observant.  Yael comes from a fourth generation American middle-class 
family that was not touched directly by the Holocaust.  She went to university in the US, going on 
to complete a Masters degree.  She is the youngest child, and only daughter, with three older 
brothers.  Her mother had died of cancer eighteen months before the interview and her father had 
recently begun a new relationship.   
 
Saul’s parents are mid-European from Poland and eastern Germany.  His mother’s family lived six 
houses away from his father’s family in Poland.  Apart from his father his whole paternal family 
and most of his maternal family died in the Holocaust.  His father was transported to Israel in 1937 
at the age of sixteen.  Saul had recently accompanied his father on a visit to Poland and Strasburg.	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Excerpt 1.   
(We have been speaking of whether Saul is a risk-taker, more like his mother or 
father.  Saul will describe some of his recent visit to Poland with his father.  His 
first language is Hebrew.)  
 
Saul.  “My family is very small.  Most of my family was, err (pause) died in the 
Holocaust.  I know really parents (pause), that’s it.  So I don’t have a wide reference to 
what other family members were”.   
…………… 
 
Saul.  “That reminds me of something.  The most tragic event of my father growing up, 
they lived in Poland.  And my grandfather, … (pause) When he was about eight years 
old, his father wanted to move the family out of Poland, and he went to friends in 
Strasburg, (pause)”   
 
HJ.  “This is your grandfather?”   
 
Saul.  “Yes.  And he got killed, trying to prepare the family to come back.  He was 
looking for business, a job, I’m not sure exactly.  My father was a kid and err, from that 
point on everything fell apart for the family.  I think he never made a connection, (pause) 
because we were on a tour, from another place, and my father really has, err, very little 
experience of having a father.  He doesn’t really know what a father should do or be.  He 
has a very vague memory of his father, (hesitates)”   
 
HJ.  “He was a teenager, or younger?”   
 
Saul.  “He was (pause) he always lived thinking he was six years old then.  Now, just 
recently, he finally found the name of his father in France, on the stone, and he found out 
he was really ten years old, and he’s confused now why he was always thinking he was 
six.  I’m not sure.”   
 
HJ.  “Do you know anything about the decision and what time he left Germany to come 
to Israel?”   
 
Saul.  “Yes, it was, err, at an orphanage run by the Jewish community, in 1937 when it 
started to get difficult there.  The community decided to send the entire school to Israel.”   
 
HJ.  “So the whole school was moved?”   
 
Saul.  “Because they were, (pause) a historical detail, the British Mandate gave 
certificates only up to seventeen years old.  And he was like under this age, so everybody 
that was under seventeen was sent.  Everybody above couldn’t.”   
 
HJ.  “So being under seventeen saved his life?”   
 
Saul.  “Ahh, (pause) yes.”   
 
Age.  Ages (time) become confused.  The father was ‘about eight years old’ but 
thought he was six.  He learns from the dates on his father’s gravestone (a time 
marker about a life’s duration) that he must have been ten, leaving him confused 
why he thought he was six and how he had ‘lost’ four years.  Age becomes 
important in another way because being “under seventeen” saved his life.  Saul 
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had always known this but not known its importance until the interview.  
Knowledge, knowing, and meaning, can be different.  Age (time) saved a life and 
left a lifelong (duration) legacy of guilt.  Following the visit there was confusion 
for Saul’s father about why he had muddled his age when his father died.   
 
Excerpt 1, continued.   
HJ.  “So he came here, and still in the orphanage.  Were there relatives also in Israel for 
him, or was he (Saul shakes his head) … so he really was on his own.  Yeah.  And he’s 
settled here ever since?”   
 
Saul.  (Long silence)  
 
HJ.  “So the decisions he took, or the decisions that were taken to move, the decisions 
that were not his because of political circumstances, …” 
 
Saul.  “Yes, err, we were in Poland, and we went to visit the house where his mother and 
his younger brother moved into after Poland fell apart and my grand-father’s death, and 
he remembers visiting them before he came to Israel.  …  I know that when we went to 
Poland we saw the house, he was just, errm (pause) he just wanted to get out.  He didn’t 
want any pictures taken, he didn’t want (pause).  …  Uhmm, later when we talked, he 
felt, he still feels somewhat guilty that he left, …”   
 
HJ.  “And he survived?”   
 
Saul.  “He survived.  He got letters from his mother.  I asked him now to translate these 
letters so I can read them, but errm, she was asking if he could help in getting them out.  
And, errm, he couldn’t.”   
 
HJ.  “And has that been a burden he’s carried all his life, do you think?”   
 
Saul.  (Nods his head - pauses)  “I think so.”   
 
 
Guilt.  Two important ideas are expressed: guilt and discontinuities.  The idea of 
guilt is a Judeo-Christian concept belonging to our psychological background.  It 
emphasises the private individual self.  Guilt refers to an internalising process 
where feelings remain fixed in time and often impede the development of 
relationships or change by freezing a past dynamic.  This is unlike the process of 
dealing with loss by not internalising and maintaining open dialogue, more 
characteristic of communities where resolution of conflict is conducted more 
publically (see chapter 7).   
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We hear tales of continuities and discontinuities in times of change.  Saul’s father 
renounces his name when he came to Israel: “It’s not unusual”.  This is a 
disconnection from the past and potential embrace of a new future.  It may also be 
a way to try and distance the pain of the past.  In the Mocan family Liviu’s 
parents renounce the land for the town.  Both renounce important aspects of 
cultural time and identity to ensure survival in dangerous politico-historical time.   
 
Excerpt 2.   
(Yael speaks of her mother and the sense of timelessness of hearing her mother 
still speaking.)   
 
HJ.  “… What, if you like, the time loop that goes on here is a replay of different loops 
from different parts of your experiences?”   
 
Yael.  “Uhh, uh, it strikes me all the time.”   
 
HJ.  “And that was just the connection I was making as you were talking and I was 
listening to you.”   
 
Yael.  “That definitely, that connectedness, is the loop of our past and our present, and 
where we’re going, it’s becoming more clear to me all the time, and as (pause) Uhh.  You 
know I’m being, becoming more and more comfortable with who I am and what my 
needs are.  Simultaneously, I’m trying to (pause) understand and truly accept Saul for the 
way Saul is.  Umm, and in some ways, you know, the fundamental differences will 
remain there forever.  …  I’m really beginning to get it.  I’m very stubborn.  I’m finally 
beginning to get it that he just doesn’t have the need to process, and he doesn’t have the 
need to talk like I do.  Umm.  And I’m slowly learning how to truly accept that.”   
 
HJ.  “If, and I know your mother only died fairly recently, but if your mother, you could 
hear her voice in your mind.  What advice do you think she would be saying to you, right 
now, about this, how you could handle this, handle yourself and handle this in your 
relationship?  What would her voice be in your head?   
 
Yael.  “I like that question.  Her advice would be: ‘Yael, be yourself.  Don’t be afraid to 
be yourself.  Continue to have the courage.’  (pause)  It would be, what, … her spirit talks 
to me now in a very different way than her words spoke to me when she was alive.  She’s 
speaking with me now at the level I always wanted her to.”   
 
HJ.  “That’s like kind of the sub-text, or the bit underneath.”   
 
Yael.  “Yeah.  And, … (pause) she would probably tell me also to accept Saul, accept 
who Saul is.  Looking back at her marriage, which she could have done differently if 
she’d had the tools and more understanding of my dad.  Because I remember that was 
also another issue for them, was, you know, my dad didn’t say the words: ‘I love you’.  I 
mean, … I mean it’s Fiddler on the Roof.  What do you mean?  I’ve been married to you 
for fifty years.  Of course I love you.  Umm, …  It’s needing to hear that many times she 
didn’t receive, and had a hard time accepting.  Umm, …”   
 
HJ.  “And yet Saul knows what he knows he feels for you, and he’s doing it his way.”   
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Yael.  “Right, right.”   
 
Communication and the past-present.  Two important ideas are expressed: 
Communication and the past-present.  When Yael says (not transcribed) ‘that’s 
the part that I think we need to continue to learn to communicate’ she means all 
levels of communication, especially oral communication, listening as much as 
speaking.  Language is one of the main factors that shapes the meaning of time in 
relationships, creates history and continuity, measures lives, and contextualises 
beliefs.  Similarly psychotherapy takes time and events as recounted and re-
experienced to help facilitate transformation (see chapter 8).   
 
It is an important human ability to distinguish simultaneously the difference 
between Augustine’s ‘present of present things’ and ‘present of past things’ 
(Augustine, 1961).  ‘(P)arts of our past become present to us once again, even as 
they are spontaneously distinguished from the present’ (Durkheim, 2001: 12).  In 
some senses these times co-exist, though philosophically we understood this was 
not possible.  When patients are unable to discriminate the past-that-becomes-the-
present and spontaneously to distinguish this different kind of present (Durkheim) 
from the ‘present of present things’ (Augustine), deep confusion and distress 
frequently follow.  We partly see this temporal discrimination in Yael’s 
description of her deceased mother: “She’s speaking with me now at the level I 
always wanted her to.”  Yael carries the past-as-the-present in her continuing 
conversations with her dead mother as a time loop, as a present-past relationship 
into the future.   
 
Excerpt 3.   
(The final part of the interview focuses towards the future, and the idea of 
parents’ wishes and legacies for their children.)   
 
HJ.  “… You have a son and you have a daughter.  What would you like them, thinking 
about them continuing, you know, the next generation to take from being born into this 
family, this marriage, as they grow up?  What are your dreams for your kids?  (pause) 
Why don’t I ask you first?”   
 
Saul.  “Uhmmm.  What are my dreams?  To be confident and, uhmm, sensitive, feel 
things, have the ability to feel, …”   
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HJ.  “To feel?”   
 
Saul.  “When I say ‘feel’, to feel other people, other situations, …”   
 
HJ.  “If there were one thing you would want your son to carry, your voice, your voice 




Saul.    “One is for him to be confident and happy in what he is doing.  But that’s not a 
continuation, which is neither my father nor me.  I mean to some extent, but not a full 
extent.”   
 
HJ.  “Is there anything else?  Is there anything else you would want him to carry, as it 
were?”   
 
Saul.    “To be, (pause) meaningful, ‘mash moulti’, …”   
……………………. 
 
HJ.  “What about for you Yael?  What would you want them to take from you as 
parents?”   
 
Yael.  “The concept that keeps stirring in me as I’m thinking about it is what I want most 
is for them to feel connected with themselves, their own inner being, to use that 
connection with us and each other and with their friends and the world around them.  And 
believe that through that connectedness with themselves and the world everything else 
will follow.  And one of the things I want to follow is for them to feel comfortable taking 
risks and know that with risks comes sometimes falling down and there really is no such 
thing as failure, but really just another opportunity to grow.  And for them to really feel it 
and not just to hear their ‘ima’ say those words, but for them to know that I’m really 
behind them, and I mean it.  And for me, I have to keep working at demonstrating it 
through my actions, and not just my words.”   
 
HJ.  “And if there were one thing you’d want, mother to daughter?  That’s important 
about becoming a woman, and maybe a mother and wife?”   
 
Yael.  “Yeah.  Part of being a woman is that very, - and it doesn’t mean that men aren’t 
sensitive, and Saul is a very sensitive man, - but part of being a woman is this very 
intuitive sensitivity and I want to help Sigal nurture that while at the same time find it 
internally and not always have to get it outside herself.  …  And for her to feel 
comfortable with who she is and to know there are costs to her, just as I’m learning.’   
 
Discontinuities.  The couple describe important ideas: future, culture, history, 
memory, context, and frozen time.  Their thoughts as parents for their children are 
similar.  Both wishes represent discontinuities with their own histories.  165  Saul 
wishes for change and discontinuity.  His wish for Tomar is “not a continuation, 
which is neither my father nor me”.  Yael wants her children to “feel comfortable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	   After	   the	   interview,	   Yael	   said	   she	   would	   keep	   their	   copy	   of	   the	   video	   as	   part	   of	   their	  legacy	   for	   the	   children	   as	   a	   future	   oriented	   decision	   for	   the	   children	   later	   to	   have	   a	  connection	  with	  an	  autobiographical	  account	  of	  their	  parents’	  pasts.	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taking risks” and so break with the past.  Risk-taking is often linked in the West to 
individual responsibility allied to an egocentric concept of self and individual 
responsibility (Sampson, 1993).  Unlike in the East, it means challenging rather 
than supporting the status quo of the community and moving into new territory of 
time and place.  Risk-taking in the East often takes into consideration the invisible 
dark realm of existence, emphasising community and group identity that place 
importance on reciprocity and filial duty (see chapter 7).   
 
A socio-cultural perspective grounds our understanding of the couple interview.  
Its subjectivity contrasts with the abstract nature of philosophical discourse, and 
dilutes the possibility of a single certainty, although ‘to become emotionally as 
well as intellectually involved in another culture in no way detracts from our 
objective, rational, intellectual analytical ability’ (Turnbull, 1990: 51).  Life has to 
be lived in the necessarily subjective experience of self and other, moment-by-
moment, taking or not taking account of the past, and envisaging or not 
envisaging a future.   
 
In the context of history and memory, Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi, draws an 
important distinction for Judaism in the ritual of the Seder service:  
 ‘The Seder service is not so much recollection as reactualisation.  Judaism 
was organised around something other than history.  Its key word was 
memory.  History is what happened to someone else.  Memory is what 
happened to me.  Memory is history internalised, the past made present to 
those who relive it.  ...  Passover is the festival in which history becomes 
memory.  ....  Memory is our best guardian of liberty’ (Jonathan Sacks, 
The Times, 1995). 166   
 
This is ever-present mémoire even if not actively recalled to mind as are 
‘souvenir’ and ‘rappel’ (Ricoeur, 2000).  When ‘memory’ of events from a 
generation or previous centuries becomes ‘what happened to me’, time collapses 
and acquires different meanings, and the three millennia-old insult to my 
forefathers is my personal insult.  It is ‘semantic memory’ that becomes an 
experientially real ‘auotonoetic episodic lived memory’ (Tulving, 2005) with all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Passover is ritual – see chapter 8.   
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the dangers of repeating the same story.  The logical consequence is vendetta, 
when the account is never ‘signed off’, like the child throwing rocks at an old 
woman in Hebron because of “what this woman did in 1929”, (MacIntyre, 23: 
2008).  The period (time) that defines, and some would say haunts the Jews, is the 
Shoah.   
‘In the new and innovative Israel, the radical movement of total renewal 
that promised a spring of nationhood and a new society was compelled to 
redefine itself by memory and the past.  Israel went beyond mourning; it 
was no longer a future oriented state, but a society connected to its 
bleeding, traumatic past.  The dramatic proximity of 1945 to 1948, the 
years of grief and of utopia, depression and mania, fused two monumental 
events, the Jewish massacre in Europe and the building of the Jewish state 
of Israel, into one single entity.  They became intertwined and inseparable’ 
(Burg, 2008: 75). 
 
If Burg is correct all are trapped by a failure to move in time, and Israel actively 
locks all parties in an eternal status quo. 167  Jewish (Israeli) preoccupation with 
victim-hood traps Israel in the past, hinders resolution with the Palestinians, and 
turns the victim into the abuser.  It means Germany is forever defined by its recent 
history.  This is not an argument to forget, but rather not to be defined by a static 
view of the past.  When these memory behaviours become fixed they take on 
qualities similar to repetition compulsion (chapter 2) or as if returning endlessly to 
‘the same logical point’ at different temporal points (Howe, 1981) discussed in 
chapter 7.   
 
Yael and Saul share different experiences of the same chronological times.  Yael’s 
time from affluent US culture is distant from its European roots and the 
immediacy of war and fear. 168  Her first language is English and Saul’s is 
Hebrew.  Saul’s experience is geographically and psychologically closer to the 
experience of annihilation.  Israel, surrounded by its Arab neighbours, is 
sometimes seen psychologically as part of Europe while located ethno-
geographically in the Middle-East.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 This becomes equally true for Palestinians (Abulhawa, 2011; Tolan, 2008).   
168 Much of this has changed post 9/11.  The great super-power is no longer inviolate.   
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Saul’s father wanted no photographs of the family home (or his father’s grave) 
and no present record of painful memories of his return to Poland.  Photographs 
‘freeze’ time and can make more real what cannot be faced.  Similarly, text fixes 
time in a way that fluid oral traditions do not.  There is confusion over dates and 
his father’s age when his grandfather died in a period of terrible chaos.  The 
certainty of age had become frozen time and his father’s time confusion troubles 
Saul.  His father remained haunted by the memory of not being cared for by his 
German relatives and his adolescent impotence to save his family.  The burden of 
survivor guilt remains with its legacy of silence.  An example of this silent 
temporal burden was that Saul’s father could not bear to translate his mother’s 
letters in Polish for Saul to read.  They remain locked in the time of their writing, 
increasing the difficulty of father and son connecting past and present.   
 
Yael, with her American heritage of openness, finds ‘not talking’ so hard.  As 
Saul finished his story in the earlier part of the interview Yael, visibly moved, 
said: “I’m hearing some of this for the first time”.  She begins to re-assess Saul’s 
reticence about speaking.  It is as if his father’s silent trauma had become part of 
Saul’s personal script.  ‘This silence is like denial: that which is not spoken does 
not exist’ (Burg, 2008: 99).   
 
Personal history is predominantly a Western concept.  In other cultures family and 
community are the main source of identity and this sense of individual history or 
guilt does not necessarily apply.  Thus, without a socio-cultural-historical 
framework to make sense of personal accounts, their stories would float away like 
un-tethered balloons.  This leads to my chosen representatives of different strands 
of socio-cultural discourse.   
 
Social or functional approaches:  
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917).   
Sociologist Émile Durkheim’s importance is as ‘the founder of modern 
comparative sociology’ (Lewis, 1996: 46).  ‘(H)e produced a theory of social 
solidarity’ (Douglas, 1996: xv), believing that humans have a need to relate 
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socially.  An important contribution was ‘the explanatory power of functionalism’ 
(Lewis, 1996: 49).  Today there is nothing extraordinary in exploring the function 
and meaning of events. 169  In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 170 he 
studies ‘the most primitive and simplest religion currently known, and to analyse 
it and attempt to explain it’ (Durkheim, 2001: 3) to understand unchanging 
principles in human society and ‘to explain a current reality, something close to us 
and consequently capable of affecting our ideas and actions’ (ibid: 3).   
 
While philosophical time can be studied in the abstract, cultural time must be 
contextualised by ‘the social origin of ‘time’ as a category’ (Gell, 1992: 5).  
Durkheim emphasises the social-collective nature of human experience and how 
theories of time affect every level of life.  The cyclicity of days, weeks, months, 
and years, is social time:  
‘We can see the enormous difference between the complex of sensations 
and images that serve to orient us in duration and the category of time.  
The first are the sum of individual experiences, meaningful only to the 
individual who has had them.  By contrast, the category of time expresses 
a time that is common to the group’ (Durkheim, 2001: 12.  Footnote 2).   
 
Time common to the group is ‘social time’ and is a phenomenon of human 
society.  My descriptions of different times for the Mocan family followed in the 
Durkheimian tradition.  Subjective experience of time will be consonant with, or 
at odds with, the prevailing culture.  The individual’s place in the social structure 
may be dislocated from the mainstream when a socially dissonant personal 
experience of time becomes public. 171  Mocan family members described the 
danger of public ‘spiritual time’ in the context of Ceausescu’s ‘political time’.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 In psychodynamic and systemic psychotherapy, by whatever terminology is used, an important 
question often is to explore the ‘function’ of the symptom/ problem in the intrapsychic - 
interpersonal system of the designated patient.   
170 First published in 1912, this was Durkheim’s last major work before his death.   171	   The	   individual	   with	   his	   banner	   in	   Oxford	   Street	   proclaiming	   the	   imminent	   end	   of	   the	  world	  -­‐	  the	  end	  of	  time	  -­‐	  is	  unlikely	  to	  elicit	  more	  than	  a	  wry	  smile	  from	  passers-­‐by	  because	  he	  does	  not	  threaten	  social	  stability.	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Reflections.   
Important contributions relevant to psychotherapy by Durkheim include; 
challenging belief that all cultures are the same, recognising that humans organise 
collectively, and attributing meanings to events that include time as part of social 
structure.  Durkheim anchors social time in society.  In order to understand 
perceptions of time in psychotherapy we must include the socio-cultural 
context(s) of practice, whether Vienna in the early twentieth century, 1960s east 
coast America, 1970s Italy, or twenty-first century plural-cultural UK.   
 
Marcel Mauss, (1872-1950).   
Marcel Mauss 172 expands our understanding of the social and easthetic by 
exploring the nature of the gift relationship. 173  From his work stem an 
appreciation of honour, obligation to give and receive, the place of gifts in 
maintaining social structures, and the ‘phenomena of exchange and contract’ 
(Mauss, 1990: 5).  His formulations of giving and receiving are systemic, 
especially in time relational elements.  Mary Douglas links Mauss in the tradition 
of Durkheim who ‘tried to keep a delicate balance between reproaching 
utilitarianism for overlooking that humans are social beings and reproaching 
socialism for overlooking the demands of the individual’ (Douglas, 1990: xv).   
 
Mauss is concerned with social functioning.  He is interested to understand 
intersubjectivity, the space(s) in-between in human relationships, how they are 
experienced and managed in time and place, and the mechanisms holding society 
together.  In the ritualistic nature of giving and receiving, timing, place, and 
participation are crucial in the context of ‘total services of an agonistic type’ (ibid: 
8).  He termed this ‘potlatch’.  Perhaps key to the process of giving and receiving 
is revealed in Maori law where the gift retains something of the giver: ‘What 
imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the thing 
received is not inactive. … Through it the giver still has a hold over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Marcel Mauss was Durkheim’s nephew.   
173 This is in cultures of the Pacific Rim, (Polynesia and Melanesia,) and the American Northwest.   
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beneficiary just as, being its owner, through it he has a hold over the thief,’ 
(Mauss, 1990: 15).   
 
A gift has significance for all parties over long periods of time.  The giver 
continues to exert influence or stay ‘alive’ over time in the gift, long after the 
event itself.  What is given may be given to others, and on occasion the original 
gift even returns to the original giver in Pacific Rim cultures.  This reflexivity 
creates a dynamic time-flow related to a social network of obligation and 
connectedness.  Timing and place reinforce the social nature of existence when 
non-participation risks social exclusion.  Following Durkheim, adherence to 
giving and receiving rituals ensures social stability and inter-group peace over 
time, while managing transition and changing circumstance.   
 
Reflections.   
When considering time in psychotherapy in the context of Mauss’ work, the 
emphasis on reciprocity is striking, especially giving and receiving gifts for social 
cohesion.  Timing of receiving and giving is important, (Mauss, 1990: 46).  In 
Palazzoli’s framework we think of the ‘time of the system’ (chapter 2).   
 
‘Debts’ are incurred and relationships reinforced within an understood timeframe 
in a stable society.  The gift draws to itself qualities of the giver that enfolds a 
memory and encapsulates the meaning of the event and its temporal context that 
can be re-experienced at any time in the future.  In the to and fro’ of the gift 
relationship we see a similar process in psychotherapy where there is an offering, 
often intangible, by the patient.   
 
In contrast to the societies that Mauss describes, Western-based psychotherapy 
has emphasised the individual psyche and an exclusive relationship between 
psychotherapist and patient.  Instead of emphasising the interpersonal, the 
individual’s others are in many ways excluded in the analytic model, ‘out of 
social context’, from the private space of a clearly asymmetric relationship in the 
consulting room.  Different approaches to psychotherapy vary in paying attention 
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to the significance of gifts or objects in patients’ relationships (Casement, 1985, 
1990).  174   
 
Important contributions from Durkheim and Mauss include, the social aspect of 
time and human interaction, cultural variations of social relationships, and the 
subjective nature of reality.  Time and timing in the rhythm of giving and 
receiving, the ‘time of the system’, are important at a structural relationship level 
and for stability of the social fabric.   
 
Systems of knowledge:  
E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973).   
Evans-Pritchard was interested in how we give meaning to our world.  During the 
1920s and 30s he lived among the Azande. 175  Their mystical world defies the 
empirical, rational world of Western thought, and encompasses unquestioned 
contradictions.  In Lewis’ words, ‘witchcraft is invoked as a causal explanation of 
irregularities’ (Lewis, 1996: 74).   
 
The poison oracle, Benge, 176 has relevance to understanding the relationship 
between the present and the future.  The oracle reveals the influence of mystical 
forces on future outcome.  Facts about events or objective conditions are not 
sought, but rather ‘information about the movement of psychic forces which 
might cause them misfortune’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 161).  It is more important 
to understand the mystical powers that affect events than objective situations.  A 
person’s future is dependent on mystical forces and witchcraft enables the person 
to avoid or counteract a black future and have it ‘changed to be more favourable 
to him’ (ibid: 161).  Influence over the future removes anxiety about the 
capriciousness of fate.  Benge’s answers are not challenged by experience since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Irvin Yalom (2001) in The Gift of Therapy underlines much more the mutuality of such an 
otherwise asymmetrical relationship.   
175 The Azande inhabit a large area of Africa at the intersection of three modern African countries: 
Republic of Sudan; Zaïre; Central African Republic.  Evans-Pritchard lived in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, mainly with the Sudanese Azande.  I use the present tense, even though the world of the 
Azande of the early part of the twentieth century no longer exists.   
176 ‘Benge, poison oracle, which operates through the administration of strychnine to fowls, and 
formerly human beings also’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 228).   
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they are not concerned with objective events while they influence events.  Future 
doom once recognised can be avoided by changing plans, without undermining 
the foreknown existence of mystical forces, or credibility of the benge.  Time for 
the Azande has moral connotations (Evans-Pritchard, 1976) and differs to 
Western experience.  ‘(T)he present and the future overlap in some way so that 
the present partakes of the future as it were. … (F)uture health and happiness 
depend on future conditions that are already in existence and can be exposed by 
the oracles and altered’ (ibid: 162).  If the oracle foresees a future event, that 
future is already part of the person.   
 
An overlapping future and present contrast with a psychodynamic emphasis on an 
unconscious past and present.  The Azande’s ‘future is already part of him’ unlike 
Western belief of the past being part of the individual.  Azande future focus on 
what can be changed to deal with ‘mystical forces that can be tackled here and 
now’, contrasts with Western ‘mystical forces’ in an ‘unconscious past’.  ‘(I)t is 
evident [for the Azande] that the answers he receives do not generally concern 
objective happenings and therefore cannot easily be contrary to experience’ (ibid: 
161).  Some may argue similarity with Western psycho-analysis and all 
psychotherapy being de facto acts of faith.   
 
Reflections.   
Importance is given to ‘epistemological value’ and in this sense Evans-Pritchard’s 
approach is intellectual, emphasising systems of knowledge and how we 
understand causation.  There are parallels in his descriptions of the Azande with 
psychotherapy, especially an emphasis on abstract concepts and unconscious 
functioning.  The fact that an analytic interpretation does not bring about 
observable change does not invalidate the approach.  The interpretation may be in 
error or the patient is not ready so that timing acquires importance. Casement 
(1985) speaks of the correct interpretation made at the wrong time in treatment, or 
in Palazzoli’s model, not respecting the Ts (chapter 2).  Psychotherapeutically, 
how the Azande blur timeframes and believe the future is foretold in the present is 
particularly interesting in contrast with so much in the West.  Oracular verdicts 
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and psychotherapy rely on external authority - spirits, oracle, king, founding 
figure - to provide socio-culturally acceptable authority.   
 
In contrast to psychoanalysis Brief Solution-Focused approaches do not 
emphasise an external oracle.  The patient is expert who influences future 
outcome, where s/he is invited to foretell a positive future event and recount it as 
if now achieved.  The therapist’s socially ascribed position validates the 
experience (de Shazer, 1982, 1985) similar to an Azande tribesman who foresees 
future doom wrought by mystical forces through the benge that has to be avoided, 
while not invalidating these forces.   
 
In the systemic world other therapists have focused on the power of invoking the 
future, supporting the patient to imagine that real or hypothetical future time, and 
to then recall, as if looking back, how they were able to bring about such positive 
change (Bertrando, 2007; Boscolo and Bertrando, 1993; Penn, 1985; Seikkula, 
Arnkil, and Eriksson, 2003).   
 
Historical approaches:  
Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah (1929 - ).   
Tambiah brings a historical approach.  He traces the thinking of nineteenth and 
twentieth century anthropologists 177 and is interested in the social phenomena of 
lyrical participation, characteristic of the oriental world of connection, continuity 
and pattern.  This contrasts with occidental virtues of egocentricity, individuation, 
instrumental action, and technical mastery (Tambiah, 1990).  Peacock suggests 
that ‘(w)ith modernization, systems of classification become emancipated from 
the social groupings within which they originated, so that they can serve as 
abstracted, analytical instruments capable of the precise distinction necessary for 
reflective thought’ (Peacock, 1975: 39).  These representations have implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Beginning with a review of anthropology’s intellectual legacy Tambiah examines the works of 
the following: Sir Edward Tylor, (1832-1917); Sir James Frazer, (1854-1938); Bronislaw Kaspar 
Malinowski, (1884-1942); and Lévy Bruhl, (1857-1939).  He links this with the works of 
Wittgenstein, (1889-1951), later historians, and the influence of psychoanalysis.   
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for the self in relation to time and place, and for perception of one’s state and 
status.   
 
Tambiah identifies ritual within a primordial time that facilitates ‘the operation of 
ritual action of the type branded as “magic”, and the elaboration of a rich 
mythology about gods and men’ (Tambiah, 1990: 7).  Contemporary Western 
societies have developed their own ‘magic’ or enchantment to cope with anxiety 
of which psychotherapy is an example, attempting to give meaning in an uncertain 
or absurd world (Camus, 1942).  These are seen in existential approaches (Frankl, 
1985, 2000, 2004; Yalom, 1989, 2001, 2006).  Tambiah invites us to consider 
how from early times ritual plays an important part in human experience 
(discussed in chapter 8).   
 
A Structuralist approach:  
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908 - 2009).   
Lévi-Strauss escapes easy categorization as he crosses many lines of thought:  
‘Claude Lévi-Strauss shares with Malinowski a Durkheimian heritage, yet 
where Malinowski has distilled from that seminal tradition his 
functionalist dogma that to understand myth one must unravel its social 
context, Lévi-Strauss champions the opposing viewpoint of 
‘structuralism’.  He teaches that understanding of the meaning of myth 
comes from analysing the structure of the text rather than its function in 
context’ (Peacock, 1975: 46). 178    
 
Lévi-Strauss is interested in commonalities that unify societies.  He believed that 
primitive life reveals basic elements relevant to all human groupings.  Like 
Durkheim, he ‘endeavours to reveal an unconscious universal structure that 
underlies seemingly diverse phenomena: kinship, ritual, language, myth, 
totemism, and systems of classification’ (Peacock, 1975: 53) such as the gift 
relationship (Lévi-Strauss, 1969), and shamanism (Lévi-Strauss, 1963).  ‘The task 
of the anthropologist, … is … to understand and illustrate the principles of 
organisation that underlie the onward process of transformation that occurs as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Peacock quotes Lévi-Strauss about how he detested the discomfort of travel, the boredom of 
wasted time waiting, compared to Malinowski’s robust total immersion in the cultures he studied.   
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carriers of the culture solve problems that are either practical or purely 
intellectual’ (Bloch, 2009). 179   
 
Universal structures of the (essentially unconscious) mind interest him 
particularly.  Little of his work is based on direct field observation reflecting a 
greater interest in the structure of ideas than the structure of society.  Freud 
influenced Lévi-Strauss’ seeking to discover the structure and layers of the 
unconscious, seeing symbolic (totemic) structures as isomorphic with social 
structures.  ‘(T)otemism is a genuine system of consciousness, a symbolic 
structure that permits the interpretation of reality’ (Peacock, 1975: 56).   
 
Lévi-Strauss discusses Mauss’ theories of the gift relationship, the principle of 
reciprocity (Lévi-Strauss, 1969: 52ff), and the importance of exchange distinct 
from economic value.  ‘The idea that a mysterious advantage is attached to the 
acquisition of commodities, or at least certain commodities, by means of 
reciprocal gifts, rather than by individual production or acquisition, is not 
confined to primitive society,’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1969: 55).  Giving and receiving 
help maintain complex sets of relationships over time.  The exchange of women 
for marriage helps maintain kinship structures, which exist simultaneously at 
different levels and help ‘resolve tensions between nature and culture, … [and] 
certain basic conflicts inherent in particular forms of social organization’ (Lewis, 
1976: 65).   
 
Lévi-Strauss offers an analysis of the shaman’s effectiveness and the parallels 
with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (Lévi-Strauss, 1963).  He echoes 
observations made by Evans-Pritchard (1976) about the benge.  For magic (or 
therapy) to be effective, three elements are required: ‘first, the sorcerer’s belief in 
the effectiveness of his techniques; second, the patient’s or victim’s belief in the 
sorcerer’s power; and, finally, the faith and expectations of the group …’ (Lévi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Maurice Bloch, Tuesday 3 November 2009, Obituary, The Guardian.   
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Strauss, 1963: 168) since ‘the efficacy of magic implies belief in magic’. 180  The 
main story relates to Quesalid who not believing in the power of shamans, 
ultimately became a member of the group he intended to expose.  In the process of 
learning the tricks he learns that real shamans exist and ultimately ‘he seems to 
have completely lost sight of the fallaciousness of the technique which he so 
disparaged in the beginning’ (ibid: 178).   
 
Social consensus is essential for the shaman, whose effectiveness depends on the 
relationship between ‘a specific category of individuals and specific expectations 
of the group’ (ibid: 180).  Like the therapist, the shaman undergoes a rigorous 
process that mirrors the ordeal of the patient (Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Vitebsky, 
1995).  Effectiveness rests on a ‘contract’ between the healer and the to-be-healed 
in a particular socio-cultural, temporal, context.  The parallels between so-called 
primitive and advanced Western societies are closer than is often acknowledged.  
What happens temporally in the healing process, how time experiences may 
intentionally be altered, and how different timeframes facilitate change, are 
important for understanding ritual and therapy.  If Lévi-Strauss is correct, the fact 
that ‘Quesalid did not become a great shaman because he cured his patients; he 
cured his patients because he had become a great shaman’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1963: 
180) may be little different to attributing a particular address, such as Harley 
Street, to a physician’s competence level.   
 
Reflections.   
Yael and Saul’s story reveals different experiences of time, history, and culture.  
Yael’s American heritage is more present-focused, emphasising her more 
instrumental wish for immediate change.  Saul appears more enclosed by his past, 
strongly influenced by parental families’ cultural histories and the Shoah.  They 
negotiate as a couple in the ‘now’ of their marriage against the turbulence evoked 
by their different legacies.  The Mocan family achieved this through their rural-
peasant / urbanised-professional backgrounds of dispossession, and shared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 This is not entirely borne out by Stoller (2009), who describes his first experience of disbelief 
in magic and shamanism in Niger, but nonetheless being transformed by the event.   
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political history in the timeless-eternal perspective of their Christian faith.  
Different experiences of social and religious solidarity of time, change, and 
survival, mark out these minority group families.   
 
To understand the meaning of religion or spirituality in different cultures has 
never been more pressing in the turmoil of globalised contemporary history.  
Mauss’ model of the gift relationship carries new meaning if we substitute 
‘injury’ or ‘insult’ for ‘gift’ in a time-framed discourse on the world stage or the 
private context of psychotherapy.  A structural analysis of symbolic functioning 
such as totemism or American neo-conservative Christian fundamentalist politics 
may help understand their societal context.  
 
All psychotherapy has an epistemology for how the therapist ‘knows’ what s/he 
observes.  A key task is how to give meaning and thus find ways for change in the 
individual’s internal world, interpersonal relationships, and to bridge both 
domains (Jenkins, 2006).   
 
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980).   
Bateson’s thinking was influential in the development of Palazzoli’s model of 
Systemic Psychotherapy.   
 
His early fieldwork published as Naven concerned the Iatmul tribe in New 
Guinea, studying pattern and communication, especially as expressed in the 
Naven ceremony.  ‘His cybernetic model, inspired by an innovative, but 
nevertheless functionalist study of the Naven ceremony among the Iatmul, was 
clearly in tune with the idea that the function of parts is to maintain the whole in 
order … or in homeostasis’ (Krause, 1998: 52).  Bateson’s broad ecological 
perspective set him apart.  With his research into communication, his 
preoccupation with how to classify information, an interest in the science of 
cybernetics, and an interactional theory of schizophrenia, Bateson became a 
commentator in many fields.  He provided intellectual credibility for family 
therapy (Krause, 1998; Luepnitz, 1988) where his ideas significantly influenced 
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theory and practice.  In later years, he feared that family therapy had become too 
instrumental and that by not celebrating heraldry therapists had lost respect for 
history and time (Lawrence Allman, personal communication 1989).   
 
Bateson’s paper on alcoholism and cybernetics highlights the importance of 
knowing how we know.  ‘(1) … an entirely new epistemology must come out of 
cybernetics and systems theory, involving a new understanding of mind, self, 
human relationship, and power’ (Bateson, 1971: 280). 181  He perceived mind as 
‘immanent’, not bounded by the brain, (Bateson, 1980). 182   
 
An interest in communication and logical typing led him to map the transactional 
patterns of schizophrenic patients and their families.  ‘(T)he theory [of logical 
typing] asserts that no class can, in formal logical or mathematical discourse, be a 
member of itself; that a class of classes cannot be one of the classes which are its 
members; that a name is not the thing named; …’ (Bateson, 1964: 251).  When 
using symbol, metaphor, ceremony in ritual and in daily activity, humans do not 
worry whether they breach the formal rules of logic.  We play and engage in 
games to resolve problems or sustain relationships that can only be understood by 
ambiguity.  We have noted this tension between the rational and visceral in 
philosophical discourse when attempting to understand human experience.   
 
Bateson considers play and ritual, which I discuss in detail in chapter 8.  Both 
activities rely on communication, and communication about (that is, meta-
communication) the nature of the activity concerned.  He proposes framing as in 
the box below to help understand communication (Bateson, 1955: 157).  The 
reader is caught in a self-referential paradox.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The rest of this paragraph continues: ‘(2) that the addicted alcoholic is operating, when sober, 
in terms of an epistemology which is conventional in Occidental culture but which is not 
acceptable in systems theory; (3) that surrender to alcoholic intoxication proves a partial and 
subjective short cut to a more correct state of mind; and (4) that the theory of Alcoholics 
Anonymous coincides closely with an epistemology of cybernetics’ (Bateson, 1971: 280).   
182 For instance, Bateson argues in this paper that the problem for the alcoholic is not inebriation 
but sobriety, and that alcohol is a solution to this intolerable state of affairs.  He describes a 
‘relationship’ with the bottle based on a faulty epistemology of ‘beating’ the bottle.   







If the first statement is true it is false, but if false, then true.  It ‘frames’ the other 
two statements making them false if the first statement is true, and true if it is 
false.  Bateson argues that the problem is a difficulty in discriminating between 
‘some’ and ‘all’ and between ‘not all’ and ‘more’.  I suggest the absence of a time 
perspective creates the problem, so that a self-referential paradox occurs because 
it is believed the statements have to be accepted simultaneously.  If time is 
introduced into the frame - times when they are true and when not, - the paradox 
dissolves.  The framing of the statements as simultaneous seems to create the 
problem, just as society’s framing of the alcoholic’s problem as inebriation, rather 
than sobriety, becomes the problem (Bateson, 1971).  This has relevance to 
Bateson’s theories about the self-enclosed quality of pathological communication.  
He suggests that in ‘pathological systems’ patterns exist similar to play and ritual, 
but without conscious contextual framing.   
 
The Double Bind theory (Bateson, 1969; Bateson et al, 1956), developed out of 
his anthropological research (Bateson, 1958) and is posited as a self-referential 
paradox.  The Möbius Strip (Plate 6.3) provides a visual image of a form that 
folds back endlessly on itself.   
 
All statements within this frame 
are untrue.   
 
I love you.   
 
I hate you.   
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Plate 6.3.  Möbius Strip.   
 
The formal components of a double bind relationship in schizophrenic transaction 
are:  
‘two or more persons; … repeated experience; … a primary negative 
injunction; … a secondary injunction conflicting with the first at a more 
abstract level, and like the first enforced by punishment or signals which 
threaten survival; … a tertiary negative injunction prohibiting the victim 
escaping the field. And finally a point comes when the individual 
perceives his world in such a way that the full sequence is no longer 
necessary’ (Bateson et al., 1956: 178-179).   
 
Individuals caught in this timeless sequencing are unable to distinguish the 
different levels of communication.  Similar to an endless self-reinforcing Möbius-
like pattern, there comes to a point where ‘(a)n individual will take a metaphorical 
statement literally when he is in a situation where he must respond, where he is 
faced with contradictory messages, and when he is unable to comment on the 
contradictions’ (ibid: 180).   
 
The double bind hypothesis describes levels of logical typing and mutually 
exclusive levels of ‘injunction’.  The brain is called to deal simultaneously with 
conflicting levels of communication, - feeling, language, relationship, complexity 
- each part attempting to make sense within its own frame of reference. 183  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 It is dangerous to attempt to over-simplify an organism as complex as the brain.  However, 
there are known areas that process different aspects of our functioning: ‘(T)here appears to be a 
collection of systems in the human brain consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking 
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sudden realisation of the unsustainable tension in simultaneous dual or multiple 
(time) levels produces the explosive laughter of humour (Bateson, 1955), partly as 
a comment on the impossibility of simultaneously holding conflicting or mutually 
exclusive positions.  Unlike the double bind, there is no ‘tertiary negative 
injunction prohibiting the victim escaping the field’ or meta-communicating.  The 
psychiatric patient’s bizarre behaviours, his symptoms, become comments on the 
situation without attribution (Haley, 1963).  Extreme behaviour becomes a 
‘solution’ to un-containable pressure when it is impossible to separate the process 
into sequential temporal ‘elements’.  If Bateson’s  ‘tertiary negative injunction 
prohibiting the victim escaping the field’ is non-verbal and affect laden, it 
becomes the dominant but unacknowledged element in the communication 
sequence.  It cannot be commented on in the same non-verbal communicational 
‘channel’, and is ‘resistant’ to time sequencing.   
 
Damasio (2000a: 159-160) suggests that feelings are aroused before the brain’s 
cognitive ability to name them.  Sequencing is critical: ‘what comes first … what 
comes after’ and involves time.  We are dealing neurologically with sequences 
however brief not simultaneity.  If multiple communication levels could be 
processed sequentially and slowed down, I suggest the ‘logical’ contradictions 
that Bateson accurately describes would disentangle and the individual become 
self-reflective or meta to that process. 184  In chapter 8 we see how ritual slows 
time.   
 
 ‘Time’ seems to be an important missing element from Bateson’s work.  For the 
individual in the emotional pressure of the moment the un-resolvable in the 
context offered is un-resolvable, as long as it is presented as resolvable 
simultaneously.  This seems similar to Evans-Pritchard’s description of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
process we call reasoning, and to the response selection we call decision making, with special 
emphasis on the personal and social domain.  This same collection of systems is also involved in 
emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body signals’ (Damasio, 2000a: 71).   
184 The work of Julian Leff and his colleagues on Expressed Emotion (EE) addresses many of 
these issues in helping families be aware of, and change, their communication patterns.  These are: 
critical comments, hostility, emotional over-involvement (Hi EE), and supportive comments, 
warmth (Lo EE) (Leff, 1979; Leff and Vaughn, 1981, 1985).   
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Azande, unable to think outside their frame of reference, and so substituting one 
mystical contradiction with a higher level mystical explanation.  Many of these 
elements are present benignly in ritual.  ‘Ordeal’ changes from being implicit and 
denied in the patient’s double bind context to explicit and intentional in ritual and 
psychotherapy (Haley, 1963).   
 
Reflections.   
We have begun to consider how an anthropological approach enhances our 
appreciation of culture to understand human activity. When it comes to noting 
time in many communities, memory is often fixed by associating specific events 
of importance that have survival value for the community, with phenomena such 
as when the volcano erupted, the rains failed, or 9/11.  This is a form of simple 
history or time frozen, even as text fixes time.   
 
What emerges from this brief consideration of anthropological studies on cultures 
and time, is how in our common humanity and need to make sense of our 
environment, we are united by our differences.  By holding a mirror up to 
differences in others we find it is just that: we are different, and should not take 
for granted what we take for granted.  Our Western emphasis on the ‘I’ and our 
internalised worlds lead to particular ways of locating ourselves in relation to 
others, seeking answers to existential questions about life, community 
responsibility, and the meaning of time and change.   
 
Socio-cultural studies remind us that human experience in diverse contexts can be 
conceptualised in a multitude of ways.  I chose to describe the Mocan family 
within different time frameworks (chapter 5).  Other equally valid ways could 
have been chosen.  Yael and Saul share common religious and political identities, 
but different cultural backgrounds.  Their difficulties understanding each other 
were gendered, and related to different experiences of time and history.   
 
Tambiah’s comparison of occidental ‘causality’ and oriental ‘participation’ 
underlines important differences in worldviews.  One is between believing that 
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the individual is responsible and can change the course of events, and a sense of 
being part of a much greater whole where identity is found in the group or 
community.   
 
Bateson has an important place in bridging different worlds.  The alcoholic caught 
in an endless relationship loop with the bottle, or the family whose double-binding 
communication patterns leave members trapped in a timeless epistemology, 
describe kinds of time where ‘participants’ live outside mundane temporality.  
The example of ‘All statements within this frame are untrue’ becomes endlessly 
self-referential when disconnected from time.  We can envisage it as a self-
contained Möbius-like context, cut off from all around it.  ‘Time’ threads its way 
through the narrative as a way to understand existence and structure our worlds.    
 
Even when approaches to research differ, anthropologists give importance to 
culture, social relationships, structure, context, and processes that provide 
stability.  Usually this is with reference to history, through ancestors and tradition.  
The frequently abstract nature of philosophical discourse about time acquires a 
different reality in the context of anthropological studies.   
 
I develop these themes in more depth and discuss two cultures and their temporal 
perspectives in the chapter 7.  I consider the nature of past, present, and future, 
among the Balinese, and time after death among the Sora tribe.   
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Chapter 7.   
 
 
Time in two cultures: timeless time and time beyond the grave.   
 
‘Few of us ever walk a totally un-trodden path and many appreciate most strongly 
those places where a link with our ancestors can be keenly felt.   
This has more to do with the survival instinct than with nostalgia.’   
(Fox, M. 2006: Exhibition Catalogue, Athens)   
 
 
Aims.   
In chapter 6 I considered a brief clinical example of slavery’s enduring impact and 
the power of unspoken history re-enacted unconsciously in the present.  I 
described in some detail a non-clinical ethnographic interview with a Jewish 
couple and their contrasting experiences of time.  These examples were 
contextualised by a short exploration of anthropological accounts of ‘cultural’ 
time with particular attention to Gregory Bateson whose important contributions 
are further explored in chapter 8.  This chapter is devoted to two specific 
examples to deepen what I have said so far about the importance of a socio-
cultural approach, by looking at the Balinese and an Indian pygmy tribe.  My aim, 
therefore, is to explore whether and how such different worldviews of time can 
fruitfully offer new insights for thinking about time in psychotherapy.   
 
I explore whether Balinese child-naming, co-existing calendrical cycles with their 
complementary methods of computing time, and ceremony in respect of time, add 
to how we can conceptualise time in psychotherapy.  I then consider the Sora 
tribe.  Times of the living, and the changing times of the dead offer a particular 
perspective on the past-in-the-present, and the present-into-the-future.  These two 
cultures suggest alternative relationships to time.  Descriptions of the Balinese 
and Sora are treated as their own case studies, while tentative observations based 
on this ethnography are made at the end of the chapter with reference to clinical 
practice.   
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Although I emphasise the Balinese, they are only one example of a people with 
complex, multi-layered, calendrical methods for measuring time and rhythm of 
the seasons.  The Aztecs had a complex day calendar and day ritual cycles of 
cycles within cycles, accurate enough to predict eclipses of the sun today 
(Soustelle, 2002).   
 
 
Plate 7.1. Aztec calendar stone, National Museum of Anthropology and History, 
Mexico City.   
 
Plate 7.1 shows one of the Mesoamerican calendars with its 365-day calendar 
cycle, 260-day ritual cycle (Tonalpohualli), cycles within cycles, and 20-month 
year that together form a 52-year ‘century’.  The time-span envisaged by this 
calendar extends beyond anything that contemporary Western society might deem 
possible.   
‘When the units coincided, they gave rise to longer cycles, including one 
known as the Long Count, lasting approximately 1,877,000 days.  It is the 
current Long Count which began in 3114BC that is due to end on 21 
December 2012’ (Tegel, 2011: 31).   
 
Extraordinarily, this civilization envisaged ‘repetition’, - for which words like 
‘pattern’ ‘circularity’ or ‘recursivity’ substitute - in an ending and new cyclical 
beginning of 1,877,000 days.  This encompasses eternity and finitude, not least 
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because such an expanse of time extends beyond any possible human conception 
of conscious memory or relatedness. 185   
 
The Balinese.   
The three Balinese examples are; naming children, calendars, and ceremony.  
These cultural examples provide an insight for the scholar into Balinese time.  
Geertz adopts three ways to describe relationships in society following Schutz 186, 
which I describe here to help think about temporal relationships among the 
Balinese and Sora.   
 
Two approaches to understanding time and culture have people as ‘predecessors’ 
and ‘successors’ with whom there is no shared ‘community of time’ (Geertz, 
1973: 365).  The third describes two relationship categories: ‘contemporaries’ 
who share time but not necessarily space, and ‘consociates’ with whom time and 
space in social, work, religious, recreational, and other contexts are shared (Figure 

















Figure 7.1.  Predecessors, Contemporaries, Consociates, and Successors.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Freud, chapter 2, was of course interested in phylogeny and the idea of a deep unconscious 
memory.   
186 Quoted by Geertz, in: Natanson, M., (Ed) (1962) Collected Papers, Schutz, 1.  The Problem of 
Social Reality.  The Hague.   
Past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Present	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Future	  






	  	  	  Consociates	  	  
	   225	  
Geertz stresses the importance of consociates in Balinese culture in the present 
oriented towards successors (the future) ‘in the context of whom (one) is ancestral 
to’ (ibid: 379).  He suggests this is an example of ‘looking forward’ to how one 
will be viewed at a later time, ‘in terms of whom one has produced’ (ibid: 379) as 
a future-past when one becomes an ancestor as part of others’ pasts.  Geertz 
suggests time and place boundaries blur with the past repeatedly re-described in 
the present in the contexts of now and then (present and past), keeping an eye to 
the future.  The Sora by contrast, discussed later, emphasise the present 
differently.  They privilege consociates and predecessors (ancestors), while 
looking to the future in divination.   
 
I will outline Geertz’s formulations about Balinese naming, calendars, and 
ceremony.   
 
Naming.   
In the context of a future-past orientation Geertz proposes that Balinese naming of 
children reinforces a sense of timelessness and absence of individuality.  In birth 
order children are Wayan, Njoman, Made and Ktut, after which the name cycle 
repeats.  The fifth child becomes another Wayan, the sixth a Njoman in ‘an 
endless four-stage replication of imperishable form’ (Geertz, 1973: 371).  
Although individuals are born and die, ‘socially the dramatis personae remain 
eternally the same as new Wayans and Ktuts emerge from a timeless world of the 
gods … to replace those who dissolve once more into it’ (ibid: 372).  
Timelessness is reflected in kinship terminology which ‘defines individuals in a 
primarily taxonomic, not a face-to-face idiom, as occupants of regions in a social 
field, not partners in social interaction’ (ibid: 373).  He suggests that the dominant 
feature is ‘the immobilization of time through the iteration of form’ (ibid: 374).   
 
Geertz has his critics, discussed briefly here and later in more detail.  While his 
overall understanding of the social world of the Balinese and taxonomic naming is 
of interest, he is incorrect in the detail.  With the arrival of a fifth child a ‘tag’ is 
added to signify that this is both a ‘first’ child and a fifth child becoming Wayan 
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balek literally ‘first child returning to the beginning’, and so on.  This acutally 
heightens a sense of recursive timelessness and subtle layering.  When a ninth 
child is born, another ‘tag’ indicates its relative birth order.  Even a child that dies 
at birth is given its appropriate ordinal name and tag. 187  Naming is thus more 
individualised and circular than Geertz suggests.   
 
Tambiah challenges Geertz’s analysis of the Balinese state (Geertz, 1980).  He 
refers to, ‘Geertz’s lacquered rhetoric [that] does not successfully glaze over the 
deep rupture he creates between expressive action, which he assigns to the still 
centre, and instrumental action, which he aligns with the base and the periphery’ 
(Tambiah, 1985: 318).  This suggests a need for a ‘re-examination of his Balinese 
data’.  The difficulty according to Tambiah is ‘the frequently unproven gap 
between ideology and practice by showing that what are often identified by the 
outsider as “practices” in fact exemplify the “ideological constructs”, and vice 
versa’ (ibid: 322).   
 
I draw attention to weaknesses in some of Geertz’s analyses, not to highlight 
mistakes per se, but to suggest that even out of ‘faulty data’ or ‘superficial 
analysis’ it is possible to develop ideas to stimulate new thinking about different 
kinds of time in psychotherapy.   
 
Calendars.   
The Balinese have two calendars.  These are the lunar-solar calendar linked to the 
cycles of the moon and sun, and the more important one that Geertz terms 
“permutational” (Geertz, 1973: 392).  This consists of ten different cycles of day-
names such that ‘any given day has at least in theory, ten different names 
simultaneously applied to it, one from each of the ten cycles’ (ibid: 392).  Howe 
(1981) supports his view.  The three most important cycles constitute sequences 
of: five, six and seven.  Those appearing trinomially are the product of all three 
cycles occurring once every two hundred and ten days (5 x 6 x 7); those appearing 
binomially are the product of every thirty days (5 x 6), thirty-five days (5 x 7), or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Dr. Angela Hobart (2007) personal communication.   
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forty-two days (6 x 7).  Geertz argues such a punctual system cannot readily be 
used to measure time as duration.   
‘The cycles and super-cycles are endless, unanchored, uncountable, and, 
as their internal order has no significance, without climax.  They do not 
accumulate, they do not build, and they are not consumed.  They do not 
tell you what time it is; they tell you what kind of time it is,’ (Geertz, 
1973: 393).   
 
This suggests that ‘analogic’, or meaning systems of time, are more important 
than ‘digital’ countable durational time, in that analogic can be viewed as 
‘endless, unanchored, uncountable’.  This may be important for considering ‘what 
kind of time it is’ in psychotherapy, whether the internal timeless time of the 
Unconscious (Freud, chapter 2), time of consciousness, memory and recall 
(Ricoeur, chapter 4), time of relationships (Mocan family, chapter 5), or Jane’s 
time dislocation (chapter 4).  These are all ‘different kinds of time’.   
 
Ceremony.   
The third element in this brief review concerns the place of ceremonial. 188  
Balinese relationships are formalised through ceremony with a high element of 
individual anonymization.  Geertz argues we are dealing with a close and coherent 
system of beliefs, meanings, and actions, which produce a sense of endlessness 
outside time.  ‘Ceremonialised interaction supports standardised perceptions of 
others; standardised perceptions of others support a “steady-state” conception of 
society; a steady-state conception of society supports a taxonomic perception of 
time (ibid: 406).  Time as we think of it in the West becomes indistinct and pluri-
directional.  Figure 7.2 represents each element of stasis defining and self-
reflexively defined by the other(s).  Each way of punctuating of events has equal 
importance.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Geertz speaks here of ‘ceremonial’.  It seems to me that he sometimes blurs the distinction 
between ‘ritual’ and ‘ceremonial’ (chapter 8).   

























Figure 7.2.  Social ‘cycle of stasis’ with the ‘immobilization of time’, extrapolated 
from Geertz’s model.   
 
The cycle begins at any point after which it is self-maintaining.  Participants are 
distanced from intimate interpersonal relationships, naming anonymises the 
individual, and calendar systems do not reflect time as flow or progression.  
Ceremonialization emphasises public participation in events, thus reinforcing a 
sense of changelessness and timelessness to Western minds.   
 
Alternate views.   
Tambiah challenges the Balinese steady state society view.  ‘(T)here were stable 
dynasties of rulers who succeeded one another according to defined and 
implementable rules of heredity. … The cosmological state had to be continually 
reimaged and reincarnated’ (Tambiah, 1985: 322).  However, despite criticism of 
Geertz’s stasis model (Figure 7.2) his ideas offer a way to conceptualise patients’ 
experience of timelessness and changelessness, where the future repeats the past.  
Ceremonialised	  (and	  fixed)	  interaction	  
Standardised	  (non-­‐changing)	  perceptions	  of	  others	  Steady	  state	  (very	  stable)	  conception	  of	  society	  (and	  of	  people’s	  roles	  within	  it)	  
Taxonomic	  perception	  of	  time	  (and	  of	  place	  of	  members	  of	  society)	  
=	  Arbitrary	  starting	  point	  for	  ‘cycle	  of	  stasis’.	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Ceremonialisation occurs in psychotherapy especially in psychodynamic models 
(Haley, 1963) which de-emphasise therapist individuality and emphasise her as a 
‘blank canvas’ for the patient.   
 
Geertz has other critics.  Leopold Howe (and Angela Hobart) question the 
accuracy of his approach to Balinese concepts of time.   
‘Indeed a study of the way that a people perceives time can only be 
accomplished by an investigation into the ways in which the passage of 
time is reckoned, how the intervals are obtained, the systems by which 
such units are counted, if in fact they are, how the units are conceptualised 
and what images and metaphors are employed’ (Howe, 1981: 222).   
 
Although time may be cyclical the Balinese possess a concept of time’s 
irreversible flow in all aspects of life.  Their word for time does not equate exactly 
with Western words, and this may partly explain these ‘transmutation’ difficulties.  
‘What they have is a set of concepts, the structure and content of which is not the 
same as ours, but which nonetheless bears comparison.  It is the presence of some 
similarities which makes a discussion of the differences possible’ (ibid: 223).  
Language informs perceptions of time just as perceptions of time influence 
language. 189  Howe maintains that Geertz misunderstands the Balinese meaning 
of day (dina) which translates as the whole of the day (duration) and is analogic.  
Dina is divided into four elements.  Two are for daylight hours (wai and lemah) 
and two for darkness (lemeng and peteng).  Wai and lemeng are used for counting 
intervals, so their use indicates whether they describe the whole or parts of a day.  
He argues that their calendar does have a durational concept of time.  
‘Balinese do count dina and they are forever referring to the past and 
future as so many dina (or wai/lemeng) ago or yet to come.  In fact it is 
precisely this calendar which enables them to compute exactly the number 
of days off a particular event is. … Balinese thus have a very strong idea 
of the day as an individual and complete unit, and the verbal concepts 
which specify these ideas all exhibit the property of countability.’ (Howe, 
1981: 224). 190   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 This is one of the main tenets of social constructionism (Gergen, 1999) and how language 
constructs our realities, just as our realities influence language, from which come ideas about co-
creating stories in therapy (White and Epston, 1990).   
190 There are particularly important days: Buda and Anggara in the seven-day week, Kliwon in the 
five-day week, and Kajeng in the three-day week.  These enable the Balinese to calculate different 
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Howe agrees Balinese days describe ‘punctual’ time but this is not the only way 
and he suggests Geertz is mistaken to propose that particulate time excludes 
awareness of durational time: ‘It simply registers that each day in a cycle has 
different properties from all the others in that cycle – this does not preclude their 
being countable.  …  The mistake … is that of attributing to the class the same 
properties that are attributable to its members’ (ibid: 224-225). 191  What Howe 
seems to suggest is that there are cycles within cycles; times within time.  This 
may add to how we understand different levels or kinds of time in therapy with 
their rhythms and realities.   
 
Awareness of their socio-religious-cultural context is crucial for understanding the 
Balinese whose lives are ordered around the spirit world.  This seems absent from 
Geertz’s analysis.  The two words closest to ours for time are kali and kala, 192 
and ‘‘time’ itself, is thought to be a wholly negative conception’ (Howe, 1981: 
226). Kali and kala also refer to a class of ambiguous or malevolent spirits: ‘Thus 
both midday and dusk are intervals when these spirits are most active. … 
(M)idday and dusk are given prominence in the series by the very fact that they 
are referred to by so many different phrases’ (ibid: 226) when certain things may 
or may not be done. 193   
 
Spirits are active at transitional periods; midday at the zenith point after which the 
sun starts to decline, and dusk which is neither day nor night that the French call 
entre le chien et le loup. 194  Time and safety inter-mix in the spirit world.  Kala 
spirits can enter someone temporarily, affect their sense of wellbeing, and make 
them more vulnerable to risk.  When someone is angry the Balinese say that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsidiary cycles and the time (interval, duration) to the day of the next ceremony (see Howe, 
1981: 224).  The ability to compute time intervals between different days that have intervals of up 
to a hundred days would not be possible without a calendar with properties of countability.   
191 This echoes Bateson’s use of Logical Typing and concepts of class and member, that a class 
cannot be a member of itself.  They describe different levels of abstraction, (see chapter 8).   
192 The suffixes - i and - a denote female and male respectively.   
193 Howe identifies eighteen different words for interval during the day in an invariant sequence, 
supporting the idea of countability in Balinese culture (see Howe, 1981: 225).   
194 Literally: between the dog and the wolf.  This emphasises the in-between ambiguous nature of 
this time of day.  Failure to distinguish dog from wolf could be fatal.   
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person has been ‘taken over by the god kala’ and it is kala that has to be 
exorcised. 195   
 
Lawas, meaning ‘a long time’, is also ‘the segment of a piece of bamboo between 
two adjacent nodes.  Just as new shoots grow from these nodes so … change 
occurs at the transitional zones of duration structured in this articulated manner’ 
(Howe, 1981: 226).  Howe maintains that ‘the conceptual opposition between the 
segments and nodes which join them is fundamental to Balinese culture’ (ibid: 
226) and can be seen in a whole range of social institutions.  Plate 7.2 shows the 
relationship of the bamboo lawas to the nodes out which new shoots (change) 
emerge.   
 
 
Plate 7.2.  Bamboo.  New shoots grow out of the nodal points of the joining 
segments of the lawas.  At this point the plant realises new, unknown, potential in 
different directions.   
 
Transitory moments are ‘in between’ periods, similar to the bamboo’s ‘nodes’ 
separating the lawas.  Nodes are ‘instants’ where what is ceasing to be remains, 
and what will be is not yet.  These are frequently ambiguous, difficult, or 
unsettling moments (or places) of not yet before, and not yet after.  The artist Alla 
Tkachuk maintains that it is precisely in these moments which cannot be pre-
planned, that the artist’s creativity occurs. 196   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 In mediaeval Europe, it was widely believed that witches were possessed by malevolent spirits.  
The cure for this would frequently result in their death.   
196 Personal communication, 2012.   
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Ambiguity threatens security and requires powerful methods to ensure safe 
passage from one stage to another.  Ritual in its various aspects performs such 
functions (chapter 8).  The person (shaman or psychotherapist) charged to take the 
person through those nodal-between lawa stages with their ‘in-between quality’ 
often live on society’s margins, themselves ‘between’ (Stoller, 2009).  These 
thoughts lead to considerations about time, change, and intentionality (Husserl, 
1991), psychotherapeutic intentionality (Tomm, 1987a, b, 1988), and the instant 
of crisis as potential for change (Jenkins, 1989b).  It is in the in-between that the 
potentially transformative can be realised in therapy.   
 
Cyclicity need not exclude duration.  The difficulty from a Western perspective 
may be how to understand the purpose and cultural fit for the individual in a 
Balinese worldview.  ‘Cyclicity does not entail non-durational time … since the 
stages succeed one another in a fixed invariant order.  Telling time, which implies 
the recognition that time passes, is achieved by reference to the place of a 
particular stage within the series’ (Howe, 1981: 227).  In this worldview the 
person’s soul is part of an eternal cycle moving between heaven and earth, 
between ancestor and the living person.  For the Balinese, as in India, there is the 
possibility of liberation to move into a transcendental realm of nirvana (Buddhist) 
or moksa (Balinese).  In both instances we are dealing with time and timelessness 
in the context of reincarnation cycles. 197   
 
Howe touches on the elusive nature of time.  There are parallels with music.  
Music has rhythm, and rhythms within rhythms, often returning to repeated 
phrasings or changing tempo, with an internal structure holding together different 
elements.  Rhythm and tempo are useful concepts for time in therapy, the apparent 
timelessness of the Unconscious, or timeless replaying of events or emotional 
states (chapter 2).   
 
Although ‘cyclicity does not entail non-durational time’ there is often a timeless 
quality to the phenomenon of being unable to escape repetition.  Howe’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Personal communication, (Dr. Angela Hobart, 2008).   
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observation, ‘(t)he accumulation of these cycles is however usually of far less 
interest than the co-ordination of events within the cycle’ (Howe, 1981: 227) can 
be re-worked therapeutically.  We saw this in the case vignettes of Caitlin and 
Peter replaying timeless scripts of abandonment, and Dan re-enacting his impotent 
rage.  Cycles do accumulate in people’s lives often becoming established 
imperceptibly like silt changing the contours of a riverbed.  Over time (duration) 
events are organised or co-ordinated (without implying conscious or intentional 
process) so that linear events, as they become cyclical, cohere with their internal 
rhythms.  If the therapist is able to identify such repeating patterns, s/he has a 
powerful ‘interpretation’ to help engender change.   
 
Confusion about meanings of time indicate interpretive difficulties for therapy.  
We need to understand ‘what kind of time’ is described, the nature of intervallic 
time between and frequency of meetings, and the rhythms of ‘the time of the 
system’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978, see chapter 2).  Psychotherapeutic approaches 
differ depending whether time is considered within an individual lifespan or over 
generations, whether cyclical and repetitive, or linear and causal.   
 
‘(T)he co-ordination of events within the cycle’ (Howe, 1981:227), social 
relationships, and harmony, are more important for the Balinese than temporal 
computational aspects of time because in the spirit-filled world ‘people and gods 
are part of the same massive cycle, since gods are simply deified ancestors’ (ibid: 
229).  Ancestors will be reincarnated through their patrilineal descendants when 
time and the cycle are closed.  It is often different in therapy.  The ‘demons’ that 
haunt patients seem to know no ending.  The therapist’s aim is for the patient to 
break those repetitive cycles, like a ‘psychological exorcism’ for which s/he needs 
powerful tools (see chapter 8).   
 
I have referred to cyclical and linear time.  These are usefully thought of as 
complementary ways to understand pattern and duration.  Figure 7.3 reflects these 
perspectives. The same number on the revolving circle and the straight-line 
represent the ‘same point’ from cyclical and linear views.  The intervals between 
	   234	  
two or more ‘points’ represent ‘duration’, a lawas or particular length of time. 198  
The rotating circle represents ‘cyclical time’.  A complete cycle is six ‘lawas’ 
from 1 through 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and ‘back’ to 1.  That ‘1’, and every numerical point 
in the cycle, (and the infinitesimal number of ‘points’ in between every numbered 
point) is Plato’s instant ‘this queer creature, the instant, [that] lurks between 
motion and rest – being in no time at all’ (Plato, 1997: 388).   
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Figure 7.3.  Cyclicity/linearity: complementary perspectives.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 That is, they can be counted as ‘number’.  This echoes Plato’s Parmenides (chapter 3).  ‘So of 
all the things that have number the one has come to be first.  …  But that which has come to be 
first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things that have come to be later are 
younger than what has come to be earlier. …” ’  (Plato, 1997: 385).  In Timaeus Plato states; ‘at 
the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving 
according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call 
“time”.’ (Plato, 1997: 1241).   
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The ‘new 1’ at the start of the subsequent sequence is not the ‘same 1’ marking 
the ‘beginning’ of the cycle.  It is at the same logical point but is at another point 
‘along the linear time line’ of number.  This different 1 we can call 1i and a 
further cycle later becomes 1ii, and so on at each logical point and subsequent 
durational point of repetition.  ‘(W)hen a cycle ends it does not return to the same 
temporal point; it returns, and this is a very different thing, to the same logical 
point’ (Howe, 1981: 231).  The ‘direction of the cycle’ shown is clockwise, the 
same left to right direction as the sun in its waxing and waning in relation to the 
earth’s axis, a direction that moves in the present from the past (earlier east) 
towards the future (later west).  The linear time-line represents far past to near 
past through present to near future and to far future, (McTaggart’s A-Series) in a 
left to right direction, mirroring the ‘forward’ direction of writing in Roman 
script. 199  From an anticipatory perspective, the sequence ‘reads’ from far future 
to far past, from right to left.  The ‘before’ and ‘after’ in Figure 7.3 is 
McTaggart’s  B-series in infinite number.   
 
Howe concedes ‘(t)here is little doubt that the Balinese accentuate the cyclical 
aspect of duration to the expense of the linear’ (Howe, 1981: 232).  While 
Western cultures often emphasise duration, the instant, and how to ‘use’ time, the 
Balinese tend to be ‘in’ time.  The difference between using time and being in 
time has a place for thinking about time in psychotherapy.    
 
In the Balinese way of naming children we discover a perspective for placing 
people and relationships over time.  Naming does not return to the same temporal 
starting point.  It becomes Wayan balek, Njoman balek.  Naming returns to the 
same logical / different temporal point (cyclical) in a sequential time-line (linear) 
of future, present, past.  This movement resonates with Western psychotherapy 
when patients repeat the same story, or different versions that structurally are ‘the 
same story’.  Repetition is an interactive act that reinforces and legitimates the 
experience and simultaneously is a beacon that signals the need for change.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 The opposite holds true for Arabic and Hebrew scripts, writing from right to left.  I know of no 
evidence that this influences or reflects a different way of understanding or experiencing time.   
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Patients may tell and re-tell these stories lacking a sense that time can be fluid.  
They return repeatedly to the same logical point, but without any temporal 
markers, such as Balinese naming, where there is difference and continuity.  
Freud was aware of this in his many descriptions of ‘compulsion to repeat’ 
(Freud, 1917: XVI, 1918, XVII, 1925, XX, 1939, XXIII, inter alia, chapter 2).  If 
we take this a step further it is as though the patient ‘stuck in their story’ has 
become ‘stuck in time’, as fixed in time as the insect in amber (Plate 7.3).   
 
 
Plate 7.3.  Insect fixed in amber, possibly 150 million years old.   
 
Patients struggling with endless repetitions of their story re-enact their experience 
in a never-ending present.  Some of the skills necessary to help break such 
patterns are discussed in chapter 8.  I first turn to the Sora to expand our cultural 
understanding of time.   
 
The Sora.   
Traditionally the Sora, an aboriginal ‘tribe’ on the eastern side of India, 
experience the continued presence of the deceased in daily life, the past actively 
influencing the present.  ‘In every Sora village, almost every day, living people 
conduct dialogues with the dead, who speak to them through the mouth of a 
shaman in a trance’ (Vitebsky, 1993: 3).   
 
Vitebsky describes how the Sora give meaning to their current lives and past 
relationships with the dead.  Much of this would be familiar to the Balinese.  The 
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boundary between the living and the dead for the Sora (and Balinese) is more 
fluid than in the West and reflects a different temporal relationship.  The dead in 
their afterlife form of sonum (Memory) are integral to daily life and participate in 
a continuing dialogue with the living.  Sonum may be understood variously as 
‘spirit’, ‘God’, ‘god’, ‘deity’ or ‘power’ (ibid: 13 ff.) but Vitebsky prefers mainly 
to translate sonum as ‘a Memory’. 200  Memory implies time and time passing, ‘a 
journey through a time which is not homogenous but is shaped by people’s 
feelings’ (ibid: 14).  Vitebsky makes a significant metaphysical distinction about 
sonum who exist outside the minds of those they affect.   
‘A Western ‘memory’ … is still seen as located firmly in the mind even 
when it is said to be ‘eating up’ its rememberer.  A Sora memory of a dead 
person remains outside the mind of the rememberer, who is at least partly 
a confluence made of such Memories rather than an entity who could 
contain them’ (ibid: 14).   
 
This suggests a different conception of personhood from a Western individualistic 
‘mind’.  ‘Memory’ (sonum) exists on the exterior and all who are dead are 
Memory.  Experiencing conflicts, sorrows or joys, sonums are engaged externally 
at different stages along an afterlife continuum.  The sonum is the person’s 
Memory of someone else and how I am influenced not only by how I was ‘but 
also by that of another person.  So in addition to the onward movement of time 
there is also a transferral of perspective, a shift from the subjective viewpoint of 
the deceased to that of his successor’ (ibid: 14).   
 
For heuristic purposes Vitebsky categorises sonums as ‘Undisturbing’, ‘Neutral’ 
and ‘Distressing’.  The most recently dead belong to the last category.  The Sora, 
as do the Balinese, live a simultaneous dual timeframe of complementary worlds 
of the living and the dead.  The past in a continuing present influences a worldly 
present and future.  These adjoining worlds exist on a daily basis in easy and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Vitebsky also refers to sonum as ‘recollection’, an active process making the distinction in 
French between souvenir, mémoire, and rappel (see Ricoeur, chapter 4).   
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uneasy relationships and are integral to life now.  Sonums have their own lives 
and eventually have their ‘second deaths’. 201   
 
Vitebsky suggests that ‘the rate at which the deceased moves away from the 
original death-Experience is related, not to the passage of time as such, but to the 
development of the feelings which the sonum and the mourner have for each 
other’ (ibid: 199).  This is a visceral phenomenon.  The relationship between 
sonum and mourner is real, changing over time, and affected by both parties’ 
























Figure 7.4.  Adapted and expanded from Vitebsky, 1993: 199.   
 
The shift between 1) and 2) proposes different relationships to the past.  I retain 
my individual view as the person involved in 1) which is my past.  That influences 
how I feel now, and what I felt about you before you died that continue to affect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Their second deaths come at the time of the living rememberers’ first deaths.  Sonums then 
become butterflies.   
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my feelings for you as a sonum.  My feelings are not actively re-evaluated, do not 
change, and in that sense are timeless.  The Sora experience is more accurately 
reflected in 2).  Here, the deceased’s past affects the rememberer in the present, 
and the sonum transmits those feelings to the living.  The surviving person must 
return again and again to revise, challenge, or engage in different time dimensions 
(Figure 7.4).  The repeated nature of returning to the sonum reflects the 
importance of affirming the experience, clarifying unresolved issues, externalising 
private stories or conflict in the communal arena, and ultimately being no longer 
defined by the past, yet not denying it.  Memory is neither static nor 
circumscribed by an individual ‘mind’.  It ‘roams outside the mind of any 
rememberer’ (ibid: 201) and is open to public dialogue.  The past continues but 
the nature of past and present remain negotiable.  Shamans are go-betweens and 
remain active participants until the sonum meets his second death.   
 
Death occurs passively to the person but after death the sonum actively seizes 
others.  The shaman discerns who is attacking the individual through divination, 
and externalises the patient’s inner turmoil.  Sonums influence the lives of the 
living while conducting their own sonum post-mortem relationships.  ‘(D)eath 
itself is not a negation of life but a continuation of it with a change in the quality 
of face-to-face interaction.  …  Once one party to a relationship dies, certain 
inhibitions are lifted and the unspeakable can be spoken’ (ibid: 17).  Dialogue 
brings the deceased person into the present moment, or perhaps more precisely 
this becomes a moment in trance out of time, the past re-experienced as present.  
These dialogues involve historical events as well as what dead relatives intend.  A 
presence from the past influences the thoughts and feelings of family members in 
the present about what is foretold, promised, or threatened, for the future; ‘your 
past’ continues to influence ‘my future’ (Figure 7.4).   
 
Vitebsky compares Western psychotherapy with Sora practices in relation to 
Freud (Mourning and Melancholia, Freud, 1917: XIV).  For the Sora ‘(t)he 
healing of the mourner, whatever this is, lies in the Memory’s changes of form but 
not in the Memory’s annihilation’ (Vitebsky, 1993: 237).  This is unlike Freud’s 
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emphasis on death’s finality: ‘By denying the memory its autonomous existence, 
Freud reverses the Sora model and takes the initiative out of the hands of the 
dead. … Thus it is not the Sora mourner who finds it difficult to ‘abandon a 
libidinal position’ 202 … but the deceased’ (ibid: 241).   
 
The Sora worlds of the living and the dead are real but different.  This has 
implications for perceptions of time.  There is seasonal external time of 
agriculture and the yearly collective stages of the funeral cycle for the dead that 
change over time.  There also exists ‘the inner timescale of the mourner with its 
more uneven, jerky rhythm and backward counter-flows’ (ibid: 245).  Vitebsky 
suggests that the difference lies not in a divide between normal and pathological 
since the healing time of Western therapy similarly focuses on the inner 
experience of the mourner, but that it lacks the Sora’s public consensual 
consciousness.   
 
Naming patterns.   
Naming patterns among the Sora record relationships over time in particular 
ways.  This can be seen in a simple kinship chart (Figure 7.5).  This indicates the 
route for a son’s name, carried by the woman from the lineage into which she was 
born across to the lineage into which she marries, thereby marking out 
relationships, time, and place.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Freud’s statement to ‘abandon a libidinal position’, Mourning and Melancholia (Freud, 1917: 
XIV).   






























Figure 7.5 From: Vitbebsy, 1993: 62, (part of Figure 3.2)   
 
Anthropological mapping typically focuses on the individual, family, and 
community’s place in traditional societies.  However, the individual is not a 
separate entity, unlike the emphasis in many Western psychotherapeutic 
approaches.   
 
Mexican artist Frida Kahlo (1907-1954) provides a powerful illustration of her 
place in her family in a particular historical socio-cultural context (Plate 7.4).  The 
image echoes the family genogram, developed by Murray Bowen (1978), as a way 
to understand patterns and themes over time in families, (Carter and McGoldrick 
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The	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  a	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  descendants.	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  every	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  Each	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  the	  name	  is	  held	  by	  a	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  she	  carries	  it	  across	  from	  the	  lineage	  into	  which	  she	  is	  born,	  to	  that	  into	  which	  she	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   242	  
emphasis on kinship in anthropology.  However, unlike the genogram Kahlo’s 
painting provides information about family, geographical, and cultural contexts, 
physical characteristics, and the painter at two stages of her life (foetus and child). 
203   
 
 
Plate 7.4.  Frida Kahlo.  My Grandparents, My Parents, and I (Family Tree), 1936.  
The Museum of Modern Art, New York.   
 
Kinship is central to identity, meaningfulness, socio-cultural continuity and 
therefore time.  Anthropologists map kinship structures to understand the worlds 
they observe.  Kinship manifested through marriage and culture (Lewis, 1976: 
234-280) provides structure for stability and continuity of generations.  In 
essence, the organisation of who may marry whom with concomitant alliances 
and obligations, and the naming of children linking the past and carrying history 
into the future, are part of the threads that give continuity to history, meaning to 
the present, and help envisage the future:  
‘Children may be named after or in honour of their grandparents, or 
considered to reincarnate them.  Often grandparents and grandchildren 
refer to each other by a single reciprocal kinship term which means in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 “Me in the middle of this house, when I was about two years old. The whole house is in 
perspective as I remember it. On top of the house in the clouds are my father and mother when 
they were married (portraits taken from photographs). The ribbon about me and my mother's waist 
becomes an umbilical cord and I become a fetus.  On the right, the paternal grandparents, on the 
left the maternal grandparents. A ribbon circles all the group — symbolic of the family relation. 
The German grandparents are symbolized by the sea, the Mexican by the earth."  Frida Kahlo - La 
Casa Azul, Coyoacán, May 27, 1939.   
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effect ‘person of alternate generation’.  This cross-generational solidarity 
is perhaps one of the most striking features shared by kinship systems 
which differ markedly in other respects’ (Vitebsky, 1993: 276-277).   
 
Time here is externalised through the ancestors.  People orient themselves 
towards communal relationships lived in public time where even age and time’s 
passing are referenced to external events of nature.  By contrast, the private world 
of family in the West, similar to Kahlo’s representastion, is primarily part of an 
internalised world.  This is psychotherapy’s territory.   
 
Vitebsky provides a telling example of differences between traditional Sora 
rhythms and the impact of Christian conversion with the introduction of an alien 
timeframe that destroyed traditional pathways for healing.  Conversion introduced 
a different kind of time without the structure or cultural assimilation necessary to 
protect its members.  He describes ‘two contradictory paces’.  The salvation time 
of conversion ‘is simultaneously both instantaneous (the farewell at the burial) 
and indefinitely postponed (the second coming).  Between the day of the funeral 
and some point in eternity, Sora Baptism omits the middle ground of much living 
memory’ (Vitebsky, 2008: 255).  Christian conversion removed rhythm, structure, 
ritual, and time perspectives, which once destroyed could not be recovered and 
resulted in an existential loss of belonging.  Not only were dialogues impossible, 
the whole rhythm of healing was disrupted.  While remaining in familiar 
geographic space their ‘time’ had been taken from them, and connection with 
their ancestors was adrift.  They faced the unfamiliar in the familiar.   
‘As Baptism collapses the slow therapeutic time of the shamans, forgetting 
is becoming more urgent, suggesting not that forgetting is a failure of 
remembering (which would be merely a cognitive lapse) but the reverse: 
remembering is a failure to forget – a moral lapse under a new ideology 
which rejects the obligation to olong’ 204 (ibid: 255).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 ‘The verb olong, meaning “greet, engage, talk to”.  …  The dead are remembered and forgotten, 
in terms of your verbal encounters with them.  The drama of olong’ing them … is framed by an 
initial summoning (guding, ‘pull by voice’) and a closing (omda, ‘let go, release, send away’).  So 
the process of remembering and forgetting the dead is cast in a relational vocabulary of 
engagement and disengagement’ (Vitebsky, 2008: 245-246).   
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Christian ‘salvation time’ is out of time and rhythm with the ‘slow therapeutic 
time’ of traditional intercessors between the living and the dead.  Sora culture 
offered the living a peopled space that would continue to change until the dead 
sonum achieved Ancestorhood.  This reflected and respected the rhythms of the 
living, for which they were traded a desolate ‘middle ground’ marked off at either 
end by the ‘immediate instantaneous’ and the ‘indefinitely postponed’.  The loss 
of culture, the glue that holds people together, meant alienation and denial of the 
past.  Ancestors became un-joined in this new pattern of time.   
 
This is different to the Mocan family (chapter 5) where from a Durkheimian 
perspective (Durkheim, 2001) I suggested there was a particular kind of time, 
‘spiritual time’, that distinguished some families throughout the Romanian 
communist era and provided an identity and temporal perspective to enable 
survival.   
 
Reflections.   
We have considered aspects of time in two cultures; Balinese daily life and Sora 
dialogues with the dead.  The case vignettes in previous chapters, by contrast, 
portrayed different aspects of Western self and personhood.  The experience and 
meaning of time in its relationship to personhood is important in any culture.  
Thus, the meaning of relationship, self, autonomy, affiliation, mortality, healing, 
and temporality, will differ.  A Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body persists in 
certain Western bio-medical systems and Western beliefs privilege an 
autonomous ‘I’, while the ‘I’ of personhood in other cultural contexts is often 
more diffuse.   
 
If Western psychological experiences of relationships and time tend to be 
internalised, in Eastern societies these are located more in the external world.  The 
psychodynamic psychotherapist works with this ‘material’ of the self and with 
relating selves in systemic psychotherapy.  In psychoanalysis this becomes an 
unchanging internal ‘time’ based on an internalised ‘archaeological’ system 
(Schorske, 1991).   
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If Western psychological perspectives traditionally view the aetiology of 
problems originating from the inside-out so that treatment uncovers what already 
exists within, Balinese spirits invade from the outside-in and have to be exorcised 
(externalised) from the inside-out.  ‘Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis lack the 
Sora concepts of communal space and time, as well as the interaction with 
exterior Memories which exist outside their rememberer’ (Vitebsky, 1993: 16).  
Even if grief following death was not invariably resolved through Sora practices, 
feelings could be acknowledged publicly and face-to-face interaction could 
continue with a different quality, as past and future continued meeting in a 
dynamic present.   
 
Returning to Yael and Saul (chapter 6) Yael spoke of her mother’s frustration 
with her.  When I challenged with “What do you think your mother sneakily 
admired in you?” she replied that she was named after her maternal grandmother 
(MGM) who died before her birth.  Then came a story that her mother had never 
recovered from her own mother’s death and how this affected her marriage.  Yael 
embodied important characteristics of her MGM for her mother thus keeping 
present a memory and relationship from a past before her birth.  Recognising the 
impact of her MGM’s death on her mother, she spoke of “my commitment not to 
repeat this in my marriage”.  This illustrates some of the complexities of loss and 
transgenerational transmission.  The extended past and the place of Sora 
Ancestor-hood became the immediate present that could be processed and 
influence the future.  Lacking a socially sanctioned public arena Yael carried on 
her private dialogue, private even from her husband, in and out of the past and 
future with her dead mother.   
 
Yael and Saul embodied different time-scales, reflecting their respective 
backgrounds.  Yael’s seemed more direct and instrumental; Saul’s was more 
internalised and timeless.  Their familial histories and healing needs were 
different but they both lacked a public ordering of time as a way to process and 
live with loss.   
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The moment of dialogue with a sonum challenges the philosophical view that no 
parts of time ‘can ever be co-existent’ (Hume, 1978: 31) and that ‘parts of time 
are always successive’ (Kant: 2003: 77).  In Dialogues with the Dead the living 
and the dead communicate in a particular kind of present, or co-existing different 
kinds of time.  The past speaks into the present and encompasses different kinds 
of future, one for the living, another for the dead.  What I think Vitebsky 
describes is Husserlian.  It is a ‘thick present’ (Husserl, 1991) although like 
Hume, Husserl held that ‘two different times can never be simultaneous, that their 
relationship is a nonreciprocal one’ (ibid: 10).  The dialogues compress history 
and the present moment and contain both in ‘retention’.  There seems to be a 
coming together of before and after, where in that moment they are one and, 
following McTaggart (1927), we could believe that time did not exist.  Certainly 
past, present, and future, are encapsulated in those moments, without confusing 
temporal orientation.  This differs from Jane’s frequent experience in therapy and 
her daily life.  Her experiences are partly captured in Howe’s (1981) idea that in 
Balinese time there is a linear temporal sequence, within which events return 
again and again to ‘the same logical point’, an always traumatic logical point.  A 
central theme of traditional Sora culture is a narrative thread, stretching from a 
past through the present to an unknown future (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), which 
challenges Strawson’s (2005) arguments against narrativity.   
 
These descriptions reveal interesting complementarities.  Linear time, the A-series 
(McTaggart, 1927) that seems to progress from far future through to the present, 
and then to furthest past, has met unexpected cultural ‘counter-flows’.  I have 
suggested a parallel between naming Balinese children and returning, not to the 
same temporal point, but to the same logical point as a metaphor for patients’ 
time in treatment.  Days, months, and years pass, but the patient remains 
somehow (trans)fixed at the same repetitive logical point as if time were 
immobilised.  I have considered ideas of times within times, seen in the multi-
layering of time and patterns in Balinese (and Aztec) calendars with their rhythms 
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in punctual or computational time.  These themes have relevance for rhythms of 
time in psychotherapy.   
 
Boundaries of time or place are often difficult, ambiguous areas in human 
experience, to be negotiated with sensitivity in order to provide stability and help 
manage uncertainty (Leach, 1976).  Boundaries between the living and the dead 
were in dynamic flux in traditional Sora culture; the future and change had a 
reference point, while the past remained actively present.  This was lost following 
Christian conversion (Vitebsky, 2008).  The traditional Sora view is contrary to 
‘cut off’ and ‘let go’ following loss in the West.  The Balinese and Sora provide a 
valuable reference point for my ultimate consideration in chapter 9 whether 
anthropological (and philosophical) descriptions can increase our understanding 
of time in therapy.  First, I explore the nature and place of time in ritual and 
therapy.   
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Chapter 8.   
 
 
Therapy as Ritual, Ritual in Therapy and the Importance of Time.   
 
‘… although our ability to alter the external environment is very limited, we have 
a virtually unrestricted  capacity for playing games with the internalised version 
of the environment which we carry in our heads.’   
(Leach, 1976: 36)  
 
‘… our contention [is] that therapy necessarily involves a combination of 
discrepant logical types of discourse. … As we see it, the process of 
psychotherapy is a framed interaction between two persons, in which the rules are 
implicit but subject to change.’   
(Bateson, 1955: 165)  
 
Aims.   
My aim is to describe the structure and transformative nature of ritual with 
reference to time and explore whether this provides a new dimension of how to 
understand psychotherapeutic change.  The structure and reported phenomena of 
rites of passage promise a model for understanding time in treatment.  Certain 
concepts are briefly described to help introduce the material.   
 
I wish to explore whether it is useful to conceptualise therapy as ritual, whether 
ritual is comparable to psychotherapy in structure and intention, and whether 
therapy sessions create experiences of time in ways that parallel the shifts and 
changes reported in ritual.  If psychotherapy is considered as ritual we must 
consider: structure, role(s) of the conductor, (shaman, priest, therapist), rhythm, 
duration, and timing.  This includes ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ of sessions and interval 
times in between.   
 
It has always been important in human history to explain unexplainable events, 
whether dis-ease of the body (soma) or the ‘psyche’ (soul).  Western thinking 
reflects a move away from external forces or spirits entering the person, to belief 
in individual responsibility and the myth of scientific, rational explanation.  I aim 
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to explore whether ritual can bring order or pattern to what otherwise appears 
disordered.   
 
I draw on ethnographic data derived from a filmed interview and case vignettes to 
support my thinking.  I return to Jane’s story with reference to ritual, time, and 
trauma and briefly describe two other clinical stories: Jenny’s ritual of 
obliteration, and Julian and Natalie’s failed rite of passage.   
 
Structure.   
This chapter has two main sections: Ritual and time, and Rites of passage: 
transformation and time mainly for heuristic purposes.  Rites of passage 
constitute a ‘member’ of the ‘class’ (Bateson, 1969) ritual.  The material is 
complex, so I first introduce my outline structure.   
 
I begin with an ethnographic example of everyday ritual and introduce a brief 
historical perspective followed by a description of a powerful therapeutic ritual of 
obliteration.  This is contextualised by an introduction to some of the terminology.  
I give a necessarily selective anthropological description of ritual and time from 
this enormous field.  Jane’s story is taken up to describe ritual and time confusion 
in trauma followed by a playful ritual.  This leads to Bateson’s contribution to 
ritual through a model of play.   
 
Rites of passage, transformation, and time, drawing on ethnographic material and 
a case vignette of a failed rite of passage, leads to a proposed a model for therapy 
and time based on this structure.  Finally, I reflect on the contribution of ritual and 
time to frame therapy.   
 
Ritual.   
Ritual can be ordinary, mundane, and go unnoticed.  I demonstrate this in the 
following excerpt from a filmed couple interview about ritual in Romanian 
culture.  Remus is a pastor and Andreea a psychologist.  I will ask about their 
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understanding and experience of ritual in their families and their marriage.  I draw 
attention to the immediate everyday experience of greeting as ritual. 205   
H.J.  “Did you notice what we just did?  We shook hands.  We entered 
into a very small ritual.  A ritual making a different contact with each 
other, and ummm, greeting each other as you said, and demonstrating to 
each other that our hands are empty; there’s nothing to be afraid of.  There 
are no hidden or dangerous things in our hands.  And we made physical 
contact.  Of course (turning to Andreea) if you were an orthodox Jewish 
woman, I would not have proffered my hand because that would have 
been inappropriate, ...  So, there are all those little rituals we get involved 
in, all the time in our lives, and most of the time we don’t pay attention.”   
 
The stuff of ritual is the everyday and the special.  In this opening reflection, we 
notice a number of elements:  
o the physical nature of our meeting in touching;  
o the symbolic nature of shaking hands and what this reveals;  
o socio-cultural and religious expectations;  
o the importance of gender; and  
o the ‘performative’ element in greeting.   
 
This ritual takes less than a minute, and prepares the ground for important areas to 
be discussed.  Thirty seconds later Remus observes,  
“I feel that I don’t know too much about ritual.  I don’t pay attention to 
this aspect very much. … (I)n my mind, most of these are negative 
aspects.  … Sometimes people do things because of the ritual, not because 
they know exactly the significance of it”.   
 
Remus’ comment is important.  It hints at whether people know why they carry 
out ritual in religious life, the ‘empty ceremonial’ mentioned by Beattie (1970: 
242).  However understood, ritual has always played an important role in human 
societies.  References to ritual go back millennia, recorded for example in the Han 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 This filmed interview took place in Timisoara on 10th September, 2011, as part of the Late 
Summer School, Dianoia Institute of Family Therapy and Systemic Practice.  Andreea and Remus 
have been married for nine years and have a son and two daughters.  The couple has given 
permission for the material to be used for research and teaching purposes.  They knew of my 
research interests in time and ritual.   
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dynasty (Muller, 2001). 206  Implements used or actions carried out are often 
familiar (mundane or profane) but acquire symbolic (sublime or sacred) resonance 
in ritual.  Earlier than the Han dynasty, Stonehenge stands enigmatically for the 
performance of ritual for fertility, renewal, or sacrifice (Williams, 2001, 2002).   
 
 
Plate 8.1.  Stonehenge.   
 
We continue to be fascinated by ritual in anthropology and psychotherapy, 
(Imber-Black and Roberts, 1992; Wilson, 1972; Wolin and Bennett, 1984; 
Woodcock, 1995), in mathematics, philosophy, physics, and theology (Connes et 
al., 2008).  Such interest may represent at least in part a desire to resolve the 
irresolvable in human experience. 207  Ritual brings cohesion to situations that 
otherwise risk disorder and entropy.  It may be simple or complex, but the task is 
to maintain stability by channelling, almost paradoxically, instability to achieve 
socially sanctioned change.   
 
Ritual in ancestor worship ‘binds the living to the dead and unborn in a 
generational solidarity that appears to preclude all change’ (Torrance, 1994: 65) 
by focusing on the past when ‘there can be no forward progression in time, for the 
past is continually being revived in the present’ (ibid: 66).  Similarly, some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 References are made to the Han Dynasty, 206BC – 220AD.  Ritual, rites, and ceremony are 
integral to the political, social, and cultural fabric of society.  The Sacred Books of China is 
volume 27 of a total of fifty volumes in the series: Sacred Books of the East.  In Sacred Books of 
China, first published in 1885, the symbol Lî ‘is the symbol for a “vessel used in performing rites” 
… and the addition of khih to complete the character, whensoever it was made, shows that the 
makers considered the rites in which the vessel was used to possess in the first place a religious 
import’ (Muller, 2001: 10).  Ceremonial and ritual are intermingled in the text.  Propriety is 
paramount for conduct and respect for social stability.   
207 It has been suggested that the Aztecs dealt with the discrepant requirements of initiating boys 
either to the calmecac, (a temple or monastery), or the telpochcalli (warrior training), as a way to 
resolve contradictory social demands (Soustelle, 2002).   
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Western approaches to therapy focus on understanding ways the past is ‘revived 
in the present’ as a way to enabling change.   
 
Therapeutic ritual must incorporate the possibility of change, so that ‘the stability 
promoted by ritual is not an inertial inheritance but a continually renewed 
endeavour’ (ibid: 70).  An excess of change in the system results in systemic 
runaway and entropy (Bateson, 1973; Beer, 1974) while excess stability risks 
negentropy.  Rituals that affirm are important for continuity while rituals that 
structure change (Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1969) support transformation in a 
framework of stability.   
 
Case vignette: Jenny.   
This example incorporates the main elements of a therapeutic ritual.  It is private 
and unconnected to a wider social community, thereby differing from rituals in 
traditional societies.  Although a single cathartic act, it is one that Jenny could 
repeat.   
 
Jenny’s partner had betrayed her.  After having a child by her he began an affair 
with a married woman with whom he subsequently had two children.  In her late 
forties, Jenny saw little hope of more children.  Her hurt was palpable.  There 
came a point in therapy when I asked her to write her story about the life of the 
relationship as ‘an obituary’.  She should handwrite the ‘obituary’.  My intention 
was for her to create a more direct, visceral relationship with her account.  She 
should determine how long it should be thereby putting her in charge of part of 
the process.  Jenny did this, and as suggested brought it to the next session.  I 
asked her to read it aloud, taking her time.  This concretised the anger and whole 
range of feelings she had previously struggled to articulate.   
 
As an ‘assignment’ following this session, I asked her to find a time when she 
could go somewhere isolated but safe with her ‘obituary’.  She should read it 
aloud as many times as she needed until she no longer felt dominated by her pain 
in its inchoate rawness.  She was then to burn it, ashes to ashes, leaving it behind 
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physically and emotionally with all the primitive socio-cultural associations of 
burial and finality.  I had instructed her to find somewhere beyond the boundary 
of the city as part of the ordeal, to heighten her commitment to the process and 
sense of completion.  This was to be a ‘sacred’ space outside the ‘profane’, 
physically beyond the city limits; physically beyond her known.  She had a 
structure, specific directions, and the message that this was for her healing. 208   
 
At the next session I asked Jenny to describe her actions and feelings.  This was to 
‘fix the moment’, reinforce her sense of control and celebrate her achievement.  
She recounted the whole process as I had directed in considerable detail.  She 
paused, and said: “Then I took my jeans down and peed on the ashes”.   
 
This is a complex ritual with a number of elements.  It was a;  
o transformative ritual of letting go,  
o symbolic burial initiating the journey from victim to survivor, 
incorporating aspects of ‘redemption’ and purification as she cleansed 
herself of feelings of toxic self-loathing, anger, and impotence,  
o deeply primitive act of annihilation.   
 
All the basics of ritual are here.  By standing over and urinating on the ashes of 
the relationship, in its physical symbolism she used the potency of her body fluids 
for total obliteration.  In the annihilation we see an ending of time, temporally 
fixing the event and that painful part of her history.   
 
The consequences of her ex-partner’s infidelity continued to live with her but a 
more self-assured Jenny began to emerge.  Subsequently, after many consultations 
and ordeals with today’s ‘shamans’, she gave birth to another child.  The 
‘obituary’ was a ‘one-off’ ritual.  It took planning, had powerful performative 
elements of privately writing it, publically reading it aloud in therapy, repeatedly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 If she had had a close friend or confidante who knew her situation, I might have asked that this 
person accompany her to ‘bear witness’ and heighten further the performative element of her 
‘ordeal’.   
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reading it aloud in a chosen place, annihilating it and, as if fixing it in a particular 
moment, recounting the whole event subsequently to the therapist.  The ‘reporting 
back’ with its own rhythm was important, as she symbolically replayed the 
physical event of reclaiming control in her life.   
 
A vocabulary.   
In the context of Jenny’s experience, I provide definitions of the main concepts to 
help clarify ideas in the context of ritual.   
 
Ritual:  
There is no consensus on what is generally meant by ‘ritual’, for ‘ritual is a form 
sui generis that shares many of its compositional elements with other areas of 
human activity yet is not reducible to these elements’ (Kapferer, 2004: 35).  The 
following quotation captures important aspects in relation to healing and change:  
 ‘Ritual … functions on a psychological level.  It provides a coherent 
framework for the disorienting aspects of human life, such as illness, 
danger, and life changes.  It gives people a sense of control over disturbing 
and threatening events; an exorcism may not actually drive out any spirits, 
but it can drive out the sense of helplessness and despair associated with 
an illness’ (Barfield, 1997: 411).   
 
The most important outcome of ritual may be to acquire the resources to survive 
or endure even though the chaotic cannot be changed or fully comprehended as 
Turner suggests.  ‘Rituals are devised to call a halt to crisis, redress wrongs, air 
grievances, find remedies that enable the group to continue’ (Turner, 1982a: 232). 
209 210   
 
A particularly clear definition, quoted in Bowie (2006: 140), captures the essence: 
‘Ritual defined in the most general and basic terms is a performance planned or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 In the film A Beautiful Mind, John Nash (played by Russell Crowe) is credited with replying 
whether the people who haunted him in his psychotic episodes have gone: “No, but I have learned 
to live with them”.  This change allows him to lead some semblance of normal life.   
210 A flavour of this is captured in Brookner’s novel, Providence.  Kitty has just seen a fortune-
teller:  
‘ “She’s good,” said Kitty, although she could no longer remember precisely what she had been 
told... She had gathered no information but some kind of shift in her consciousness had taken 
place.’  (Brookner, 1983: 75).   
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improvised, that effects a transition from everyday life to an alternative context 
within which the everyday is transformed’ (Alexander, 1997: 139). 211  This 
allows for the planned and spontaneous to occur and for the active performative 
aspect. In Jenny’s example this climaxed when she peed on the ashes.  It 
distinguishes between transitional change and the qualitative nature of 
transformative change.  Jenny experienced the process as transformative, although 
nothing had changed in her personal circumstances.  And, while not precluding 
religion or magic, this definition does not make either a requirement, (cf., Turner, 
1967: 19).  
 
Ceremony:  
Ceremony and ritual are sometimes confused.  ‘Ceremony indicates, ritual 
transforms, and transformation occurs most radically in the ritual “pupation” of 
liminal seclusion – at least in life-crisis rituals’ (Turner, 1982b: 80-81).  Or, ‘ritual 
is transformative, ceremony confirmatory’ (Turner, 1967: 95).  Ceremony is 
associated with the affirmative external, contrasting with the ‘liminal seclusion’ of 
the internal space of ritual.   
 
Rappaport (1999: 38-39) referencing Firth 212 emphasises the social and symbolic 
quality of ceremony, as ‘… it seems to me appropriate to refer to the secular as 
‘ceremonial’ and to reserve the term ‘ritual’ for more full-blooded activities 
which, in the view of the participants at least, owe their efficacy to connection 
with a mystical power’ (Lewis, 1976: 130).  Therapists are more likely to think in 
terms of a non-conscious or sub-liminal than mystical.   
 
Myth:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Alexander, B. C., (1997) Ritual and current studies of ritual: overview.  In: Glazier, D., (Ed) 
Anthropology of Religion: A Handbook.  Westport, CT.  Greenwood Press.  139-160.   
212‘Ceremonial I regard as a species of ritual in which, however, the emphasis is more upon 
symbolic acknowledgment and demonstration of a social situation than upon efficacy of the 
procedure in modifying that situation.  Whereas other ritual procedures are believed to have a 
validity of their own, ceremonial procedures, while formal in character, are not believed in 
themselves to sustain the situation or effect change in it’ (Firth, R., 1967 Tikopia Ritual and Belief.  
Boston.  Beacon Press.  13).   
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Myths provide an opening to understanding societies and the foundational beliefs 
that legitimate religious, social, and legal practices.  Myths (Greek muthos, 
‘story’) have ‘truth-value’ for the people concerned.  Peacock quotes Malinowski: 
‘Myth … safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual 
and contains practical rules for the guidance of men.  Myth is thus a vital 
ingredient of human civilization’ 213  (Peacock, 1975: 41-42).  Myths provide 
authority from the past for present activity almost contracting the time interval 
between then and now.  Leach links myth, ritual, and symbol: ‘(M)yth is a charter 
for ritual performance and … we can only understand what is being symbolised in 
the ritual if we take note of what is being ‘said’ in the mythology’ (Leach, 1972: 
240).  Myths legitimise action with reference to events of a previous time, or 
‘beyond time’, and may be re-edited to fit current circumstances, just as ‘myths of 
course do change in their retelling ‘ (Hobart, 2003: 125) to reflect a changing 
world.  They are stories with a purpose and ‘must say a great deal briefly and 
effectively’ (Lewis, 1976: 128) embodying important truths without being 
factually true. 214  Lifton and Olson speak of mythic time where ‘(o)ne feels 
oneself alive in a “continuous present” in which the ancient past and distant future 
are contained,’ (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 38). 215   
 
Symbol:  
‘The symbol is the smallest unit of ritual which still retains the specific properties 
of ritual behaviour; it is the ultimate unit of specific structure in a ritual context’ 
(Turner, 1967: 19).  The relationship between therapist and patient in 
psychodynamic practice is symbolic, substituting for people, relationships, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Malinowski, B., (1954) Magic, Science, and Religion, and Other Essays.  Garden City, New 
York.  Anchor Books.  101.   
214 ‘A myth is a fiction which gives us the facts.  The ‘facts’ that a myth conveys are not those of 
the world of evidence but the essential data of human nature.  Myths chronicle the restlessness of 
humankind, its fascination with transgression, its curiosity and self-blindness’ (Vickers, 2008).   215	  A historical example brings myth and ritual together in a recursive loop.  The Aztecs believed 
that in the beginning ‘the most important act … was clearly the birth of the sun: and this sun was 
born from sacrifice and blood’ (Soustelle, 2002: 96).  Their creation myth required daily blood 
sacrifice to ensure the sun rose every morning.  ‘Blood was necessary to save this world and the 
men in it: the victim was no longer an enemy who was to be killed but a messenger arrayed in a 
dignity that was almost divine, who was sent to the gods’ (ibid: 99).  The sun’s daily rising 
validated the ‘muthos’ requiring ritual blood sacrifice.   
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situations, past or present, in the patient’s life.  Therapeutic transference (chapter 
2) is a symbolic transposing of other people, relationships, time(s), and place(s).  
Symbols have different meanings in particular times and contexts.  Simply 
shaking hands in a greeting ritual has many possible symbolic meanings, as with 
Remus and Andreea.  How these ‘patterns of the mind’ (Leach, 1976: 17) develop 
is complex and beyond the scope of this research.   
 
Performance.   
There is a performative aspect to ritual, whether in the temple, the bush, or 
psychotherapy room.  Ritual is: ‘… the performance of more or less invariant 
sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers’ 
(Rappaport, 1999: 24).  None of these are unique to ritual, as for example 
Kapferer describes performance in ritual (and art) as ‘the universalizing of the 
particular and the particularizing of the universal’ (Kapferer, 1986: 191).  In 
psychotherapy, performance lies in the drama of timing interventions, managing 
time, and the nature of the psychotherapist / patient relationship.  In healing, ‘(t)he 
emphasis is on ritual as performance that transforms situations and affects the 
individual’s invisible realm in order to tap forces that can either recreate or 
destroy the realities of patients concerned’ (Hobart, 2003: 2-3).   
 
The power of the invisible is important, whether as; spirits in a religious context, 
an internalised psychology, or a founding figure in therapy.  The quality of the 
patient/healer relationship and the place of performance in healing, vary in 
different approaches.  Performance has its own transformative dynamic, rendering 
ritual potentially effective even if healer and patient do not share beliefs about 
healing or spiritual powers (Stoller, 2009).   
 
Ritual and time: an overview.   
Émile Durkheim, (1858-1917).   
Ritual practices reflect the eternal and the timeless.  Superficially, there is nothing 
extraordinary in ritual activity.  However, ‘(a) thing is consecrated when it is put 
into contact with a source of religious energy … Understood in this way, religious 
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technique seems to be a kind of mystic mechanism. … (T)he ideal society, then, 
presupposes religion rather than explains it’  (Durkheim, 2001: 314-315).   
 
Ritual interrupts and disrupts the mundane pattern.  It draws participant and 
observer from a cognitive logical environment into a symbolic experience of the 
world. For Durkheim, ‘(t)he very impracticality of the ritual arrangements 
underlines the rite’s symbolic and sacred character’ (Peacock, 1975: 15).  Rituals 
mark time in some way, for ‘rituals are ways of acting that are generated only 
within assembled groups and are meant to stimulate and sustain or recreate certain 
mental states in these groups’ (Durkheim, 2001: 11).  Similarly, psychotherapy 
requires a change in ‘mental states’ if a different kind of change is to occur.   
 
We have noted an acknowledgment in some philosophical descriptions that in 
moments of arousal everyday experience of time changes.  Ritual involves an 
intended altering of emotional arousal to ‘recreate certain mental states’ that 
involve a different kind of time.  I believe this often resembles a patient’s 
experience in therapy.   
 
Henri Hubert (1872-1927).   
Hubert describes the manifestation of time through the ‘sacred’ in ritual (Hubert 
1999) 216.  His interest in time’s representation in religion and magic drew him to 
think about kinds of time and space that differ from the everyday.  Since all ritual 
is located in space and time, ‘it is necessary to ask how the theoretical separation 
of time and space can be reconciled with the infinitude and immutability of the 
“sacred”, in which rites and mythical events take place too’ (Hubert, 1999: 43).  If 
time differs qualitatively in religious or magical contexts, this may be true in 
psychotherapy.  Time is at the centre of his thinking, for ‘(t)he examination of any 
ritual will suffice to show that rites vary by reason of the circumstances of time, 
…’ (ibid: 45).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Originally published as Étude sommaire de la représentation du temps dans la religion et la 
magie, (1905), Annuaire de l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses.  
Paris.  1-39.   
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Hubert considers the nature of calendrical time and rites: ‘(T)he calendar … 
originates not in the idea of a purely quantitative time, but in that of qualitative 
time, composed of discontinuous parts, heterogeneous and ceaselessly revolving’ 
(ibid: 81).  Calendars have never been fixed entities.  Their history over some 
5000 years is the history of humankind and its struggle with time (Duncan, 1999). 
They chart ‘the return of events’, and mark linear points ‘to entail the celebration 
of certain rites’.  They proclaim pattern, encode qualitative and quantitative 
meaning, provide rhythm and predictability (the recurring rhythm of religious 
events), and engender a longitudinal experience of past, present, and future, as 
McTaggart’s (1927) A and / or B series, according to how one perceives 
calendrical sequences.   
 
Bronislaw Malinowski, (1884-1942).   
In Coral Gardens and their Magic (Volume 2) we discover a minute study of 
language.  Language ‘differs from other aspects of culture in one respect: there is 
much more of the conventional or arbitrary element in the symbolism of speech 
than in any other aspect of manual or bodily behaviour’ (Malinowski, 2008: vii).  
Malinowski is concerned ‘to distinguish between the names of a rite, a spell, or a 
whole inaugural ceremony’ (ibid: 156) and finds ‘linguistically interesting’ (ibid: 
160) the names of the rites that he describes.    
 
He ‘contrasted initiation rites, which are religious and aesthetic because their 
function is inculcation and maintenance of collective traditions valued for 
themselves, with childbirth rites which are magical because they are directed to 
the practical aim of safe child delivery’ (Tambiah, 1990: 69-70).  Malinowski  
saw magic springing ‘from the idea of a certain mystic, impersonal power’ 
(Malinowski, 1926: 23) composed of ‘a body of purely practical acts, performed 
as a means to an end’ (ibid: 66).  Emotion in ritual implies deep involvement and 
is as important as performance for a desired outcome.   
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Victor Turner (1920-1983).   
Turner believed that ‘very often decisions to perform ritual were connected with 
crises in the social life of villages’ (Turner, 1995: 10).  He supports the 
Durkheimian view that ritual establishes meaning and maintains social structure 
and that the designated person or caste that initiates or employs ritual in healing 
occupies the ground at the edges of those structures.  Like the shaman in ritual 
and the ritual of healing, the therapist crosses boundaries forbidden to others to 
breach, enabling the patient to return safely from the sublime to the mundane. 217  
To practise ritual a person must be socially sanctioned to straddle the worlds of 
spirit, mind, and after-life, as the following Yolmo example highlights.  Turner’s 
ideas on ritual are discussed again later.   
 
Robert Desjarlais.   
Desjarlais describes the initiation to become a Yolmo shaman healer in Helambu, 
north-central Nepal.  His skills require an ability to ‘tour “with his heartmind” 
(with his sems)’ (Desjarlais, 1996: 147) the shrines and religious areas of the 
country.  ‘Heartmind’ encompasses the whole being.  A Yolmo heals by relying 
on symbols and metaphoric language as well as what the scholar terms ‘imagistic 
poem’ (ibid: 151).  Healing ritual is a phenomenological experience.  The shaman 
seeks bodily changes in the patient, thus emphasising the importance of sense 
perceptions and visceral engagement.   
 
Only after change in the individual’s ‘heartmind’ can a person become aware of 
being healed.  While there is a symbolic element in the journey from 
disintegration to reintegration in healing, rites only provide the necessary 
structure; ‘if the rite is to be considered successful, it must change how a person 
feels, (and) since the spirit is an intangible force, a villager can only determine its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Turner describes the role of the healer in the Ndembu tribe.  ‘The doctor mediates between the 
sexes, in that he treats both.  The Ndembu doctor, in fact, has many attributes that are regarded as 
feminine in Ndembu culture; … he handles women and talks to them about private matters in a 
way that would be impermissible to men in secular roles’ (Turner, 1995: 38). Turner continues: 
‘One term for “doctor”, chimbanda, is said by Ndembu themselves to be connected with the term 
mumbanda, standing for “woman” ‘ (ibid: 38).   
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return by interpreting how body and ‘heartmind’ feel in the hours and days after a 
rite’ (ibid: 151).   
 
There is thus an important time element between performance of the rite and 
phenomenological evidence of healing.  It is a time without active intervention, 
pregnant with possibility, that allows change to occur.  A change in world-view 
without physiological change would not be effective.  Change is measured over 
time, and echoes an increasingly required behavioural emphasis on outcome in a 
Western context (Layard, 2006).   
 
Roy Rappaport (1926-1997).   
Rappaport examines the quality of time in ritual.  He suggests that demarcation in 
ritual as an interval between two other kinds of time periods is more important 
than duration.  ‘The distinction between intervals and the periods they separate 
corresponds to a frequently remarked distinction between two “kinds of time” … 
(I)ntervalic “time” is said to be different’ (Rappaport, 1999: 181).  Rappaport 
refers to sacred time as time out of time where the everyday is transformed.  He 
pursues the question of change of consciousness in ritual states.  ‘Metaphoric 
representation, primary process thought, and strong emotion become increasingly 
important as the domination of … simple everyday rationality, recedes’ (ibid: 
219).   
 
As awareness of mundane time changes, so does the individual’s experience of 
being.  During ritual the tempo of social life is replaced by a different pace, which 
reinforces a sense of being ‘out of time’.  Rappaport suggests how computer 
binary logic computations of 0 or 1, can help understand those interstices as the 
ignored space of change.  There is between each operation a ‘time’ that is 
different; neither 0 nor 1. 218   
‘The intervals during which the values of variables are actually changing 
are outside the times during which the computer’s operant logic prevails 
and are ignored in its computations. … (T)he values of the variables that 
do enter into the computations are contingent upon those changes.  …  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 0 - (no longer 0: not yet 1) - 1 
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transition from 0 to 1 taking place in the ignored interval is not a digital 
but an analogic process.  The processes occurring in the intervals are 
literally governed by a logic other than that in terms of which computation 
proceeds’ (Rappaport, 1999: 216-217).   
 
In the Yolmo change that occurs after a rite is an ‘analogic process’, in ‘a logic 
other than in the terms of’ the rite.  We can draw a parallel between binary 
computer logic with ‘mundane’ conscious time and ‘sublime’ time in ritual where 
‘the quality of experience dominating many rituals stand in profound contrast to 
those of ordinary time’ (ibid: 218).  In the in-between moment time stands 
suspended, which suggests an alternative time reality.  The digital and countable 
possess ‘hard edges’ while the analogic possesses ‘soft edges’.  Rappaport’s 
computer language analogy re-introduces the transitional space of the instant ‘in 
the ignored interval’ where change occurs outside conscious awareness.  This 
recalls Parmenides; ‘… when it changes, it would be in no time at all, …’ (Plato, 
1997: 388).  Some would go further and portray the effects on time stemming 
from positive activity.  ‘(M)ajor rituals … aspire to annihilate measurable 
temporality … to redress the failures of the present “time” … and to restore the 
primaveral past as paradigmatic reality’ (Turner. 1982a: 228).  I suggest that in 
effective ritual, and ‘the ritual of psychotherapy’, there exists a similar instant of 
potentiality actively to crystallise as change that temporarily creates a different 
temporality.  The problem is momentarily detached from the moment before but 
is not yet attached to the instant after.   
 
This resembles a transcendent experience of going beyond, or being ‘out of time’ 
in psychotherapy, recalling Heidegger’s exstasis (chapter 4).  The patient enters 
symbolic reality where, in effective therapy, ‘a patient feels a widening of the 
space in which he lives.  It is as if the narrow images through which he has seen 
reality have been reorganised so that the past appears more coherent and the 
future more inviting’ (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 38).  Some of these phenomena are 
evident in a ritual I developed to end Jane’s persistent nightmares.   
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Jane – a ritual of trauma.   
Jane’s life-long nightmares presented a seemingly intractable problem.  As 
nightmares occur during sleep the individual cannot consciously control them.  
Jane would wake two or three times each night, usually at the bottom of the stairs.  
For almost fifty years, (then fifty-three,) she could not recall having more than 
four hours’ continuous sleep.  Relaxation strategies and new routines had partially 
worked, but the nightmares continued.  At this point I proposed a counter-intuitive 
ritual with the following structure:  
o Early each evening Jane was to plan the worst nightmare she expected that 
night, based either on the previous night or the one she most feared.   
o She was then to write it down in detail, in stages if that helped.   
o She was to read it aloud on her own as many times as necessary, as the 
‘performative’ part, in the spare room, - a prescribed place – until she no 
longer felt panicky hearing her own voice speaking it.   
o She was then to leave the room (physically leaving the event behind) and 
do something pleasurable (‘performative’) elsewhere in her house.   
o Finally, after a relaxing bath she was to go to bed at least an hour earlier 
than usual, thus changing the time of her normal routine.   
 
This ritual had a dramatic effect.  For the first time in memory she slept seven 
hours without interruption.  Subsequent nights were the same.  The effect was 
‘transformative’; a change from nightmare-full to nightmare-empty nights.   
 
The ordeal element of actively calling up the nightmare she most feared as a 
necessary part of healing was important (Jenkins, 1980). 219  To be willing to 
carry it out, night after night, meant committing fully to the process.  The time, 
place, structure, and ‘performance’ were clearly defined, and the goal was clear.  
As the nightmares ceased dramatically, Jane was faced with a further dilemma.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 As Jane knew she had to approach the ritual each evening, she found herself holding this ‘in 
mind’ more and more as the evening approached.  Paradoxically, this increased the likelihood that 
she would not have a nightmare.   
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She could not plan the night’s nightmare from the previous one and so had to 
imagine fearing a nightmare that was based on experience that became 
increasingly remote.  This became her further and further past (McTaggart, 1927).  
The final stage came when Jane ‘forgot’ to carry out the ritual and she did not 
have a nightmare.  She then tailed off the ‘formal ritual’ at her own pace as she 
felt less need of it. 220   
 
The temporal mix is important.  Jane;  
o consciously and intentionally mentalised an unconscious process 
happening in the immediate future,  
o wrote it down now in the present.  She then 
o read the future expected nightmare or the one she most feared aloud, 
repeatedly if she needed to, creating its own rhythm and bringing it under 
her present control  
o in the present to relegate it to the past of a future that putatively was yet to 
happen as a future-now-present.   
 
It appears that in this later future Jane does not experience her nightmare as being 
out of her control since it is now in the past under her conscious will.  Ultimately, 
she establishes a new pattern in the present that survives into the future and 
confirms the changes in her present relationship with her traumatised and 
traumatising past.  Jane describes some of her experience in interview.   
H.J.  “What were your experiences of time and place when carrying out 
the ritual.  What typically used to happen?” 
 
Jane.  “It felt like you were taking the control out of my nightmares.  I 
thought, ‘I’m going to concentrate on this’.  In a way it did go against 
common sense.  I suppose it worked because I could plan and write it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 At the start following nightmare-free nights, Jane stopped the nightly ritual without consulting 
me, and the nightmares returned immediately, to her considerable distress.  It was not clear 
whether the ordeal of carrying out the ritual was too much, or that she could not hold in her mind 
the connection between ritual and cessation.  Formally reinstituting the ritual had the immediate 
desired effect.   
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down so that I was in control of it, and then if it happened, it was 
something I’d planned, and if it didn’t, then it was a result.  It was a win-
win situation.  If I can sit down and plan it out, it can’t be that dangerous.”   
 
H.J.  “From a time perspective, what would happen?” 
 
Jane.  “At the time of doing it, I’d sometimes enter a different time and 
space, and there were times when I’d flit between now and the past, and it 
would make time seem longer.  When you go back into the past, in time, 
you seem to lose track of that, whole great big chunks, and it can seem like 
hours and hours.  And when I came back to reality, I’d be kind of 
confused.  I would have music on and I’d come back and it was the same 
music, and it was like, ‘How did that happen?’  And then I’d carry on, and 
sometimes flip back again, and each time it was not quite so bad.  It 
probably helped because by then I’d done it, and so I didn’t need to go 
back and replay it in my sleep.  If it happened again, it was never so bad.”   
 
Jane indicates my go-between role of crossing limen, wresting control of her 
nightmares, and giving it to her.  This suggests a powerful positive identification 
with me and trust of the therapeutic process.  It meant that in therapy there was a 
‘different kind of time’ to her everyday (mundane) time where nightmares had 
dominated.  Her descriptions of how time changed for her in therapy are powerful.  
She describes losing ‘track of time’.  I suggest that for this to occur there was 
simultaneously another kind of (sublime) time that was not subject to the same 
constraints of her mundane time.  The rhythm of repeated experiences of being 
safe enough in the containing structure of therapy contributed to her healing, 
where slowly she could bring order to the moment.   
 
After the first interview with Jane about her experiences in therapy I failed to 
warn that discussing them might resurrect the old terrors.  Realising this, I 
emailed her my concern.  She replied:  
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25th July 2010   
‘Dear Hugh  
It was good to see you.   
I did have the dream on Friday night, it came as a nasty surprise, but on 
reflection, I should not have been surprised.  Last night I went back to the 
ritual, and all was ok again, phew.   
In a way our meeting and the dream being a one-night stand, was a 
confirmation of the improvements made.’   
 
Fortuitously my error confirmed to her how much she had changed and reinforced 
the enduring power of this ritual.  Despite her abuse and terror, there was 
sometimes a playful quality to confronting these issues with a dark humour.  
Humour can momentarily release the person from present pain into a different 
time and place reality.  Humour was especially important in her healing, to which 
there are many ‘post-scripts’. 221   
 
While the ritual ‘muddled up’ time by dis-locating the future nightmare, there 
may have been another temporal effect.  Ritual creates ‘a slowing down of the 
tempo of everyday life and a holding in abeyance or suspension some of the ritual 
qualities of lived reality’ (Kapferer, 2004: 48).  Kapferer argues that in the 
repetitive dynamic characteristic of much ritual we find ‘the radical slowing 
down’ which the participant experiences as a different time reality.  Jane 
internalised the ritual and with it a different tempo of her lived reality.  The 
‘slowing down’ creates temporal space where it is possible to establish or re-
establish control.   
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  A	  ‘post-­‐script’:	  	  
In October 2008, four and a half years after her parents were sentenced, her mother became 
terminally ill and was moved from prison to hospital.  She asked to see Jane and she visited her.  
She told Jane that she was sorry for all that she had done to her throughout her life and asked her 
forgiveness.  Jane said she forgave her.  Her mother died two days later.  The (ritual) act of 
forgiveness was an important indication of her personal healing.   
 
A lay reader in the Church of England, Jane decided to officiate at her mother’s funeral: the final 
rite of passage.  She later said that it was a surreal experience, but one that she was pleased she 
was able to do, for herself, and her self-perception as a human-being that was not ‘bad’ or ‘evil.   
	   267	  
 
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980): Play, frames, and ritual.   
I have mentioned Jane’s ability to be ‘playful’.  Play and playfulness have been 
recognised throughout history as fulfilling important social functions, whether to 
draw attention to the unspeakable or to facilitate coping with the unbearable.  In 
similar vein to ritual Bateson describes play as ‘(t)hese actions in which we now 
engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote’ 
(Bateson, 1955: 152).  Everyday action, time, and meaning, are suspended within 
this frame as participants enter the world of the sublime.  Within the rules of the 
‘game’ as in ritual, the everyday is re-framed ‘in which the discrimination is 
drawn, but not completely, between denotative action and that which is to be 
denoted’ (ibid: 154).   
 
Much that relates to ritual and shamans applies to the psychotherapist’s 
‘outsiderhood’ role.  Like the fool or the clown in the courts of kings and 
emperors the therapist breaches boundaries, voices the forbidden, and often 
employs humour although, as the Fool in King Lear says, it is not without its 
costs:  
‘I marvel what kin thou and thy daughters are.  They’ll have me whipped 
for speaking true; thou’lt have me whipped for lying; and sometimes I am 
whipped for holding my peace.  I had rather be any kind o’ thing than a 
Fool, and yet I would not be thee, Nuncle; ...’  (Shakespeare 1963: Act I, 
sc. iv.  66-67).   
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Plate 8.2.  The Fool, Shakespeare’s King Lear by Lady Eleanor Cleavely.   
 
The clown (Plate 8.2) in his serious playfulness communicates simultaneously at 
many levels.  He confronts the impossible and speaks the unacceptable; he lives 
on the edge, necessary for the system and an uncomfortable reminder of 
mankind’s frailty.  Handelman notes how ‘(c)lownlike figures are well-suited to 
perform as reflexive agents, for they are sited at the boundary of occasions’ 
(Handelman, 1998: 240), in an in-between space. 222  The ‘status-less-in-
betweeness-status’ of the Fool is dynamic and fraught with tension yet provides a 
clear example of ‘the power of the between’ (Stoller, 2009).   
 
‘(H)uman verbal communication can operate and always does operate at many 
contrasting levels of abstraction’ (Bateson, 1955: 150).  With multiple levels of 
communication Lear’s Fool is safe to be outrageous and not lose his head, 
because all is framed; ‘as said by the Fool’.  Equally, the statement “this is ritual”, 
“this is play”, or “this is psychotherapy”, frames an event for its duration.  Like 
the Fool the shaman, priest, or therapist, holds and constantly reinforces the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 The etymology of ‘clown’ and ‘fool’ is something or someone not finished or complete, a being 
in-between, on the edge.  Clown: North Frisian, klünj, ‘clod, lump and the like’, and Low German, 
cloine, cloyne.  Fool: Medieval English, fõl, and Old French, fol, ‘mad’, but also from the Latin, 
folli-s, ‘bellows, inflated ball, money-bag, and later empty-headed person, ‘windbag’ (The Oxford 
Dictionary of English Etymology, 1966, Oxford.  OUP).   
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frame.  Frame is important as a metaphor for defining boundaries of who is out or 
in.  Below I have added ritual to underline this point.   
‘The resemblance between the process of therapy and the phenomenon of 
play/ritual is, in fact, profound.  Both occur within a delimited 
psychological frame, a special temporal bounding of a set of interactive 
messages.  In both play/ritual and therapy, the messages have a peculiar 
relationship to a more concrete or basic reality.  Just as the pseudocombat 
of play/ritual is not real combat, so also the pseudolove and pseudohate of 
therapy are not real love or hate’ (Bateson, 1955: 164). 223   
 
Bateson’s description of meta-communication and meta-language provides a 
framework to understand ‘the about’ of an activity.  These processes are ‘liminal, 
in the sense that they are suspensions of daily reality’ (Turner, 1984: 22) of time 
and place.  Therapy deals with ‘about’.  Boundaries legitimise and ensure the 
safety of those participating in the activity. Therapy becomes a meta-pattern for 
the ‘frames, the metaphorical borders within which the facts of experience can be 
viewed, reflected upon, and evaluated’ (ibid: 22).   
 
I suggested that clarity of time and place structures allowed Jane to risk herself in 
therapy with her constantly shifting inner boundaries.  The effectiveness and 
lability of ritual lie perhaps in the ‘disjunction of the world of rite from its larger 
context’ (Kapferer, 2004: 46).  Jane’s ritual of pre-enacting her nightmares is such 
an example.  There was a labile feel to the process that the map-territory 
distinction 224 would collapse, and the play of ritual would re-become the terror of 
nightmare; the abuse itself.  Her willingness to carry this out eventually changed 
her relationship with her past and created stronger past-present time boundaries.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Bateson cites the Andaman Islanders’ peace ritual.  Each side has permission to strike the other, 
which carries the danger that ritual blows are mistaken for the real blows of war.  ‘This … 
illustrates the labile nature of the frame ‘This is play’, or ‘This is ritual’.  The discrimination 
between map and territory is always liable to break down, and the ritual blows of peace-making 
are always liable to be mistaken for the ‘real’ blows of combat’ (Bateson, 1955: 155).   
 
Schechner reports a similar event of ritual invasion re-enactment of one village group by another 
in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea.  ‘The performance both symbolised and actualised 
the change in status.  …  Dancing and giving-taking the meat more than symbolised the changed 
relationship between hosts and invaders, it was the change itself’ (Schechner, 2003: 127).   
224 Map-territory distinction: referenced by Bateson (1955) to Korzybski, A., (1941) Science and 
Sanity.  New York.  Science Press.   
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Ritual is real and is an ‘as if’ time and place.  The ‘ordeal’ is real, is what it is, 
and symbolises something other.  The ‘frames’ of rituals for Jenny and Jane 
include designations of time, place, procedure, and process, only possible in an 
intense relationship with meaning beyond the mundane.  ‘Frames’ can of course 
be confusing, ambiguous, or contradictory (Plate 8.3).   
 
 
Plate 8.3.  René Magritte (1898-1967).  La Reproduction Interdite (Not to be 
Reproduced) (1937).  Museum Boijmans Van Benningen, Rotterdam.  (Bailey, 
2004.) 225   
 
In La Reproduction Interdite Magritte’s figure is seen from behind.  The figure is 
looking into the mirror but inexplicably sees himself from behind.  We recognise 
it as the reflection but not the reflection we expect.  The title employs a different 
method of (meta-)communication.  Does it intend the image, its content, or that 
this kind of reproduction is forbidden?  Frames of time in ritual and 
psychotherapy often need to be similarly ambiguous, for such confusing structures 
facilitate spontaneity.  Work with Jane underlines some of these points.  At 
different stages of her treatment I created rituals, often ones she could repeat in 
specific situations.  The following examples demonstrate the nature of changing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Part of the ‘surreal’ effect of Magritte’s work is his paintings, at first encounter are ‘of a 
traditional oil painting, but only the appearance … in (a) meticulously realistic technique, 
associations that are impossible in real life’ (Gimferrer, 1987:6-7).  This gives a dream quality to 
his work and sense of timelessness.   
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frames, playfulness, the performative, altering experience of time, and the 
therapist’s directiveness.   
 
Case vignette: Jane: rituals, frames, and time.   
It had become evident Jane needed a resource to draw on when she began to panic 
or dissociate.  This became her ‘BMW’ (Breathe-Mantra-Write) ritual.  It had 
simplicity at its core.   
 
When she began to feel distressed, Jane was to follow three steps:  
o to breathe slowly and deeply three times;  
o then, to repeat to herself aloud her chosen mantra: “The time is now; I’m 
in control”;  
o to write down in a note-book, if possible, how she was feeling for as long 
as she needed until she felt calmer.  Later, she was to read it aloud to 
herself.  She could then destroy the pages if she chose.   
 
The slowed-down breathing helped calm her.  It calmed her physiological arousal; 
it slowed her sense of time; it made her mantra possible and helped her focus on 
the present - “The time is now”; while reinforcing her sense of agency - “I’m in 
control”.  In this different kind of time it changed her (experience of) time.  
Writing enabled her to externalise feelings of panic and dissociation, giving them 
a different kind of (survivable) reality outside her body.  They were no longer 
‘boundaried’ in her head.  Her first, and most difficult step was to recognise her 
approaching dissociative state.  This requires the ability to self-reflect rather than 
slip into a flight-fight mode created by her amygdala and brain stem functioning 
(Damasio, 2000a, b; Gerhardt, 2004; Schore, 2003a; Solms and Turnbull, 2002).  
At the point of pre-emptively recognising her rising panic, Jane had already begun 
the changes that BMW was designed to achieve.  Over time she became adept at 
instigating her BMW without first phoning me in a panic.  This helped reinforce 
her sense of control and began a virtuous cycle.  I asked Jane about BMW. 226   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Interview on 15th April, 2011.   
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H.J.  “Can you tell me something about the BMW ritual?  How did that 
work for you?”   
 
Jane.  “It just calmed everything down.  It changed the time when 
everything was out of control.  The breathing slowed me down when it felt 
like time was running away with me.  It was like taking control.  And the 
mantra, ‘the time is now; I’m in control’, helped with this, when it would 
otherwise have spiralled out of control.  The writing was like a 
confirmation.  It was like seeing it from the outside.  When things started 
to go wrong, it would be like it was spiralling faster out of control and it 
was like multi-tasking, and my brain was trying to multi-task what was 
happening in the present and the past at the same time.  I was trying to stay 
in control with you, but then at the same time there was a part of my brain 
that was trying to go through what had happened before.  That was the out 
of control bit.  That was the scary bit.  It was almost then that I’d realise I 
was losing control and lose contact with you.  By concentrating on what 
was going wrong, it then pulled me into it further, like going to an eddy, 
like a whirlpool, sucking you down.”   
 
She indicates how the BMW helped her not focus on her panic.  It distracted her 
enough to experience time differently.  Similarly, and although not formally 
introduced as ‘ritual’, over time she allowed me to hold her coat when leaving.  
Initially, this was terrifying and impossible because there is always a moment (in 
time) when the person must turn their back, to put an arm in the second sleeve.   
 
H.J.  “There was the issue about whether you could let me hold your coat 
to help you put it on.  What happened there?” 
 
Jane.  “When I couldn’t let you do that, I thought, like, how difficult can 
that be?  When it happened it was really good.  After, I wondered ‘Why 
did I get myself in a mess’ and the next time it was back to square one.  
There was a point before when it was totally impossible.  Then, like a 
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binary system it was suddenly OK.  You distracted me enough for me to 
do it, so that I wasn’t exactly paying attention, because you got me 
thinking somewhere else, so I did it without me psyching myself up for it.   
I was concentrating on what you were talking about and not on what was 
about to happen.  Somehow, for a moment I was not quite there, and then 
it was done.  And it was good.”   
 
Jane realises that my structured and carefully timed distraction of her conscious 
attention placed her momentarily in a different kind of temporal space.  When she 
“was not quite there” in that other time-space she could allow me to hold her coat.  
Once established as a ritual I did not need to ‘distract’ and she could own her 
increasing sense of self and safety.  This event took place outside ‘therapy’ in the 
waiting room between the consulting room and the outside world.  This is also a 
physical in-between space, representing leaving therapy and re-entering the 
outside world.  Simple though it was, I planned it as a performative event.  There 
was an element of ‘intentional ordeal’.  I never formally defined this as ‘ritual’ or 
‘therapy’ thus intentionally making it more intangible.  Part of the distracting 
involved my active playfulness, thus changing the frame.  The everyday act of 
helping Jane with her coat becomes ‘sacred’ in this specific context.  As the 
‘ritual’ became ‘normal’ it was more ‘ceremony’ celebrating a new status quo.  
Therapy often occurs as much in the accumulation of informal small events as in 
more formal conscious interventions.   
 
Rites of passage: transformation and time.   
‘Rites of passage’ describes a particular ritual structure and, I suggest, holds 
particular relevance for psychotherapy.  ‘Rites of passage occur when people 
cross boundaries of space, of time, or of social status. … Since rites of passage 
occur at the boundaries of cultural categories, they provide a valuable key to a 
society’s social and temporal classifications’ (Barfield, 1997: 410).  The nature of 
time is central.  Boundaries, or Bateson’s ‘frames’, are spiritual, imaginary, 
existential, psychological, and emotional, as much as physical.  We will see how 
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psychoanalysis is strongly ritualised with many characteristics of an extended rite 
of passage.   
 
Arnold van Gennep (1873-1957) published Rites de Passage in 1908, and Victor 
Turner greatly developed his ideas. 227  Both scholars emphasise the initiates’ 
experience of the quality of time changing.  What therefore is the ‘fit’ (Dell, 1982) 
for rites of passage as structure and process for psychotherapy?   
 
Gennep, (1960) described three phases: séparation (separation); marge 
(transition) also the liminal phase; and agrégation (incorporation). 228  Rites 
facilitate the passage to the ‘sacred’ (‘sublime’ or ‘ideal’) and back to the 
‘profane’ (mundane).  ‘The sacred is not an absolute value but one relative to the 
situation.  The person who enters a status at variance with the one previously held 
becomes “sacred” to the others who remain in the profane state’ (Kimball, 1960: 
viii-ix).  DiNichola writing of language and therapy ‘at the nexus of culture and 
family’ speaks of the patient who comes for help.  ‘People in this situation are 
liminal: at a threshold “betwixt and between” the old world they know and the 
new one they are experiencing. … (T)his is an ambiguous state’ (DiNichola, 
1993: 53).   
 
Psychotherapy and rites of passage are intentional activities.  The purpose is to 
bring about irreversible change that some scholars refer to as ‘second order 
change’ (Bateson, 1955, 1971; Hoffman, 1985).  In the interview, Andreea 
describes her experience on the morning of her wedding at the threshold of this 
rite of passage:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Abrahams comments that Gennep’s work was ‘ignored in the cultural sciences in the main until 
the post-war generation’ (Abrahams, 1995: x).  He continues: ‘It remained Turner’s task, based on 
van Gennep’s recognition of the structural similarities of rites of elevation, initiation, healing, 
incorporation, and transience, to show how this system operated as a way of marking life process 
in the experience of the people among whom he had lived and worked’ (ibid: xi).   
228 The Anglicism, reaggregation, (Turner, 1966) seems clumsy.  In France a university graduate is 
agrégé, that is incorporated or admitted into the world of academe as a rite of passage, 
representing transformation.  ‘Re-incorporation’ is sometimes used to imply return.   
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Andreea.  “I want to tell you a something.  The day we got married, my 
father took me in the car to a gas station before he took me to the church.  
And he wasn’t coming back.  He was drinking coffee and he was smoking 
and he was saying, “Yeah, give me a minute”.  So I was dressed as the 
bride, in the car, waiting for my dad to take me to church.”   
 
H.J. “How sad was he at losing his daughter?”   
 
Andreea.  “He was sad.”   
 
H.J.  “So he was acting out his sadness?”   
 
Andreea.  “Yes he was very sad.”   
 
H.J.  “His last coffee and his last cigarette with his unmarried daughter, 
because you were about to become committed to another man.”   
 
Andreea.  “He really likes, he really loves Remus, before we got married.  
He didn’t like him afterwards for one year, one year and a half.  Then he 
liked him again.”   
 
H.J.  “But you were no longer his daughter in that way.  That’s something 
about a real change, isn’t it?  You can never go home as a single woman.”   
 
Andreea.  “Yes, and also I was very active in the church and I realised 
that I cannot be the same now.  I was the pastor’s wife.  I was Andreea, the 
pastor’s wife.”   
 
H.J.  “So, we must come back to the wedding.  As Andreea the pastor’s 
wife, you lose something of your identity in a sense.   
 
Andreea.  “Yes, I did.  My independence, complete independence.  Yes.”   
 
H.J.  “So, what you’re telling me is that the marriage for you, and maybe 
for him, meant letting go of certain things, of independence, of doing what 
you would like when you like.”   
 
Andreea.  “Yes.  When I was thinking of rituals, I have a brainstorm, 
which was this exactly, what a ritual marks the end of something, the 
beginning of something else.  You give away and you receive.”   
 
Andreea describes her irreversible change of status, change that affects more than 
only the couple.  There are gains and losses with strong emotions, such as her 
father’s feelings towards his new son-in-law.  In the clinical story of Julian and 
Natalie the picture is different.   
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Case vignette: Julian, Natalie, and a ‘failed rite of passage’.   
Julian and Natalie had known each other for six years and been married eight 
months.  Natalie struggled with Julian’s inability to resist his mother’s demands 
for involvement.  She recalled in therapy a conversation with her future mother-
in-law who had insisted on specific flowers for her son’s wedding.  She said to 
her.  “I’m telling you this because your son hasn’t got the bollocks to tell you 
himself”.   
 
They had gone through the symbolic separation in preparing for the wedding day 
when, wearing ‘ritual wedding garments’ they entered the church, a public liminal 
or in-between space (Plate 8.4).  They made vows to each other, exchanged 
wedding bands symbolising eternal union, and signed the register, making their 
vows to God, public promises to each other with witnesses, and the civil contract.  
On leaving the church, there was a celebratory wedding breakfast to signify re-
entry into the outside (profane) world, now publically and legally transformed as a 
married couple.   
 
 
Plate 8.4.  Wedding ceremony.  This woodcut emphasises the public nature of the 
event in front of the priest, representative of a higher authority, witnessed by 
family and friends.   
 
Despite outward appearance, pre-existing relationships remained unchanged.  
Natalie deeply missed her family overseas, while Julian seemed neither 
psychologically nor emotionally married to his wife.  Their formal change in 
status posed a threat.  ‘(T)hese changes may be dangerous, and, at the least, they 
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are upsetting to the life of the group and the individual.  The transitional period is 
met with rites of passage which can cushion the disturbance’ (Kimball, 1960: ix).  
The marriage ritual had not fully achieved its purpose.   
 
Therapy involved two complementary elements: ‘emotional and psychological 
divorce therapy’ in respect of Julian’s symbolic ‘marriage’ to his mother, and a 
rite of passage to recover the ‘failed’ transformative purpose of the wedding.  A 
number of simple rituals were developed for Julian to re-enact the emotional and 
psychological process of dedicating himself anew to the marriage.  These included 
establishing a new relationship with his father to help set boundaries around his 
marriage, as an important step to help Julian redefine his marital relationship with 
Natalie.   
 
Victor Turner  (1920-1983).   
Turner (1995) suggests there are two ways to be in relationship, based either on 
differentiation and hierarchy, or the liminal.  My focus is on ‘liminality’ and its 
putative value for understanding ‘moments out of time’ such as Jane describes.   
 
Turner suggests that the liminal occurs in unstructured space. 229  If relationships 
are based on a structure of socio-politico-religious positions inter alia, ‘we must 
regard the period of margin or “liminality” as an interstructural situation’ (Turner, 
1967: 93).  Change between states becomes possible in the ‘interstructural’ 
moment.  In the shift from one way of being, of quality of relationship or 
organization to another, ‘there has to be … an interval, however brief, of margin 
or limen, when the past is momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the 
future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality, when everything, as it 
were, trembles in the balance’  (Turner, 1982b: 44).   
 
In Roman mythology the god Janus exemplifies this moment (Plate 8.5).  
Representing time with his two faces, Janus saw into the past and the future.  He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Liminal from the Latin, limen, for threshold, also meaning lintel, entrance, or house (Morwood, 
2001).   
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also symbolises doorways, the limen or marginal place between two defined 
spaces that is neither inside nor outside.   
 
 
Plate 8.5.  Janus: god of gates, doors, doorways, beginnings and endings.  
(Vatican museums.)   
 
Liminality in ritual describes an in-between state where the ‘the characteristics of 
the ritual subject (the “passenger”) are ambiguous; he passes through a cultural 
realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state.’ (Turner, 
1967: 94).  This suggests a simple understanding of liminality but nothing of its 
complexity.  ‘It is often the scene and time for the emergence of a society’s 
deepest values in the form of sacred dramas and objects’ (Turner, 1984: 22).  Life-
crisis ritual is often hedged around with powerful myth and symbol to ensure 
socio-cultural continuity at moments of potential threat to stability.  A ‘rite of 
passage’ is a dynamic, active process, whose function is ‘to transform one identity 
into another’ (Kapferer, 1983: 179).  It facilitates an intended move from one state 
to a newly appropriate one.  Male circumcision is a transformatory initiatory rite 
of passage of physical, social, and symbolic change. 230  Among the Ndembu, the 
boys’ removal from maternal dependence in the male circumcision rite of passage 
symbolises ritual death and subsequent association with their ancestors, before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Similarly, the Jewish Bris Milah (infant circumcision on the 8th day) is a sign of the covenant 
reaffirming the bond between God and the Jewish nation for all time.   
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incorporation into adult male society (c.f., Turner, 1967: 52). 231  Therapy is a 
Western phenomenon for dealing with ‘life crises’ or achieving transformative 
change in the individual or relationships.  Here the mundane and all that was 
familiar acquire new meaning.   
 
Comments and critique.   
While Turner contributes greatly to our understanding of ritual some scholars like 
Bruce Kapferer have expanded his thinking.  Kapferer distinguishes between 
process and linguistic analyses.  He stresses the importance ‘of dynamics to 
encompass both process or change and statics or stasis’ (Kapferer, 2004: 40) 
because this ‘moves the understanding of ritual beyond an emphasis on symbolic 
meaning, reflexivity, and representation’ (ibid: 37).  ‘Dynamics’ imply tension, 
and without tension change, which involves a degree of letting go as Andreea says 
about marrying, is unlikely to occur or be sustained.   
 
Transition and transformation are often confused in the systemic literature.  Colin 
Turnbull suggests that through performance of ritual, ‘a transformation takes 
place, not a mere transition, and this has everything to do with our understanding 
of liminality and I believe, calls for a rethinking of what we mean by that term’ 
(Turnbull, 1990: 73). 232  Turnbull suggests that Gennep and Turner short-change 
the complex emotionality of the ‘liminal’.  Experience in a liminal state is often 
confusing, disorienting, and emotionally demanding.  If we are to comprehend 
therapy as dynamic, transformative, and visceral, we need to incorporate this 
perspective.   
 
Liminality is ‘the process of transformation at work.  The technique of 
consciously achieving transformation is the process of entering the liminal state’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Traditionally among the Sande in Liberia, initiation lasted months or even years, and ‘until 
someone was initiated they did not truly exist. … (A) person was not regarded as having been 
really born until initiated’ (Butcher, 2011: 203).   
232 In systemic psychotherapy the distinction is made between first order change (a change within 
existing parameters) and second order change (a change of change).  First order change may be 
thought as more like quantitative change (more or less of the same thing), and second order change 
as qualitative change.   
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(Turnbull, 1990: 79).  This captures the dynamic of psychotherapy when the 
rational is subverted in an experiential shift, after which present and future cannot 
be the same.  In this subjective in-between description we enter a more complex 
world, between the ‘phenomenological experience of time and chronological 
time’ (Perelberg, 2007: xv).  St. Paul’s (liminal) experience, struck from his horse 
on the road to Damascus between two geographical places, between being 
persecutor and convert, arguably changed the course of world history. 233  His 
transformation phenomenologically was beyond rational explanation.   
 
Rites of passage: psychotherapy.   
There is little reference to the liminal in the therapeutic literature.   This is the 
often over-looked space where the patient is free to change in this ‘instant of pure 
potentiality’ that Plato describes in Parmenides (Plato, 1997).   
 
In many respects psychotherapy is a liminal temporal phenomenon, inhabited by 
patient and therapist at the margins of society.  In the Oedipus myth, Oedipus kills 
his father at Phokis ‘where three roads meet’ from Daulis, Delphi, and Thebes 
(Vickers, 2007).  It is an ambiguous transitional territory of psychological 
transformation, choice, and uncertainty, pregnant with potential for confusion.  It 
marked the cataclysmic moment that sealed Oedipus’ predicted ultimate 
destruction. 234   
 
Therapy involves ordeal, play(fulness) and transformation. The reader could 
easily replace ‘psychotherapy’ with ‘rite of passage’ in this description:  
‘If one could simplify the context of psychotherapy and ways to achieve 
enlightenment, it could be said a similar paradox occurs … Within a 
benevolent framework, … the suppliant … undergoes an arduous ordeal 
which makes it difficult for him to continue in his usual ways.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Without Paul’s evangelizing and his letters, which encompass almost every human emotion, it 
is arguable that Jesus’ story would hardly have survived the immediate generations who followed 
his crucifixion as a common criminal.   
234 Tali Sharot (2012) makes the point that prediction causes future events.  Saying that something 
will happen becomes heavily causative.  She draws attention to the fact that we use the same parts 
of our brain to plan the future as we use for memory.  This points to an interesting neurological 
relationship of past and future, and perhaps to how difficult it is to ‘learn from our mistakes’ rather 
than repeat them.   
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response to this paradoxical situation is a type of response which the 
individual has never made before and he is thereby freed from the 
repetitive patterns he has followed in the past.’  (Haley, 1963: 85).   
 
Haley describes a dynamic resembling a rite of passage.  However, an over-focus 
on the session and its parallel with rites of passage risks ignoring another element 
of treatment.  These are the in-between-session-times, the spaces that create some 
of the complexity suggested by Turnbull (1990).   
 
Leach draws attention to the betwixt and between moments between the betwixt 
and between, from pre-liminal to liminal, and from liminal to post-liminal.  He 
suggests boundaries are artificial distinctions for what would otherwise be 
continuous.  In the no-man’s land between boundaries lie ambiguity and anxiety.  
‘A boundary separates two zones of social space-time which are normal, time-
bound, clear-cut, central, secular, but the spatial markers are themselves 
abnormal, timeless, ambiguous, at the edge, sacred. … The crossing of frontiers 
and thresholds is always hedged about with ritual, …’ (Leach, 1976: 35).   
 
The uncertainty of the limen often evokes discomfort and in dynamic liminal 
tension transformational events may more readily happen between sessions, 
rendering the interval between sessions a marginal time of potentiality.  The face-
vase-face (Figure 8.1) captures the nature of ambiguous boundaries.  The lines 
define lip, mouth, nose, throat, vase, vase stem, forehead, a bowl.  The lines 
simultaneously ‘frame’ inside and outside: this is face; this is vase, (vide, this is 
play; this is therapy), or this is not face, not vase, creating an image of constantly 
changing phenomenological realities.   
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Figure 8.1.  Face-vase-face gestalt: one, other, both.   
 
Figure 8.2i proposes a rites of passage structure view of psychotherapy.  The 
duration of therapy becomes a dynamic liminal period.  It represents treatment 
like a unity as if ritual were without variation or rhythm within its structure.   
 	  
Overall course of psychotherapy: stages: 
 
            Separation                            Liminal / Transformative                       Re-Incorporation 
 
 
The overall context of psychotherapy as Separation-Liminal-Re-Incorporation (S-L-R).   	  
 
Figure 8.2i.  Psychotherapy: a rite of passage structure.   
 
In Figure 8.2i treatment is conceived as liminal, a sublime period during which 
transformation is possible.  Its chronological time and the phenomenological 
experience of time from within refer to different kinds of time.  The start of 
therapy, which can be highly stressful, represents separation from the mundane.  
For example, at the start of his second session a patient, John, reflected to me 
about his first meeting.  He said he had found the process of beginning to confront 
his personal experiences and relationships “traumatising” and he had left the 
session “exhausted”.  Beginning therapy was an ordeal in the physical, emotional, 
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and psychological separation from the familiar, without knowing quite what to 
expect in that process.   
 
As psychotherapy ends a process of re-integration must be achieved, separating 
from the psychotherapist’s continuing involvement.  Casement, (1985, 1990, 
2002, 2006), Sandler, Dare, and Holder (1992), Sandler et al., (1997), and Yalom 
(1989, 2001, 2006) discuss separation and ending as a critical, transformative, and 
integral aspect of treatment.  Ending symbolises a moment of re-incorporation to 
the world of the everyday.   
 
Each session, to which much attention traditionally is given, is potentially 
transformational.  However, the time between sessions suggests another kind of 
temporal space out of time from the sessions, which themselves are out of time 
from the mundane.  This becomes a betwixt-and-between time between betwixt-
and-between.  Transformation may occur in that in-between period 
‘spontaneously’ from the session or through the psychotherapist’s explicit 
intentionality through ritual or ordeal-like tasks (Jenkins, 1987).  Just as the 
shaman’s activities are intentional, (the Yolmo, the Ndembu, or the many aspects 
of shamanism described by Vitebsky (1995)), so too are the psychotherapist’s in 
the psychoanalytic (Sandler, Dare and Holder, 1992; Sandler et al., 1997), and 
systemic fields, (Palazzoli et al., 1980; Penn, 1985; Tomm 1987a,b, 1988).   
 
Jane describes her experience of the in-between periods and the impact of varying 
the length of describing that time between sessions as important and active. 235  
The timing of sessions, morning or evening, was significant, while my 
availability, almost on-call constant-time, played an important part:  
H.J.  “What did you think about the time and spaces in between our 
sessions?  How did you experience them at different times, stages of our 
meeting?”   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Interview on 21st January 2011.   
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Jane.  “After meetings it could be worse. I needed time to settle.  
Sometimes it was worse, or sometimes it was better.  Everything was there 
and I couldn’t ignore it, and it was as though it was happening then, but 
better for the same reasons because I could feel in control of the situation.  
But then it would go in the opposite way, and swing and feel as though I 
was losing control of it.  The space in between was better to give time to 
sort things in my head in between.”   
 
H.J.  “What was important about the intervals?”   
 
Jane.  “When it was a longer time, that was quite difficult.  By the time 
we met, I’d managed to tuck it away again.  To a certain extent that made 
it difficult to come back to it.  When there were longer intervals, there was 
a danger of pushing it away like I’d done before I came.”   
 
H.J.  “How much were the intervals part of therapy?”   
 
Jane.  “I think it was very much in my mind, or at the back of my mind all 
the time.  It was like it was all the time because the things we talked about 
here, I could use as a tool in between.  Going first thing in the morning 
allowed me to get over it a bit and to focus on going to work.  Evening 
sessions were more difficult because I’d get in a mess.”   
 
H.J.  “What was important for you about the rhythm, pattern, and timing 
of the sessions?”   
 
Jane.  “I found the flexibility of spacing helpful.  It was helpful because 
we both decided at the time, a consensus, and sometimes I needed a break 
from it.  That was important.  It allowed me to feel I was partly in control.  
It was a joint thing.”   
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H.J.  “And what did you feel about the use of the phone and email?  That 
you could contact me at any time you chose?” 236   
 
Jane.  “That was really good, especially the phone because we would talk 
and the fact that it was a reminder that you hadn’t given up on me, and 
could talk me through, a bit like first aid.”   
 
H.J.  “And the Sunday routine, when you would call every Sunday and 
leave a message whether you needed me to call you back?  How was that 
for you?” 
 
Jane.  “That was good.  It was like doing a stock-taking at the beginning 
of the week.  It was often a bit of a relief, and we could talk it through if it 
was going wrong.  It was knowing you were there, and knowing that, 
when it came to the phone, it meant I had to make a decision and not let it 
drift and get in a mess.  I could think: ‘I can sort this’, and ‘I know what 
Hugh would say, so why do I need to phone him?’  And either way, I had 
to decide if I wanted you to call me back, so in that way I was in control.”   
 
The agreed variable nature of time between sessions gave Jane a sense of control 
and autonomy, while timing of sessions had a significant impact on her ability to 
cope.  She also had responsibility for knowing what she needed when phoning on 
Sunday evenings.  Significantly “It was knowing you were there”, reflecting the 
importance of time constancy.  An important premise for therapy was that 
eventually she would not need a therapist, as she would internalise that figure of 
constancy.   
 
Figure 8.2ii re-configures this structure for each therapy session.  Every session is 
a microcosm of the larger whole, each with its rhythm.  The liminality of each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236  I said that she could call or email any time, although I might not always be immediately there.  
I instigated a regular Sunday evening call rhythm where Jane left a message saying if she needed 
me to call her back.   
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session is ‘boundaried’ by a beginning (separation) and ending (re-incorporation).  
However, the intervals boundaried by and between each session have their own 
liminal quality and ‘rhythm’ (Hubert, 1999): five times a week, weekly intervals, 
every 2/3 weeks.  These are not inert periods that passively separate sessions.  
They are replete with potential for planned or spontaneous change.   
 
 
Individual psychotherapy sessions within a period of treatment: 
 
 
                        L               L               L              L              L                L               L 





                                 L               L               L     
                              S    R         S    R         S    R   
 
 
Intervals between sessions are active, dynamic, periods.  They embody potential for 
transformation, as in carrying out ritual tasks.  Transformation may occur ‘spontaneously’ as 
part of the therapist’s intentionality, or serendipitously. 
 
 
Figure 8.2ii.   
 
Each S-L-R sequence (Figure 8.2ii) represents an individual session, a particular 
separation from the mundane.  Intervals between sessions embody a different kind 
of out-of-session liminality.  Session-interval-session becomes figure and ground 
in dynamic flux, each defining and re-defining the other, like the face-vase-face 
gestalt (Figure 8.1).  Each interval has its own kind of S-L-R.  Interval-session-
interval becomes a different sequence like music with its rhythms and tempo 
(Turner, 1982a).   
 
Therapy has similarity with music.  It can be discordant as much as melodic, with 
therapist as ‘conductor-composer’.  Beethoven composed in his head listening to 
the strings, feeding in the brass, and cumulatively composing.  Mozart also 
composed in his head, but ‘(s)omething about the way in which his central 
nervous system was organised enabled him to experience his music all at once’ 
Individual	  session	   Individual	  session	   	  	  Etc.	  	  
	  Interval	   Interval	   Interval.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Etc.	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(Hall, 1983: 139).  As I deconstruct the rites of passage structure into its 
component parts something of the whole is inevitably lost.  After identifying the 
parts we must return to the whole, to experience phenomenologically and 
viscerally the melody of therapy.   
 
Reflections.   
The analytic invariant of time and place over a long period of months or years, 
can be conceptualised as a sublime, liminal state, as an experience of different 
kinds of time or no time; ‘the anti-temporal character of ritual’ (Turner, 1982a: 
237).    Systemic therapy is likely to be more variable in frequency of sessions 
often planning longer intervals in between.  The patient does not bring material 
immediately back to treatment and this creates a different kind of tension, tempo, 
or tune (Palazzoli et al., 1978).  In effect, psychoanalytic and systemic models 
create different kinds of time during and between sessions.   
 
In many ways psychotherapy through process and structure share much with age-
old healing traditions.  What scholars have to say from their researches into ritual 
opens up ways to understand psychotherapy, the nature of change, and the 
experience of being a patient.  Of particular interest are ideas about the 
mundane/profane and the sublime/sacred; the nature of ordeal, and change or 
transformation.   
 
The sense of uncertainty or imminent chaos as part of a liminal state, the sense of 
time slowing down, experiencing oneself out of time, are brought in sharp focus 
as a result of these studies.  The idea that the liminal is a dynamic phenomenon 
(Kapferer, 2004), occurring in interstructural points (Turner, 1967) provides 
powerful concepts for the psychodynamic or systemic therapist.  In order to cross 
thresholds (Leach, 1976) we need structures and procedures to navigate these 
ambiguous areas.   
 
This research has brought us full circle to Parmenides’ reflections in the Way of 
Truth and Way of Illusion and Plato’s ‘instant’ being out of time.  Now, this 
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‘instant’ can be an extended duration and have different temporality.  It is not 
chronos that we experience or measure, but kairos.  The inward process of what 
happens structurally and externally to the initiate is they become ‘invisible’ in this 
period of pupation, ‘at once no longer classified and not yet classified’ (Turner, 
1967: 96).   
 
We have encountered another kind of timelessness paradox in ritual, with parallels 
to psychotherapy.  Ritual emphasises stability and continuity, loyalty to one’s 
ancestors, while requiring adaption to changing external influences.  There is 
always tension between forces for change and stability, and if in ritual it seems at 
times that the weighting tends to stability over change with ‘traditions eternally 
acted in ritual’ (Torrance, 1994: 65), in therapy the focus must fall more towards 
change and transformation in a context of over-arching stability.  In both instances 
in dynamic tension, time may appear to tremble.   
 
Without ways to describe and take account of time and timelessness we are left 
with an ‘absence’ that prevents us from understanding what happens to patient 
and therapist ‘meeting in the moment’ (Jenkins, 2005).  In developing these ideas 
we have given importance to ‘the interval’ which is not the inert time-space of 
after and before.  It is dynamic, changing, elusive, and powerful, like human 
experience of time itself.   
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Chapter 9.  
 
Ending at the beginning.   
 
‘What might have been and what has been  
Point to one end, which is always present.’   
(T. S. Eliot, 1944/2001: 3)  
 
‘The whole of our thinking about what we are and what other people are 
has got to be restructured.  … The most important task today is, perhaps, 
to learn how to think in a new way.’   
(Bateson, 1970: 437)  
 
 
‘What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his 
previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him.’   
(Kuhn, 1996: 113)  
 
 
Aims.   
I want to return to the question raised in chapter 1.  How do temporal notions in 
philosophy and anthropology contribute to understanding time in psychotherapy 
with specific reference to Freud and Palazzoli’s work?  Mainly, I want to re-visit 
and develop my thoughts in the Reflections of the preceding chapters.   
 
In the last part of this chapter I take an unconventional stance.  I introduce some 
new ideas.  They are about changing relationships and attitudes to time in a 
rapidly changing world, a world where the Touareg call on their mobiles as they 
cross the Sahara by camel; where political and natural disaster go viral on 
YouTube as they occur.  Part of the impact of these changes is mediated by 
cinema, whether the plushest multiplex in London or an open-air screen in Gao in 
the Sahel.  Technological advances since the 1990s have set off a chain of 
exponential change that continues.   
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The process.   
I have contrasted philosophy’s essentially abstract methodology with 
anthropology’s more phenomenological approach to human activity.  ‘Normal 
science … is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows 
what the world is like’ (Kuhn, 1996: 5).  Both disciplines seek to understand the 
world as not yet known and challenge our assumptions about it.  Freud the 
neurologist and psychoanalyst Palazzoli developed theories of the mind that were 
controversial to contemporary Western thinking and ‘what the world is like’.   
 
Time as a bridge.   
Time is my bridge connecting psychotherapy, philosophy, and anthropology.  It 
transcends culture, language, and shapes our experience of both (Hall, 1989; 
Levine, 2006).  The bridge metaphor complements my starting point ‘where three 
roads meet’ (Vickers, 2007).   
 
A bridge (Plate 91.) is a connecting structure that can facilitate communication 
across the in-between space separating two places of which it is neither.  The area 
at either end generally differs in nature, function, even substance, and presents an 
edge or boundary that the bridge structure meets, but is not.  It is ‘liminal’ in-
between these opposite edges.   
 
 
Plate 9.1.  Dialogue on a Bridge, Liviu Mocan, 2008.  (Photo.  Hugh Jenkins)  
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In the sculpture (Plate 9.1) the physical barrier separating the couple disrupts and 
bars dialogue as they sit supported on slender stilts in a liminal space that 
emphasises the nature of in-between.  The contrast in the surfaces of the barrier, 
one smooth and shiny, the other covered with sharp points highlights the different 
realities for the couple in the same temporal moment.  The ‘his’ and ‘her’ story 
are radically different, but not necessarily known to the other. 237   
 
My clinical stories (‘vignettes’) have been bridges linking experience, notions of 
time, psychotherapy, philosophy, and anthropology.  In clinical and ritual 
encounters I described ‘different kinds of time’.  The therapist’s ability to connect 
with the other at multiple levels is important for bridging divergent perspectives. 
238  Patients’ stories become part of my stories as I become part of theirs.  ‘(T)he 
personal (is) a bridge … that connects our realities to inner impressions, others to 
selves’ (Stoller, 2009: 164).  This concerns more than ‘talking about’, for to talk 
about time is to inhabit the mundane.  Ritual transcends social time and bridges 
these worlds.  Psychotherapy as ‘ritual’, and rituals in treatment, create bridges 
between the ‘material’ and the ‘spiritual’. 239   
 
Case vignette: Judith and Chris - bypassing worlds.   
A great deal written is on my subject of study so it is inevitable that much had to 
be omitted.  Such omissions are easily identified, such as gendered experiences of 
time that are influenced by culture, ethnicity, and religious belief inter alia.  The 
artist Alla Tkachuk 240 says women experience time mainly as a circular 
phenomenon linked to the menstrual cycle.  By contrast, she says for men time is 
linear as manifested in their approach to people or problem-solving.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 I use this sculpture in couple therapy.  I bring it into my consulting room so it can be 
experienced.  Sometimes the image is emailed and put up in the couple’s home, often the 
bedroom, to help them focus and seek solutions in their intimate relationships.   
238 This is reminds me of C. P. Snow’s Two Cultures (The New Statesman, 6th October 1956).  He 
identified the divide of the ‘two cultures’ of science and humanities as a consequence of the 
English approach to education.  The philosophy of Sussex University in the 1960s was an attempt 
to bridge that divide.   
239 Also the ‘mundane’ and the ‘sacred’.   
240 Personal communication, 17th January 2012.   
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suggests that biological-hormonal-socio-cultural factors impact on experience and 
notions of time.  In order to illustrate an aspect of gendered time I describe briefly 
Judith and Chris’ dissimilar temporal realities.   
 
Judith describes feeling emotionally disconnected from her husband, Chris.  She 
tells how he seems not to share her interests, how he walks away when she wants 
to discuss what is in her heart.  She has a hearing disability so it is easier to watch 
DVDs with sub-titles, which Chris points out spoils his experience.  Hence he will 
not watch sub-titled films with her.  This is symptomatic of their relationship.   
 
It is possible to understand their difficulties in terms of their personal histories, 
emotional absence in their families, especially of fathers and poor attachment 
figures, which leads to a relational dance that avoids intimacy.  However, there is 
a temporal way to ‘reframe’ their disconnection that is ‘to change the conceptual 
and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is 
experienced and to place it in another frame which fits the “facts” … and thereby 
changes its entire meaning’ (Watzlawick et al., 1974: 95).   
 
Chris lives in a world of episodic moments (Barbour, 2000, 2008; Strawson, 
2005; Tulving, 1983, 2005).  He becomes involved in what interests him now, 
excluding other things around him.  Once finished with one, he engages with the 
next.  By contrast, Judith inhabits a diachronic world of continuity and history 
that relates to her present; it is narrative and not episodic time (Strawson, 2005).  
The temporal reframe helped Judith accept that the problems were not her 
creation.   
 
Communication is problematic in these circumstances.  Judith and Chris live in 
discrepant temporal worlds.  Psychodynamically and systemically we have 
different explanations for their difficulty in communicating.  However, time the 
‘silent guest’ suggests another perspective.  I will briefly compare these ideas in 
relation to Freud and Palazzoli.   
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Freud and Palazzoli.   
An important part of psychoanalytic treatment is to make the unconscious 
conscious.  Freud even proposed a time-span encompassing phylogenetic 
memories that ‘behave as though they had just occurred’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 
74).  Treatment addresses unconscious mental processes that are ‘timeless’ 
(Freud, 1920: Vol. XVIII: 28) usually early events that have been repressed.  We 
can understand transference as a phenomenon of the ‘simultaneity of the 
noncontemporaneous’ (Schorske, 1991: 9) to confront the ‘unalterability by time 
of the repressed’ (Freud, 1933: Vol. XXII: 74).  Causality is predominantly 
historical and linear as I discussed in chapter 2.  This has resulted in a model 
requiring longer treatment than Freud necessarily envisaged (Meisel and 
Kendrick, 1986).   
 
If Judith and Chris were taken into analysis they would see separate analysts who 
would preserve the integrity of the analytic boundary.  Early experiences would 
be examined in the temporal transference phenomena as they play these out in 
later and adult relationships (Malan, 1979).  Aetiology and psychical topography 
would be more important in the exclusivity of this liminal space.  The time of 
change for Judith and Chris would probably be different and any temporal 
disjunction would make it more difficult to establish a new kind of relationship.  
Personal individual growth may be privileged over relational systemic 
considerations as part of ‘working through’.   
 
By contrast, Palazzoli opens the private space of psychoanalysis using teams, one-
way mirror, communicating with the family from both sides of the screen, and 
active involvement of family members.  It represents a shift from a Western 
science linear model to a circular systemic-cybernetic stance that changes how we 
understand causality and seems to blur responsibility: ‘No-one can have linear 
control in an interaction which is, by definition, circular’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 
30).  While working in the present with families the Milan team accepted 
Bowen’s thesis (Bowen, 1978) of three-generational aetiology for schizophrenic 
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onset.  This is recognises history re-playing in the present but does not accord the 
same degree of importance in the symbolic relationship with the therapist.   
 
The Milan team reformulated treatment duration.  They defined ‘this method of 
work as long brief therapy.  It is brief considering the time dedicated by the 
therapist to working directly with the family, and long in respect to the time 
needed by the family to organise the transformation’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978: 14). 
Such long-term treatment contrasts with much contemporary psychoanalysis (see 
chapter 2).   
 
If Judith and Chris were seen in Systemic psychotherapy they would be seen 
together, without precluding possible individual sessions.  In exploring their 
recent histories, their ‘projections’ each to the other in marrying and their 
‘invisible contracts’ that ultimately become a ‘pact to disappoint’ (Jenkins, 2006), 
they would confront many unconscious issues played out in their marriage.  Time 
in the many ways I discussed in chapter 2 would be held in mind with the 
different ‘times of the system’ (Bateson, 1955; Palazzoli et al., 1978).  Work on 
repeating ‘logical points’ (Howe, 1981) would become an active element in 
working for change.   
 
By exploring Freud and Palazzoli’s theories anew, we celebrate their unexpected 
complementarity.  As I have discussed (chapter 2) Freud’s concept of 
‘compulsion to repeat’ can be reframed in Bateson’s terms of temporal repetition 
and memory circuits in a sequence where ‘behaviour … is thus in some degree 
determined, not only by its immediate past, but by what it did at a time which 
precedes the present by the interval necessary for the message to complete the 
circuit’ (Bateson, 1955: 287).  This is another type of ‘memory’.  By being 
mindful of these models we achieve a depth of vision that neither temporal 
perspective provides singly.   
 
One of the complementary perspectives often cited concerns a linear epistemology 
for psychoanalysis and systemic ‘causality’ as circular.  While true to an extent, 
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the timespan involved may affect description.  A large number of straight lines 
ultimately creates a circle (Keeney, 1983).  Freudian psychology relates causality 
to early experiences, yet a phylogenetic perspective must incorporate flows and 
eddies, pattern repetition and linearity (Eliade, 2005) just as the psychodynamic 
literature records the replaying of old scripts in marital problems (Dicks, 1967).   
 
Philosophy and anthropology.   
Differences between philosophy and anthropology soon became apparent. 
Philosophy tends to rely on rational abstract thought.  Philosophers talk about 
‘normal’ experiences of time.  This resulted in some of the difficulties in relating 
philosophical time constructs to clinical experience (discussed in chapters 3 and 
4).   
 
The Greeks were preoccupied with time and cosmology (Sorabji, 1983) while the 
Enlightenment emphasised reason and the rational mind (Hampshire, 1956).  
Phenomenologists and existentialists focused on a more embodied experience 
(Kaufmann, 1956).  This is evidenced in Heidegger’s project, which began with 
the (thingly-ness of the) thing. 241  He (Heidegger, 1962) looked to the future and 
unlike Freud was not preoccupied with the past (Ellis, 2008).  Ricoeur (2000) 
draws different themes together through narrative, time, memory, forgetting, and 
history.   
 
Anthropology engages with the unexpected and the seemingly messy, with human 
‘existential’ questions about the nature of being. 242  It moves us to the embodied 
physical sensual being who moves in multiple social contexts.  In this respect, 
anthropologist and psychotherapist share common ground.  ‘Like an 
anthropologist, the family therapist joins the culture with which he is dealing.  In 
the same oscillating rhythm, he engages and then disengages.  He experiences the 
pressures of the family system’ (Minuchin, 1974: 124).  The ‘intimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Heidegger’s description of van Gogh’s clogs gives a visceral story of their construction, their 
structure, their usage, and their history as embodied memory / time (see chapter 4).   
242 This can be as much a marginalised inner city community as a remote Amazonian tribal group.   
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experiential’ involvement that Minuchin describes differs from philosophy.  
Anthropology, especially when it turns to healing and ritual, explores a world 
beyond the rational.   
 
Contributions of philosophy and anthropology to the study.   
Parmenides (Geldard, 2007) and Aristotle (1999) argued that time does not exist 
while Plato’s (1997) Parmenides and Timaeus include attempts to describe time.  
Augustine proposes past and future as dimensions of the present. 243   
 
Parmenides reminds us of reality behind the phenomenological world of 
experience.  His emphasis on self-reflecting requires an awareness of a present 
self, the ability to retain a past, and envisage a future.  Similarly, Freud believed 
in the importance of self-reflection and rationality in psychoanalysis.  In the 
clinical vignettes patients who were unable to stand outside their un-reflected 
accounts remained timelessly in their pasts.  This increased the likelihood of 
remaining emotionally at an earlier developmental stage.  Judith’s husband, Chris, 
cried when she returned from ten days visiting her brother in the US, like an 
infant whose mother has returned whom he feared he would never see again.  This 
reaction re-enacted early life experiences fifty years ago re-experienced ‘now’.   
 
The ascription ‘instant’, ‘now’, or ‘present’, continues to intrigue me.  Plato 
introduces ‘the instant’ (Parmenides, Plato, 1997: 388) being not in time.  If the 
therapist’s task is to align the patient’s undifferentiated time perspectives, the 
‘instant’ becomes an ‘a-temporal-temporal space’ for change.  This imperceptible 
‘instant’ of pure potential remains elusive. 244   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 My task has not been to debate the relative merits or demerits of their arguments or provide a 
comparative exegesis of their theories.  See for example Cornford, (1997), Judson (1991), Roark, 
(2011), Sorabji (1983), Tallis (2007), and White (1992).    
244 I believe this ‘instant’ is the ‘out of time’ moment that allowed Jane (chapter 8) to have her coat 
held for her.  A seemingly insignificant instant, she remains puzzled about how it happened and 
the impact that this micro-event continues to exert. Just as Jane had to turn her back physically to 
be helped into her second sleeve, so analogically there was an instant of turning her back and 
dropping her guard about her past, to look towards a different future.  (Personal communication, 
25th February 2013)   
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Aristotle’s view that the present is always passing, the past is no longer, and the 
future is not yet, describes many patients’ difficulty retaining a sense of temporal 
continuity as trauma or dread overwhelm their sense of present-ness.  Patients 
who cannot ‘hold onto reality’ lose their sense of time or ‘being’. 245   
 
Even though Aristotle states time does not exist, he offers a temporal framework 
appropriate for therapy.  The past had potential and has crystallised in one of 
many possible ways.  The future has potential which has yet to crystallise.  The 
therapist can explore Aristotle’s notion of ‘potential’ that has previously 
crystallised with ways that potential in the past could have crystallised.  By asking 
“What would have needed to change then for that potential to have crystallised 
differently and how might now potentially be different?”  Thus the therapist can 
explore future potential as choices not yet crystallised.  In this difference lies ‘the 
information that makes the difference’ (Bateson, 1970) with potential for change.   
 
Augustine (1961: 269) suggests we have only three presents, the present of past, 
present, and future.  This offers a powerful temporal structure for therapy.  If the 
present of past and future things exist only in the present, all is ‘now’.  The 
‘present of past things’ describes well the phenomenon of time confusion of 
‘now’ and ‘then’, whether in personal relationships or in psychotherapy.  A 
category mistake is attempting to change the past.  One’s relationship to a 
particular event in time can change and potentially allow the future to crystallise 
differently to the one feared. 246  
 
Twentieth century phenomenological approaches are more useful for 
psychotherapy than notions of reason and rationality characteristic of the 
Enlightenment period that neglects psychological aspects of experience 
(Hampshire, 1956).  A phenomenological focus ‘solely on what shows up as it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Kelly Holmes spoke of her self-harming at a point in her career when she no longer saw herself 
when she looked in the mirror.  It was as if she had ceased to exist.  Dame Kelly Homes: Sports 
Life Stories.  ITV.  24 April 2013.   
246 Protestant Christians in Romania could not change events, (chapter 5).  Their spiritual time 
context that theologians call ‘sacred time’ (Duncan, 1999: 75) gave a different temporal and 
meaning relationship to oppression that helped sustain them under persecution.   
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presents itself in our experience’ (Dostal, 1993: 141) is relevant.  Therapists begin 
with what and how they observe at the outset of therapy. 247  The experientially 
real of phenomenology offers a bridge between philosophy and psychotherapy 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945).   
 
We can usefully build on Husserl’s ideas about ‘intentionality’ (1991) since 
psychotherapy is intentional.  His conceptualisation of the present introduces a 
contextualised ‘embodied-ness’ or ‘thickness’.  It signals a dynamic tension that 
changes according to circumstance and amplifies understandings of ‘memory’ in 
psychodynamic and systemic psychotherapy.  Excessive retention overwhelms the 
present, obscures protention, and creates an unbalanced temporal thickness.  
However, Husserl’s concept of ‘shading off’ in everyday life contrasts with 
clinical experience of no sense of ‘shading off’.  We see this in Bill’s story.   
 
Case vignette: Bill.   
Bill had a difficult and very enmeshed relationship (Minuchin, 1974) with his 
mother whom he felt never loved him for who he was, and an emotionally arid 
relationship with his father for whom money, and no doubt insecurity, was of 
paramount importance.  One day Bill entered the kitchen to find his wife making a 
birthday cake for their daughter.  The combination of cake-baking for a much 
loved daughter and accompanying smells reminded him so powerfully of his 
mother and his feelings of maternal emotional neglect that he abruptly left the 
kitchen for his bedroom and hid under his duvet for the whole afternoon. 248  Bill 
experienced no sense of ‘shading off’.  The ‘present of past things’ was painfully 
‘now’.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 This recalls the principle skills for training family therapists, and true for all skills training.  
They are, perceptual, conceptual, and executive skills (Cleghorn and Levin, 1973).  That is, what 
we see, how we make sense of what we see, and the interviewing skills, structures, strategies 
employed (executive).  Each depends on how we make sense of what we see.  Each aspect is part 
of a continuous recursive loop.   
248 This recalls the madeleine dipped in a tisane in Prousts’s À la Recherche du Temps Perdu.   
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In the phenomenological mould, Heidegger’s project to grasp the nature of being-
in-the-world (dasein) is part of understanding a temporal ‘self’. 249  He describes a 
‘presentness’ embodying memory and ‘horizonal’ future different to notions 
developed in Freud’s work. Heidegger’s view of time confronts the reality of our 
finite existence of uncertain future in an ever-fleeting horizonal present.   
 
Merleau-Ponty emphasises ‘the field of experience in which I find myself’ 
(Honderich, 2005: 588) future and past being a single movement where being and 
passing are synonymous.  What is now past still is.  ‘(T)he “synthesis’ of time is a 
synthesis of transitions’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2011: 485).  This describes 
psychotherapy that seeks transformative transitions.  Merleau-Ponty’s ideas lead 
to an embodied existential relational temporal model.   
 
Ricoeur describes a dynamic that extends ‘from untold and repressed stories in the 
direction of actual stories’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 74) in a ‘structural reciprocity of 
temporality and narrativity’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 170) which describe important 
elements of psychotherapy.  Because the human psyche and relationships are 
multi-layered it is not a simple linear cause-effect model.  Drawing on Aristotle’s 
(1996) treatise on plot, Ricoeur suggests a temporal structure.  ‘Plot’ implies 
‘whole’, encompassing beginning, middle, end, and therefore time.  ‘By plot I 
mean the intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story’ 
(Ricoeur, 1980: 171).  A patient who tells her story knows the end of the ‘plot’, 
while the therapist pieces together the bits and pieces of the tale to enable a new 
narrative to emerge.  The time of the plot and changed time of the re-told plot 
place time at the centre of therapy.  It brings us again to Palazzoli’s ‘time of the 
system’ (Palazzoli et al., 1978).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 All concepts of the ‘self’, the ‘I’, and a private interior world, are characteristically Western.  
This is pertinent for an activity that is particularly Western in orientation. Where patients do not 
share this, it is essential that psychotherapy involves and incorporates respect for the patient’s 
socio-cultural world, (Ahmed, 1986; Kareem, 2000; Lau, 1988; Messent, 1992; Wieselberg, 1992) 
as in Joy’s story of blackness, gender, and slavery (chapter 6).   
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In exploring ‘memory’ 250 Ricoeur (2000) describes ‘the temporal distance of the 
past’ (ibid: 6) in contrast to the experience of the compressed temporal distance of 
many patients, such as Bill and Chris (this chapter).  It would be a mistake to 
think of memory as fixed.  Husserl suggested that the remembered event is 
different to the event experienced at the time (see chapter 4).  Jay (2013: 15) 
captures memory as dynamic;  
‘Memory creates our identity, but it also exposes the illusion of a coherent 
self: a memory is not a thing but an act that alters and rearranges even as it 
retrieves.  Although some of its operations can be trained to an astonishing 
pitch, most take place autonomously, beyond the reach of conscious 
mind’.   
 
This suggests ‘the presence of the absent’ (Ricoeur, 2000: 23) that touches on the 
boundary between souvenir and rappel. 251  Ricoeur’s understanding of 
differentiated ‘memory’ and the possibility of changing relationships to the past, 
as I have previously discussed, contribute to therapeutic notions of time. 252   
 
Strawson (2005) proposes that our world is episodic or diachronic.  I described 
this to Judith and the effect of her and Chris’ contrasting temporal worlds.  While 
this could not change the situation, it reframed (Watzlawick et al., 1974) their 
different realities and eased Judith’s feelings of responsibility for their situation.  
Temporal ‘reframing’ 253 does not contradict psychodynamic or systemic 
understanding.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 The three kinds of memory are: mémoire, souvenir, and rappel.   
251 I am aware that at no point have I discussed the phenomenon of pre-cognition, and the idea of 
future knowing.  Although this is a relatively common experience, I decided this would distract me 
from my main focus.  It may be that we can know in advance, or that through sub-liminal signals 
we experience sub- or unconscious ‘pre-knowing’ before consciously ‘knowing that we know’ and 
experiencing that we ‘know that we knew’ in advance.   
252 Ricoeur adds to Plato’s instant in Parmenides.  There is the ‘absolute instant’ and in Husserlian 
tradition the thick present or ‘existential now … which is a “making-present”, inseparable from 
awaiting and retaining’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 173).  This ‘thickness’ is a dynamic (making-present) 
temporal space.   
253 Minuchin (1974) and Minuchin and Fishman, (1981) also describe the technique and 
effectiveness of ‘reframing’, literally of giving a new ‘frame’ to the familiar (sequences of) 
behaviour, thus increasing the likelihood of (relational) change.   
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Anthropology and psychotherapy share a great deal.  Both engage with ‘the other’ 
and endeavour to see the other from their perspective; ‘the task of an 
anthropologist causes him to land in strange places.  That is, places that are 
strange to him but, of course, not strange to the people who belong in those 
places’ (Bateson, 1987b: 71).   
 
Anthropological studies always concern time and clearly contribute to notions of 
time in psychotherapy.  Time is intrinsic to every anthropological account, 
embodying the present and transgenerational perspectives.  Stories about 
communities’ origins, survival, or respect for the past have a temporal component. 
254  This is evidenced in Mauss’ discussion of gift and gift exchange (Mauss, 
1990).  In my own work the power of gift exchange is evidenced by the Dialogue 
on a Bridge sculpture (Plate 9.1) that I discussed in relation to time and the 
liminal.   
 
This sculpture was presented to me at the academic rite of passage of a student 
graduation in Romania.  It embodies nuanced relationships and varied meanings.  
Initially, it embodies the long-term friendship between the Mocan and Radu 
families.  This provided the context for the commission. 255  The act of 
presentation celebrated my training and course development roles over the 
previous six years and our envisaged future collaboration; it embodied elements 
of past and future.  It personified ‘memory’ for the giver and recipient, and was a 
public witness for all present that could be recalled at future times.  This gift has a 
life and story that changes over time.  It embodies the linear time trajectory of the 
A series (McTaggart, 1927) for a future that will reflexively refer to a future past 
and foresee further futures; ‘the thing received is not inactive’ (Mauss, 1990: 15).  
There is equally a B series of before and after the gift giving.  An event marks a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Time has been a ‘silent guest’ in many spheres of human activity.  The global warming debate 
is loaded with temporal urgency.  In politics, the future is the ‘pauper’.  ‘Time will become more 
important than space to the politics of 2013. … We know how to examine the politics of “where”.  
But that is not much use when the big issues are when, and over what time frames decisions 
should be taken. … The trouble with the politics of time is that the future has no constituency 
whereas the present has plenty to defend its interests’ (Leadbeater, C., (2013) The art of knowing 
when to go slow.  New Statesman.  8-14 February.  13-14).   
255 Ileana Radu is the driving force behind many of the training initiatives in Timişoara, Romania.   
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temporal point, defines kinds of time for people in a particular place, and links 
them to each other at that specific moment.   
 
The image of Dialogue on a Bridge has been adopted as the symbol for a series of 
‘bridging conferences’ in Timişoara.  This embeds it further in the Romanian 
history of family therapy and gives it a public presence to complement its multiple 
private meanings.   
 
The therapist-patient relationship embodies elements of ‘gift relationship’ 
(Yalom, 2001).  When I bring the sculpture into therapy I make a ‘gift’ of its story 
to my patients and celebrate its creator, Liviu Mocan.  When I give or email a 
photo, I make a ‘gift’ to my patients in their healing journeys.  Through 
professional ‘giving’ the therapist ‘receives’ 256 without which there can be no real 
encounter (Yalom, 1993).  ‘We must speak of us and our problems, because our 
life, our existence, will always be riveted to death, love, loss, freedom to fear, and 
growth to separation.  We are, all of us, in this together’ (Yalom, 1989:14).   
 
The poison oracle (Benge) (Evans-Pritchard, 1976) introduced other ideas about 
time with relevance to psychotherapy.  The Azande believed that by altering plans 
in the present, future doom could be avoided without undermining mystical 
forces. 257  Being attuned to the future in the present has begun to play a more 
significant role in Western therapy.  The therapist may ask the patient to imagine 
achieving a desired change by a specific future time, and to consider the steps 
necessary to achieve that (de Shazer, 1982, 1985, 1991: Penn, 1985) or by 
temporal circular questions (Tomm, 1987a, b, 1988).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Some of these issues are explored in Jenkins, 2005.   
257 ‘(T)he present and the future overlap in some way so that the present partakes of the future as it 
were. … (F)uture health and happiness depend on future conditions that are already in existence 
and can be exposed by the oracles and altered’(Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 162).  Jane’s nightmares 
(chapter 8) existed for her in the present in her (impending) future and every further future before 
her, based on fifty years’ experience (her past).  By entering into her future in her ritual and 
replaying / pre-playing her nightmares she brought them actively into her dynamic present.  Once 
present at her command they lost their potency.   
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Cross-cultural comparisons can be made with conceptions of time among the 
Balinese and the Sora world-views (chapter 7).  By naming time sequences 
differentially Balinese calendars complement each other. 258  In similar vein, 
temporal sequencing according to the psychotherapeutic model brings forth 
different temporal rhythms.   
 
In exploring the Balinese calendar, I found the concept of returning to ‘the same 
logical point’ (Howe, 1981) helpful in my practice.  For example, the man who 
has married and divorced three times and whose current relationship is in 
difficulty might be ‘returning to the same logical point’ when understood 
temporally. 259  Previous marriages become ‘the same marriage’ ending at ‘the 
same logical point’ related perhaps to difficulties with intimacy, trust, or 
abandonment, possibly relating to earlier such experiences.  When the difficulty is 
re-framed (Minuchin, 1974: Watzlawick et al., 1974) as ‘returning to the same 
logical point’ the patient is encouraged to identify the pattern and examine how it 
illustrates another failed attempt.  Judith (this chapter) realised through therapy 
that she was replicating her mother’s marital script and hence returning to the 
‘same marital logical point’.   
 
Sora attitudes to an active post mortem relationship have influenced my clinical 
practice of continuing evolving dialogues with the dead.   The ‘healing of the 
mourner, whatever this is, lies in the Memory’s changes of form but not in the 
Memory’s annihilation’ (Vitbesky, 1993: 237).  By reversing the focus from the 
past to a present-past-future in active dialogue with the deceased, the patient is 
helped to have a memory of the real person.  Dialogue contextualises, making 
memory dynamic.  By being true to life it becomes possible to be true to death.  
The therapist helps the patient mourn and live with a real relationship.  ‘Once one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Calendars measure predictive time.  Measuring time has often been a matter of life and death 
(Duncan, 1999, Levine, 2006).   
259 The actress, Elizabeth Taylor married eight times, twice to Richard Burton.  In spite, no doubt, 
of different circumstances surrounding her divorces, I wonder to what extent they all faltered 
around the same or similar issues as her ‘same logical point’.  For example, to do with trusting the 
other, emotional intimacy, disappointment at not finding the perfect or the impossible in love, all 
in her ‘pact to disappoint’ (Jenkins, 2006).   
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party to a relationship dies, certain inhibitions are lifted and the unspeakable can 
be spoken’ (ibid: 17).   
 
Ritual.   
Research on ritual has proved invaluable.  Many clinicians describe the use of 
ritual in practice (see, Friedman, 1989; Imber-Black, 1989, Imber-Black, and 
Roberts, 1992; Palazzoli et al., 1977, 1980; Wolin and Bennett, 1984; Woodcock, 
1995) but little use is made of anthropological research to create a deep 
understanding of ritual in treatment.  A temporally oriented description of the 
Catholic Mass adds an important dimension.   
 
Ritual in Catholicism is an important feature of worship in many cultures.  
Communicants are invited to become one with Jesus by imbibing the bread and 
the wine.  These are transformed into his body and blood where ‘two objects or 
two points in time are united ritually’ (Murphy, 1979: 319).  260  The collapse of 
time in that specific moment and place in the church before the altar, requires that 
the believer does not differentiate the time shift.  A ‘third time reality’ occurs.  
Liturgical time ‘is thus represented as never-changing.  The relationship of what 
occurs in liturgical intervals to that which occurs in mundane periods is the 
relationship of the never-changing to the ever-changing.’ (Rappaport, 1999: 187-
188).  A common denominator of  ritual is an invariant structure entailing process 
and content that is embodied in the priest and congregation, shaman and ‘patient’.  
Ritual demands commitment, involves risk, and contains elements of ordeal.  In 
this there are similarities with psychotherapy (Haley, 1963).   
 
A reason that time in ritual in clinical practice is often overlooked may be that 
transformation occurs ‘in the ignored interval’ (Rappaport, 1999: 217).  When I 
created a moment of distraction so Jane could do the impossible and turn away 
safely (chapter 8) there was an ‘ignored interval’ where she was in-between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 In the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches the bread 
and wine become Jesus’ body and blood.  In the protestant churches, they symbolise his body and 
blood.  The words used in both rites are identical but their meaning is different.   
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conscious awareness of the event in the moment.  Therapists who work with 
ritual, create ritual, or challenge the patient through ritual, in so doing step outside 
their and their patient’s everyday logic and enter the world of playfulness 
(Bateson, 1955; Turner, 1982) even when past or current trauma is truly 
horrifying. 261  The liminal is a disorienting space but the goal is for the initiate to 
be legitimised in his or her (new) role.   
 
Ritual that is part of a community’s calendar can have deep symbolic meaning.  
The Seder service is such an example.   
‘The Seder service is not so much recollection as reactualisation. … 
Judaism was organised around something other than history. Its key word 
was memory. … History is what happened to someone else. Memory is 
what happened to me. Memory is history internalised, the past made 
present to those who relive it’ (Jonathan Sacks. The Times. 1995).   
 
This unchanging memory fixes an event forever and provides continuity over long 
periods.  It is different to the memory ‘that alters and rearranges even as it 
retrieves’ (Jay, 2013: 15).  History becomes memory at Passover and memory is 
the past contemporised.  The Seder service performatively re-tells and re-enacts a 
moment of uncertainty and danger.  It re-affirms God’s enduring faithfulness to 
His people in an unending temporal connection.  The forty years in the wilderness 
becomes an extended liminal phase before the ‘chosen people’ were transformed 
and purified and could return to the Promised Land.   
 
The ritual of the Catholic Mass is a re-enacted transformative memory recalling a 
specific historical event.  Sora mourning involved active Memory (sonum) from 
the present to the future.  Active recall and re-enactment fix times-then in a new 
time-now.  Transformative ritual in initiation enables socially sanctioned change 
and ensures continuity with the ancestors, founding fathers, or particular creation 
story.  In ritual and the ritual of therapy patient and therapist engage in a unique 
liminal moment in the healing encounter.  Emphasis on the socio-cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 In Jane’s situation when her life was threatened regularly throughout the long period of therapy 
being ‘playful’ could not have had a more serious intention.   
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importance of memory, different meanings of memory, and the continuity of time, 
provide simple templates for therapy.   
 
Actively incorporating ritual and time into psychotherapy encouraged me to 
develop new methods in my practice.  Therapy becomes a ‘liminal’ period 
between ‘separation’ and ‘re-incorporation’.  This further entails working with the 
isomorphism of separation and reincorporation of each session.  This focused my 
attention on the importance of between-session time.  As the patient separates 
from the session, the in-between interval becomes ‘liminal’ which later has to be 
‘left’ to re-incorporate into the next session. 262  The interval is not time out of 
therapy but is dynamic and has temporal reality. 263   
 
In summary, it emerges that there are parallels between ritual and psychotherapy.  
Both involve risk and ordeal may arise in the, often paradoxical, nature of healing 
(Haley, 1963).  Familiar premises are challenged in this ‘liminal’ space (Jenkins, 
1980, 2005).  Memories of the past, explanations of the present, and expectations 
for the future, are questioned.  The emotional connection of ‘meeting in the 
moment’ (Jenkins, 2005; Stern, 2004: Yalom, 1989, 2001) is essential in 
confronting uncertainty.  Change requires survivable uncertainty and sufficient 
temporal/spatial boundaries.   
 
Critical appraisal of philosophy and anthropology for the study.   
The challenge of engaging with different disciplines has been its own reward by 
encouraging me to think more critically about both sides of any argument.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Jane spoke clearly about how intervals and their timing between sessions impacted on her.  
Intervals were not passive moments in between (see chapter 8).   
263 Liviu and Rodica Mocan (chapter 5) described their experience of transition from a command 
centralised political system to an emerging democracy in a period of social and political 
discontinuity.  These were ‘interstructural’ situations (Turner, 1967: 93) ‘in many respects 
“homologous” to the liminal periods … when major groups or social categories in those societies 
are passing from one cultural state to another’ (Turner, 1995: 112).  In a state of transformation, 
the ‘structural “invisibility” of liminal personae has a twofold character.  They are at once no 
longer classified and not yet classified’ (Turner, 1967: 96).  Rodica reflected many of those 
uncertain elements in her descriptions of the changing roles of women in post-communist 
Romania.   
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whole study has provided me with a more complex understanding of the field.  
The major difficulty confronting a therapist is that much philosophical thinking 
relies heavily on rationality and logic and not on visceral experience, i.e., of 
patients.  This view applies less to the existentialist emphasis on the nature of 
‘being’.   
 
Marinoff attempts to bridge the Plato-Prozac gap but does not fully resolve the 
problem for me (chapter 4).  He argues that McTaggart’s (1927) B series offers 
existential comfort.  ‘Even when your life ends, it can never “unhappen”.  All 
events … are somehow preserved in the B-series of time’ (Marinoff, 2000: 247-
8).  McTaggart’s A series is in constant flux as ‘time dissolves into an ever 
moving present moment’ (Marinoff, 2000: 247) while the static B series remains 
in the same relation to events.  McTaggart’s A and B series are interesting 
nonetheless as they draw attention to complementary temporal formulations of a 
static time relationship and a fluid changing temporal horizon.   
 
Some systemic therapists have followed the philosophical route.  Steve de Shazer 
began with simple ideas about brief therapy (1982, 1985).  He then tried, 
unsuccessfully in my view, to legitimise them with increasingly abstract 
philosophical ideas (1991, 1994). The existential models of Viktor Frankl (1985, 
2000, 2004) and Irvin Yalom (1989, 2001) have a more grounded feel.   
 
The dominant philosophical position propounds that humans cannot experience 
different times simultaneously.  Clinical examples challenge this view.  It became 
clear that it would be a mistake to seek a coherent understanding of time in 
psychotherapy from any single philosopher or school of philosophy.  This is 
partly because notions of time often appear within a broader body of 
philosophical thought by all those I have considered, and partly because I did not 
set out to establish a single philosophical perspective on time for psychotherapy.   
 
In relation to my study, understanding phenomena as overlapping realities is 
difficult when boundaries dissolve in a kaleidoscope of changing foreground / 
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background experience.  Magritte captures this (Plate 9.2).  Unity comes from 
disunity of expectation about what is before and after, nearer or farther away with 
the apparently mundane image of a rider on a horse.  This complexity increases 
when we incorporate other disciplines.  It requires suspending known realities to 
enter others’ worlds and preconceptions of what to expect.  Having lived and 
worked in different cultures it seems normal to accept and celebrate difference 
(Hall, 1989). 264   
 
Plate 9.2.  René Magritte, Carte Blanche.  Paul Mellon Collection.  Washington 
DC.   
 
It is easier to relate the contributions of anthropology to time for psychotherapy 
than philosophy.  Nonetheless, it is easy to miss commonality of experience due 
to different cultures or belief systems (Fadiman, 1998).   
‘Could not the therapist who gives psychotherapy to a severely 
deteriorated schizophrenic patient by trying to establish contact with the 
remaining healthy parts of the personality and to reconstruct the ego be 
considered the modern successor of those shamans who set out to follow 
the tracks of a lost soul, trace it into the world of spirits, and fight against 
the malignant demons detaining it, and bring it back to the world of the 
living?’ (Ellenberger, 1970: 9).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 My personal mantra on my visits to Singapore, (a country in transition and transformation, 
caught between powerful cultural currents east and west) was whenever uncertain about how to 
respond to a situation to ask: “Is this culturally appropriate?”  It showed respect for the other, 
protected me from the hubris of ‘the expert’, and introduced humour in delicate social and 
professional situations.   
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All stories in anthropological studies are temporal.  To say of others “They are not 
like us” must be followed by “How can we learn and enrich the patient through 
this experience?”  Jane’s accounts of her childhood and adult life described a 
‘world’ beyond the pale of civilization (chapters 4 and 8).  Seeing her as a 
survivor and accompanying her on a ‘journey’ with no guaranteed outcome was 
like an anthropologist entering an alien world.   
 
Concluding comments on Freud, Palazzoli, and time.   
A temporal viewpoint changes our understanding of Freud.  He was certainly 
interested in the nature of time; ‘There is nothing in the id that that corresponds to 
the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time’ (Freud, 1933:  
Vol. XXII: 74).  The Unconscious, for which he constructed a complex and 
changing architecture 265 is central. This reflects the least directly accessible 
aspect of our minds and suggests that in a conscious world where we track time, 
there exists a profound part that is ‘timeless’ or ‘a-temporal’.  This touches the 
atheist or God-believing existential position that while we struggle to give 
meaning to our lives, to gain temporal control of our destiny, it is the timeless 
core that confronts our finite nature (Sartre, 1945).   
 
Let me describe a moment in the everyday of a simple, mundane experience.  Just 
before reconsidering the previous paragraph I was waiting to be served coffee in a 
local coffee shop.  The assistant asked me, “Are you busy today?” (she certainly 
was).  It was a simple question.  As I reflected on this it occurred to me that 
‘being busy’ shields us from the timelessness of the id and  facing existential 
despair at our finiteness.  If we are to avoid Sartre’s ‘mauvaise foi’ we must grasp 
both realities of timeless eternity and mortality.  ‘L’homme n’est rien d’autre que 
ce qu’il se fait’ (Sartre, 1945: 30) 266 since life in itself a priori ‘n’a pas de sens’ 
(ibid: 74).  ‘Busyness’ anaesthetises such temporal dilemmas and numbs the 
‘absurd’ of existence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 And therefore the sub- and pre-conscious together with his evolving ideas about the id, ego, and 
super-ego.   
266 ‘Man is nothing other than what he makes of himself’.   
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Palazzoli introduces a temporal framework.  She explicitly used ritual (Palazzoli 
et al., 1977, 1978, 1980), and alternative ways to consider time in healing.  While 
Palazzoli (Palazzoli et al., 1978) does not refer to any anthropological studies 
about ritual, the work of Kapferer (1986, 2004) Turner (1967, 1969) and 
Schechner (1990, 2003) increases our understanding of the performative and 
temporal aspects of the Milan Systemic model.   
 
Contributions from anthropology are present from the start (Bateson, 1973) such 
as the idea of ‘the time of the system’ returning (at a different temporal point) 
(Bateson, cf., The Cybernetics of Self, 1971) observed in his concept of mind.   
‘The elementary cybernetic system with its messages in circuit is, in fact, 
the simplest unit of mind; and the transform of a difference travelling in a 
circuit is the elementary idea. … The unit which shows characteristics of 
trial and error will be legitimately called a mental system’ (Bateson, 1970: 
433-4).   
 
When that system becomes my wider ecology and affects my interaction with an 
environment that reflexively influences my responses, my skin is no longer the 
beginning-and-end-of-‘me’.  Bateson concludes, ‘The individual nexus of 
pathways which I call ‘me’ is no longer so precious because that nexus is only 
part of a larger mind’ (ibid: 440).  A person’s ideas are immanent in ‘the other’ 
and become timeless.  Palazzoli’s work with wider systems, and organizations 
(Palazzoli et al., 1986) was a logical progression from Bateson’s later ideas about 
our wider ecology and planetary survival.   
 
Palazzoli was intensely pragmatic as demonstrated in her later work (Palazzoli et 
al., 1989).  In this respect phenomenological approaches to time in philosophy, 
with special reference to Husserl (1991) and Merleau-Ponty (2011) provide a 
context for understanding a present imbued with temporal depth and substance 
that affects patients in their quest no longer to be defined by their pasts.   
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Twentieth and twenty-first centuries: reflections on our changing times.   
The impact of repeatedly asking “What is time?” and realising how little we grasp 
its quicksilver qualities leaves me as curious as ever.  The changing impact of 
time in contemporary life is a new area I want to consider briefly.  Developments 
in technology are occurring at an exponential rate.  Change is and has been so 
rapid that at the end of my research I can only flag certain issues related to time 
that are changing our living patterns.   
 
‘Time and space – time to be alone, space to move about – these may well 
become the great scarcities of tomorrow’ (Burnside, 2013: 23) as we experience 
difficulty coping with ‘the overabundance of events in the present’ (Augé, 1995: 
34).  The malaise imputed in the aphorism ‘cash rich, time poor’ pinpoints a 
contemporary Western conundrum.  Time is crowded out by living and the way 
we live leaves little time for life.  The developing technologies create expectations 
to achieve more and more in less time.   
 
The Tree of Life (Plate 9.3) is an eternal image that contrasts acutely with our 
‘time poor’ life styles.  It encompasses a threefold perspective and draws on 
imagery going back millennia, crossing all cultures and religions.  It is an image 
that reflects our holistic yearnings for completeness ‘of the threefold structure of 
the cosmos, often expressed in the image of a tree.  The Tree of Life … penetrates 
the three zones of heaven, earth, and underworld, its branches penetrating the 
celestial world and its roots descending into the abyss’ (Cook, 1972: 8).   
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Plate 9.3.  Petru Leahu.  Tree of Life (Gospel Book) (Photo: Hugh Jenkins)  
 
The Tree of Life unites underworld, earth, and heaven in one, the id, ego, and 
super-ego. 267  Roots reach deep exploring a world that reaches our elemental 
being.  Branches spread in every direction from a central supporting trunk. 268  
The celestial realm beyond the tree is ‘timeless’ space.  In an age attuned to urban 
living there is hardly time for awareness of space or time; this possibility is even 
actively avoided.  ‘Time and space have become luxuries or, for the many who 
have become unaccustomed to them, new and surprising burdens’ (Burnside, 
2013: 23).  This leaves us at risk of losing any sense of ‘I-Thou relation’ (Buber, 
1955, 1966) with fellow humans or our ecology.   
 
How does this affect psychotherapy?  It raises issues about time, timing, rhythm 
in treatment, and patients’ changing expectations for immediate attention and 
quick results.  Long-term therapy is not necessarily more effective although 
different kinds of problem need different levels of intensity and duration.  
Nonetheless, therapeutic models should not determine treatment duration.  Work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Dante’s Divine Comedy describes a unity of three, paradise, purgatory, and inferno (Dante, 
1964a, b/1965).  In Christianity the triune God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.  We describe our 
world in 3-D, or by adding time, in 4-D.   
268 The eucalyptus tree sheds its bark regularly and is a representation of eternal life and 
regeneration.   
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with children and young people is affected to a degree by the pace of 
physiological, emotional, and cognitive changes.   
 
 A consequence of ‘the overabundance of events in the present’ is to invoke 
technology to cram more activities into less time.  The internet on the move and 
smart phone technology as commuters on the 6.36 a.m. deal with their emails 
before they arrive at work (they are already ‘in work’, never ‘leave work’) allow 
everyone to be connected to everyone – globally, instantaneously. 269  The internet 
enables multiple identities – several mobile numbers, more than one internet 
address.  People who complain of being disturbed in the night by their mobile 
phones become anxious to use the on/off button for fear of losing an important 
contact.  The apogee / nadir, depending on one’s viewpoint, is Facebook, Twitter, 
MSN, blogs, LinkedIn, texting, all accessible on the go via laptop, tablet, or smart 
phone.  Self-worth is measured by how many ‘friends’ one has on social 
networking sites, living with the constant fear of being ‘unfriended’ by people one 
has never and will most probably never meet.  Even food is ‘to go’; there is no 
time for being or ‘to be’.   
 
This has practical consequences of immediate access in therapy with iPhone, 
Face-time, texts, emails, and Skype. 270  These resources promise an ever-
expanding world of possibility, or so it would seem.  What if behind this global 
immediacy the world of experience and real interpersonal encounter is shrinking?  
I will take Skype as an example.  We no longer have to leave our homes; we can 
meet instantly and have immediate control over the environment.  The patient can 
terminate the encounter if s/he feels upset.  How do I as therapist reach out to 
someone in distress a hundred miles away?  The encounter is at the mercy of an 
unpredictable line drop-off.  There is the problem of time boundaries and demand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 The ‘Blackberry’ is no longer a sweet autumnal hedgerow berry, but an unforgiving tyrant that 
takes the office on holiday and has alienated many a family that has felt itself marginalised by its 
insistent demands.   
270 There are examples of telephone contact services that can be life-saving.  In the UK, 
Samaritans and Child Line are two highly professional services.  The caller will never meet their 
‘counselor’, but without them living might not be possible.  A disadvantage of GPS technology is 
that people regularly using Sat Navs have no idea of where they are.   
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for instant gratification of reply via internet.  The expectation to be an all-
providing good figure is easily transformed into the rejecting parent if a reply is 
not immediately forthcoming.  The therapist quickly becomes overloaded with 
data between sessions when every thought or emotion can be expressed instantly 
via email.  There need be no sense of in-between-ness, no liminal tension because 
at any moment the patient can ‘communicate’.   
 
Well managed, these new resources potentially enhance therapy, deepen a 
relationship that has begun, hold the patient in crisis, enabling him or her to take 
responsibility for contact.  Active permission to call between sessions should the 
situation become intolerable, when based on a sound therapeutic relationship, 
becomes part of the holding, often reducing the need for instant contact. 271   
 
I will return to the timeless image of the Tree of Life (Plate 9.4) and its place in 
such a changing world.  This is the African baobab whose roots are said to be as 
deep as its branches are high. 272   
 
 
Plate 9.4.  African Baobab tree, known as The Tree of Life.  Photo Hugh Jenkins 
(1970).   
 
The baobab in African mythology represents stability, rootedness, and balance 
between different spheres of being.  In Western terms we think of psychological, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Jane describes importance of this (chapter 8).   
272 The African baobab is reputed to live for thousands of years, in one instance 6,000 years, 
although since they do not create rings, they are much harder to date.   
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socio-economic, and cosmological spheres where balance must continually be 
sought anew.  The African baobab, of all trees, is rooted deeply in the earth; it is 
profoundly stable, safe from toppling.  Such images are important waymarks in a 
postmodern world of relative and changing values.   
 
As a metaphor for time, structure, and continuity, tree images are powerful.  Frida 
Kahlo’s Family Tree (chapter 7, Plate 7.4) provides a dramatic symbolic image.  
Family genograms (chapters 1 and 5) recall anthropological kinship charts 
(chapter 7).  All tell stories over time.  They are temporal records of a specific 
moment of past-present timelines (Suddaby and Landau, 1998), like inverted trees 
as the older generations or ‘roots’ are above and the most recent ones below.  In 
these images multiple realities of the ‘branches’ spread out from a central trunk 
between life and death.   
 
Film and cinema.   
In chapter 5 I reflected on different timeframes for the Mocan family filmed 
interview.  There was the time of the interview, the times of viewing and re-
viewing the film, the time of transcribing the dialogue, and later commenting on 
the material.  This related to time categories for the family’s experiences in a 
series of ‘nows’ then, and ‘different kinds of nows’ then.  Thinking about this 
process I reflected on the power of film and cinema in daily life.  Film arguably 
has had, and continues to exert a profound influence on how we view ourselves or 
others in many contexts.  It reflects and shapes the world in equal measure; at 
time it challenges our sense of the real.  Deleuze explores film in terms of ‘the 
movement-image’ (1986: 23) and ‘time-image’ (1989: 40).   
 
In film we are presented with images of movement and time.  What is actual and 
defines a virtual that can become actual; the actual map then defines a new virtual 
setting.   
‘When the virtual image becomes actual, it is then visible and limpid, as in 
the mirror or the solidity of the finished crystal.  But the actual image 
becomes virtual in its turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and 
shadowy’ (Deleuze, 1989: 68).   
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Colebrook (2002: 33) says that we should ‘(t)hink of time as the power of 
difference or becoming whereby we move from the virtual to the actual, from all 
the possible creations and tendencies to actualised events’.  That is we have ‘the 
past or impersonal memory which is virtual and the actual lines of lived time’ 
(ibid: 33) recalling Aristotle’s crystallised potential (actual) past and a future 
potential (virtual) yet to crystallise.   
 
And what of time?  From an Augustinian point of view all time is now, past, 
present and future; the image can only be in the present.  In film, what has taken 
place, what takes place, and what will take place are all the same, past-present-
future are a created illusion.  There is a succession of events in the cinema yet 
they exist simultaneously.  It is only in the now in the viewing room that we have 
the illusion of sequence or succession in ‘a direct time-image … the simultaneity 
of peaks of present’ (Deleuze, 1989: 98).  Cinema is not derivative but ‘offers an 
image of time itself … where time is what connects one movement to another’ 
(Colebrook, 2002: 30).  From a number of images which form a sequence when 
joined together ‘it cuts and connects … using the inhuman eye of the camera’ 
(ibid: 31) to create a number of competing viewpoints or angles.  The order in 
which scenes are shot, how they are cut, the juxtaposition of people and places, 
are different to real time sequence when filming.  This results in a portrayal of 
time (and place, movement) that draws the viewer in but does not reflect the 
chronological order of filming.   
 
For example, each episode of the Danish TV series The Killing presents a specific 
sequence where each key event is titled as a specific time; day, month, hour and 
minute. 273  At the start of each episode there is a résumé of events so far which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 The Killing (2007) (Forbrydelsen) Søren Sveistrup.  Danish Broadcasting Corporation.  Time 
or its seeming absence always structures film narrative.  Memento is a powerful example of this.   
Memento (2000) Christopher Nolan.  ‘Memento is presented as two different sequences of scenes: 
a series in black-and-white that is shown chronologically, and a series of color sequences shown in 
reverse order.  The two sequences "meet" at the end of the film, producing one common story’ 
(Wikipedia, 2013).  Time past-to-future and future-to-past interweave throughout and the viewer’s 
chronological reference points are constantly disrupted.   
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reminds us of ‘the inhuman eye of the camera’ since sound and visual sequences 
are disrupted and re-ordered, and subsequent résumés are further disrupted, yet 
tell the same narrative.   
 
As we think of film and time we consider movement, which would seem to be in 
and through time.  Colebrook suggests that movement does not happen within 
time because time is not an entity.   
‘Rather, time as the force of movement, is always open and becoming in 
different ways.  Movement does not just shift a body from one point to 
another (translation); in each block of movement bodies transform and 
become (variation).  So each movement transforms the whole of time by 
producing new becomings’ (Colebrook, 2002: 44).   
 
In this brief foray into film, I wanted to consider time differently to what we have 
considered so far.  Cinema has changed our worldview over the last hundred 
years.  It disrupts our certainties of time and place, forces us to view from many 
other angles through a different eye - the camera eye.  It challenges the certainty 
of memory (Jay, 2013) as in L’Année Dernière à Marienbad 274 and our sense of 
reality.  Were they there, did they meet, and what becomes of time?  In cinema we 
are presented with ‘sounds that do not coincide with visual images’ (Colebrook, 
2002: 33) and time-images that do not coincide with a progressive chronology or 
images that are time itself beyond our experience.   
 
In an increasingly frenetic world our time sequences become disrupted.  We see 
from other angles that we are not our own, the actual and virtual are blurred, and 
‘things fall apart; the centre cannot hold’ (Yeats, 1994: 158).  The promise of The 
Tree of Life comes to mind.  If the person is centred like a trunk he or she has 
then the capacity simultaneously to perceive and enter multiple temporal and 
spatial realities, and retain equilibrium in a rapidly changing world.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Directed by Alain Resnais (1960).   
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Conclusion.   
Philosophy and anthropology have enhanced my thinking about notions of time in 
psychotherapy in surprising ways.  I realised as I continued that this inquiry could 
not stay ‘out there’.  It became increasingly personal.  As I added my clinical 
experience my own story started to show through, as often happens in therapy.  
As Yalom (1989:14) suggests, ‘we are all in this together’.  It had to include me if 
the plot was to be more than a dry exercise without heart or soul.   
 
With time a pivotal factor in psychotherapy the process and moment of healing 
assume unexpected qualities.  The Platonic ‘instant’ provided insights into what 
appears to be beyond or out of time to enable change.  Different ways of being in 
a present that co-exists with the past and future have sensitised my thinking and 
practice.  When memory becomes mémoire, souvenir or rappel, this affects the 
nature of time past, irrespective of my conscious awareness; the present acquires 
more or less retentive or protentive thickness.  Awareness of ‘the liminal’ in ritual 
has enabled me to give deeper meaning to the patient’s experience.  Whether we 
return at short or long intervals to ‘the same logical point’ or expand our horizons 
to allow a dialogue with the dead, we engage in changed temporal encounters.  
Whether we fear the future and confront it in the present through ritual; or 
whether we travel with our ‘heart-mind’ to instigate change, we alter the temporal 
world which in turn changes us.  Whether we struggle with our patients’ ‘demons’ 
in the ‘time travel’ of transference where time and place are transposed in a time 
that is never fully grasped, my notions of time and the Unconscious have 
expanded and changed.  Time may previously have been a silent, even invisible 
guest.  Through conscious awareness we intuit time, through cognition we 
describe time, through our hearts we experience time.  In none of these can we 
grasp time. The Latin dictum claims; tempus fugit!   
 
I began this thesis by quoting the anthropologist Paul Stoller.  He worked in Niger 
while I worked in Gao, Mali, and he spoke Songhai better than I ever did.  His 
writing reflects the power of the desert world, a vast liminal space where my heart 
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remained.  ‘ “But to tell my story … you have to tell your story as well.  It takes 
two hands, … using a well-known Songhay proverb, to secure a friendship” “Or 
to tell a story” ’ (Stoller, 2009: 161) and time, I would add, is their silent guest.   
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Appendix 1.   
 
Examples from analysis of material.   
Transcript 1.   
Rodica  “May I say something, what David should 
have said to introduce his dad?  When 
David was two, my husband had an 
exhibition at the art museum.”   
 
Past: a particular instant  
David (Inaudible – Liviu laughs)  
Rodica “… and while he was in the exhibition I 
had a walk with him in the park.  And we 
have that huge, umm, monument of 
Matthew Corvin, the king.  And it’s a very 
big bronze statue that has figures standing 
on the sides.  And he wanted me to take 
him up to one of the sculptures, and he 
was the size of the boot of one of the 
characters.  And he put his arms around 
the boot, and he said: “This is what my 
daddy made”.  And for me that was the 
first time I realised he knows what his 
father’s job is, to make this kind of 
sculptures.  But many years later, about 
five or six years later, my husband had a 
sculpture in that square.  It’s in bronze, 
and every time I pass by I touch it and 
say: “This is what my husband did”.  So 
this is probably the way he should have 
introduced his father.” 
[< 6.02. p. 4]   
Past, a particular time, 
which has a powerful 
meaning.  Time locates 
place and relationships  
Statue represents 











That is, in the immediate 
past – just now.   
 
Transcript 2.   
HJ  “… And I’ve just been thinking about you 
as a family who lived in Romania, have 
crossed from one place to another, which is 
before and after the fall of the Ceausescu 
regime.  And one thing maybe for Paul and 
Emma and David, what do you think the 
coming down of the Ceausescu regime in 
December 1989, what do you think it 
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“I was pretty small.  I was two years old 
when that happened, but I still remember 
the revolution, there were gunshots 
outside.  It was pretty interesting, perhaps 
interesting memories about that time, a 
pretty dark and, errm, I don’t know.  I 
think it’s about freedom.  That from that 
moment on we gain the freedom to speak, 
and to write and to express ourselves and 
of religion, and I think that was the best 
part of it, the freedoms we’ve gained.”   
 
“What do you think it meant for your mum 
and your dad, because it may mean a 
different thing?  What do you think that 
changed for them in the last seventeen 
years?   
 
“I think they had to decide whether to 
change their way of thinking and basically 
start a new life, because their whole life 
style changed at that moment, and so I’m 
glad that my parents were open-minded.  
And I know that a lot of people their age 
are not willing to learn computers and be 
ready to, errm, be open-minded.  So I 
think that’s the best thing about them, that 
they became open-minded, and after that 
we travelled a lot and we had a good 
time.”   
[< 10.17.  p. 7]  
Past: an instant  
Memory  
Context of gunshots  
 
Memories (the past)  
 
Past: that instant - 
meaning 
 
The freedoms – individual 






Time past – duration  
 
Choice and change at a 
particular point in time  
Time – new start.   






Effects of changes – over 




Transcript 4.   
Emma  “I think this ‘open-mindedness’, (makes 
quotation marks in the air with her hands) 
you can read a lot of this after the 
communism, … because I have no idea 
how my parents were before.  I was four 
as well.  I was thinking more of the 
travelling, that my brother was thinking 
about.  So, I know a lot of parents that are 
our parents’ age still have problems with 
adapting themselves and raising their 
children, especially because they still 




Now – after political time, 
communism  
 Past - personal 
 
Personal present, change 
and problems adapting 
(duration)  
Past views in the present, 
recent past (post 1989)  
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your children in their way of thinking.  It 
was great for us that our parents were 
going away all the time, and especially the 
travelling Paul was talking about.  I think 
it had a lot to save my parents’ 
relationship, because I remember when 
my mum was first time in Norway.  I 
remember that now she goes everywhere 
she can.  …  And now, fifteen years later, 
my mum has no problem to go by herself, 
and my dad has no problem letting her go.  
This has brought them closer.”   
[< 12.10.  p. 8]  
 
 
Past – political changes 
affect personal 
relationships 
Personal time past  
 





































“Do you want to answer that? (takes 
microphone) Umm, I was studying Fine 
Arts, from the beginning of my education, 
and I enjoyed that.  I came from a very 
poor family.  My parents were farmers, 
but very intelligent and people that 
believed in God.  They were very open-
minded.  So, they worked a lot as farmers, 
and bought a piece of land, and another 
piece of land for us three children.  I have 
two brothers also.  We are three.  So, 
when my parents had some land, after 
many years of hard work, the communists 
came, and took everything, everything.  
So in that moment they were absolutely 
poor again, as they started.  Then they 
used to tell us that when they started as a 
couple, they had just one spoon, they were 
so poor in those years in Romania.  After 
that, when they got something with a lot 
of effort, and now they were poor again.  
Then God gave them a very good thought, 
they said, very remarkable they said, 
‘From now on we cannot offer our 
children land,’ - that was the biggest value 
in the countryside, when you have land, 
you have a life.  Because they said, ‘we 
cannot offer any more land to our 
children, we’ll move to the city and we 
will give them education’.  So, today, if 
that wouldn’t have happened, you would 
 
Personal history time  
 








Instant - communists 
(political time past)  
In an instant (of time)  
Family history – past 




Faith – an instant in time 
past  
Moment in time - instant  
 
Personal past – at that 
time  
 
Personal future choice  
 
Education  
Effects of history on the 
present  
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have interviewed a peasant now (makes 
hand gestures for hat and dancing 
movements, smiling) dancing here for you 
for something nice, but, …”   























“… It was not simple for the 
communists.  In order to take the land 
from my parents.  My father was a 
fighter, so he kept fighting for that.  The 
animals that they took, the carriage, 
everything that they had.  But my father 
was one of the last ones in the village 
that accepted.  Only when they twisted 
his arm so badly (makes gesture) then he 
said: “OK.  No way”.  But they could do 
that because they had not only an open 
mind, but they had God that they 
believed in, they, they trust in.  So, they 
could fight with people because they had 
a, ..”  
 
“Truly, a belief system, …”    
 
“Yeah, and that became dangerous for 
any centralising political policy.  Right, 
yeah.”   










Open-mindedness.  God, 




Higher authority  
 
Challenge, in political 
past - to authority  
 
















“It’s different for you?  Liviu was saying 
about his family coming from one of three 
boys, a rural family.  Was yours 
different?”   
 
“Yes, very different.  I grew up in the city, 
although my parents also came from poor 
backgrounds, but my mother is a medical 
doctor.  Errm, I got the same idea, but a 
bit different than his parents.  His parents 
did not know anything else, and they said: 
‘We moved to town to give an education’, 
but they didn’t really know how to give an 
education, other than moving to the town.  
So, out of the three brothers, Liviu is the 
 




































only one who went to college eventually.  
Umm, my mother had a different 
approach.  Errm, it was always clear that 
after you finish high school, you go to 
university.  We haven’t talked about 
university.  It was something understood.  
…  At that time when we grew up, we 
lived in a Christian family, and we had 
not much choice in terms of education.  
There was not much to choose, because a 
lot of the jobs were closed, either for what 
it was called ‘unhealthy social origin’, or 
just because you had Christian beliefs you 
could not go in a certain direction.  And I 
had both.  I had an uncle who defected 
and went to the US, and I knew I could 
never be able to study history, law, umm, 
what else was forbidden?  And of course 
police, and because we were in a Christian 
family …” 
 
“Become a professor, ..”  
 
“… and we were practising Christians, we 
were not recommended to go to any 
profession that would make us school 
teachers, because they were getting rid of 
the school teachers that they had.  So it 
wasn’t a screening at the admission 
process, but it was a screening later on for 
jobs.  So I ended up like many of the 
people of my generation, to go to 
polytechnic school.  To my surprise I 
liked it, and I discovered I had some 
technical abilities.  I never practised as an 
engineer for one day in my life, - never.  
Just because after I graduated I had my 
second child, so I stayed home for two 
years.  And after that, the revolution 
came.  And following my husband in the 
States for one year that he did there as a 
student, I had the chance of studying 
something else, and getting into a 
completely new field.  And, er, that job 
took me to a university position now, and 
I discovered that I enjoy learning, - that I 
have to study all the time, as a job, and 
 
 
Family script - present in 




Political past & choice  
 












Personal time, faith  
Discrimination  
 
Political past time  
 
 






Past, personal event time  
 








Personal past, legacy for 
the future  
Mother’s personal and 
political past times  
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that I start to like it.  And it’s probably 
part of the legacy that I had.  And I look at 
my mother sometimes, and I think that she 
could have gone much farther if she had 
lived in the times I lived, because she was 
much more serious and much more 
thorough.  But because of the times that 
were given to her, she ended up as a 
country medical doctor, where she did a 
great job, but she could have done much 
better than that.  And probably I was able 
to take the legacy a bit further.”  
[< 26.17.  p. 17]  
 
Political past times (for 
mother)  
 
Opportunities (less) for 
mother - past  
 
 































“What I am saying is that it’s much more 
difficult now to keep a firm belief, umm, 
to present your value system than it was 
during the communist times.  At that time 
it was dangerous, at that time, if you said it 
in the wrong setting it could have been 
dangerous, you could lose your job, and 
we know people, we have friends who got 
arrested.  So it was pretty extreme.  But 
now, …”  
 
“At least it was clear.”   
 
“It was clear.  White was white, black was 
black.  All people knew that is white, that 
is black.  And now I am saying a lie 
because I have to, and everyone around 
me knows I am saying a lie, for I can say it 
because I know what the truth is.  That 
was pretty much the system we operated at 
that time.  Right now, I find it more 
difficult to talk about my faith than at that 
time.  At least at that time I could say: 
‘Well, I’m brave if I do it!’  Now I’m 
ridiculous if I do it. …  Just one phrase 
before I pass the microphone, (pause).  
I’m at the point of seeing these two, 
somewhat satisfied with the past, at least 
some of our values, the main ones.  I’m 
more worried if they will be able to pass 
Present – personal time 
(in political context), in 








Political past – clarity of 
situation  







Present political time – 
more difficult  
Past – then  
Present – now political & 
personal  
Personal present time  
 
 
Personal future, anxiety  
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them on!”   
 
“I think that mum is pretty much right, 
because in the communist regime 
everybody had something they wanted to 
say, but they never had the courage 
because what it would mean to get 
arrested.  I’m not talking only about 
Christians, but also about non-Christians.  
So, being a Christian and having a faith 
and having the courage to speak up, it was 
a really big thing.  But nowadays you can 
say whatever you want because today 
nobody cares.  So, you’re more like, ‘Why 
should I say because nobody cares?’  And 
that time was like, ‘I’m saying that I’m 
being a brave person, I’m being arrested.  
Everybody knows I risk a lot by saying 
that’.  Today you don’t risk anything.  
They just get to mock you.’   
[< 48.58.  p. 31]  
Personal present  





Past, personal time, in 
relat. to past political 
time   
 
Personal / political 
present  
 
Personal past in political 
past context  
 




























“… I think change is differently for 
everyone, and change from communism to 
this system has been very difficult for 
everyone.  And I’m sure that men have 
their own story and their own viewpoint 
on issues.  But as a woman, I think I am 
part of a generation that is going to 
disappear.  We are a species, and by we, I 
talk, me, Ileana, Ileana, and maybe other 
women here (indicates,) and I don’t know.  
Umm, look at us carefully because we are 
an endangered species!  We inherited 
(Liviu chuckles) a mentality of being 
housewives, errm, submissive wives, do 
all the chores in the house, washing, 
cleaning, shopping, - am I right?  (Looks 
towards Ileana Radu in audience)  umm, 
…”  
 
“Cooking, ..”   
 
“Cooking, washing the dishes after, ..” 
 
Change – personal time 
Political time, past  
 
Gender personal time – 
present  
Future personal time  




Endangered species:  
from the past personal 
time thro’ to future.  
Legacies  
 

















































“Cutting the hair for everybody.” 
 
“I missed that, (she and Liviu laugh).  
Cleaning the house from loft to basement 
every Easter and Christmas.  Then 
cooking at least three to four kinds of 




“No, no”  (Laughter, joking, Rodica, Liviu 
and Paul, physical touching.)   
 
(Laughing, inaudible)  
 
“Ummm, definitely doing preserves in the 
fall; canning for winter.  Everybody 
understands me, and then, after the 
revolution, all of a sudden there was this 
opening for a lot of careers.  And there 
were a lot of things we could do, that we 
could not do before, and very graciously, 
our husbands allowed, and I stress the 
word ALLOWED us to develop a career.  
But we remained also, with all the rest, 
with all the other things.  And I think that 
we are a generation that is going to 
disappear, because we juggle, and we still 
try to do all of this.  I don’t know about all 
you women (indicates with her hand), but 
it’s been a few years since I don’t do 
preserves any more.  I don’t do canning 
and I feel very guilty about it.  And 
sometimes the environment makes me feel 
guilty for not doing any of this.  And my 
children sometimes mock me that they 
have to borrow ‘zacusa’ from somebody 
else, because “our mother never does it!”  
Errm, and I was able not to do this 
canning because I was away during the 
summers and I had a lot, and I had an 
excuse.  But, there are other things, and I 
don’t do and feel guilty about them.”   
 
(Laughs)  “I don’t know if I’ll ever be a 
lot of a career woman. …”   
[< 58.15.  p. 37]   
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Transcript 10.   
Emma  “I think that you cannot change the world.  
I personally don’t think I can change the 
world, but at least what you can do is 
change the people that are very close to 
me, and maybe one day, when I’ll have 
my own family I’ll get to share with them 
some of the values that my parents shared 
with me.  So, I’m not hoping for a new 
world, I’m just hoping for having a family 
like mine, if I can say that.”   
[<51.30]   
Present in the context of 
the personal future.   
 

















“I have no idea what the future brings us, 
at least politically speaking, because 
maybe as my parents lived years ago, what 
they will tell their children, I mean twenty 
years ago, maybe my parents thought it 
will still be communism.”   
 
“But you’ll be talking, one way or another, 
about how your parents lived through the 
end of communism and the beginning of a 
different kind of society in Romania.  …  
If you had a child, now you could tell your 
child something of that story.  I wonder 
what that story would be for you?”   
 
“I don’t know.  Probably a thing that I 
would try to pass on, …  I think that’s the 
first thing I’ve learnt from my parents is to 
talk, to communicate.  If you have an 
issue, don’t just go away and lock yourself 
in a room and shut up for the rest of your 
life about it.  Just let it out.  And being 
able to share things with your family, with 
my parents means a lot because I know a 
lot of my friends don’t have this at home.”   
[<53.32]   



















Transcript 12.   
HJ  (To Emma) “But, you see.  I don’t know Recent personal past time 
















































how it felt for your mother when she was 
telling us this, but behind what I was 
hearing, although she talked about 
endangered species, I was also hearing a 
kind of story about survival over, errm, not 
just the communist period, but before that.  
There were generations, often within a 
female culture, how women support each 
other.  And I think women often support 
each other very differently to how men do 
or don’t support each other.  But what I 
was hearing was a kind of thread about 
survival.  It was almost as though passing 
the microphone (makes as if to pass the 
microphone) she’s passing the baton to 
you.  And saying, how are you, as a young 
woman, if you are going towards middle 
age, get older, how are you going to 
survive?  Because it’s going to be different 
from how it was for her, how it was for her 
mother, how it was for her grand mother.  
That is what was coming into my mind 
when I was hearing the story.”   
 
“I don’t think it’s going to be that hard for 
me, because as I look at my grand mothers 
and their way of keeping the house, I think 
that as my generation comes in, ...  I think, 
..”   
………………  
(To Emma) “Maybe, as you see for you or 
your mother, and from her generation 
moving to your generation, if you can 
inherit a different kind of freedom and 
choice without feeling guilty.  Maybe 
that’s a kind of chain you won’t have to 
carry around any more.  And, of course, 
it’s men traditionally who often make 
women feel guilty.  So that is also going to 
change in relationships between men and 
women, husbands and wives.  That’s 
what’s behind a fundamental change in 
society I come from, at least at some level.  
Maybe that’s the same kind of changes 
here too in Romania.”   
[< 1.00.50 p.  39]   
………………………… 
in interview  
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“And I thought that every woman is 
supposed to be a loving, caring wife and 
mother, and it’s maybe why we marry and 
have children, to find our identities.  So, 
like I was telling you, I don’t think I’m 
going to be a very high career woman 
because I think that somewhere we each 
find ourselves in our gender about 
families.  And so, about the guilt you were 
saying, it comes along the way I see 
things.  It’s the same society, there’s 
nothing wrong.”   
 
“Yes, I think … (inaudible) some of what 
you are saying is extremely important, is 
that the thing I’m hearing you say is you 
have a choice.  You could choose if you 
want to be a high career person woman, if 
that’s what you chose, or you could choose 
to be something different, whatever that is, 
career and family, and so on.  But actually, 
you have a choice, and maybe that is the 
really important thing.  And maybe, your 
mother said, I’m sure there were not the 
same choices for your mother, and certain 
ones for her mother, and most certainly not 
for her mother before her.”   
[< 1.03.52 p.  41]   
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Appendix 2.   
 
David’s position in the family interview.   
 
Although David, the youngest family member spoke, looking at the recorded 
material it became clear that on each occasion he was asked a question, one or 
more family members would take over, to ‘interpret’ my comment or question, to 
suggest an answer to him, or to answer for him.  It seemed that all members were 
quite appropriately in this public context, highly protective of him.  Since this was 
not a therapy interview, my task was to elicit, not provoke changes in their 
dynamics.  For this reason I chose not to use the minimal data from him in this 
study, as what he says is very much prompted by one or other family member.   
 
An advantage of the group or family interview format is that different views are 
shared with family members, and members can develop or change their views.  
This also provides important information on family process dynamics.  A 
disadvantage from a research point of view is that a particular member may find it 
more difficult to articulate their individual perspective.  For example, about 
twenty minutes into the interview, I ask David: “David, I wonder what you were 
thinking, hearing about Emma.  You’re the generation of the internet, Google and 
all this kind of thing.  So, it’s a very different world you are living in, even from 
what Emma and Paul grew into.  What do you think about that?”  Emma leans 
forward to talk to David, and simultaneously Rodica asks if she can re-phrase the 
question, which becomes: “How do you feel about your life.  Tell us something 
about your school.  You’re second grade right now.  Would you tell us how old 
you are?”   
 
